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The European Union (EU) is, once again, challenged by several crises. The economic crisis, the 
more recent immigration crisis and the general ‘political crisis’ epitomized by the results of the Brexit 
referendum are challenging the stability, unity and shape of the European integration project.  
In connection to a diffuse ‘democratic malaise’ (Brack 2018), these crises contributed to the 
consolidation and stabilization of a polymorphic opposition flank addressing the shape and the 
competencies of the EU and, depending on its intensity, also rejecting it.  
This mechanism is exemplified by the success of parties critical of the EU in recent rounds of 
national elections around Europe. Some prominent examples of this trend are Hungary, Poland and 
Greece where the FIDESZ, Law and Justice – PIS – and SYRIZA cover major governing positions. 
Spain, where the left-wing PODEMOS won 71 seats in the national parliament after the 2016 Spanish 
elections. France, where the National Front – FN – led by Marine Le Pen challenged Emmanuel 
Macron and his newly created centrist party ‘En Marche’ during the second round of the French 
presidential elections in May 2017 and got 8 seats in the French National Assembly in the June 2017 
legislative elections. Germany, where the right-wing party Alternative for Germany – AFD – managed 
to get representation in the Bundestag after the 2017 national elections becoming the main opposition 
party in Germany (Lees 2018). Austria where the Freedom Party of Austria – FPÖ – is the junior 
coalition party of the Kurz government since December 2017, and Italy, where the re-branded League 
– former Northern League, LN – and the Five Stars Movement – FSM – scored unprecedented 
electoral results at the expenses of their mainstream governing counterparts1 and formed the so-called 
‘yellow-green’ governing alliance.  
This ‘polymorphic opposition’ encompasses political parties that differ in several characteristics 
(e.g.: their origin and role at the national level) and range from the extreme-left to the extreme-right of 
the ideological spectrum. However, they are conceptualized by the literature under a single ‘umbrella 
concept’: Euroscepticism.  
Initially, the literature considered Euroscepticism as a political phenomenon belonging to the 
‘margins’ of the political competition (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008c) at the national level and was thus 
studied within the national arenas as a phenomenon related to the government vs. opposition dynamics 
of political competition at the national level (Taggart 1998; Sitter 2001, 2003). The parties not 
                                                        
1 This is particularly true for both the centre-left Italian Democratic Party (PD) and the centre-right 
Forza Italia (Go Italy) that scored the lowest result in their history.  
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belonging to governing coalitions at the national level take up the EU issue to challenge the mainstream 
governing majority and attract electoral consensus (Taggart 1998; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2017). 
If in the past it was legitimate to consider Euroscepticism as a ‘marginal’ concept, this 
consideration now clashes with more recent developments in Europe: parties critical of the EU are 
gaining ground at the national level (see the electoral results mentioned above) and will probably score 
even better results in the upcoming EP elections in 2019. Consequently, ‘Euroscepticism’ should not 
anymore be relegated to the margins of the national political competition. On the contrary, it should be 
studied at the various levels of the EU multi-level governance (Hooghe and Marks 2001) as suggested 
by Usherwood (2017), or at least at the two major levels of the EU governance: national and 
supranational (Helms 2008).  
In spite of these considerations, instances of ‘Euroscepticism’ in the EP have been widely 
neglected, due to two main reasons. First, the political competition in the EP is hindered by the fact 
that mainstream governing parties operate in the so-called ‘grand coalition’ de facto excluding their 
challengers from the political competition. This is why the EP is widely regarded as a consensual 
institution, a ‘bastion’ of pro-European integration sentiments. Second, the EP has been considered as 
an ‘unrewarding location’ for forces critical of the EU, since its activity is mainly concerned with 
legislation rather than issues of more or less Europe (Benedetto 2008). In fact, apart from some 
eminent exceptions (Katz 2008; Brack 2012, 2018; Brack and Costa 2012; Lynch et al. 2012; Whitaker 
and Lynch 2014), studies concerning Euroscepticism within the supranational EP arena are rare.  
This work aims at partially filling this gap. It starts questioning if the concept of Euroscepticism 
is still adequate to understand the variegated nature of criticism toward the EU that has developed over 
the last decade or so. It then relies on the assumption that the EU is a political system (Kassim 2003; 
Hix 2005; Hix and Høyland 1999, 2011; Kreppel 2012; Mair 2013) where political parties take stances 
on its various components (the authorities, the institutions, the political community and the output of 
the system, the policies, see Easton 1975) and, finally, proposes a reconceptualization of 
Euroscepticism in terms of political opposition. Parties working within the EU system position 
themselves toward the various aspects of the EU system (in terms of either opposition or support) thus 
configuring a broad range of stances toward the system. Using EU-opposition as the central concept 
for research, this work focuses on the supranational level of the EU multi-level governance, specifically 
on the EP, and proposes to answer to this central RQ: Which aspects of the EU do national parties 
oppose from within the arena of the EP?  
To highlight the relevance of this question, it is useful to trace back the origin of the European 




democratic parliamentary institutions and the codification of fundamental rights (Rittberger and 
Schimmelfennig 2006)2 – and how such process interacts with the crises affecting Europe.  
The process of constitutionalisation is widely regarded as an ‘elite-led process’ originating from 
the mainstream governing elite that decided to pool part of the national sovereignty for the 
development of a supranational community (Mair 2007, 2013). This elite-led process gave origin to a 
peculiar polity with a peculiar multi-level system of governance3 (Hooghe and Marks 2001), where 
political actors share decision-making competencies at different and increasingly interconnected levels 
of governance (sub-national, national and supranational) rather than monopolise them at the national 
level. To put it more simply, the EU is ‘a construct, a system designed and built by constitutional 
architects’ (Mair 2013, 216) who were government and parties’ leaders at both the national (national 
governments) and the supranational levels (Council of Ministers and European Commission – EC) and 
built the EU without any substantial room for either politics or parties. 
This ‘consensual’ decision-making style of the European integration process was, initially, ‘largely 
unexplained and certainly under-advocated to the average citizens’ (Bellamy and Warleight 2001:9) and 
the EU issue was almost absent from the national political competition. Europe was framed positively 
– as a common good – by those mainstream parties inhabiting the decision-making arenas at the 
national and, consequently, at the supranational level. In other words, initially, the European integration 
process could progress smoothly thanks to a diffused ‘permissive consensus’ among the elite and the 
public at large (Mair 2007).  
Signs of contestation of the EU integration process were, however, present since its inception 
and became more apparent in the 90s with the first referendum on the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty (held in France and Denmark where it was repeated twice). In other words, we assist to the 
passage from ‘permissive consensus’ to the ‘constrained dissensus’: thanks to the action of 
‘Eurosceptics’ capitalizing on the EU issue, people become more aware of the European integration 
process and start criticising it. Besides the fact that criticism of the EU developed in correspondence to 
key events shaping the European integration process (e.g.: the above mentioned Maastricht Treaty, the 
                                                        
2 Traditionally, the term ‘constitutionalisation’ has been employed to describe the process of European 
legal integration leading to a remarkable transformation of the EU ‘[d]isplacing the traditional state-
centred, “international organization” of the diplomat and the “regime” of the international relations 
scholar with a polity which has evolved from a set of legal arrangements binding upon sovereign states 
into a vertically integrated legal regime’ (Rittberger and Schimmelfennig 2006, 1148). 
3 While proposing this interpretation of the European governance Hooghe and Marks challenged the 
intergovernmentalist interpretation – what they call the state-centric interpretation – according to 
which European integration is driven by bargaining among national governments. National 
governments can decide how much authority they want to devolve to the supranational sphere to 
achieve specific goals and the supranational institutions exist to facilitate this bargaining process 
providing information that would not otherwise be available (for an extensive explanation see Hooghe 
and Marks 2001).  
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Single European Act – SEA – or the Lisbon Treaty), the burst of the economic crisis which effects are 
nowadays coupled with the immigration crisis, contributed to increase the salience of the EU issue that 
has been easily capitalized by populist Eurosceptic parties attracting consensus among the broad public. 
The consensual decision-making style of the EU alongside its multi-level governance limiting 
both political competition and the scope of action of national governments (Mair 2007, 2013) are key 
aspects to fully understand the rise in consensus of so-called populist Eurosceptic parties at the 
expenses of their mainstream-governing counterparts, especially in the midst of the economic crisis 
(Cotta 2016). Once the economic crisis originating in the USA hits the European shores, the EU 
struggles to find common solutions to counteract it. National governments are somehow ‘forced’ to 
accept European measures oriented to cure the symptoms of the economic crisis rather than solving it 
at its roots. The measures implemented had far-reaching socio-economic – rising unemployment, 
falling growth rates and soaring public deficit and debt (Serricchio, Tsakatika and Quaglia 2013) – and 
political consequences (e.g.: the resignation of the government in office in some member states like 
Greece) and contributed to increase citizens’ awareness of the cost of the EU. In other words, ‘it seems 
that the EU is not anymore able to guarantee one of the key promises of the European integration 
process i.e.: prosperity’ (Brack 2018,1). ‘Populist Eurosceptic parties’ easily capitalized on the renewed 
public awareness to challenge their mainstream counterpart. In fact, besides the fact that such actors 
endorse a variegated mix of stances to the EU, they easily took the EU issue and used it against the 
political establishment recognised as the main responsible for the crisis since their exponents cover 
decision-making positions at the national and, consequently, at the European level.  
If the increased consensus for ‘populist Eurosceptic parties’ in the national political arenas is a 
more recent phenomenon, in the EP they, generally, enjoy a stronger representation also thanks to the 
second-order nature of the EP elections, where governing parties are eventually punished for their 
actions at the national level and ‘protest parties’ perform better (Reif and Schmidt 1980). The results 
scored by so-called Eurosceptic parties during the last round of the EP elections in 2014 are an 
evidence of this process (two major examples are the French FN and the British United Kingdom 
Independence Party – UKIP).  
This tendency is likely to be confirmed or to increase with a view to the future EP elections in 
2019 and, in the optic of the European multi-level governance; it is inextricably bonded with the 
aforementioned results that Eurosceptic parties scored at the national level. In other words, the success 
obtained by these parties at national level, enabled part of them to obtain governing positions (see the 
cases of SYRIZA in Greece; PIS in Poland; FIDESZ in Hungary; FPÖ in Austria, or LN and FSM in 
Italy), thus to be represented in the Council of Ministers and potentially influencing the future 
composition of the EC. In parallel, such parties are already represented in the EP, where they are likely 




parties’ will surely manage to stop the European integration process but rather to state that the inter-
institutional dynamics at the supranational level are likely to change and to constrain the role played by 
mainstream governing parties, thus impacting on the consensual decision-making style of the EU 
governance.  
A study of patterns of EU-opposition expressed by national parties within the arena of the EP is 
thus relevant in this regard. It enables to shed light on the complexity of the polymorphic phenomenon 
of opposition to the EU, consequently, to differentiate between political parties critical of the EU, 
further understanding which are the most criticised aspects of the EU by so-called Eurosceptics.  
 
1.1 Research design and the main research objectives  
 
To achieve its central objective, this work relies on both EU studies (specifically on 
Euroscepticism literature) and on the comparative politics literature. As mentioned in the previous 
section, it starts questioning the suitability of ‘Euroscepticism’ as central research concept to investigate 
the variegated nature of criticism toward the EU, which has developed over the last decade or so and 
proposes to reconceptualise it in terms of EU-opposition. 
As recent studies report, Euroscepticism is not anymore to be considered as a passing 
phenomenon or as a grit in the developing European political system (Usherwood and Startin 2013) 
but as something that is there to stay. Furthermore, it is a chameleonic and multidimensional 
phenomenon encompassing different types of criticism expressed by a variegated plethora of actors 
(social movements, political parties, the media or the public at large). It is precisely for this last 
consideration that it is so difficult to conceptualize Euroscepticism, to produce a broadly accepted 
definition thereof, and to elaborate an all-encompassing theoretical framework explaining its presence 
(for a valuable review see Vasilopoulou 2013 and Mudde 2012). Euroscepticism is not an ideology but 
rather an element connoting other ideologies linked together by some sense of disliking of the EU and 
the European integration project (Usherwood 2017; Flood 2002). Furthermore, it is a media-driven 
concept generally used by political competitors to disparage their challengers. 
It is essentially for these reasons and for the implicit normativity hidden in the term4, that this 
work proposes to reconceptualise Euroscepticism in more ‘neutral terms’ relying on the concept of 
political opposition. More specifically, starting from the classical works by Dahl, Sartori, Schapiro, 
Kirchheimer, Ionescu and de Madariaga concerning the concept of political opposition and considering 
more recent developments in this field (Brack and Weinblum 2011), this work reconceptualises 
                                                        
4 As deeply discussed in the next chapter (see chapter 2, section 2.2.3, pages 23-26) Euroscepticism is a 
negatively-constructed concept immediately reminding of some negative feeling addressed to the EU 
while implicitly referring to a positive pro-EU side which in its turn not defined.  
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Euroscepticism in terms of EU-opposition. To do that, as mentioned previously, it relies on the 
assumption that the EU can be conceived as a political system and can be studied through the tools of 
comparative politics (Brack 2018; Mair 2013): ‘regardless of what occurred in previous decades, the EU 
today resembles a ‘normal’ political system’ (Kreppel 2012, 636)5. If we consider the EU as a political 
system, it is then plausible to think that support or opposition may be oriented both to the objects 
composing the political system – the political community, the regime and the political authorities – and 
to the outputs of the political system, the policies resulting from the interaction between the institutions 
of the political system (Easton 1975; Almond and Powell 1966; Norris 1999).  
Relying on this assumption, the proposed concept of EU-opposition encompasses three main 
aspects: 1) the targets toward which parties’ stances are directed; 2) the directionality of the positioning 
(negative, positive or neutral), and 3) the character of the positioning. As sketched above, the ‘targets’ 
are conceptualized as: a) the output of the EU, the EU-policies; b) the actors inhabiting the EU, the 
EU-elite6; c) the values norms and functioning of the EU-institutions, the EU-regime and d) the EU-
community defined as a group of member states united by shared values and norms but also as the 
specific geometries deriving from the process of EU integration, e.g.: the Euro area, Schengen, etc. The 
positioning may assume two main directionalities: negative indicating opposition and positive referring 
to support. Lastly, the character of the expressed positioning may be either principled if based on a 
normative judgement or pragmatic if based on practical considerations (see Chapter 2, section 2.4, page 
35). 
Starting from the central reconceptualisation of Euroscepticism in terms of EU-opposition, this 
work has two main empirical objectives (see Figure 1.1 below for a schematic representation of the 
research’s steps): the first one is descriptive and aims at understanding patterns of EU-opposition 
expressed by national parties in the EP from the perspective of both their ‘quantity’ (how much are 
parties opposed to the EU-targets) and their ‘quality’ (which is the character of EU-opposition and 
which are the motivations used to justify opposition to the EU-targets). The second objective is 
explanatory aiming at explaining the patterns of EU-opposition found: which factors shape different 
patterns of EU-opposition expressed in the EP?  
                                                        
5 Such process of ‘normalization’ does not only concern the EU as a political system but also the way 
scholars study it. In other words, if at the beginning the EU was mainly studied by the international 
relations (IR) literature, nowadays this subject of analysis has expanded well beyond the realm of IR 
into the realm of comparative politics (for an updated meta-analysis on studies concerning 
‘Euroscepticism’ see Vasilopoulou 2017). 
6 As further detailed in chapter two (see chapter 2, section 2.4 page 37), this work relies on a broad 
definition of EU-elite encompassing all the actors inhabiting EU-institutions (functionaries and 
politicians) thus considering also the representatives of so-called Eurosceptic parties. This is done 
because the work analyses the stances of both ‘Eurosceptic’ and mainstream national parties. Thus this 
broad definition of the EU-elite target allows the research to observe how mainstream parties relate to 




To accomplish these tasks, the work formulates an index of positioning for the considered EU-
targets. It then relies on a recently elaborated framework to study the formation of pan-European and 
transnational ‘Eurosceptic’ groups (Usherwood 2017) adapting it to the study of patterns of EU-
opposition in the EP. This framework draws on the concept of political opportunity structure (POS) 
elaborated by Kitschelt (1986) to denote the degree of ‘openness’ or ‘accessibility’ of a given political 
system for would-be political entrepreneurs (Arzheimer and Carter 2006, 422). The proposed 
framework aims at analysing the effects of three different sets of factors on patterns of EU-opposition 
in the EP: 1) ideology as a factor endogenous to the parties; 2) national and supranational institutional 
factors both formal and informal (e.g.: the role covered by parties in the national political arena); 3) 
event-related factors – exogenous variables – referring to countries’ vulnerability to exogenous shocks 
like the economic and immigration crises.  
To achieve both objectives the work relies on a restricted sample of national parties – both 
‘Eurosceptic’ and mainstream parties7 – and uses the speeches that their representatives deliver in the 










                                                        
7 The analysis focuses its attention on seven ‘Eurosceptic’ parties from both the left and the right of the 
political spectrum (the French, FN; the German Alternative for Germany, AFD; the Italian Northern 
League, LN, the British UKIP; the Spanish PODEMOS and the German LINKE). Furthermore, the 
work uses five mainstream parties as ‘baseline comparison’ one for each of the included countries (the 
French Socialist Party, PS; the German CDU-CSU; the Italian Democratic Party, PD, and the Spanish 
Popular Party, PP). See chapter 4 section 4.2.  
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RQ: Which aspects of  the EU do national parties oppose from within the arena 
of  the EP?  
Heuristic validity of  Euroscepticism: reconceptualisation in terms 
of  political opposition (EU-opposition) 
Targets  
 - EU-policy 
 - EU-elite 
 - EU-regime  
 - EU-community  
Directionality  
 - Positive 
 - Negative 
Character  
 - Principled  
 - Pragmatic  
DV: Creation of  an index of  parties' positionig on the 
- EU-policies  
- EU-elite  
- EU-regime  
- EU-community  
First main research objective: descriptive. 
Method: deductive and inductive content 
analysis. Data: MEPs' speeches 
Qualitative observation of  the 
quantity of  EU-opposition 
In depth qualitative 
observation of  the quality of  
EU-opposition: the character, 
and justifications used  
Second main research objective: 
explanatory. Method: Regression 
analysis 
IVs: POS, as drivers of  EU-
opposition in the EP 
Factors endogenous: 
ideology 
Factors exogenous: formal 
and informal institutions 























1.2 Contribution to the literature 
  
 
Since more than 40 years, so-called Eurosceptic parties are represented in the EP but were unable 
to block the process of European integration: ‘[t]he EU has a remarkable integrationist track record: it 
has faced multiple crises, has weathered them and continued to integrate. The institutions, though in 
persistent turmoil, are still standing; integration has widened (…) and deepened’ (Brack 2018, 4-5). So, 
why bother about Euroscepticism in the EP now?  
Even if it is true that so-called Eurosceptic forces did not manage to stop the European 
integration course also because of their relatively scarce representation in the EP, it is evident that 
something has changed in the last years. Thanks to their electoral success in national but especially in 
European elections, Eurosceptic actors managed to get visibility and ‘legitimacy’. Their presence in 
such arenas potentially exercises pressure on the mainstream establishment: on the one hand, 
Eurosceptic members consolidate their role as ‘agenda setter’ (Brack 2018), while, on the other hand, 
they contribute to framing the future of the EU and of European integration in a different way. Such 
change is epitomised in the results of the Brexit referendum, considered by most ‘Eurosceptic’ parties 
as a direct victory. Even if it is true that the Brexit referendum was not directly proposed by the UKIP 
that played a rather ‘marginal’ role in its promotion, (Usherwood 2016) Brexit has far-reaching 
implications for the future of European integration. While before conflicts on the EU were solved with 
solutions concerning either more integration or the maintenance of the status quo, nowadays the 
options ‘less integration’ or ‘leave the EU’ are not anymore to be discarded (Young 2016; Brack 2018). 
In a nutshell, Euroscepticism is the result of a prolonged legitimacy crisis in the EU (Pirro and Taggart 
2018; Pirro and van Kessel 2018) and its consolidation contributes at least to slow down the process of 
European integration (Brack 2018; Brack and Startin 2015; Usherwood and Startin 2013). In more 
speculative terms, the success of Eurosceptic parties at national level coupled with their potentially 
increased success in next year EP elections will probably contribute to change the dynamics of political 
competition at the supranational level. To put it more simply, a potential increase in ‘Eurosceptic’ 
parties’ seats-share in the EP coupled with a potential increase of ‘Eurosceptic’ parties’ governing 
positions at the national level (as it is now the case in Italy), thus an increased presence of ‘Eurosceptic’ 
exponents in the Council of Ministers, could potentially change EU’s consensual decision-making style. 
Against this backdrop, it is thus fundamental to study opposition to the EU in all its forms and 
expressed in all the available arenas: a study of patterns of EU-opposition in the EP is fundamental in 
this regard. 
Conflicts about the nature of the EU and the European integration project are vivid and 
extremely important nowadays that the option ‘less Europe’ is a plausible one and the EP is the perfect 
‘laboratory’ to provide answers to the above-formulated questions. The EP, being the only directly 
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elected supranational arena, is one of the few channels of representation available to opposition actors8: 
in the EP, parties representatives from all member states can express their views about the future 
trajectories of the EU in a rather free way (Brack 2012, 2013). This is not to state that the EP is entitled 
to take decisions concerning ‘more or less Europe’ (Benedetto 2008), but rather to say that debates in 
the EP not only concern the choice of the preferred policies but also the future trajectories of the EU. 
At which level of the multilevel European governance should decisions be taken? How much 
sovereignty should each member state give to the supranational sphere?  
Particularly, this work makes three main contributions to the literature. Firstly, from a conceptual 
point of view, reconceptualising Euroscepticism in terms of EU-opposition, this work contributes to 
the literature on Euroscepticism in four main ways. A) Considering the EU as a political system 
composed of specific objects and producing specific outputs enables to single out which are the aspects of 
the EU that a variegated plethora of parties opposes. Thus, identifying the objects of criticism 
(Krouwel and Abts 2007; Weßels 2007) targeted by parties enables researchers to avoid considering the 
EU and the European integration project as a monolithic unit. B) A ‘target-oriented’ definition of EU-
opposition (and a consequent pragmatic consideration of the objects and outputs of the EU) does not 
imply a pre-emptive normative evaluation of the perpetrators of opposition. As mentioned previously, 
Eurosceptic is a normative concept that implies an implicit negative evaluation of political parties and 
can be easily misused in political competition for strategic reasons (Neumayer 2008; Flood 2002; 
Caruso 2016; Verzichelli and Pellegrino 2016; Cotta 2016). Interestingly, several groups refused to be 
labelled as such, considering themselves as ‘Eurorealist’9 or as alternative voices to the current state of 
European integration (Leruth 2017). C) The definition of EU-opposition allows also the delineation of 
support toward the EU-targets, expressed as the contrary of EU-opposition. Consequently, its 
application allows comparing EU-opponents and EU-supporters’ stances toward the EU. D) A 
reconceptualization of Euroscepticism in terms of EU-opposition investigating the character of the 
expressed critique provides further insights on the relationship between such criticism and future 
developments of the EU. The elite-led origin of the EU polity is based on one interpretation of the 
EU, of the European integration project, and of the future trajectories it should take, that is 
unanimously shared by mainstream parties. A consequent normative categorization of the challengers 
of this general interpretation classifies ‘alternative views’ of the European integration process as 
destructive. However, are all critiques of the EU to be considered as such? Isn’t it possible to find 
                                                        
8 A prominent example is the UKIP that had only one seat within the national lower chamber and lost 
it after the last UK elections in 2017, while having 24 seats in the Strasbourg chamber after the 
impressive result scored in EP elections 2014 (UKIP obtained 26.77% of the national vote share 
becoming the most voted party in the UK) 
9 As further specified in the next chapter ‘Eurorealist’ is a term coined by the European Conservatives 
and Reformist party group in the EP to rebrand their stances to the EU (See Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3, 




forms of criticism that are alternative to the mainstream one and do not aim at dis-integrating the EU?  
Second, such a reconceptualisation of EU-opposition also contributes to the comparative politics 
literature. Studying criticism of the EU through the lenses of EU-opposition helps scholars to avoid the 
use of concepts created ad hoc for the EU, in this case, Euroscepticism (Cotta 2016). In other words, it 
helps to bring the phenomenon of opposition to the EU back to the realm of comparative politics. The 
proposed concept has, in fact, two main advantages: firstly, it is flexible enough to be applied to the 
observation of criticism of the EU expressed by political parties in other institutional arenas (like 
national parliaments). Consequently, it enables an inter-level comparison of negative stances to the EU, 
something of core importance in the study of a multi-level system of governance (Helms 2008). 
Secondly, such concept can potentially be applied to the study of a wider range of political actors 
expressing criticism toward the EU.  
Lastly, and connected to the first point, the application of a target-oriented definition of EU-
opposition in the EP contributes to the still limited literature concerning ‘anti-system’ and ‘anti-
establishment’ opposition in democratic institutions. As mentioned in the previous section, the EU is 
widely considered as a consensual system (Lijphart 1999) where governing forces at the national level 
generally cover governing positions also at the supranational level. This translated into the lack of an 
institutionalised divide between governing and opposition forces typical of the national political system. 
According to Mair, it is exactly the way in which the EU is constructed that deprives the EU of one of 
the three great milestones in the development of democratic institutions (Dahl 1966): political 
opposition. The fact that the EU has always been governed by a ‘cartel’ of mainstream parties 
ostensibly competing against one another and with few or no meaningful differences dividing them, led 
either to the ‘elimination of opposition’ or to the mobilisation of a principled opposition directed 
against the political system10. Using Peter Mair’s words: ‘once we cannot organize opposition in the EU, 
we are then almost forced to organize opposition to the EU’ (Mair 2007, 7). This is to say that all the 
‘non-governing’ forces at the supranational level are deprived of the possibility to exercise opposition 
and organise themselves against the system. However, even if the EU and, more specifically, the EP 
lack an institutionalised divide between governing and opposition flanks, this work argues that not all 
forms of opposition represented in the EP should be treated as opposed to the EU.  Thus, the 
application of a target-oriented definition of EU-opposition helps to shed light on the heterogeneous 
mix of voices represented in the EP: are all these parties to be considered as opposed to the EU? Would 
                                                        
10  In his theorization of political opposition, Dahl distinguishes between three main types of 
opposition: classical opposition (government vs. opposition distinction); the ‘opposition of principle’ 
rejecting the government, its policies and the very system of governance and the ‘elimination of 
opposition’ indicating the absence of any meaningful difference between the parties competing for 
office (Dahl 1966). This latter might not be considered as a form of opposition per se but more as a 
‘government by cartel’, where opposition instances are directed toward the personnel of government 
(Mair 2007, 5).  
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it be possible to find criticism of the EU that goes in the direction of more (or different) integration 
rather than proposing less EU integration?  
 
1.3 Contents of the thesis  
 
This work is divided into nine chapters: after this introductory chapter, chapter 2 focuses its 
attention on the concept of Euroscepticism and its reconceptualization in terms of EU-opposition. The 
chapter starts by presenting the evolution of the concept in the media, the political and the academic 
environments. It then details the progresses done by the literature in this field particularly focusing on 
the theoretical efforts to provide a definition of the concept and to formulate typologies of parties’ 
scepticism to the EU. Once the general evolution of the concept is sketched, the chapter contests the 
suitability of ‘Euroscepticism’ as a theoretical instrument for the analysis of the variegated forces 
opposing the EU (political parties in the case object of this work). It then reconceptualises 
Euroscepticism in terms of political opposition and formulates a definition of EU-opposition that 
details the targets toward which negative sentiments may be addressed as the EU-policies; the EU-elite; 
the EU-regime and the EU-community.  
Once the definition of EU-opposition is detailed, chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework 
suited to explain patterns of EU-opposition in the EP. This chapter sketches a literature review 
concerning the explanation of party-based Euroscepticism mainly aggregating around two schools: the 
Sussex School (based on the work conducted by Paul Taggart at the University of Sussex) and the 
North Carolina School (originating from the PhD dissertation by Leonard Ray – 1999 – and further 
developed in the work by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks). The first one identifies the government vs. 
opposition dynamics at the national level as the main source for the explanation of Euroscepticism; the 
second one considers ideology as the core explanation for opposition to the EU. Having performed a 
brief literature review, the chapter presents and adapts Usherwood’s model for the study of the 
emergence of pan-European and transnational Euroscepticism to the study of patterns of EU-
opposition in the EP (Usherwood 2017). As mentioned before, the chapter relies on three sets of 
factors that can potentially constitute a political opportunity structure (POS) suited to explain patterns 
of EU-opposition and formulates six hypotheses alongside two general associations to be empirically 
tested in the following analysis.  
Chapter 4 focuses on the data and the methods used in performing the analysis. The chapter 
firstly proposes justifications for the selected national parties (see supra footnote 7 in page 7) and for 
the time period of the analysis (2014-2016). It then analytically presents the data used in the analysis (an 
original collection of almost 8000 speeches divided into 36 different corpora), alongside the two 




illustrates the development of the dependent variables used in the work (i.e.: EU-opposition index), 
summarizes the formulated hypotheses and proposes a description of the independent variables used to 
explain party-based EU-opposition in the EP.  
Then chapter 5 focuses on the ‘quantity’ of EU-opposition or support expressed by parties 
within the EP arena. It starts reporting the obtained index of the quantity of EU-opposition in both 
static and dynamic ways (how the quantity of EU-opposition evolves in the period of observation). To 
do that the chapter compares the ‘heterogeneous’ group of EU-opponents with their mainstream 
counterparts allowing the observation of potential criticism expressed also by the last-mentioned group 
of actors. The chapter then compares the obtained index of the quantity of EU-opposition across 
policy issues to assess the presences of differences and similarities in the expressed positioning11. 
Once patterns of opposition are detected, chapter 6 focuses on the parties expressing opposition 
to one of the above-mentioned EU-targets (to recall them: EU-policies, EU-elite, EU-regime and EU-
community) and proposes an in-depth description of the motivations used. The chapter disentangles 
differences and similarities among parties’ negative stances to the EU: all the parties (both Eurosceptic 
and mainstream) expressing opposition to one of the EU-targets are thus considered. To do that, the 
work relies on the results obtained from the inductive coding analysis of MEPs’ speeches mentioned 
above further emphasizing differences in the character of the expressed opposition (either principled or 
pragmatic).  
Once patterns of EU-opposition are described both from a quantitative and from a qualitative 
perspective, chapter 7 assesses the hypotheses and the associations formulated in chapter 3. Relying on 
the formulated indexes of positioning vis-à-vis the studied EU-targets – encompassing both the quantity 
and the quality of the expressed stances – the chapter performs a regression analysis (multivariate 
hierarchical regression analysis – OLS) to assess how the three sets of factors (ideology, institutional 
factors both national and supranational and exogenous factors impacting on each parties’ country such 
as the effects of both the economic and migration crises) shape patterns of parties’ positioning toward 
the EU. The chapter proceeds presenting the results of the regression analysis for each of the included 
EU-targets.  
Chapter 8 starts summarizing the core objectives of this work. It then stresses how the 
observation of Euroscepticism in terms of EU-opposition helps researchers to find two main 
dimensions of competitions along which EU-opponents tend to cluster: 1) the anti-EU-establishment 
vs. pro-EU-establishment one, and 2) the anti-EU-system vs. the pro-EU-system one. EU-opponents 
                                                        
11 It is to be noted that the work analyses speeches delivered by national parties’ MEPs with reference 
to three broad policy issues: economy; immigration, asylum and borders control and environmental 
protection.  
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may, in fact, be divided along these two main dimensions. Furthermore, the chapter underlines the 
factors mainly contributing to shape the found patterns of EU-opposition.  
A last conclusive chapter proposes a systematization of both the patterns and the ‘determinants’ 
of EU-opposition. Furthermore, it stresses the higher heuristic value of the concept of EU-opposition 
when compared to the normativity of Euroscepticism further detailing the main contributions to the 
literature in the field. The last section of the chapter underlines some avenues for further research that 











2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter focuses on the central theoretical question of this work: is Euroscepticism still an 
adequate concept to understand the variegated nature of criticism toward the EU, which has developed 
over the last decade or so? To answer this question section 2.2 reviews the evolution of the concept of 
Euroscepticism, how it was adopted in the political and academic environments and how it became 
central to the study of the EU (subsection 2.2.1). This section also reports the theoretical efforts done 
by the literature in providing a definition of this concept, stressing both the pros and contra of such 
definitions (subsection 2.2.2) and the biases related to the concept of Euroscepticism: why should 
scholar pay attention to apply Euroscepticism as the central concept of research? (Subsection 2.2.3). 
The chapter then proposes a reconceptualization of Euroscepticism in terms of a more ‘neutral’ 
concept: political opposition. To do that section 2.3 proposes a review of the literature concerning 
‘political opposition’ stressing the biases related to it (subsection 2.3.1). The section then explains the 
reasons why scholars are generally reluctant to talk about political opposition at the supranational level 
of the EU (subsection 2.3.2). Once presented the problems and constraints of opposition at the 
supranational level, section 2.4 proposes a way to ‘overcome’ such problems defining EU-opposition in 
a target-oriented way. The definition disentangles the objects toward which disagreement may be 
addressed: the policies enacted by the EU, its political establishment, its political regime and the 
political community as a whole or one of its geometries deriving from the process of European 
integration (see below for a further discussion). The section also stresses how, besides the target of 
opposition, also the character that it assumes (either principled or pragmatic) plays a role in 
determining parties’ stances to the EU. Crossing these two components (target and character of the 
expressed opposition) section 2.4 proposes a set of guidelines for the observation of parties’ 
positioning on the EU. The conclusive section highlights the advantages related to EU-opposition as 






2.2 Euroscepticism: the state of the field  
 
Academics in the field define the variegated forces opposing the EU using the central concept of 
Euroscepticism. This section guides the reader through the evolution of this term highlighting the 
major theoretical contributions that enhanced our knowledge of this phenomenon further focusing on 
the problems related to the use of Euroscepticism in both academic and political fields.  
2.2.1 Euroscepticism: the origin of a contested concept 
 
 “Britain does not oppose the idea of removing the barriers to trade, only the idea that these and other measures should be 
written in the Treaty of Rome”. 
 “Tomatoes Throw Europe’s Summit Progress”, The Times 11th of November 1985. 
  
The British media were the first to use the hyphenated version of ‘Euro-scepticism’, to indicate 
those British Conservative party’s flanks opposed to the construction of a supranational common 
market, as epitomized by the quotation reported above (Harmsen and Spiering 2004). Several events 
were fundamental to the development of Euroscepticism like the negotiations held for the signing of 
the SEA, the Maastricht Treaty or the constitutional project blocked by the French and Dutch ‘no’ to 
the referenda held in that occasion. Among these events, Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges Speech was the 
first occasion that placed the issue of European integration from ‘sideshow to centre stage’ (Holmes 
2001, 1) 1. While in the short-run Margaret Thatcher was outmanoeuvred by her cabinet that was 
favouring the European integration project, in the long run, the consequences of her speech were 
favourable to the development of Euroscepticism in the British environment. In fact, it is exactly after 
this period that Euroscepticism started to ‘crystallise in any meaningful, mainstream way’ (Usherwood 
and Startin 2013, 3) becoming popular among the British media (Flood 2002).  
The tendency to frame opposition to the EU using Euroscepticism spilt over to the academic 
environment especially during the negotiations held for the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. This latter 
is widely regarded as the real turning point in the development of academic interest around the 
phenomenon of Euroscepticism (Ray 1999; Flood 2002; Taggart 2006; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2013; 
Usherwood and Startin 2013; Brack and Startin 2015; Sørensen 2004). Indeed, from Maastricht 
onwards, the Community of Member states becomes a Union of Member States, a Union of the 
European Peoples with shared objectives and shared values (see art. 1 of the TEU). Moreover, 
Maastricht marks the moment when the demarcation between national and supranational competencies 
in economic, social, legal, environmental, and foreign affairs become even more blurred. Furthermore, 
                                                        
1  The Margaret Thatcher foundation reports the entire text of the Bruges speech at: 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107332 Consulted in January 2017. 
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in the post-Maastricht era, the European integration project begins to be politicised 2  among the 
European publics by parties opposing the intensification of both political and economic integration 
(Vasilopoulou 2017). As evidence of this process, after the Maastricht Treaty, scholars notice an 
increase in the use of referenda to ratify changes to the EU Treaties (Mair 2007). In the period between 
1972 and 1992 eight referenda were held: the Maastricht Treaty triggered the vote in five different 
referenda (in Italy, Ireland, France and Denmark where it was repeated twice). After the Maastricht 
Treaty in the period between 1992 and 2016, 35 referenda concerning EU issues were held all around 
Europe3. In other words, Maastricht determined a departure from the normal political practices applied 
in the various EU member states, a move toward a more plebiscitary politics as a possible solution to 
the European ‘democratic deficit’4 (Hug 2000; Taggart 2006)5. 
From Maastricht onwards, the European integration project undergoes a period defined by 
scholars as the passage from ‘permissive consensus’ to ‘constrained dissensus’. Better explained, until 
there was agreement concerning the European integration project among the political elite (consensus), 
coupled with the absence of public conflict, or even awareness, on its scope and objectives in public 
opinion (permissive), the European integration project could progress smoothly. When political 
dissensus and public conflict (awareness) began to set ‘the elite became vulnerable. And, as they 
became vulnerable, so too did their projects, and in particular that for Europe’ (Mair 2013, 114).  
During the period of ‘permissive consensus’, only some scattered small Eurosceptic formations 
existed. An example is the case of the Danish Peoples Movement against the EU (Folkebevægelsen mod 
EU). This party was founded in 1972 as a cross-parties campaign platform for the ‘no vote’ in 
Denmark’s referendum on the European Community membership, it obtained a considerable success 
at its first EP election in 1979, gaining around 20% of the national vote share and 4 seats in the EP. 
However, it struggled to impact on the debate surrounding the European integration project 
(Usherwood and Startin 2013). It is precisely due to this lack in political weight that scholars dealing 
                                                        
2 The term politicization is related to the increasing salience and divisiveness of a specific issue (EU or 
the European integration process) inside member states’ polities (de Wilde and Zürn 2012). 
3 Since the Lisbon Treaty, the use of referenda related to EU treaties decreased. Noticeable exceptions 
are the referendum held in Ireland in 2012 for the ratification of the Fiscal Compact (as required by the 
Irish Constitution), the Croatian accession referendum in 2013 and the UK Brexit referendum held in 
June 2016. Further two important referenda ‘related’ to the EU are to be mentioned: in 2015 the Greek 
bailout referendum and in 2016 the referendum held in Hungary for the abolition of the Hungarian 
migration quota (invalidated by a turnout that was too low)(Carlotti 2017).  
4 The problem of the European ‘democratic deficit’ relates to how much the European channels of 
representation (direct and indirect, see below for further indication) are effective in connecting 
European citizens’ preferences to the outcome of the EU decision-making. 
5 According to Sørensen (2004) the Maastricht Treaty is central also to the development of studies 
concerning popular Euroscepticism since it faced the European elite with three dilemmas: 1) accepting 
both public Euroscepticism and overt criticism to the EU coming from the elite and the academic 
world; 2) increased use of referendum; and 3) connected to the previous point, finding solution to a 




with Euroscepticism in this early phase considered it as a niche, maybe even a passing phenomenon, a 
‘“grit in the system” that occurs when political systems are built and develop’ (Usherwood and Startin 
2013, 2). Moreover, due to the fact that the impact of Euroscepticism was more likely to be felt at the 
national level, the majority of early works used a national perspective when studying it (see for example 
Ward 1996; Helms 1997; Benoit 1998). Furthermore, national case studies of Euroscepticism were 
unevenly distributed among the various countries and the majority of them focused on countries where 
Euroscepticism was a prominent phenomenon (like in Britain or in the Nordic countries: e.g.: Evans 
1998; Sitter 2001; Aspinwall 2000) disregarding the others (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004, Usherwood 
2017). 
The changing nature of the EU, its increased competencies, its developments, such as the advent 
of the euro, the ‘big bang enlargement’ in 2004, the negotiation for the constitutional project alongside 
its failure and the subsequent signing of the Lisbon Treaty have placed progressive strains on the 
notion of permissive consensus (Brack and Startin 2015), shifting public and political leaders’ opinion 
to the ‘constraining dissensus’ flank. The advent of the economic and financial crisis in the Eurozone 
exacerbated this trend pushing the literature’s debate about Euroscepticism toward a new phase. As 
observed in the previous chapter, the way in which the EU is constructed somehow forces EU-leaders 
to deal with the increased hostility coming from various member states both from the North – like the 
UK and Denmark rejecting to aid countries in financial difficulties – and from the South – like Italy, 
Spain and Greece that struggle to solve the social consequences of the crisis, such as the increased 
youth unemployment. Moreover, the current refugee crisis and the inability to reach an EU-wide 
consensus over refugees’ resettlement (see the case of Hungary but more generally the opposition of 
Central and Eastern European – CEE – Member states) have sharpened tensions over the EU, its 
current state and its future trajectories. The effects of such tensions are already visible in the results of 
the Brexit referendum. Most commentators now agree that the notion of Euroscepticism is not 
anymore to be considered as a ‘passing phenomenon’ but as something that is here to stay: 
Euroscepticism ‘moved from the realm of political phenomenon to constituent element of the 
European political sphere’ (FitzGibbon et al. 2017, 3). 
If the evolution of Euroscepticism follows the development of the EU, also its study follows a 
similar trend: the literature dealing with Euroscepticism evolves hand in hand with the direction taken 
by the EU and the European integration project. During this second phase, in fact, a considerable body 
of literature has developed and it is nowadays regarded as a fully-fledged subfield of European Studies 
(Flood 2009; Mudde 2012; Brack and Startin 2015). Two main approaches have been used to study 
Euroscepticism from a party-based perspective6: the first one provides definition(s) of Euroscepticism 
                                                        
6 Academic literature also focuses on the phenomenon of popular Euroscepticism aiming at providing 
cross-cutting explanations of the reasons leading voters to express their preferences for Eurosceptic 
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and formulates typologies to classify parties’ stances to the EU – what Mudde calls the Sussex School 
(Mudde 2012) – while the second one tries to explain the phenomenon mainly relying on socio-political 
cleavages – described by Mudde as the North Carolina School (Mudde 2012). This chapter focuses on 
the first strand of the literature highlighting the main theoretical efforts to define Euroscepticism and 
to categorise political actors, while the following chapter (chapter 3) provides insights on models 
explaining the phenomenon from a party-based perspective.  
 
2.2.2 A critical literature review of Euroscepticism 
 
Proposing a ‘one-size-fits-all definition’ of Euroscepticism and categorising parties positions to 
the EU are the core objectives of the first strand of the literature7 mentioned above. However, the 
classificatory schemes that have been proposed are now so many and detailed that sometimes it is 
difficult to recognize differences and/or potential similarities among critical actors. Some 
commentators state that similarly to populism, also Euroscepticism suffers under the ‘Cinderella 
Complex’. This is to say that there is a shoe in the shape of Euroscepticism but no foot to fit in 
(Caruso 2016). Just to mention an example, Euroscepticism becomes even more complex when looking 
at the recent developments of the literature assessing the ‘mainstreaming of Euroscepticism’ 
(Vasilopoulou 2013). According to this theory, if it is, on the one hand, true that Eurosceptic parties are 
generally located at the extreme of the ideological spectrum (Hooghe and Marks 2007b; Hooghe et al. 
2002), or at the periphery of the national political system (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002), nowadays also 
parties situated toward the centre, generally mainstream parties, are critical of the EU: Euroscepticism 
becomes a phenomenon of the mainstream. If the concept of mainstreaming of Euroscepticism (or 
Euroalternativism – Flood 2002) is useful to rationalize mainstream parties’ opposition to the inability 
of the EU decision-making system to face the economic crisis, understanding what Euroscepticism 
entails becomes an even harder task. Up to now the only thing that is clear is that the mix of voices 
labelled under the term Euroscepticism differ from several viewpoints (e.g.: their position along the 
left-right ideological continuum, their role within the national political system or their stances along the 
national-supranational axis), but are equated by some undefined negative sentiment to the EU and the 
European integration project which in its turn is considered as a monolithic construction.  
The first remarkable attempt to conceptualise the phenomenon of Euroscepticism was done by 
Paul Taggart, who defined Euroscepticism as a ‘contingent and conditional opposition to the EU 
integration as well as a total and unconditional opposition to it’ (Taggart 1998: 366). According to 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
parties (Gabel 1998; McLaren 2002, 2006). This literature review is centred on party-based 
Euroscepticism even though some hints concerning popular Euroscepticism are provided in the next 
section.  




Taggart, these forms of opposition are detectable among parties (more likely parties which identity is 
tied up with a single issue such as ecology or immigration) that cannot aspire to achieve any 
governmental positions (thus covering peripheral positions at the domestic level) and, consequently, 
might be critical of the European integration project in a relatively costless way. The first refinement of 
this definition was provided later on by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002). The two scholars categorise the 
concept of Euroscepticism between two main poles: 1) ‘hard’ Euroscepticism (parties rejecting the EU 
as such) and 2) ‘soft’ Euroscepticism (parties expressing dissatisfaction either with some policies 
enacted at the supranational level or with the current state of the European integration project).  
Being the most widely used typology even nowadays and having paved the way to further 
terminological innovations in the field, this dichotomy presents some problematic aspects. First, there 
are difficulties in recognizing a clear-cut distinction between the soft and the hard pole of the concept 
(Beichelt 2004; Kopecky and Mudde 2002; Vasilopoulou 2009): if hard Euroscepticism is comparable 
to a principled rejection of the EU, its softer counterpart is still not well defined. To avoid this 
problem, the authors further specified that soft Euroscepticism implies the opposition to some areas of 
policies ‘that are core part of the European project as embodied in the EU or encapsulate its current 
and future trajectory’, however admitting that this is ‘open to dispute’ (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008a, 
250). This led Vasilopoulou to question how many (and which) policies should one party oppose being 
considered as soft Eurosceptic (Vasilopoulou 2009, 5) 8 . Furthermore, applying Taggart and 
Szczerbiak’s framework, how should we then classify a party that rejects the current trajectories of the 
European Integration project but does not aim at destroying it? Second, the hard vs. soft 
Euroscepticism dichotomy can hardly be classified as a typology of critical stances to the EU. Crespy 
and Verschueren (2009) using Sartori’s argumentation (1970) argue that a typology as such should 
distinguish between categories (differentiation in kind) rather than differentiating within the categories 
(differentiation in degree). Furthermore, according to Kaniok (2012), ‘the ranking of soft and hard 
Euroscepticism alongside one another renders problematic the position of the former, who are 
typologically […] put into an imaginary camp with the latter’. This is to say that in political reality (and 
discourse) the media and commentators generally do not distinguish between hard and soft 
Euroscepticism but tend to conflate them in a single category. Consequently, soft Eurosceptic parties’ 
instances are generally deemed as non-democratic due to their association with their hard counterpart 
(Kaniok 2012). Thirdly, this definition only looks at the current state of the EU, thus not identifying 
any form of opposition to further integration or to a widening and deepening of EU’s competencies9. 
                                                        
8 According to Brack and Costa, the EU is a political system in a state of ‘quasi-permanent crisis’ which 
very existence is often questioned and where the debate not only concerns the type of desired policy 
but also how and at which territorial level decisions should be taken (Brack and Costa 2017, 370).  
9  This is the main reason why Taggart and Szczerbiak refined their work by stating that soft 
Euroscepticism should be considered as the absence of a ‘principled objection to the European 
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Fourthly, this approach rightly points to the strategic use of Eurosceptic stances by protest parties, 
however, it is not applicable to the study of Euroscepticism enacted by mainstream parties. This 
consideration is related to the last critique moved to Taggart and Szczerbiak’s approach concerning the 
causes of Euroscepticism. The scholars, in fact, stress the institutional dimension of Euroscepticism 
(e.g.: the position of the party in the national political system, its electoral strategies and potential 
coalition tactics) however little space is left to the role of ideology. 
Adapting Easton’s framework concerning diffuse and specific support for a political regime (Easton 
1975)10, Kopecký and Mudde bring ideology back to the fore distinguishing between diffuse support 
for the European integration project (along the Europhile/Europhobe dimension) and specific support 
for the EU (the EU-optimist/EU-pessimist axis). Crossing these two dimensions they obtain four ideal 
types of party positioning on the EU. Euroenthusiasts (Europhile and EU-optimist), Eurosceptics 
(Europhiles and EU-pessimist), Europragmatists (Europhobe and EU-optimist) and Eurorejects 
(Europhobe and EU-pessimist). The resulting typology has the advantage to encapsulate both negative 
and positive stances to the EU (Rovny 2004) – an important aspect since parties’ stances to the EU 
vary over time and space (Flood 2002) – but it is not free from problems. In fact, the bipolar 
distinction along the Europhile/Europhobe axis does not pinpoint all the nuances of fluid party 
positioning on the EU (Flood 2002). Let’s take as an example a party that opposes its country’s 
membership to the European Monetary Union (EMU) but not to the Schengen area and vice-versa, 
where should researchers collocate this party in this theoretical framework? Furthermore, as admitted 
by Kopecký and Mudde, the Europragmatist category is counterintuitive since it defines parties that 
express a ‘diffuse’ opposition to the European integration project while supporting the general practices 
of the EU (Kopecký and Mudde 2002, 303, Taggart Szczerbiak 2002, postscript, Beichelt 2004, 
Vasilopoulou 2009). Moreover, the Eurosceptic category is not able to tap all the nuances of pessimism 
toward the EU (especially at the mass level) (Krouwel and Abts 2007), something that was also stressed 
by Taggart himself: ‘opposition and support to the EU are rarely either binary or absolute’ (Taggart 
1998, 365). Breaking parties positioning on the EU in two analytical dimensions concerning support for 
the EU and support for the European Integration process helps to differentiate between ‘parties that 
are critical only of the EU, and those that are also negative about the ideas underlying the general 
process of European integration’. However, what is still not clear is what does it mean ‘being critical 
only of the EU’. For example, how can we differentiate between a party rejecting the values of the EU 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
integration project of transferring powers to a supranational body such as the EU, but there is 
opposition to the EU's current or future planned trajectory based on the further extension of 
competencies that the EU is planning to make’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2003: 12). 
10 The adjective diffuse is used by the two scholars to identify support for the general ideas underlying 
the EU integration project, while the term specific indicates support for the general practice of the EU 




and a party proposing their reformation? Shall we label both in the same way? Lastly, if diffuse support 
refers to the ideas underlying the European integration project and specific support refers to the practice 
of the EU, it is still not clear what constitutes the general ideas and practices of the European 
integration project. In fact, there is no precise vision of how the EU could or should be (Brack and 
Costa 2017) and there have been since the very beginning competing views concerning the nature, 
scope and finalité of the European project (Mény 2012). In other words, the very meaning of European 
integration changes over time and space (Ray 2007, Brack and Startin 2015, Usherwood 2017). In 
summary, ‘even if these terms were specified, the key difficulty is that there is no trans-historical general 
practice of European integration since the integration practice can – and indeed does – change quite 
fundamentally’ (Kný and Kratochvíl 2015, 209).  
The flourishing of different typologies highlights the complexity of the phenomenon from both a 
popular and a party-based perspective, this work reports only the most cited or applied ones. Flood 
(2002, further elaborated in Flood and Usherwood 2007) proposes a set of six categories providing 
researchers with some guidelines about parties’ positioning on the EU: EU-rejectionist, EU-revisionist, 
EU-minimalist, EU-gradualist, EU-reformist and EU-maximalist 11 . Sørensen attempts to classify 
popular Euroscepticism starting from the identification of six broad types of attitudes toward the EU 
deriving from: a) the concern about the integrity of the nation state; b) the values of the EU; c) the 
transfer of new competencies toward the EU with the main aim to enhance efficiency; d) the economic 
rationale of integration; e) the (lack of) emotional attachment to the EU; and f) the stances toward the 
very principles of the EU (determining the principled opposition to the EU) (Sørensen 2004, 3). Conti 
(2003) building on Taggart and Szczerbiak’s (2001) hard vs. soft Euroscepticism adds three further 
categories looking at the positive and neutral sides of the phenomenon: ‘no commitment’, when a party 
displays no clear attitude toward the EU; ‘functional Europeanism’, when support for European 
integration is understood as a function of domestic interests or parties’ objectives and ‘identity 
Europeanism’, when there is a principled support for the EU. Rovny’s (2004) conceptualizes 
Euroscepticism along two scales: the first one dealing with its magnitude (the hard vs. soft distinction) 
and the second one dealing with the motivations guiding it (that according to the scholar are to be 
defined as ideology and strategy). Vasilopoulou’s (2009) tripartition of Euroscepticism based on parties’ 
position to the principles, the practices and the future development of the EU: Rejecting 
Euroscepticism (principles of the EU), Conditional Euroscepticism (practices of the EU), and 
Compromising Euroscepticism (future of the EU).  
                                                        
11 In the elaboration of his typology, Flood has been clear in not linking it to issues of ideology and/or 
strategy. His aim is to provide in-depth specifications of parties’ positioning to the EU that could vary 
over time (Vasilopoulou 2017). For further insight about the formulated guidelines see Flood and 
Soborski (2017).  
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It is, however, to be noted that in comparison to Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001) and Kopecký 
and Mudde’s (2002) typologies, these new theorizing efforts remain ‘marginal’ since they tend to 
introduce new terminology aiming at replacing the term Euroscepticism (Crespy and Verschueren 
2009, Kaniok 2012). What emerges from these typologies is that the more complex and detailed the 
theoretical framework for the analysis of Euroscepticism is, the more difficult it is to operationalize it 
(Szczerbiak and Taggart 2017). Relying on complex models for the observation of Euroscepticism 
requires a considerable amount of data with the main risk to fall in the non-mutual exclusivity of the 
formulated categorization. In other words, the major risk is to categorize the same party in more than 
one cell of one of the proposed typologies.  
Without disregarding the advancements of the literature in the field, this work focuses on the 
limitation of the concept of Euroscepticism and contests its ability to analyse the differentiated parties’ 
positions on the EU. The next section concentrates on this aspect proposing a structured review of 
Euroscepticism’ s biases.  
  
2.2.3 Euroscepticism as a problematic concept: detailing its biases 
 
Coming ‘in from the cold’ (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2013), Euroscepticism is now part of the 
mainstream of European politics with a high probability of growing in importance and coherence in 
view of the forthcoming EP elections in 2019. However, as reported in the previous paragraph, no 
generally respected and uncontested definition and/or typologies of Euroscepticism exist 
(Vasilopoulou 2017). Despite this, Euroscepticism is still the most widely used concept to analyse 
parties’ negative stances to the EU, but why researchers should pay particular attention when applying 
it? 
A useful starting point to review the problems related to the concept of Euroscepticism is the 
composition of the term itself. ‘Euroscepticism’ consists of three main parts, the ‘Euro’ prefix, the 
‘sceptic’ component and the ‘ism’ suffix. The ‘Euro’ part blurs the distinction between the EU as a 
political system (Kassim 2003; Kreppel 2012; Mair 2013) and Europe as a geographically situated set of 
peoples grouped in States. This led scholars to stress that it would be worth eliminating such semantic 
confusion (Cotta 2016). Despite this, it may be associated with a tangible object of criticism and used as 
a proxy for the EU or the European integration project. The second element, the ‘sceptic’ component, 
as reported in the Oxford Dictionary recalls the attitude of a person who questions the truth of 




particular question12. In the context of our word the ‘sceptic’ part refers to the contraposition to the 
pro-EU ‘religious orthodoxy’ (Cotta 2016), an intellectual posture of doubt with regard to the object, 
the EU, the European integration project or Europe13, as well as a generic attitude of doubt or a 
disposition of disbelief toward the EU (the European integration project or Europe). The last part of 
the word, the ‘ism’ suffix is a component widely used to refer to ideologies. However, the use of this 
suffix clashes with the findings of the literature assessing that Euroscepticism is not an ideology per se, 
it might be considered as a ‘thin-centred ideology’ but it is more usefully viewed as a component or a 
local application of other major ideologies (Flood 2002; Vasilopoulou 2009; Usherwood 2017; Flood 
and Soborski 2017). Consequently, starting from the literal meaning of each single components of the 
term, Euroscepticism is equated to an ideologically, intellectually, religiously-driven posture of doubts 
toward a belief system that represents the EU or the European integration project: not a clear concept 
so far.  
A second major problem related to Euroscepticism is its normativity. Euroscepticism is in fact a 
clearly negatively constructed concept (Crespy and Verschueren 2009, Usherwood 2017) that can easily 
be misused in political competition for strategic reasons (Neumayer 2008; Flood 2002; Verzichelli 
Pellegrino 2016; Cotta 2016; Caruso 2016) both in intra-party (see the above-motioned example of 
Margaret Thatcher) and in inter-party competition. In other words, it is easy for European political 
leaders to point their finger toward Eurosceptic parties accusing them to be the major cause of EU’s 
problems, warning that the EU is currently facing a ‘battle for survival against nationalism’14. This is the 
main reason why several political groups refused being labelled as Eurosceptic and decided either to 
adopt other names like ‘Eurorealist’, a term used by the European Reformist and Conservatives (ECR) 
group in the EP to rebrand their stances toward the European integration project (Leruth 2017), or to 
become the voices of alternatives to the current form of the EU like in the case of the European 
United Left-Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL) political group that took as its motto: ‘Another Europe is 
possible’ (in terms of national parties see the cases of SYRIZA in Greece, but also the Spanish 
PODEMOS, not objecting Europe per se, but delineating alternatives to the integration course). It is to 
be noted that also the academic sphere has played its role in identifying Euroscepticism as a negative 
phenomenon. While confining Euroscepticism to the margins of political reality could be seen as 
legitimate in the early years of research, this normative approach continued also in more recent works, 
where scholars treat Euroscepticism as a phenomenon to be ‘confronted with’ (Usherwood, Startin and 
                                                        
12  As a matter of fact, the first antonyms of “sceptic” is “believer” 
(http://www.thesaurus.com/browse/sceptic?s=t) 
13 As far as it makes sense for a party to be opposed to Europe as a geographical area or as a set of 
countries.  
14  Junker’s declaration in front of the EP. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3788765/EU-
faces-battle-survival-warns-President-Juncker-points-murder-Polish-man-Britain-example-happens-
nationalism-allowed-fester.html  
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Guerra 2013) or to be ‘responded to’ (Leconte 2015, 264). In other words, Euroscepticism has 
generally been treated as pathology or as a malaise of the EU. This tendency might also find its origin 
in a diffuse pro-European bias among scholars in the field. As reported by Leconte ‘EU studies have 
long been influenced by the proximity between many EU experts and EU Institutions, or, at least, by 
the shared belief in the durability of the integration process’ (Leconte 2015, 252). This same proximity 
may have influenced the process of theorization of the concept itself that, as its current construction 
suggests, seems to reflect also this pro-EU bias: ‘support for European integration is implicitly 
identified with support for one specific form of European integration: the one that dominated the EU 
throughout the 80s and the 90s’ (Kaniok 2012, 40).  
 Thirdly, and connected to the second point, being negatively constructed, the term implies the 
recognition of a positive side, the pro-EU side which in its turn is not well specified. This is to say that 
defining both Eurosceptic and pro-EU attitudes, researchers are stuck in a theoretical deadlock since 
‘any definition of Euroscepticism presupposes a necessarily subjective definition of the EU’ (Leconte 
2015, 254, see also Kaniok 2012) and of the European integration project. The literature presents some 
attempts to define pro-EU stances of parties (see the typologies by Conti 2003, Conti and Verzichelli 
2003, Flood 2002 and Kopecký Mudde 2002 mentioned above) that help researchers to avoid 
considering negative stances to the EU in isolation. However, these attempts classify support for 
European Integration as a monolithic unit, while proposing some variant in terms of opposition to the 
EU. This is to say that besides the implicit recognition of an undefined positive pole (pro-EU), there is 
also a tacit assumption of what the EU and the European integration project consist of. The 
Manichean distinction between what is positive and what is negative about the EU is connected to the 
implicit assumption that there is only one viable way to integrate Europe that is the one unanimously 
shared by those mainstream parties that have dominated the process of European integration until 
today. Consequently, all those forces expressing any sort of opposition to the European integration 
process are ‘automatically’ to be framed as opponents of the process. But, wouldn’t it be possible to 
find forms of opposition that are not destructive but constructive? Wouldn’t it be possible for some 
political actors to express criticism of the EU that goes in the direction of more integration but 
following alternative paths? In summary, on the one hand, a reconceptualisation of Euroscepticism 
helps researchers to disentangle parties’ stances to the EU, while, on the other hand, it helps the 
literature to consider criticism toward the EU – or at least part of it – as more ‘legitimate’.  
The fourth problem concerning Euroscepticism is related to the mere absence of a commonly 
shared definition of it. If it is true that Euroscepticism should be seen as an umbrella concept hosting a 
panoply of different voices (Taggart 1998, Flood 2002, Mudde 2002; Vasilopoulou 2009, 2013), the 
analytical application of one of the definitions mentioned above may lead to stretch the concept of 




cases, rather inclusive (Vasilopoulou 2013; Cotta 2016). Researchers who use one of the above-presented 
typologies risk either not to capture all the nuances of criticism toward the EU or to categorize actors 
as opponents when they are not. In this latter case, if the researcher opts to apply a ‘rather inclusive’ 
typology, then the risk is to categorize any form of critique to the European integration project as an 
expression of Euroscepticism, consequently removing an important function to the EU political 
system: the ability to receive feedbacks and react to them (Kaniok 2012)15.  
Connected to the previous point, one last bias consists in the fact that researchers dealing with 
parties’ positioning on the EU generally tend to consider the EU or the European integration project as 
a monolithic unit avoiding to identify the targets of opposition16. As reported by Krouwel and Abts 
(2007) in their analysis of popular Euroscepticism, if it is evident that the concept of Euroscepticism 
evocates negative feeling that may cover a variety of different intensities, the targets of dissatisfaction 
are still not clearly defined and ‘vary from the very idea of European integration to EU institutions, EU 
policies or its politicians’ (Krouwel and Abts 2007, 253)17. Similarly also Weßel (2007) applying the 
theoretical framework proposed by Easton (1965) distinguishes between the various targets of 
opposition’ to the European political regime as the authorities; the regime; and the community. To put 
it more simply: what is that parties, political actors, the masses or any form of organised actor oppose? 
The entire EU? The policies it enacts? Its institutions? Its political establishment?  
This literature review has sketched the problems related to the use of Euroscepticism as the 
central concept of research. To overcome such problems, this work proposes to reconceptualise 
Euroscepticism starting from a more neutral concept at the basis of the development of democracies: 
political opposition. The next section reviews this concept, stressing its problematic aspects and 
proposes a theorization of critical stances to the EU that further details the targets toward which 
opposition to the EU may be directed.  
 
                                                        
15 According to Kaniok (2012), the critical elements providing the EU political system with feedbacks 
are already chronically neglected or under evaluated by the EU political elite, something that scholars 
should avoid.  
16 As recent studies suggest those groups or movements opposing the EU are equated by some sense of 
disliking the general object (the EU). However, assessing what the EU is open to dispute. In some 
countries, other European institutions suffer under ‘collateral scepticism’ purely because they have the 
word ‘European’ in their name (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2017; Startin 2015). 
17 In their study of popular Euroscepticism Krouwel and Abts argue that negative sentiments to the EU 
should be seen alongside two main axes: the first one identifies the targets of discontent as the 
authorities, the institutions composing the political system and the political community. The second 
axis refers to the degree of intensity and reflexivity of the expressed judgement (how much people are 
able to monitor the political environment; how much the system is open to evaluations and how much 
information is available; how much people are able to differentiate between the targets) (Krouwel and 
Abts 2007; Vasilopoulou 2017).  
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2.3 Opposition as an alternative to Euroscepticism 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, before defining opposition to the EU, it is important to 
understand the general objects toward which political parties’ attitudes are oriented (the EU and the 
European integration project), unpacking all its potential targets. In fact, as rightly pointed out by 
Kaniok (2012), the whole body of conceptualization of Euroscepticism implies a hidden assumption: 
everybody knows what the EU is, which kind of polity it is, which are its positive sides and how it will 
transform through time. In other words, the EU is conceived as a ‘structure’ that sooner or later is 
going to become a federation of member states. If this is the general conception of the EU, then it 
follows that the only options left to political parties are either to support it (be Europeist) or to exercise 
a systemic opposition to it (be Eurosceptic). For the purposes of this study, it is of primary importance 
to understand what the EU consists of, moving then to delineate the potential objects of criticism.   
This work starts from the basic assumption that the EU should be considered as a political 
system (Kreppel 2002; Kassim 2003; Hix and Høyland 1999 and 2011; Mair 2013; Brack 2018; Brack 
and Costa 2017). Understanding the EU as a political system enables researchers to observe 
‘Euroscepticism’ as a natural component of the system, thus avoiding considering it from a normative 
perspective.  
Taking back the work done by David Easton (1975) and further deepened by Pippa Norris 
(1999), political support within a political system may be directed to a series of objects: the political 
community, the regime and the political authorities. Drawing a parallel with the European level, it is 
thus possible to argue that support for the EU ranges from: a) support to the EU political authorities; 
b) support for the EU institutions (e.g. specific formal institutions like the European Parliament or the 
European Commission); c) support for the EU policies configuring the main outputs of the interaction 
between EU institutions (Almond and Powell 1966) and d) support for the process of widening and 
deepening the European Integration (along the national-supranational axis) alongside the support for 
the principles and the values underpinning the EU political community.  
These considerations on political support could be applied to political opposition to the various 
objects of the EU (Weßels 2007)18 . However, as observed in the previous chapter, the lack of an 
institutionalised government vs. opposition distinction coupled with a restricted definition of political 
opposition in the literature led scholar to argue against the presence of a proper opposition in the EP 
and to frame opposition in terms of its anti-systemic characteristics (Helms 2004; Helms 2008; Mair 
2007, 2013). This section firstly focuses on the biases connected to the concept of political opposition 
presenting a flexible definition to be applied to the case of the EU (sub-section 2.3.1). Secondly, it 
                                                        
18 It is to be noted that the lack of support might also include indifference (Weßel 2007). This work also 
considers potential indifferent stances to the various EU-targets, see below and chapter 4 (see Chapter 




explains the reasons why scholars are reluctant to talk about political opposition at the supranational 
level (sub-section 2.3.2). 
 
2.3.1 Political opposition: a brief literature review 
 
The concept of political opposition19 has always been conceived as a key element of democracies. 
According to Dahl, opposition represents the first axis (alongside the ‘inclusion/participation’ axis) that 
constitutes polyarchies (Dahl 1971) and it is one of ‘the three great milestones in the development of 
democratic institutions’ (Dahl 1966, xiii).  
In spite of its centrality for the study of democracy, Brack and Weinblum observe how the 
theorization of political opposition is still anchored to the classical works conducted by eminent 
researchers in the 60s and the 70s. Scholars like Dahl (1966), Ionescu and De Madariaga (1968) and 
Schapiro (1972) conceptualized opposition in the context of Western European democracies where 
strong political parties played a relevant role in the major political arenas of national Parliaments (Brack 
and Weinblum 2011). However, since then the political reality has evolved and quite strong changes 
took place like the democratization of ex-authoritarian states, the regionalization of Unitarian states, 
changes at the level of the executive-legislative relationship, changes in the role performed by parties 
and the development of the supranational political system of the EU (Brack and Weinblum 2011, 70).  
Furthermore, opposition is generally conceived as a concept implying contraposition between 
one body and another body (Norton 2008). In a nutshell, this is to say that political opposition has 
been generally equated to the legitimate contraposition between parties composing the governing 
majority and those pertaining to the non-governing minority where the objective of the latter is to take 
the place of the former. This is the approach of Dahl’s minimal definition of political opposition: 
‘[S]uppose that A determines the conduct of some aspects of the government of a particular political 
system during some interval (…). Suppose that during that interval B cannot determine the conduct of 
the government; and B is opposed to the conduct of government by A. Than B is what we mean by an 
opposition’ (Dahl 1966, xviii). 
Proposing an in-depth review of the classical literature, Brack and Weinblum argue that, beside 
the fact that there is still no clear-cut definition of political opposition, the legacy of the traditional 
literature on more contemporary studies engenders three (rather interconnected) biases concerning: the 
locus of political opposition, the actors exercising political opposition and the ‘repertoires of action’ 
                                                        
19 This work focuses on political opposition expressed by organized actors (more specific political 
parties) working within the institutional arena of the EP. However, this theoretical chapter does not 
aim at excluding any other form of political opposition, expressed by any other type of organized actor. 
The only form of opposition that is excluded is the one exercised by non-organized actors or actors not 
belonging to the political context. 
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alongside the objectives of political opposition. The classical theorization of opposition foresees a 
restricted conception of the arena where it can be enacted: parliaments. If it is on the one hand true 
that parliaments are the ‘privileged locus for the institutionalisation of political action in our 
contemporary democracies’ (Brack and Weinblum 2011, 73), on the other hand considering parliaments 
as the only place to exercise opposition is limiting. This is why Blondel encourages scholars to study 
forms of what he defines ‘extra-parliamentary opposition’ (Blondel 1996). Secondly, classical works 
have also a limited understanding of the actors exercising opposition: political parties composing the 
minority contrasting the governing majority. However, there are different modes of opposition that should 
be further studied: the inter-party mode of opposition (opposition of one party from within the 
coalition), the intra-party mode of opposition (opposition within the parties, also called factionalism), 
the cross-party mode of opposition (political parties exercising opposition on a specific policy issue 
independently from the majority or minority divide) and the non-party mode (actors exercising 
opposition on the bases of shared interests independently from political parties) (Norton 2008). 
Furthermore, Brack and Weinblum suggest that in some cases, like in the Nordic countries or in 
Switzerland, it is difficult to delineate which parties compose the minority opposed to the governing 
majority, generally because governing parties tend to rely on opposition parties to fulfil their duties. In a 
similar vein, also the EU political system does not foresee a majority vs. minority distinction in 
traditional terms. Third, constraining the concept of political opposition to the majority vs. minority 
divide also implies a restriction in terms of its objectives and functions (generally related to the 
construction of a viable alternative to the governing majority aiming to take its place). However, ‘it 
should not be taken for granted that the roles of opposition are only related, basically, to the purpose 
of controlling and restraining the exercise of power’ (Sartori 1971, 31). As seen previously, opposition 
may also work alongside the government in specific cases (see Nordic countries). Furthermore, 
opposition groups may also channel the voice of underrepresented minority groups in a society, or act 
as a communication channel or even represent a ‘safety valve’ (Sartori 1971, 32). According to its 
objectives, opposition has been defined either as ‘normal’ (Schapiro 1965), identifying parties with the 
main objective to replace the one holding governing positions or as ‘deviant’, considering all the other 
forms of opposition. Kirchheimer (1964) for example distinguishes between a ‘classic’ (loyal) 
opposition as the one that is legally recognised and proposes alternatives to the policies enacted by the 
governing majority and a ‘principled opposition’ opposing both the policies and the constitutionality of 
the political system. Similarly, Sartori recognises a difference between a ‘real opposition’ and an anti-
system opposition. Differently from the former, the latter does not accept the fundamentals of the 
regime thus opposing it on the basis of its principles. Sartori (1971) provides a further development of 
the notion of opposition tracing a difference between responsible (opposition that is potentially called 




not even wish to do that20). He also adds a further type of opposition that is neither constitutional nor 
responsible, termed as contestation. This differentiation has been further crystallised by Norton (2008) 
who delineates two broad categories of opposition: the one accepting the legitimacy of the political 
system and agreeing to work within it and the one rejecting and opposing the system (Norton 2008; 
Brack and Weinblum 2011).  
This normative conception of opposition had one main consequence: it helped the development 
of two separate fields of research about opposition, the one dealing with the ‘responsible’ flank and the 
other dealing with the unconstitutional side. Consequently, it contributed to negatively connote forms 
of opposition not belonging to the classical view. As Helms (2004) puts it, there is a quasi-theoretical 
distinction in opposition forms in Western European democracies that is widely used by authors and 
where parliamentary opposition is ‘considered to be the true form of opposition’ differently from other 
deviant ones (Helms 2004, 24). Consequently, the existence of these two separate fields of research 
affected the study of opposition within those political systems where alternation in government does 
not happen or is not foreseen as in the case object of this work (Mair 2007, Helms 2008). This 
happened against the warnings of eminent scholars in the field like Dahl who stated: ‘If all oppositions 
are treated as dangerous and subject to repression, opposition that would be loyal if tolerated becomes 
disloyal because it is not tolerated’ (Dahl 1973, 13). In summary, even if the classical majority vs. 
minority distinction does not strictly exist at the supranational level, this should not push scholars to 
consider all forms of opposition as non-legitimate, unconstitutional or irresponsible.  
Considering all the above-mentioned problematic aspects, Brack and Weinblum define 
opposition as: 
 
A disagreement with the government or its policies, the political elite or the political regime as a whole, expressed in 
the public sphere, by an organised actor through different modes of action. (Brack and Weinblum 2011, 74)  
 
This intentionally open definition provides sufficient room for manoeuvre to: a) be applied on 
different types of organized actors (among them we find of course the political parties) and b) observe 
it from the inside and the outside of the parliamentary arena. This definition has two further properties: 
firstly, it is extremely flexible and applicable to all political systems. Secondly, it precisely highlights the 
objects toward which it can be directed, as the government (as in the classical government vs. opposition 
divide), the policies that the government enacts (as for example in the case of the aforementioned 
cross-party mode of political opposition), the political elite (to be conceived as both governing and 
opposition forces as for example in the case of populist parties) and the political regime as a whole.  
                                                        
20 Sartori (1971) recognises two types of irresponsible (constitutional) opposition: a semi-responsible 
and a fully-fledged irresponsible opposition.  
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Once identified the targets of opposition, it is furthermore possible to delve deeper in its 
character questioning if it is pragmatic thus criticizing one of the aforementioned targets out of 
pragmatic considerations or principled thus a priori rejecting all or some of the mentioned targets.  
Being extremely flexible I argue that this definition can be applied to the supranational sphere of 
the EU aiming at re-conceptualizing the debated concept of Euroscepticism. However, before moving 
in this direction, it is important to understand why scholars are so reluctant to talk about political 
opposition at the supranational level of the EU. The next paragraph accomplishes this task. 
2.3.2 Why are scholars reluctant to talk about opposition at the EU level?  
 
Van der Eijk and Franklin refer to popular contestation of the EU as a ‘sleeping giant’ arguing 
that ‘[i]t is only a matter of time before policy entrepreneurs in some countries seize the opportunity 
(…) to differentiate themselves from other parties in the EU’ (Van der Eijk and Franklin 2004, 47). In 
other words, sooner or later parties opposing the EU will successfully use the anti-EU issue to gain 
consensus. The last EP elections are an evidence signalling that this time might have come. As 
underlined before, the EU has been previously described as a political system (Kreppel 2002; Hix 2005, 
Hix and Høyland 1999 and 2011). Thus, being the EU a political system, it should be natural to talk 
about both political support and political opposition in a non-normative way. However, scholars are 
still reluctant to talk about opposition at the supranational level mainly for reasons related to the same 
EU’s construction. 
Starting from the classical view about opposition (governing majority vs. opposition minority), 
scholars have rightly underlined the difficulty of recognising sources and manifestations of 
parliamentary opposition in a polity ‘in the absence of a sufficiently clear understanding as to what or 
whom the opposition is directed against’ (Helms 2008, 213, see also, Mair 2007, 2013). To put it more 
simply, if political opposition is conceived as the majority vs. minority divide then there is no possibility 
to observe it at the supranational level 21 , just because there is no precise definition of what the 
government of the EU should consist of 22 .  As already observed in chapter 1 of this work, the 
                                                        
21 This absence of a stable government vs. opposition divide has also been empirically confirmed by 
Stefano Braghiroli, who analysing roll call votes (RCVs) in the EP discovers a shifting majority vs. 
minority divide in the EP depending on the issue at stake (Braghiroli 2015). 
22 To solve this dilemma, scholars propose three viable solutions: some authors envisage the presence 
of a ‘dual executive’ at the EU level, where both the Commission and the Council cover governing 
positions (Hix 2005), some others describe the EU as a two chamber system, where the Council is a 
powerful Senate, an upper house working together with the EP (especially after the Lisbon Treaty 
when the co-decision procedure was re-named ordinary legislative procedure becoming the main 
legislative procedure of the EU), while the Commission holds a governing position (Helms 2008). 
Other scholars describe the EU as a system of government characterised by a ‘sharing of decision 
making power among four institutions’ (Fabbrini 2015, 33): a dual executive composed by the 




institutional complexity of the EU (the same EU as a construct) has led to its depoliticisation: ‘we 
cannot organize opposition in the EU – we cannot appeal for votes against the government in election 
or in parliament – because the EU has been depoliticised’ (Mair 2007, 7). The elite-led project of 
European integration gave origin to a multilevel structure of the EU polity 23 that has blurred the 
distinction between the ‘channels’ available to parties to express their political opposition (national or 
supranational). On the one hand, citizens might seek to exercise control on their ‘delegates’ 24 
populating the EU institutions through both national and the supranational elections; on the other 
hand, parties might use the EU issue in both channels to attract votes. However, due to the very 
construction of the EU, these two channels overlap in two main ways: firstly, issues and appointments 
are decided on the basis of two channels at the same time; secondly the same delegates generally 
populates both levels: ‘the same political parties, subject to control by the same political leadership and 
by the same organized membership, compete in both channels’ (Mair 2007, 8-9). Consequently, an 
institutionalised form of opposition at the supranational level is almost impossible to be achieved 
(opposition in the EU) and opposing forces tend to express harsher forms of opposition (opposition to 
the EU) (Mair 2007, 2013).  
What this work proposes is not to ignore the different configuration of the supranational level 
‘polity’ but rather to argue that in spite of these limitations it is still possible and useful to think about 
Euroscepticism in a non-normative and unbiased way through a reconceptualization of it in terms of 
EU-opposition exercised in the EP. Furthermore, the neutral definition of political opposition 
provided by Brack and Weinblum represents a valid alternative suited to unpack the notion of 
Euroscepticism tracking more precisely what it entails.  
Starting from the limits that political opposition has to face at the supranational level, the next 
section proposes an adaptation of Brack and Weinblum’s definition of political opposition to the 




                                                                                                                                                                                        
Treaty) and the Commission, working together with a bicameral legislative branch constituted by the 
EP (the lower house) and the Council (the upper house). 
23 This concept has been studied in-depth by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2001) who refers to the 
EU as a multilevel governance.  
24 Mair uses the term ‘delegates’ in Strøm’s sense (Strøm, Müller and Bergam 2003). In the case of the 
EU there are two channels of delegations: firstly, legislators at national level delegate the executive 
branch to compose the national government and, consequently, the Council of Ministers and the 
European Council. Secondly, European voters delegate their national representatives through a direct 
election of the EP.  
Chapter 2: Reconceptualising Euroscepticism in terms of EU-opposition 
 
 33 
2.4 Defining EU-opposition 
 
Brack and Weinblum’s definition of political opposition (2011) highlights four precise targets 
toward which opposition may be directed. To recall them: 
1. Opposition to the government with the main aim to propose an alternative policy program and 
maybe take its place; 
2. Opposition to the policies that the government enacts aiming at changing them more or less 
radically; 
3. Opposition to the political elite (actors belonging both to the governing and to the opposition 
establishment) (Cotta 2016); 
4. Opposition to the political regime proposing to change it more or less radically (e.g.: proposing 
the reformation of the institutional setting).  
 
As observed in the previous paragraph a major limitation that led scholars to argue against the 
presence of political opposition at the EU level is the absence of a ‘government’ defined in the classical 
terms. It is true that one may argue that opposing the European Commission (EC) in its activity or for 
its stances with respect to some specific policies may be conceived as a sort of opposition to the 
government of the EU. However, a similar reasoning could be applied to the Council as well as to the 
European Council or the growing powers and centrality of some prominent EU-leaders (e.g., Juncker). 
One may, in fact, argue that criticism targeting this or that specific leader should be considered as a 
critique to the government of the EU. However, such criticism (apart from being captured from the 
EU-elite target) will not be stable through time. Furthermore, changes in leaders’ positioning with 
respect to some specific policy should not be equated to changes in the ‘EU-government’ positioning 
within that specific policy field. It thus follows that, despite recognizing the potential limitations of 
excluding the first target, since it is not precisely defined, it is better to observe forms of opposition to 
EU institutions or to specific EU-leaders as forms of opposition to the EU-regime or to the EU-elite 
targets (see below for further details) (Carlotti 2017). 
In spite of this limitation, political opposition may still be directed to the other three remaining 
targets. A party can oppose the policies enacted by the EU (target 2); the elite configured as the entire 
political establishment (both mainstream and opposition parties) as well as the panoply of functionaries 
vital to the work of the EU (target 3); and the EU regime (target 4) encompassing the EU institutions, 
their performance and the values underpinning them (Krouwel and Abts 2007).  
As Cotta (2016) rightly points out, when dealing with opposition to the EU it is of particular 





x ‘The existing political community with the central objective of changing, more or less radically, its 
borders for example through a secession’ (Cotta 2016, 238). 
 
This target encompasses forms of political opposition related to the undefined general idea of 
European integration as well as conceiving it as a common good for Europe. Moreover, it concerns 
also ‘the basic political principles and values that underpin the transnational European democracy’ 
(Krouwel and Abts 2007, 257) and conceives the EU as a player securing peace prosperity and 
democracy. In other words, forms of opposition targeting the political community relate to the 
identification with the political community itself. Consequently, as further detailed below, forms of 
opposition referring to this target may preach for a more or less stronger reformulation of the 
community itself (along the national, supranational axis) as well as stronger forms of opposition asking 
to redesign the borders of the community (see the Brexit framed as a direct victory scored by EU-
opponents). However, a further specification of this target should be added: an actor (e.g. a political 
party) may, in fact, oppose or support one of the geometries resulting from the process of European 
integration. The implementation of some specific policies (e.g., the common monetary policy) also 
defines a territorial scope of that policy (e.g., the Euro area). A party may demand either the exit of its 
country from the group of Member States constituting the ‘territorial scope’ of a specific policy or the 
elimination of that ‘territorial scope’ or the reformation of the rules governing it (Carlotti 2017). Taking 
as an example the Euro area, a party can either preach for the reformation of the policies governing the 
Euro area, or demand the exit of its country from the Euro area or (in most extreme cases) the 
dissolution of the Euro area.  
 The four delineated targets (EU-policies, EU-elite, EU-regime and EU-community alongside the 
various EU-geometries) are in line with the general assumption of this work that considers the EU as a 
political system (see section 2.3 above). This is to say that the outlined targets of EU-opposition match 
the objects of political support as delineated by Easton (1975). 
Taking into account the specificities of the EU political system alongside the characteristics of its 
targets and starting from Brack and Weinblum’s definition of political opposition, this work defines 
EU-opposition as:  
 
A disagreement with the policies enacted by the EU, its political elite, the EU institutions and the 
political community as a whole alongside the various geometries deriving from the process of 
European integration, expressed in the public sphere, by an organized actor through different 
modes of action25. 
                                                        
25 This work considers the speeches delivered by national parties’ representatives as modes of action used 
to express their opposition to the EU. Surely enough, MEPs might also use votes to express their 
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Such definition of EU-opposition implies also the definition of its positive counterpart: political 
support for the EU or EU-support. In other words, applying this definition to the study of political 
parties enables the researcher to understand the targets of both political opposition and political 
support to the EU.  
Once the targets toward which political opposition may be oriented are detailed, it is important 
to underline a further characteristic of EU-opposition: its character. For this purpose, it is possible to 
draw a parallel with Taggart and Szczerbiak’s hard-soft dichotomy. Similarly to Euroscepticism, also 
EU-opposition entails a ‘harder’ and a ‘softer’ pole, more precisely, a principled form of opposition 
(principled opposition to the EU-policies, the EU-elite, the EU-regime and the EU-community) and a 
more pragmatic and contingent one (pragmatic opposition to the EU-policies, the EU-elite, the EU-
regime and the EU-community). In the case of pragmatic opposition, parties justify their criticism 
toward one of the studied targets on the basis of a ‘‘means-ends’ type of rationality where actors are 
considered to take decisions made on calculations of utility based on a given set of interests’ (Sjursen 
2002, 494). For example, a party A opposes the target EU-elite because a specific politician does not 
have the required qualities to accomplish her or his tasks. On the contrary, principled opposition refers 
to normative arguments based on claims about values or moral standards of justice and legitimacy 
(Wendler 2016). For example, a party B opposes the EU-elite on a principled basis because a specific 
politician does not have the moral qualities to accomplish her or his duties (e.g.: accusations of 
corruption). As stressed before the same consideration holds true also for the counterpart of EU-
opposition: EU-support. It is, in fact, imaginable that a party expresses support to the four delineated 
targets, which is either principled (principle-based support for the EU-policies, the EU-elite, the EU-
regime or the EU-community) or pragmatic (pragmatic support for the EU-policies, the EU-elite, the 
EU-regime or the EU-community). Crossing the two above-delineated characteristics of EU-
opposition (target and character), Table 2.1 below presents a set of guidelines to understand parties’ 
positioning on the EU.  
 





Character of party 







Principled Principled support 
Support Pragmatic Pragmatic support: Conditional 
Support 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
opposition. However, as further detailed in chapter 4 (See Chapter 4, section 4.3.1), MEPs’ are freer to 
express themselves through speeches than through votes. However, any other mode of action might be 




None None No-commitment 
Opposition Principled Principled Opposition: Total 
Rejection 






Support Pragmatic Pragmatic support: Conditional 
Support 
None None No-commitment 
Opposition Principled Principled Opposition: Total 
rejection 




Support Principled Principled Support 
Support Pragmatic Pragmatic support: Conditional 
Support 
None None No-commitment 
Opposition Principled Principled Opposition: Total 
rejection 





Support Principled Principled Support 
Support Pragmatic Pragmatic support: Conditional 
Support 
None None No-commitment 
Opposition Principled Principled Opposition: Total 
Rejection 




Support Principled Principled support 
Support Pragmatic Pragmatic support: Conditional 
Support 
None None No-commitment 
Opposition Principled Principled Opposition: Total 
Rejection 
Opposition Pragmatic 
Pragmatic Opposition: Partial 
Rejection 
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A party may also decide to express ‘no commitment’ or judgement toward one of the discussed 
targets, thus lacking a specific positioning toward that specific target. Similarly to Conti’s typology of 
party attitudes to the EU (2003), this work considers such stances as neutral26. The below-presented 
description of Table 2.1 intentionally takes this attitude for granted.  
Starting from the first target, a party may decide to oppose or support the EU-policies either in a 
pragmatic or in a principled way. For what concerns opposition, a party may pragmatically oppose EU-
policies accepting the general policy framework but rejecting some specific part of it out of pragmatic 
considerations. On the other hand, a party expressing principled opposition to a specific EU-policy 
rejects it on the basis of normative argumentations. For example, a party rejects EU-asylum policies on 
the basis of its nationalistic stances. In a similar vein, also support to the EU-policies may be either 
pragmatic (utility-based considerations) or principled (normative-based considerations).  
The EU-elite target encompasses attitudes to the EU-authorities: politicians, functionaries and 
institutional actors (Serricchio, Tsakatika, and Quaglia 2013). This target is intentionally defined in a 
broad way to encompass both the ‘governing’ elite (e.g.: commissioners) and the ‘opposition elite’ (e.g.: 
MEPs belonging to so-called Eurosceptic parties). This broad definition of the EU-elite enables the 
observation of both mainstream and EU-opponents attitudes vis-à-vis this target. In a similar vein, 
Vasilopoulou et al. (2014) study populism in the Greek political system as a form of ‘blame-shifting’ 
happening between the various political actors throughout the domestic political debate. Their main 
conclusion is that there are two types of ‘blame-shifting’ in the Greek political system: the mainstream 
blame-shifting and fringe blame-shifting (Vasilopoulou et al. 2014, 401). The former is exercised by 
mainstream parties (generally parties of government) and it is directed against few actors (generally 
challenger parties or external elite). The latter is instead exercised by smaller parties and it is directed 
against a wider array of actors (like governing parties, parties of opposition, external elite and so on). 
Thus, even if it is true that the expression of criticism toward the EU-elite target exercised by 
mainstream parties could be seen as a normal adversarial dynamic within the parliamentary arenas 
(national parties belonging to the ‘grand coalition’ blame their ‘challengers’), adopting a broad 
definition of the EU-elite allows the study to observe if and how the mainstream reacts vis-à-vis their so-
called Eurosceptic challengers. Parties’ stances to the broadly-defined EU-elite target concern two main 
dimensions: the first one implies a judgement of the moral values and conduct of the EU-elite that taps 
into assessments concerning how much the elite is committed, motivated, reliable, consistent and 
integer in its activity. The second one concerns evaluations about the performance of the EU-elite: how 
much it is competent, efficient, skilful and productive in exercising its duties (Levi and Stoker 2000; 
Krouwel and Abts 2007). Thus a party supporting the elite in a principled way will exalt its moral-
                                                        
26 The empirical part of this work aims at registering also potential neutral stances toward the above-




ethical conduct, while, a party opposing this target in a principled way will denigrate the moral aspects 
of EU-elite (e.g., accusing the EU elite to be corrupted). Whereas, a party that supports or opposes the 
EU-elite in a pragmatic way will focus on its ability to accomplish its tasks.  
The EU-regime target encompasses judgements of specific EU institutions (e.g.: the EP, the EC, 
the Council of Ministers and so on) either in terms of their performance or of the values and principles 
underpinning them. On the one hand, the expression of a pragmatic attitude (support or opposition) is 
associated with the performance of such institutions: how much such institutions are able, skilful 
effective and efficient in solving specific problems. Thus pragmatic opposition to the EU-institutions 
consists of a negative judgement of the performance of the whole complex of EU-institutions or part 
of them. Consequently, pragmatic support implies a positive judgement of the action performed by 
EU-institutions and does not involve any reference to the values, the norms and the principles 
underpinning them. On the other hand, principled expressions (both positive and negative) refer to 
judgements concerning the sphere of the values, norms and principles underpinning EU-institutions. In 
extreme cases, these forms of opposition imply the total rejection of a specific or of all the EU-
institutions (e.g.: AFD’s denial of the powers of the European Central Bank). On the contrary, 
principled support exalts the values, the norms and the principles beneath EU-institutions.  
For what concerns opposition to the EU-community, parties criticising this target on a principled 
basis do not identify themselves with the EU-community. They reject the very idea of the EU, criticise 
the impact that the EU-community exercises on member states’ sovereignty considered as of special 
value, refuse to enlarge it (both in terms of widening and deepening the EU), and would like to modify 
more or less radically the borders of the community (e.g.: through a secession). While parties exercising 
a pragmatic opposition to the EU-community identify themselves with the EU-community but are 
pragmatically critical of the EU (using utility-based argumentations). Such parties generally accept the 
values of European democracy, however, they are critical of the current state of the EU. With reference 
to the support side, parties supporting the EU-community on a principled basis do identify themselves 
in the EU-community, accepting and exalting its values. Whereas parties pragmatically supporting the 
EU-community express a positive evaluation of the EU and accept the values of the EU-community 
but propose reforms of it on the basis of pragmatic argumentations. As mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, a similar reasoning should be applied also to the territorial geometries deriving from the 
process of European integration. Even in this case, parties can express support or opposition, which 
are either principled or pragmatic. A party expressing principled support for one of the EU-geometries 
(e.g.: EMU or Schengen area) share the values, the principles and the rules underlying that specific 
geometry also aiming at expanding its territorial borders (e.g.: the entrance of new member states in the 
Euro area). Conversely, a party expressing pragmatic support for a specific EU-geometry (e.g.: 
Schengen area) is more oriented to support contingent factors. With reference to the negative side of 
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parties’ stances to the EU (opposition), a party expressing principled opposition to a specific EU-
geometry rejects its mere existence and would like to opt for the redefinition of the territorial borders 
of its application (e.g.: preaching for the exit from the EMU or from the Schengen area). Conversely, a 
party exercising pragmatic opposition to a specific EU-geometry does not reject the existence of that 
geometry per se but contests some of its specific aspects out of pragmatic considerations. 
 
2.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter reviews the origins of the concept of Euroscepticism and presents the theoretical 
developments aimed at defining it, particularly focusing on the critical points connected to the use of 
Euroscepticism as a central concept for the empirical analysis. It then reconceptualises Euroscepticism 
in terms of political opposition. After a brief literature review concerning the concept of political 
opposition, this chapter has provided a definition of EU-opposition that disentangles the targets 
toward which it can be addressed as the EU-policies, the EU-elite, the EU-regime and the EU-
community alongside the geometries deriving from the process of European integration. The concept 
of EU-opposition implicitly encompasses also indications about support for the EU and its various 
targets. Furthermore, the chapter also stresses the differences in the character that EU-opposition may 
assume: either principled or pragmatic. Crossing the two characteristics of parties’ positioning – 
direction and quality – this work proposes a set of guidelines to better disentangle parties’ positioning 
on the EU and to answer the central research question of this work: Which aspects of the EU do 
national parties oppose from within the arena of the EP?  
The guidelines reported in the previous section should not be seen as a fixed and stable typology. 
On the contrary, they provide researchers with a set of ideal type positioning on the EU (including 
negative, positive and ‘neutral’ stances). Parties’ positioning on the EU may, in fact, vary in terms of 
both the addressed targets and the endorsed character. In other words, this work argues that EU-
opposition should be considered as phenomenon varying according to the issue at stake, the period and 
the context of observation (national, supranational level).  
The use of the concept of EU-opposition presents four main advantages when compared to the 
one of Euroscepticism. Firstly, starting from the composition of the term itself, differently from 
Euroscepticism, EU-opposition does not report any conceptual confusion concerning its general 
object. In other words, while the ‘Euro’ component of Euroscepticism blurs the distinction between 
the EU and Europe as a geographical area, the concept of EU-opposition unequivocally identifies the 
EU political system as the central object of criticism. Furthermore, while the ‘sceptic’ component 
points toward a sort of posture of doubt, opposition refers to disagreement with one of the proposed 




‘ism’ suffix reminds an ideology, EU-opposition as a term does not necessarily refer to any ‘ideological 
roots’ but rather refers to an action or position that a party may decide to perform or endorse.  
Secondly, conceptualizing parties’ positioning following the theoretical indications provided in 
the previous section, allows researchers to avoid describing criticism of the EU in a normative way. 
This is to say that EU-opposition does not imply a normative judgement of the party performing the 
action. While the term Euroscepticism can be easily used to denigrate political competitors, EU-
opposition is more ‘neutral’. Even if it also considers harsh forms of criticism such as the one directed 
to the very existence of the EU-community, it does not treat the opponents as the pathology of the 
European democracy (Leconte 2015), but as an important component of the system itself, thus aiming 
at framing criticism toward the EU as a more ‘legitimate’ phenomenon.  
Thirdly, similarly to the concept of Euroscepticism, also the one of EU-opposition presupposes 
the existence of a positive side. However, in the case of EU-opposition, the positive side is defined as 
the counterpart of EU-opposition, EU-support. This is to say that delineating the targets and the 
character of EU-opposition implies also a clear-cut distinction between the targets and the related 
character of EU-support. Such clear-cut distinction reduces the risk of conceptual stretching related to 
Euroscepticism. Furthermore, the distinction between different ‘types’ of opposition (assuming a 
different character) helps researchers to understand if the broad flank of EU-opponents also reports 
forms of opposition that go in the direction of more integration rather than aiming at reducing it. 
Moreover, differently from Euroscepticism, the concept of EU-opposition may be applied not only to 
parties critical of the EU but also to the study of their mainstream counterparts. This last assertion 
opens up new questions for empirical research that will be partially addressed in this work such as: Is 
opposition to the EU to be relegated only to some specific type of parties such as those belonging to 
the nationalist family? Do mainstream parties express opposition to the EU? If the answer to this last 
question is positive, which are the aspects that mainstream parties oppose of the EU?  
Finally, differently from Euroscepticism, the above-presented guidelines do not consider the EU 
or the European integration process as a monolithic unit but proposes a way to unpack them. This is 
useful to provide an in-depth description of parties’ positioning avoiding flattering difference among 
them.  
The next chapter presents a model to observe Euroscepticism in the EP proposing a way to 
understand the causes behind parties’ positioning vis-à-vis the EU.  
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This chapter provides a theoretical framework to accomplish the second objective of this work: 
understanding what shapes patterns of EU-opposition in the EP.  
Similarly to the evolution of taxonomies and definitions of Euroscepticism, models dealing with 
understanding what shapes this controversial phenomenon evolved in close step with the development 
of the EU itself (Usherwood 2017). Researches about drivers of party-based Euroscepticism can be 
fundamentally divided between two main camps: those examining Euroscepticism as originating in 
party-political divisions at the national level (Taggart 1998; Sitter 2001, 2003) and those providing wide-
ranging explanations rooted in the existence of a new ‘social cleavage’ shaping parties’ positions on to 
the EU. 
Mudde has labelled these two branches of the literature as the ‘Sussex School’ the former, and 
the ‘North Carolina School’, the latter (Mudde 2012). Despite providing useful insights into the nature 
of ‘Euroscepticism’, more recent studies argue that the two schools still have a considerable way to go 
before addressing everything that concerns Euroscepticism (Usherwood 2017). Such models have in 
fact given very little consideration to the phenomenon in a transnational and in a pan-European 
perspective. The transnational dimension of ‘Euroscepticism’ refers to the coordination of opposition 
to the EU and the process of European integration as expressed across several countries, while the 
pan-European dimension of ‘Euroscepticism’ relates to the coordination of opposition to the EU and 
the European integration process as expressed at the supranational level, in institutions such as the EP 
(Leruth and Startin 2017).  
As mentioned before, this work focuses primarily on opposition to the EU in a pan-European 
perspective, in the EP. Since the models elaborated by the literature so far focus on the national 
political arenas of contestation, this work relies on the theoretical framework elaborated by Usherwood 
(2017) to study the formation of Eurosceptic groups both in a pan-European and in a transnational 
perspective. This model is based on the concept of Political Opportunity structures (POSs) elaborated 
by Kitschelt (1986) and enumerates three different sets of factors shaping the development of such 
forces in the above-mentioned contexts: 1) ideology as a factor endogenous to the group; 2) institutions 




the group (both intentional and unintentional events). While this theoretical framework has been 
formulated to study the emergence of both transnational and pan-European ‘Eurosceptic’ groups, this 
work applies it to the study of the found patterns of EU-opposition.  
As further detailed in the conclusive section, the application of this theoretical framework has 
three main advantages. Firstly, it enables researchers to consider factors that are both exogenous and 
endogenous to the studied actors (political parties). Secondly, it allows considering both the national 
and the supranational levels of analysis, something that is of crucial importance when dealing with the 
EU multilevel system of governance (Hooghe and Marks 2001, see also Helms 2008; Mair 2007; Cotta 
2016). Lastly, it merges together elements from both schools of Euroscepticism: the ‘Sussex school’ 
and the ‘North Carolina School’.  
This chapter firstly reviews the main models proposed by the literature to study Euroscepticism 
stressing their limitations and problematic aspects. It then presents the three different types of factors 
potentially influencing patterns of EU-opposition. The chapter then adapts the three sets of factors to 
the study of EU-opposition expressed by national parties within the EP (section 3.4) formulating six 
hypotheses alongside two general associations to be tested in chapter 7 of this work. The conclusive 
section summarizes the advantages deriving from the application of the presented framework.  
 
3.2 Strategy vs. ideology. Explaining Euroscepticism: the state of the art 
 
As observed in chapter 2 theorizations of Euroscepticism have been relatively scarce 
(Vasilopoulou 2013) and the literature still strives to produce exhaustive frameworks to understand the 
development of this phenomenon (Usherwood 2017). Euroscepticism was initially studied as a sub-
field of international relations rather than from a comparative politics perspective. The comparative 
study of Euroscepticism diffused mainly after the Maastricht Treaty aiming at understanding the 
variegated responses to the ever-deeper process of European integration. From the 90s onwards the 
boundaries between domestic and foreign policies become more blurred, consequently, also the 
demarcation between the ‘new EU studies’ and the traditional European studies becomes fuzzier. It is 
in this period that a ‘true cottage industry of Euroscepticism studies has emerged, which has given way 
to hundreds of publications in increasingly prominent journals’ (Mudde 2012, 193).  
While the literature explains Euroscepticism from the perspective of different actors (e.g., the 
public at large, the mass media, social movements and so on), this literature review focuses on political 
parties. In his article ‘The Comparative Study of Party-Based Euroscepticism: the Sussex versus the 
North Carolina Schools’, Mudde reviews studies explaining Euroscepticism dividing them, as the title 
of his work suggests, between two main schools: the so-called ‘Sussex School’ articulating around the 
works by Paul Taggart and the ‘North Carolina School’ originating from Ray's dissertation (1999) and 
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further developed in the work by Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks and Marco Steenbergen (see Hooghe, 
Marks, and Wilson 2002; Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Hooghe 2007; Hooghe and Marks 2007) 
(Mudde 2012). According to Mudde, these approaches differ in 1) the provided motivations at the basis 
of Euroscepticism; 2) the methods applied in the analysis (quantitative and qualitative methods); 3) the 
type of data used, and 4) the final scope of the research. This literature review focuses on the main 
aspects of these two schools specifically, on the scope of their research, and on the conclusions 
reached. 
The first school, the Sussex school1, as stressed in the previous chapter, devotes most of its 
efforts to conceptual issues alongside the cornerstone dichotomous distinction between ‘hard’ and 
‘soft’ Euroscepticism. The ‘bread and butter’ of the works originating from this school is the 
observation of Euroscepticism from a party-based perspective using qualitative methods and data and 
concluding that the roots of the phenomenon are to be found in party competition at the national level 
(Mudde 2012). The first scholar to provide an explanation of the nature of party-based Euroscepticism 
was Taggart defining the phenomenon as a ‘touchstone of domestic dissent’ (Taggart 1998). In his 
work, Taggart argues that ideology plays a role in shaping parties’ positions on the EU, however, it ‘[i]s 
not necessarily a guide to parties’ position on the EU’ (Taggart 1998, 379). In fact, the degree to which 
ideology serves as a constraint in determining parties’ stances to the EU depends on parties’ role in the 
national party system (government vs. opposition dynamics at the national level, including different 
types of opposition parties like ‘anti-system parties’). According to Taggart, in fact, parties covering 
political positions at the periphery of the national political system (e.g.: Single issue Eurosceptic parties 
or Protest-based parties with Euroscepticism2) do not consider the EU as a central issue. Lacking 
access to governmental offices at the national level, they are unlikely to influence decisions concerning 
the EU, since the policy-making in that area is mainly intergovernmental. However, the parties at the 
fringes of the national political system (especially the ones which identity is tied up with some particular 
issues like environmental protection or immigration) can in a relatively costless way take up the EU 
issue to strengthen their claims to be alternatives to the political centre, to be alternatives to the 
                                                        
1 The Sussex school takes its name from the University of Sussex where the European Parties Elections 
and Referendums Network – EPERN – is based. The network was established in 2003 and is currently 
jointly convened by Alekzs Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart. For further information see EPERN website 
at http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/research/europeanpartieselectionsreferendumsnetwork  
2 In his work Taggart recognizes four types of Eurosceptic parties to be found in the national party 
systems: the Single issue Eurosceptic parties (whose raison d’être is the opposition to the EU), the Protest based 
parties with Euroscepticism (for them the anti-EU position is an adjunct to their general opposition to the 
functioning of the political system, thus they stand outside the established group of parties), the 
Established parties with Eurosceptic positions (either parties that have covered governmental positions or 
parties that covers position close to the governmental one that adopt Eurosceptic positions) and the 
Eurosceptic factions (significant factions within the existing established party that endorse Eurosceptic 




political establishment. There are two main reasons explaining why the parties at the margins of 
national political competition take up the EU issue: the first one is connected to the construction of the 
EU (as an elite-led project) where the political establishment – the main ‘challenger’ of parties at the 
margins of the political competition – is dominated by pro-European stances. Consequently, the 
appropriation of the EU issue by ‘marginal’ parties could be seen as a way to differentiate themselves 
from the establishment. Second, as observed in chapter 2 (See Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3), pro-European 
positions are not well defined and are dominated by the tacit assumption that everyone knows what the 
EU is and in which direction the European integration process should progress. As a consequence, the 
EU issue is conceptually malleable. This malleability ‘allows different political forces to use scepticism 
(…) as a mobilising force’ (Taggart 1998, 385). Consequently, Euroscepticism is to be intended as a 
reaction of certain parties to the party system where they operate and to the ‘prevailing model of 
political party’ found in that national political system: the pro-European cartel of dominant parties 
(Taggart 1998, 384; see also Katz and Mair 1995). In a similar vein, Sitter conceives Euroscepticism as a 
government vs. opposition dynamic at the national level where patterns of competition translate the 
European issue into party politics (Halikiopoulou et al. 2012). According to Sitter, in fact, 
Euroscepticism is to be intended as the ‘politics of opposition’ (Sitter 2001, 23). Party-based 
Euroscepticism relates to several factors like voters alignments, ideology, interest and identity but also 
to party strategy and organization. However, all these factors are translated into party competition in 
the context of the national party system, thus if an extreme party (either from the left or from the right 
of the political spectrum) wishes to participate in governing coalition at the national level, it needs to 
mitigate its opposition to the EU.  
On the contrary, the original purposes of the second mentioned school, the North Carolina 
School, was to study parties’ positions on the European integration project in general, providing broad 
explanations of the phenomenon and relying on quantitative data and methods. It is, in fact, indicative 
that early works by these scholars did not even mention the term ‘Euroscepticism’ (Mudde 2012). 
Scholars affiliated to this school further developed the study of Euroscepticism not only from a party-
based perspective but also from other perspectives such as popular-based Euroscepticism (Eichenberg 
and Dalton 2007; Krouwel and Abts 2007; Gabel and Scheve 2007) and the diffusion of 
Euroscepticism in the media (Kriesi 2007; de Vreese 2007) 3 . According to these scholars, party-
ideology is the main driver of Euroscepticism (see also De Vries and Edwards 2009 and Flood and 
Soborski 2017 for further insight about the role of ideology in shaping parties' positions vis-à-vis the 
EU). As mentioned before, these works originates from Leonard Ray’s dissertation (1999) who later on 
                                                        
3 These works are contained in two special issues: one edited by Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, 
‘Understanding Euroscepticism’ (Hooghe and Marks 2007) and one edited by Liesbet Hooghe ‘What 
drives Euroscepticism?’ (Hooghe 2007).  
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published a research note4 presenting the results of his analysis of parties’ positions on the EU deriving 
from the observation of three main sources of data: parties’ manifestos, mass surveys (like the 
Eurobarometer) and an original expert survey5. While Ray’s objectives were descriptive (focused on 
parties’ positions on the EU and the increased salience of the EU as a result of the increased EU 
competencies), his work paved the way to the now famous Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) the first 
release of which was conducted in 19996. Later studies used the CHES dataset to understand parties’ 
positions on the EU, elaborating the famous 7-points index of parties’ positioning on the EU with the 
lowest score indicating strong opposition to the European integration and the highest score indicating 
strong support for it 7 . Nowadays the CHES is one of the most widely used sources of parties’ 
positioning on the EU (Bakker et al. 2015). Building on Lipset and Rokkan cleavage theory (1967), the 
scholars affiliated with the North Carolina School argue that parties’ positions on the EU are mainly 
structured around a new cleavage in European politics. This new dimension of competition has been 
labelled in various ways: Inglehart (1990) named it post-materialist/materialist; Franklin (1992) labelled 
it old/new politics while Kitschelt (1994) chose the terms left-libertarian/authoritarian. One pole of 
these scales includes ecology, alternative politics and libertarianism as core elements; the other pole 
combines support for traditional values, opposition to migration and defence of the national 
community. In later works, Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks and Carol J. Wilson summarize those 
denominations in a new dimension of contestation delimitated by two poles: the Green – Alternative – 
Libertarian – pole (GAL) in opposition to the Traditional – Authoritarian – Nationalist pole (TAN). 
Relating political parties’ stance along the 7-point scale to their position along the GAL/TAN axis, the 
scholars found an ‘inverted U curve relationship’. Parties positioning toward the extremes of the 
                                                        
4 The published research note is titled ‘Measuring Party Orientation toward European Integration: 
results from an expert survey’ (Ray 1999). 
5 According to Mudde the data contained in the first expert survey (encompassing four EP elections in 
1984, 1988, 1992 and 1996) was sent to 258 scholars, but only a few of them worked specifically on 
party positions on European integration in general or Euroscepticism in particular. This is why Mudde 
describes this first wave of data as a peer survey rather than an expert survey (Mudde 2012).  
6 The Chapel Hill Expert Survey, as its name suggests, is an expert survey estimating party positioning 
on European integration, ideology and policy issues for national parties in a variety of European 
countries. The first relies of the CHES dataset is in 1999. This dataset merges the so-called Ray-Marks-
Steenbergen Dataset with Ray’s survey (conducted for the EP election in 1984, 1988, 1992 and 1996). 
See: http://chesdata.eu/ 
7 ‘An expert survey conducted in 1999 by Gary Marks, Marco Steenbergen, David Scott, and Carole 
Wilson asks country experts to evaluate the positions of national political parties on European 
integration on a 7-point scale (ranging from 1 to 7)’(Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002, 967). Ray in later 
works combines the 7-point index with the Sussex distinction between hard and soft Euroscepticism. 
He argues that parties scoring a value between 1 and 2 of the 7-point scale are to be considered as hard 
Eurosceptics while parties scoring values ranging between 2 to 3.5-4 should be considered as soft 
Eurosceptic. On the contrary, parties located between 4 and 5.7 along the 7-points scale are equated to 
Conti’s ‘Functional Europeanism’ and parties scoring values between 5.7 and 7 on the 7-points scale 




GAL/TAN axis tended to display a higher level of opposition to the European integration project, 
while parties positioning toward the centre of the GAL/TAN axis mostly favoured European 
integration.  
Apart from the evident differences between the two approaches summarized in Table 3.1 below, 
works by scholars belonging to these two schools have contributed to our current understanding of 
party-based Euroscepticism. However, these two approaches present both strong and weak points. 
 The Sussex school’s main strength is its validity. Works belonging to this approach, in fact, 
consists of in-depth and detailed studies conducted by experts in the field of Euroscepticism. 
Furthermore, this approach relies on a more precise typology for the classification of Euroscepticism. 
However, on the one hand, it still lacks reliability that could be improved by providing clearer 
definitions and stating the basis upon which parties positions on the EU are evaluated (Mudde 2012). 
On the other hand, the explanations provided by the Sussex’s approach relies heavily – if not 
exclusively – on strategic tactical explanations of party politics (Flood and Soborski 2017). In other 
words, as stressed also by Taggart and Szczerbiak in retrospect, the strategies adopted by parties are 
influenced in complex ways by their ideological identities (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008b). 
 On the contrary, the North Carolina school uses quantitative data that are reliable (especially 
from a cross-time perspective), easily available and combinable with other cross-time datasets. Its 
weakness lies in the lack of detail and depth of the analysis. In fact, if on the one hand, the North 
Carolina school combines the historical institutional approach to party families with the cleavage 
theory. On the other hand, the use of quantitative data underplays ‘significant differences lying beneath 
apparent similarities, and significant similarities underlying apparent differences, within or between 
families’ (Flood and Soborski 2017, 38). In other words, an in-depth closer reading of parties’ 
ideological sources could be of help to this approach8.  
As Mudde points out, what is still striking about the evolution of these two schools is that there 
has been little ‘cross-fertilization’ (Mudde 2012, 200) between them, something that can be easily 
attributed to the differences in their methodological, ontological and epistemological approaches. As a 
matter of fact, the EU is a set of ‘hybrid interlocking institutions’ and the role played by parties in one 
of the levels is fundamental to understand its’ position on the EU. However, the EU is also a project, 
created to guarantee peace and prosperity to its member states, as a consequence, ideology is somehow 
inseparable from political debates on the EU issue (Flood Soborski 2017, 36).  
 
 
                                                        
8 Flood and Soborski suggest that an analysis of parties’ ideologies should not only be restricted to the 
analysis of policy programmes and party manifestos but should also include documents for internal 
audiences within parties, party factions and other political organizations. 




Table 3. 1: Comparison of the Sussex and the North Carolina School’s models of party-based Euroscepticism 
The two main models explaining Euroscepticism 
Issues related to the 
approaches to 
Euroscepticism 
Sussex School North Carolina School 
Definitions 
Great importance. Most 
influential definition: ‘Hard vs. 
soft’ dichotomy of 
Euroscepticism  
No particular attention to 
definitions. 7-point scale index 
ranging from strong opposition 
(value of 1) to strong support 
(value of 7) to the European 
integration project  
Data and method  Mainly qualitative data and research methods  
Mainly quantitative. 
Longitudinal dataset (CHES). 
Expert survey on parties 
positioning on the EU.  
Scope Predominantly focused on party-based Euroscepticism.  
Initially intended to study 
parties’ positions on the 
European integration, later on 
enlarged beyond party-based 
Euroscepticism 
Explanations 
Strategic tactical party 
competition factors (recognizing 
the role of ideology) 
Ideology as central element of 
party-based Euroscepticism 
(elaboration of the GAL-TAN 
axis as new cleavage). 
Strength  
x Validity (depth, detail, 
and expertise); 
x Use of a more precise 
typology. 
x Reliability (cross-time); 
x Availability of the data 
(potential combination 
with other cross-time 
datasets) 
Weakness  Reliability  Lack of detail and depth  
 
Source: the table is elaborated on Mudde’s article ‘The Comparative Study of Party-based Euroscepticism: the 
Sussex versus the North Carolina School’ (Mudde 2012) 
 
Besides the fact that both models advanced the scientific understanding of the phenomenon, 
neither of them is suited to the study of Euroscepticism either from a transnational or from a pan-
European perspective, as further explained below (Usherwood 2017).  
The next section firstly presents the concept of POS; the early stages of its development related 
to the study of social movement’s (SMs) evolution and performance and its application beyond the 
realm of SMs to actors like interest groups or political parties. The first part of the next section also 
reviews the limitation of this concept and how the literature faces them. Later on, it proposes a 
summary of Usherwood’s framework for the study of the emergence of Eurosceptic groups in both 





3.3 The ‘baseline’ model: drivers of EU-opposition in pan-European and 
transnational contexts 
 
The two main models presented above refer to two main ‘drivers’ of Euroscepticism: the 
dynamics of the national political system and parties’ ideology. However, both of them, and more 
generally the literature on Euroscepticism, focus their attention on the national political arena as the 
main locus where to observe the phenomenon (Brack 2012, 2013). Nonetheless, more recent 
researches argue for a more ‘holistic’ approach to the study of this phenomenon considering actors 
others than political parties (e.g., the media or non-party groups) and dimensions others than the 
national one (Usherwood and Startin 2013). These works primarily conclude that Euroscepticism 
should no longer be regarded as a passing phenomenon; on the contrary, it should be seen as a 
‘constituent element of the European public sphere’ (Risse and van Steeg 2003; Usherwood 2017). 
According to Usherwood, in fact, the assumption that Eurosceptic actors are unlikely bedfellows in 
terms of cross-border cooperation due to their nationalist, pro-sovereignty sentiments is no longer 
given. Such dynamics are, in fact, likely to become more influential in the coming years. Consequently, 
studies on the development and functioning of Eurosceptic groups operating both in transnational and 
in pan-European contexts should consider factors pertaining to the characteristics of the actors 
themselves, the national sphere where the actors evolve, and the characteristics of the supranational 
environment where they operate. This is the main reason why Usherwood argues for the application of 
the concept of POS developed by Kitschelt (1986), to understand which opportunities (and/or 
constraints) affect the mobilization of both transnational and pan-European opposition. The next 
paragraph starts with a presentation of the concept of POS in general, detailing the main steps of its 
evolution and reporting how it can be adapted to study Eurosceptic actors operating in the 
supranational context of the EP.  
 
3.3.1 The concept of POS applied to the study of pan-European and transnational 
Eurosceptic groups.  
 
The concept of POS has been firstly developed by Kitschelt in his influential work ‘Political 
Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies’ 
(Kitschelt 1986). As the title suggests, the concept of POS was firstly used in the study of the impact of 
SMs’ protest on the development of nuclear technologies in four countries (France, Sweden, USA and 
West Germany). Kitschelt was the first one to formulate a set of exogenous POS impacting on SMs’ 
formation and performance. He defined POS as a ‘specific configuration of resources, institutional 
arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization which facilitates the development of 
protest movements in some instances and constrains them in some others’ (Kitschelt 1986: 58). 
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According to this scholar, the application of such concept explains 1) the variation among SMs with 
similar demands in different settings, 2) the choice of SM’s protest strategy, and 3) SMs’ impact on their 
environment. For this purpose, Kitschelt identifies three different sets of variables mainly exogenous to 
the SMs, the first set deals with coercive, normative, remunerative and informational resources that an 
SM can extract from the setting and employ in its protest. The second set of factors entails the 
potential for an SM to access to the public sphere and the political decision-making arena that is shaped 
by the existent institutional rules. The last set of factors relates to the appearance or disappearance of 
other SMs engaged in the same cause over time. He argues, in fact, that the simultaneous appearance of 
SMs contesting the institutions of social control may represent one of the best POS for SMs. 
This theoretical framework received criticism from several viewpoints, mainly contesting its 
precision. Understanding if this framework is enough suited to the study of SMs’ protest is not the core 
point of this work, however, two critiques are of central importance to the development of 
Usherwood’s theoretical framework for the study of pan-European and transnational Eurosceptic 
actors. Kitschelt’s model was in fact mainly criticised due to its understanding of POS as composed by 
factors exogenous to the SMs, while living aside factors endogenous to the groups (Tarrow 1998). In 
their study of interest groups in the context of the EU multi-level system, Princen and Karremans 
(2008) state that POSs can be both exogenous and endogenous to the political process since POSs may 
advantage or constrain interest groups but may also vary as a result of group activity. In fact, POSs are 
exogenous in origin but still need to be recognized by such groups, thus being framed as opportunities 
and used alongside the groups’ resources (Usherwood 2017). The second set of critiques is also central 
to this work, the first models of POS (e.g.: Kitschelt 1986, Tarrow 1998) indeed tended to conflate 
structural and contingent factors. This had two main consequences: first, the ‘very success of the idea 
has led to extensive concept-stretching, to the point that almost anything could be considered as a part 
of an opportunity structure under certain conditions’ (Usherwood 2017). Second, the increased focus 
on contingent factors at the expenses of structural ones risked downgrading the role played by those 
structural factors within the POS that might condition the action of all actors. These are the main 
reasons why recent works moved away from an explicit discussion and definition of POS.  
However, the literature still uses the concept of POS when addressing the aforementioned 
problems also beyond the realm of SMs and applies it to the study of the success of political parties. 
Arzheimer and Carter (2006) in their study about the success of right-wing extremist parties in seven 
European countries9, explore the effect of voters’ socio-demographic variables alongside institutional, 
party system and conjunctural variables (defined by the two authors as long-term, medium-term and 
                                                        





short-term contextual variables respectively)10. According to their analysis, socio-demographic factors, 
combined with permanent institutional factors and more short-term (volatile or conjunctural) factors, 
produce an overall peculiar POS that explains the rise of right-wing extremist parties in the studied 
countries. 
Usherwood’s theoretical framework is more ‘modest’ (Usherwood 2017) when compared to 
Arzheimer and Carter’s one (2006) due to two main reasons: first, data for the study of Eurosceptic 
groups in both transnational and supranational environments are more limited. Second, the opportunity 
of comparative work is much more restricted due to the very nature of pan-European and transnational 
Euroscepticism. However, his framework suggests three sets of factors both endogenous and 
exogenous to Eurosceptic actors that are useful to understand the dynamics of this phenomenon. This 
is of particular importance due to the fact that the political space in which such forces operate (both 
supranational and transnational arenas) is largely unstructured ‘making an appreciation of what matters 
internally to any given group all the more consequential’ (Usherwood 2017).  
Starting from these preliminary considerations, Usherwood elaborates a theoretical framework to 
observe how the combination of three specific sets of factors may create a POS favouring the 
formation of pan-European and transnational Eurosceptic groups as detailed below.  
 
Endogenous perspective: ideology to the fore. The European political sphere – as much as it exists (Risse and 
Van de Steeg 2003) builds upon pre-existing national political spheres; consequently, it is imaginable 
that the ‘ideological imperatives’ of transnational and pan-European political groups will reflect those 
of the national political spheres. In other words, transnational and pan-European groups’ ideology will 
be reflective of national political ideologies: pan-European and transnational groups are likely to form 
out of pre-existing national groups coming together under similar ideological groundings. This 
dynamics is clearly reflected in the EP where generally ‘Eurosceptic’ groups have formed among MEPs 
but with little or no ideological depth behind them (Usherwood 2017; Brack 2013). As a consequence, 
we might expect that the ideological difference between different Eurosceptic groups will tend to be 
bigger than that between Eurosceptics and non-Eurosceptics. Taking the EP as the central object of 
research, this is to say that the pro-anti European distinction in the EP is not so much developed 
(Cheneval and Schimmelfenning 2013) and that national delegations tend to aggregate according to pre-
existing ideological distinctions following an extreme-left-left-right-extreme-right divide (Bressanelli 
                                                        
10 The analysis done by Arzheimer and Carter (2006) considers as long-term institutional variables the 
electoral system and the degree of decentralization/federalism. The medium-term party system 
variables considered refer to: the ideological positions of other competitors in the party system, the 
degree of convergence between mainstream parties and the coalition format in the respective party 
systems. The short-term contextual variables refer to the level of immigration within a nation-state and 
the economic performance of that member state. This last factor is related to the supposed competition 
between the indigenous population and non-EU migrants.  
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2012). This is to say that, even if weak, ideology is a pervasive glue holding together national 
delegations from different member states11. ‘To draw on physical analogy, ideology is like gravity: it 
pervades the space and provides some general structuration, but a structuration that is much weaker 
than the other dynamics and forces that occasionally encounters’ (Usherwood 2017, 19).  
 
The exogenous perspective: institutional opportunities. Within the national context, institutions represent 
the dominant, highly articulated and regulated, structures. However, Usherwood argues that it is 
possible to draw a parallel with the supranational level. As a consequence, the most important set of 
institutional POS is to be found at the heart of the EU: in its archipelago of activity and activists – the 
Brussels bubble – but also in secondary nodes around other institutions such as the Council of Europe 
or the North Atlantic Free Trade Organization, the European Free Trade Organization and sub-
European groupings (Usherwood 2017). Such institutions provide pan-European and transnational 
Eurosceptic groups with the sufficient material and non-material resources to pursue their objectives; 
consequently, both pan-European and transnational Eurosceptic groups will form around such 
institutions. He also stresses the potentiality of informal institutions in shaping the formation and the 
activity of Eurosceptic groups. Informal institutions are particularly relevant in the evolution of 
transnational groups of EU-opponents. He argues that besides the fact that mobilization against the 
EU is unevenly distributed (both in form and in content) among countries, whenever such mobilization 
directs itself to European level activities, it creates the possibility for further mobilization in other 
countries, similarly to a sort of contagion. Among the informal institutions, he also highlights the role 
played by the media: both public and personal communication channels (e.g.: classical media outlet or 
personal social media) can contribute to the development of Eurosceptic groupings helping them to 
broadly diffuse their claims. Having access to a public arena constitutes, in fact, a valuable weapon for 
Eurosceptic actors. In summary, additionally to their benefits and potentials of attraction for such 
groupings, institutions provide a degree of stability and are reliable (at least in the medium-term 
perspective). 
 
A third exogenous perspective: events as opportunities. According to Usherwood, events besides being an 
‘eclectic’ category difficult to model and predict, ‘create extended moments where pre-existing political 
actors and processes move into a contingent constellation of interaction, to debate and seek policy 
outcomes’ (Usherwood 2017, 21). Generally speaking, such pan-European events have no national 
source but affect many if not all EU member states or even beyond. There are two types of events, 
those intentionally driven (intentional events) and those that are independent of the political context, 
                                                        
11 It is to be noted that the ideological core of the resulting pan-European group will be thinner than to 




thus unintentional. Intentional events are rare and mainly represented by Treaty reforms. A major 
example in this case, as seen previously, is the Maastricht Treaty that favoured the passage from 
‘permissive consensus’ to ‘constraining dissensus’ helping the formation and consolidation of 
Eurosceptic groups all around Europe. The second set of events is generally less clearly definable, 
however, such unintentional events follow logics similar to the intentional ones. The simple fact that 
such events exist moves attention and interest toward the European level, providing space for the rise 
of views that are alternative to the dominant one: Euroscepticism is thus the alternative to the 
dominant pro-European view. An example of unintentional events favouring the development of 
Eurosceptic groups around Europe is the Euro area crisis. The main difference between intentional and 
unintentional events is that in the second case the national political order plays a larger role. This is to 
say that the development of contestation to the EU depends on country-specific needs in the context 
of the unintentional events. In summary, for both types of events, Usherwood hypothesizes that the 
more wide-reaching the event (and its effects) the more profound the impact, so the more likely there 
will be a transnational or pan-European response and contestation. Nevertheless, according to the 
scholar, the shape of contestation will be highly dependent on the type of event itself. Table 3.2 below 
summarizes the three sets of factors highlighted by Usherwood.  
 
Table 3. 2: Political opportunity structures shaping the formation of transnational and pan-European 
Eurosceptic groups.  
POS shaping pan-European and transnational Eurosceptic mobilization  
Structure Nature of the impact Examples 
Ideology 
Endogenous. Ideologies represent a 
weak but pervasive effect. Groups align 
first with national political current, 
then with pan-European/transnational 
ones. 
Far-right/right/left/far-left 
cleavage in the formation of EP 
party groups. 
Institutions  
Exogenous impact. Both formal and 
informal institutions in transnational 
political space affect groups’ formation 
and activity.  
Material and non-material 
incentives provided to political 
groups in the EP help shaping 
their formation.  
Contingent events  
Exogenous impact. It provides the 
opportunity for mobilization (public 
profile and impact). Two types of 
contingent events: intentional (e.g., 
treaty reforms); unintentional (e.g., 
crises) 
Formation of groups in times of 
treaty reforms and/or in times 
of crisis (e.g., Euro area crisis).  
Source: re-elaboration of Usherwood model (Usherwood 2017). 
 
This ‘baseline model aims at studying the formation of pan-European and transnational 
Eurosceptic groups, however, this work argues that it can be applied to the study of national parties’ 
positioning vis-à-vis the EU in the EP.  
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As further detailed below, the national parties entering in the EP, on the one hand, show a ‘pre-
constituted’ ideologically grounded stance vis-à-vis the EU, on the other hand, they play a more or less 
marginal role in political competition at the national level that might shape their attitude with relation 
to the EU. Once national parties populate the EP arena, they are somehow ‘forced’ to constitute 
political groups that, on the one hand, have their own ideological grounding and, on the other hand, 
play a more or less marginal role in political competition in the EP, two factors that potentially impact 
on national parties’ positioning on the EU. Finally, national parties’ positioning vis-à-vis the EU might 
be conditioned by country-specific reactions to contextual factors like the degree of vulnerability of 
their respective countries to both the migration and the economic crises. Consequently, it is imaginable 
that all the three sets of factors reported above, not only influence the formation of transnational and 
supranational groups but also national parties’ positioning on the EU. The next section further details 
how these three sets of factors might influence national parties’ positions toward the EU.  
3.4 POS shaping patterns of EU-opposition in the EP 
 
This section firstly presents the ‘endogenous’ ideology-related factors (sub-section 3.4.1), it then 
details the exogenous factors impacting on parties positioning on the EU starting from the institutional 
POS belonging to both the national and the supranational sphere of political competition (sub-section 
3.4.2). Finally, it presents the exogenous factors related to the country-specific degrees of vulnerability 
to two exogenous events: the economic and the migration crisis (sub-section 3.4.3). The section 
formulates six hypotheses and two general assumptions to be tested in chapter 7 of this work.  
3.4.1 Endogenous factors: ideology 
 
The first factor taken into consideration by Usherwood is ‘endogenous’ in the sense that it 
pertains to each observed national party referring to its ideological orientation. National parties enter 
the EP arena through a direct election held every five years in each of the EU Member states. Once 
parties enter in the EP, they are granted the right to compose party groups, which are generally an 
‘aggregation of like-minded sharing at least some policy objectives’ (Bressanelli 2012, 751). In fact, 
according to the EP’s rule of procedure no. 32 ‘Members form themselves into groups according to 
their political affinities. Parliament need not normally evaluate the political affinity of a group. In 
forming a group together under this Rule, the Members concerned accept by definition that they have 
political affinity’. However, if this process of aggregation based on the general ideological orientation is 
‘easier’12 for mainstream national parties (they own more seats and can fulfil the criteria foreseen by the 
                                                        
12 EPPGs are the result of pre-existing national groups coming together following the prevalent, pre-




EP’s rules of procedure13), a similar reasoning is not always applicable to so-called Eurosceptic parties 
that typically struggle to reach the sufficient number of MEPs from the sufficient number of member 
states to compose an EPPG also due to their ideological divergences. As observed in the previous 
chapter, opposition to the EU is exercised by a variegated group of actors which general ideological 
orientation varies between the far-left and the far-right of the ideological spectrum. This pushes some 
researchers to describe their presence in the EP as a ‘paradox’ since such parties are commonly equated 
by strong nationalistic stances while working in a supranational environment (Benedetto 2008) 
(according to Halikiopoulou et al. 2012 this consideration holds true for both right and left wing 
nationalism).  
Considering EU-opponents’ presence in the EP as a paradox is, however, to confuse strategies 
with objectives (Usherwood 2017). These actors gain representation in the EP, a relatively easy-to-
access arena, due to the second-order nature of the EP elections (Reif and Schmidt 1980). Once there, 
they rationally profit from the benefit of a public arena in terms of access to both the public sphere and 
to material and non-material facilities: to do that they should aggregate in EPPGs. Thus, being, on the 
one hand, ‘forced’ to build an EPPG and being, on the other hand, ideologically heterogeneous, the 
resulting EPPG will ‘forcefully’ be ideological heterogeneous. As former researches in the field observe, 
strategy or the pursuit of ‘pure office goals’ (Bressanelli 2012, 752) alongside material and non-material 
incentives offered by the EP arena guide national parties in the choice of their partners to compose an 
EPPG14. Emblematic in this sense is the case of UKIP that, despite the ideological divergences, works 
together with the FSM in the EFDD. UKIP could not count on resources coming from the national 
level due to its low representation in the British House of Commons. Consequently, the only resources 
at its disposal are the one coming from the EP. This is why UKIP and FSM have been described by 
previous research in the field as an ‘odd couple’ working in the same EPPG (Carlotti 2017; Franzosi, 
Marone, and Salvati 2015).  
In summary, EU-opponents may ‘opportunistically’ choose to form an EPPG with other parties 
from other member states (as long as they have the requisites to do so) despite only partially sharing 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
ideological depth when compared to national party groups in the national arenas (Usherwood 2017). 
Bartolini describes the existence of what he terms ‘Europarties’ as surprising due to their generally low 
ideological homogeneity. He justifies the feasibility of these aggregations noting that, on the one hand, 
the advantages to building a group in the EP are small but, on the other hand, they are bigger then the 
costs since ‘these alliances have no palpable perspective of electoral reward/punishment in either the 
European or national election’ (Bartolini 2012, 161). 
13 According to the EP’s internal rules of procedure (see rule 32) a group of 25 MEPs from at least one-
quarter of all EU member states can form an EPPG. EPPGs are granted higher financial and 
administrative allocations when compared to non-attached MEPs. 
14 Brack argues that so-called Eurosceptic MEPs use their time and the resources obtained from the EP 
to campaign elsewhere since both their attendance to the EP sittings and their relative EPPGs’ voting 
record are low (Brack 2013). 
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their ideological orientation. Consequently, the formed EPPG will be ideologically heterogeneous. On 
the contrary, mainstream parties tend to aggregate in larger EPPGs that are based on a relatively 
stronger ideological homogeneity.  
What is still not clear is how and if the degree of ideological heterogeneity of the EPPGs might 
shape patterns of national parties’ positioning vis-à-vis the EU. Do national parties belonging to more 
ideologically heterogeneous EPPGs tend to propose a similarly higher opposition to the EU? To 
answer this question this work formulates the following association: 
 
A1: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by national parties within the EP are associated with 
the degree of heterogeneity of the EPPG they belong to.  
 
Even if it is true that ideology might be considered as a ‘weak glue’ holding together EPPGs in 
the EP, a potential influence of the general EPPGs’ ideology on patterns of EU-opposition in the EP 
cannot a priori be discharged. In fact, as proposed by Tsebelis and Garrett (2000) political conflicts 
among EU institutions reflect ‘varying preferences about the regulatory environment at the European 
level that may be arrayed on the traditional left-right dimension’ (Tsebelis and Garrett 2000, 11). 
According to the two scholars, politics at the supranational level is mainly concerned with economic-
related issues. Thus political competition at the EU level mainly relates to choices on whether the EU 
should employ market-based solutions to social problems or if it should opt for government regulation 
(Otjes and Van der Veer 2016). Consequently, the dominant dimension shaping political conflict 
concerning the future trajectories of the EU is based on decisions on how much the EU should leave 
the market free or regulate it, which in their turn are shaped around the left-right ideological distinction. 
 Aiming at analysing political competition in the EP, previous research on Roll Call Votes (RCVs) 
has demonstrated that EPPGs tend to be cohesive in their voting patterns and that cohesiveness of 
EPPGs over the years has increased constantly (especially for larger EPPGs): ‘national parties only 
rarely instruct their MEPs to vote differently from the party group because they are not interested in 
weakening the group’ (Franzosi, Marone and Salvati 2015, 118). As a consequence, considering Tsebelis 
and Garetts’ model of political competition in the EU, we should expect that EPPGs’ voting patterns 
and, consequently, national parties’ voting patterns are structured around the left-right continuum.  
Thus, if on the one hand, EPPGs’ general ideological orientation influence voting patterns in the 
EP, on the other hand, what it is still not clear is if the general ideological orientation of the EPPG 
impacts on patterns of EU-opposition expressed in the EP. This is why this work formulates the 





A2: Patterns of EU-opposition are associated with the general ideological orientation of the 
EPPG to which national parties belong.  
 
As observed above, since national parties’ incentives to create an EPPG are not only ideologically 
driven, it is plausible to think that national parties’ ideological orientation influence patterns of EU-
opposition independently from both the ideological heterogeneity of an EPPG and the general 
ideological position of the EPPG they belong to. As showed before, the orientation of national parties 
to the EU is seen as depending on their position on the left-right cleavage, on the GAL versus TAN 
axis (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002; 2004). From an ideological perspective, right-wing parties 
oppose the EU due to their traditionalist, authoritarian and nationalist ideological characteristics (TAN) 
and parties from the extreme left oppose the EU due to their green-alternative-libertarian ideological 
orientation (GAL). From a strategy view-point right-wing parties strongly link their opposition to the 
EU to immigration and the defence of the national community and culture against foreigners, while 
left-wing parties’ opposition to the EU is ‘rooted in the perception that European integration 
fundamentally threatens cherished radical left goals’ (Hooghe et al. 2004, 128), since the EU favours 
neoliberal policies (Halikiopoulou et al. 2012).  
It is thus fundamental to generate a hypothesis that goes beyond the EPPGs’ ideology. Other 
things been equal, we can, in fact, imagine that national parties belonging to different EPPGs are 
similarly opposed to the EU depending on their degree of extremism along the left-right continuum 
(extreme left and extreme right parties). In other words, two parties belonging to two different EPPGs 
may share their views about the EU as a function of their general ideological extremeness: 
 
H1: Patterns of EU-opposition vary as a function of each national party’s ideological 
extremeness, independently of the general ideological position of the EPPG. The more parties 
position themselves toward the extremes of the left-right ideological continuum the higher their 
degree of EU-opposition will be. 
3.4.2 Exogenous factors: institutions as POS  
 
Euroscepticism at the supranational level remained for a long time unstudied also due to the 
development of the EP itself. The EP starts its history in 1952 as the Common Assembly of the 
nascent European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The Assembly was initially not central to the 
plans of the founding fathers of European integration (Scully 2005); together with the European Court 
of Justice, it played a role of control and scrutiny (Neunreither 2000). Members of this Assembly were 
nominated among the members of member states’ national parliaments, thus leading to an over-
representation of mainstream parties or, more generally, representatives favourable to the European 
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integration project (Brack 2013). In other words, expression of opposition to the EU and the European 
integration project in the EP was almost limited if not even absent15.  
The first enlargements to Denmark and the UK (1973) brought some changes in the composition 
of the ‘EP’. In fact, representatives from both the Conservative (UK) and communist parties 
(Denmark) entered in the EP bringing instances of Euroscepticism in the parliamentary arena. 
However, it is only in 1979 with the first direct EP elections that most of the Eurosceptic parties face 
an opportunity to easily enter the EP arena through direct elections (Leconte 2010), especially due to 
the already mentioned second-order nature of the EP elections (Reif and Schmidt 1980). This theory 
suggests three main conclusions: 1) turnout in EP election is generally low when compared to national 
elections (first-order elections); 2) small (and generally protest) parties perform better in such elections; 
3) governing parties (at national level) are punished for their performance (Hobolt and Wittrock 2011). 
In summary, ‘intentional’ events (e.g., the first direct election of the EP) coupled with the nature of EP 
election (second-order elections) contributed, on the one hand, to the dissemination of Euroscepticism 
around Europe and, on the other hand, to its consolidation in the EP arena (see the results of the last 
EP elections), something of particular importance for the EU’s future developments.  
However, if it is on the one hand true that such parties are consolidating in the EP; on the other 
hand, Eurosceptic forces still, generally16, play a ‘marginal’ role in the political competition at national 
level, being relegated to the opposition flank, but increasingly getting representation. Consequently, one 
further aspect to be taken into consideration to understand patterns of EU-opposition in the EP is the 
role played by national parties in the national political sphere that indirectly affects the inter-
institutional arrangements of the supranational sphere. In their study about the impact of 
Europeanization on ethno-regionalist parties, De Winter and Cachafeiro (2002) argue that two 
structural factors of the EU must be taken into consideration. According to these scholars, the main 
party families in the EP have extra-parliamentary access to EU-decision making bodies. This is due to 
the fact that national parties belonging to the main EPPGs (the European People Party – EPP, the 
Socialists and Democrats for Europe – S&D, the European Conservatives and Reformists – ECR and 
the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe – ALDE) also cover governing positions at national 
                                                        
15 According to Brack (2013), the only prominent exceptions to these rules were the representatives of 
the French Gaullist and some from some liberal parties in the Netherlands and Germany.  
16 A major example of party generally belonging to the ‘margins’ of the national political sphere that 
scored impressive results in the last rounds of elections both national and European is the Greek 
Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA). This party is currently represented in the EP and belongs to 
the left-wing (‘soft-Eurosceptic’ – Cammino and Verzichelli 2016) EPPG of the Green United 
Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL). Furthermore, it holds the majority in its national government 
and, consequently, it is also represented in the Council even though not in the Commission. The 
current Greek commissioner (Dimitris Avramopoulos) has in fact been nominated under the Greek 
national government led Antonis Samaras (active between 2012 and 2015) exponent of the New 




level. Consequently, due to their participation in national government, they influence the nomination of 
commissioners (thus the composition of the EC) and form by default the Council; conversely, ethno-
regionalist parties are excluded from such channels of influence17. Thus such parties see their political 
action, their resources and their visibility ‘dramatically reduced by size and structural opposition status’ 
(De Winter and Cachafeiro 2002, 485). This line of reasoning can be applied to parties opposing the 
EU independently of their ideological standpoint. Indeed, if it is, on the one hand, true that after the 
last EP election in 2014 such dynamics partially changed. On the other hand, most of the 
‘Eurosceptics’ either do not cover governing positions at the national level or are not even considered 
as eligible partners. Consequently, since they have no possibility to ‘use’ other channels of 
representation (e.g., having a commissioner in the EC or being represented in the Council) they will 
take advantage from their participation in the EP’s activities (e.g.: speeches held during the EP’s plenary 
sessions). It is thus imaginable that parties not ‘represented’ in the EC or in the Council or more 
generally parties not covering governing positions at national level, will be freer to express EU-
opposition when compared to their mainstream counterparts. Other things being equal, we can 
formulate a second hypothesis as follows: 
 
H2: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by national parties in the EP vary as a function of their 
‘marginality’ in political competition at the national level. Parties not belonging to governing 
coalitions at the national level (or not even eligible to cover governing positions at the national 
level) will display a higher degree of opposition to the EU.  
 
As observed in the previous section, national parties’ aggregation in EPPGs in the EP (either 
according to some general ideological lines or to strategic moves) is central for the mere redistribution 
of material and non-material resources. However, the construction of EPPGs represents an 
institutional incentive that is fundamental for political competition at the supranational level. If it is, on 
the one hand, true that so-called Eurosceptic groups might create EPPGs, such EPPGs are generally 
‘marginal’ in the supranational political competition.  
Political competition in European politics in general and in the EP, in particular, has been 
explained by previous research in the field according to three main models (Marks and Steenbergen 
2002): the first one is the called IR model (Gabel and Hix 2002) stating that political conflict in the EU 
focuses on the nature and speed of the integration process concerning the division of powers and 
competencies between national states and the supranational level (Hix 2001). According to this model 
                                                        
17 An example of exception thereof as argued by De Winter and Cachafeiro is the Italian Northern 
League. This party participated twice in the centre-right governing coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi 
(briefly in 1994 and more successfully from June 2001 to April 2005) (De Winter and Cachafeiro 2002).  
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political competition is shaped along a pro-anti European dimension. The second model already 
sketched in the previous section is the one elaborated by Tsebelis and Garret (2000) and is called 
‘Regulation Model’, where political competition is mainly shaped around the left-right ideological 
dimension. The third model is called the ‘Hix-Lord model’ and states that the left-right and the 
integration dimensions are perpendicular and independent. According to this model, the left-right 
distinction is the dominant one because the EU focuses primarily on economic issues18. The pro-anti 
European integration is neither as important nor as stable as the left-right distinction (Hix et al. 2006), 
however it sees the large established pro-European groups in the EP (EPP, S&D and the Alliance of 
Liberals and Democrats for Europe - ALDE19) standing against so-called Eurosceptic EPPGs that are 
as a consequence more marginal to political competition in the EP. The EPP and S&D (and more 
recently ALDE) always had a majority coalition in the EP, as a consequence they operate similarly to a 
majority coalition in national parliamentary systems and has been labelled the ‘grand coalition’ (or ‘giant 
coalition’ – Neuhold and Settembri 2007) akin to Christian and Social-democratic coalitions in 
Germany and Austria (Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999; Kreppel and Hix 2003; Otjes and Van de Veer 
2016). 
Among the three proposed models, the Hix Lord model is largely considered as the more 
adequate to explain political competition at the supranational level. Besides the left-right dimension of 
competition, the pro-anti EU dimension enables to capture the inter-institutional dynamics at 
supranational level with parties represented in the Council voting one way and parties not represented 
voting in the other way (Hix et al. 2006). In summary, the existence of a ‘grand coalition’ enables the 
largest established groups in the EP (EPP, S&D and ALDE) to work together so as to avoid 
compromise with marginal EU-opposition EPPGs (Benedetto 2008), this is the main reason why the 
EU has generally be seen as a consensual system. 
A further consideration concerning more marginal EPPGs is fundamental to formulate the next 
hypothesis. Recent works, in fact, assess that MEPs coming from more ‘marginal’ EPPGs are freer to 
act in the EP when compared to representatives of larger and more established party groups (Brack 
2012; 2013). This is mainly due to the fact that most of the ‘marginal’ EPPGs have been constituted ‘on 
                                                        
18 It is, however, to be noted that some researches in the field account for the fact that the left-right 
distinction not only encompasses purely economic issues but also environmental and law-and-order 
policies (Hix 2001, Hix et al 2006).  
19 While in the first three EP legislatures both the EPP and the Party of European Socialist (the PES, 
the current S&D) composed the so-called grand-coalition, since the 4th EP legislature, the Alliance of 





the basis of an “agreement to disagree”20 and members act and vote as they see fit’ (Brack 2012, 160)21. 
Other things being equal, national parties’ members belonging to marginal EPPGs are less constrained 
from the internal rules of each EPPG and are freer to express their opposition to the EU. In other 
words, MEPs from marginal groups are freer to express EU-opposition through ‘individual type of 
actions such as speeches or parliamentary questions’ (Brack 2013, 90).  
Allegedly, future EP and national election will subvert the composition of the EP and the inter-
institutional arrangements of the supranational level of governance favouring on the one hand, the 
creation of larger and probably less marginal EPPGs opposed to the EU and, on the other hand, the 
increased representation of EU-opponents in other EU decision-making arenas. However, the current 
situation still sees EU-opponents (and their EPPGs) playing a relatively marginal role in political 
competition in the EU in general and in the EP in particular. Consequently, taking into consideration 
both the models of political competition in the EP and the studies on MEPs’ behaviour it is possible to 
formulate the following hypothesis:  
 
H3: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by national parties represented in the EP vary as a 
function of the ‘marginality’ of the EPPG they belong to. The more marginal the EPPG the 
higher EU-opposition expressed by national parties belonging to that EPPG will be. 
 
As mentioned previously, EU-opposition may vary as a function of both formal and informal 
institutional POS. The two hypotheses reported above refer to formal institutional POS. However, one 
last informal institutional POS is to be taken into consideration when assessing patterns of EU-
opposition.  
EU institutions (especially the EC, the Court of Justice and the EP) are considered as the 
bastions of European integration inhabited by pro-integrationist actors whose activities favoured the 
process of European integration. This is particularly true for the EP especially since its first direct 
elections in 1979. After this date, in fact, the EP and its members have promoted a stronger and more 
ambitious political union at the supranational level, an example of this is the adoption of the Spinelli 
Report22 in 1984 urging EU institutions to move forward in the process of European integration (Brack 
                                                        
20 A recent example of this compromise is the ENF EPPG: it took approximately one and a half year of 
intensive negotiations to find the sufficient number of MEPs from the sufficient number of member 
states to build up an EPPG. 
21 According to Brack: ‘The situation of Eurosceptic MEPs is particular in this respect. Unlike members 
of large groups, they (MEPs belonging to smaller groups) are freer to act: they have to comply to a 
lesser extent with rules of conduct and voting instructions’ (Brack 2013, 89).  
22 The Spinelli Report is based on the Manifesto di Ventotene written by Altiero Spinelli and Alberto Rossi 
in 1941 during Spinelli’s exile period in the island of Ventotene in the Tyrrhenian Sea advocating the 
idea of the United States of Europe.   
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and Costa 2017). In other words, parties’ representatives in the EP might be considered as promoters 
of the European integration project.  
The literature dealing with MEPs’ behaviour within the supranational arena of the EP signals a 
potential relationship between the degree of MEPs’ socialisation within the EP and their attitude 
toward the EU and the European integration project. In a nutshell, this theory suggests that MEPs’ 
showing a longer experience within the EP (thus covering more mandates within the EP) tend to be 
less opposed to the EU than the ‘younger’ exponents (Brack 2017). More into details, starting from 
pragmatic considerations related to the political practice of the EU, Navarro sustains the thesis that the 
‘socialization effect’ that MEPs may experience in the EP is strictly related to the concept of European 
integration since ‘both notions refer to the cohesion of a group’ (Navarro, 2007: 181)23. Alongside this 
consideration, Navarro argues that the EP plays a voluntary crucial role in the reinforcement of the 
European construction. As stressed previously, the EP moved from a simple scrutiny institution (in 
1952 as the assembly of the ECSC) to a pure decision-making body, such shift has been possible also 
thanks to the same EP’s representatives. In other words, the representatives belonging to a 
supranational institution have an interest in defending that institution and increasing its powers. As a 
consequence, it is legitimate to think that those MEPs spending longer time within the institutional 
framework of the EP will show a higher degree of support for the EU than their ‘younger’ colleagues. 
The effects of seniority in connection to a socialization effect have been tested also outside of the EP; 
an example above all is the study by Mughan and colleagues (1997) concerning the British House of 
Commons. The scholars demonstrate that the time spent in the institution lowers the degree of 
radicalism expressed by parliamentarians. From these considerations it is thus possible to think that an 
‘informal’ institutional factor shaping patterns of EU-opposition is related to the socialization effect 
deriving from the degree of MEPs’ experience in the EP:  
 
H4: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by national parties represented in the EP will vary as a 
negative function of the seniority of their MEPs. The less national parties’ MEPs are socialized 
within the EP the higher their EU-opposition will be.  
3.4.3 Exogenous factors: events as POS  
 
Usherwood’s framework recognises two different types of events shaping the formation of pan-
European and transnational Eurosceptic groups: intentional and unintentional. For the purposes of this 
                                                        
23 As stressed by Navarro, European integration may be defined through Haas definition as ‘the process 
whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, 
expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand 




work, the attention is focused on unintentional events, more specifically the two main crises affecting 
the EU: the immigration crisis and the economic crisis.  
‘Have the Euro crisis and the immigration crisis congealed a distinctive structure of conflict in 
Europe?’, with this opening question, Hooghe and Marks’ work (2018, 1) argues that Europe has been 
transformed by a new divide which has in its turn mainly developed around the two crises that the EU 
is experiencing: the immigration crisis and the economic crisis. They argue for the rise of a transnational 
cleavage concerning the defence of national, political and social-economic ways of life against external 
actors who penetrate the state by migrating, exchanging goods and exerting rules. The two scholars 
argue that both the economic and the immigration crises ‘reveal the causal power of social forces in the 
face of established institutions’ (Hooghe and Marks 2018, 2). This is to say that both the economic and 
the immigration crises contributed to unpredicted developments throughout Europe such as the 
formation of rejectionist parties from the left and the right (Hobolt 2016; Hobolt and Tilley 2016) and 
gave an impulse to the British rejection of the EU membership. Consequently, they constitute two 
events with a transnational character that can potentially impact on patterns of EU-opposition as 
expressed by national parties within the EP arena. The next paragraph shortly describes the evolution 
of both the economic and the immigration crises alongside the main measures taken by the EU to face 
them. The core objective of the next paragraph is to explain the reasons why the two crises created 
distinctions between the EU member states, how such distinctions translated in higher or lower levels 
of vulnerability of the various EU member states to the crises, and how such different degrees of 
vulnerability could impact on patterns of EU-opposition.  
 
3.4.3.1 Economic and migration crises: unintentional events shaping EU-opposition  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the economic crisis, after Lehman Brothers’ collapse, Angela 
Merkel declared that ‘the guarantee that no other important financial institutions would be allowed to 
fail should be given by each country separately, not by the EU acting jointly’24. As a consequence of this 
declaration, the economic crisis transmuted in a distinct European crisis, where each member state was 
pushed to act on its own to save its financial institutions. This observation is coupled with other two 
factors: on the one hand, the anti-bail-out German public was fed by Merkel government’s 
commitment to preserving Article 125 of the Maastricht Treaty25 (Hooghe and Marks 2018). On the 
                                                        
24  http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/george-soros-on-the-euro-crisis-germany-must-lead-or-
leave-a-855270-3.html  
25 Art 125 co. 1 of the TFEU: ‘The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central 
governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public 
undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint 
execution of a specific project. A Member State shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of 
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other hand, the ordo-liberalist rhetoric described by Angela Merkel as the values of a Swabian 
housewife26 with ‘saving, parsimony and the avoidance of debt, being the key to success’ (Blyth 2013, 
115) quickly diffused around Europe. 
This rhetoric was translated in practice into series of ad hoc negotiations among national 
executives deciding for financial bailouts for indebted countries in return for their implementation of 
stringent national austerity policies. Some scholars argue that these negotiations have advanced as a 
form of ‘“depoliticized” economic governance, led by the national financial ministers in alliance with 
the European Central Bank (ECB) and with support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’ 
(Statham and Trenz 2015, 10). According to Statham and Trenz, the Fiscal Stability Treaty illustrates 
the new ‘defensive strategy’ enacted by national executives delegating their power to supranational 
(more or less accountable) institutions to avoid conflict. As an example, under the mantra of ‘doing 
whatever it takes to save the Euro’27, since 2012 the ECB (an institution with no popular pressure) 
instrumentally provided the needed liquidity to face the Euro crisis. This is coupled with piecemeal 
reforms, mechanism of financial surveillance and the banking union that did ‘just enough to save the 
Eurozone and avert the default of heavily indebted states’ (Hooghe and Marks 2018, 9). 
In summary, the economic crisis led to the ‘depoliticisation’ of the economic governance by 
national executives that relied on supranational and international institutions’ interventions. However, 
the growing involvement of EU institutions28 in national economic politics contributed to increasing 
citizens’ perception that the EU is the main actor to be blamed for the consequences of the economic 
crisis (Hobolt and de Vries 2016). Consequently, being the EU citizens more aware of the fact that the 
‘EU matters’, the European integration issue becomes politicised and increases its salience (Statham 
and Trenz 2014; Börzel and Risse 2017; Hooghe and Marks 2018 ) 29 also thanks to the role played by 
the media (both old and new) in the diffusion of public conflict around this thematic (Börzel and Risse 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or 
public undertakings of another Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the 
joint execution of a specific project.’ 
26  See: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/17/angela-merkel-austerity-swabian-
housewives  
27  See: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/9428894/Debt-crisis-Mario-Draghi-
pledges-to-do-whatever-it-takes-to-save-euro.html  
28 Alongside supranational institutions, the crisis saw the involvement of international institutions like 
the IMF. In the context of the Euro crisis, the IMF worked alongside the ECB and the EC in the so-
called Troika with the main aim to monitor countries experiencing difficulties in their economic 
situations. 
29 Hooghe and Marks (2018) using expert survey data (Chapel Hill Expert Survey) demonstrate that the 
salience of the European integration issue has increased markedly since 2006 moving from a mean of 




2017). According to several scholars, such increased politicization of the European integration30 issue 
contributed to the rise in consensus of parties critical of the EU particularly during the last EP elections 
(even though not exclusively confined to such elections) (Hobolt and De Vries 2016, Hobolt and Tilly 
2016, Vasilopoulou, Halikiopoulou and Exadaktylos 2014). 
 EU’s inability to face the economic crisis and the renewed politicization of the European 
integration issues had a twofold impact. Firstly, a distinction between EU member states emerged: on 
the one hand, there are the ‘creditor’ member states that experienced a lighter impact of the economic 
crisis and were ‘forced’ to save those countries in economic difficulties. On the other hand, there are 
the ‘debtor’ member states where the economic crisis had a stronger impact and that, in some cases, 
needed the financial assistance from the EU. The latter were helped to solve their sovereign debt crisis 
through more formal institutional reform of the European Monetary Union constraining national fiscal 
policy. Such formal policies were highly contested in the public sphere across the EU for several 
reasons, such as the increased transfer of competencies toward the supranational sphere or the 
imposition of severe austerity measures. Secondly, the renewed salience of the EU issue has been 
capitalized by parties both from the left and the right of the political system. Such parties blame both 
the EU and their national governments for their failure in handling the economic crisis and display 
different levels of criticism toward the EU as a whole, its policies, its elite and its institutions. While 
North European ‘creditor’ countries saw the rise of right-wing parties (see only as an example AFD’s 
raising consensus in Germany despite the historic resistance of this country to extremism), left-wing 
parties gained consensus in South-European ‘debtor’ countries (e.g., Podemos in Spain or Syriza in 
Greece).  
 
In a similar vein, also the migration crisis has variegated effects on EU member states even if the 
mechanisms implemented to face it are different from those used during the economic crisis. While the 
handling of the economic crisis was first left to EU member states, then brought to the supranational 
sphere (e.g., through the Fiscal Compact, the European Stability Mechanism, the Banking Union, the 
Macro-Economic Imbalance Mechanism and the European Semester), in the migration crisis, the EU 
failed to coordinate Member states’ actions especially due to their non-compliance to the supranational 
decisions (Börzel 2016). 
2015 is recognized as the year when the migration crisis reached its peak. According to 
EUROSTAT31 data, the number of first-time asylum seekers rose from 61000 in January 2015 to 
153000 in November 2015. Consequently, between the end of 2015 (approximately the end of 
                                                        
30 European issues have generally be addressed as low salience issues by scholars in the field (see 
implicit discussion by Mair 2000, 2007 or Netjes and Binnema 2007). 
31  For more information see EUROSTAT webpage at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics  
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September) and April 2016 a series of measures have been taken at the supranational level with the 
main aim of ‘sharing the migration burdens’ among member states both for the refugee already present 
in the EU territories and for those yet to come (Börzel 2016). Generally speaking, such measures 
included funds for member states most heavily affected by migration flows, the adoption of a common 
list of safe third countries32, measures dealing with the relocation of migrants from Italy and Greece to 
other Member states alongside the creation of additional hotspots 33  in the territory of these two 
countries (such actions were taken drawing on the EU’s legal framework for a common asylum and 
migration policy).  
Despite this supranational, solidarity-oriented approach, most of the measures enacted by the EU 
failed due to a lack of compliance: in general member states more ‘lightly’ affected by the migration 
crisis rejected to share the burdens of the migratory pressure and blamed their counterpart of not being 
able to handle the immigration fluxes. An example of this is represented by the failure of the relocation 
mechanism delineated by two binding decision of the Council in 2015 (European Commission 2016)34. 
Among the member states lacking compliance with the EU’s decisions, Hungary is one of the most 
famous cases. In June 2015 the Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán ordered the construction of a 
175-kilometres-long fence along the Hungarian Southern border with Serbia to block migrants coming 
from the so-called ‘Balkan route’. Furthermore, he rejected the Council decisions mentioned above and 
announced, on the 24th of February 2016, that Hungary would hold a referendum on whether to accept 
EU’s mandatory quotas for the relocation of migrants. The referendum was held on the 22nd of 
                                                        
32 ‘By definition of the law, all Member States of the European Union are safe third countries. In 
addition, a list of further safe third countries can be drawn up. In those countries, the application of the 
1951 Refugee Convention and of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has to be 
“ensured”’. For further information see: 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/germany/asylum-procedure/safe-country-
concepts/safe-third-country  
33 Hotspots areas are defined by the European Border and Coast Guard regulation (see below) as sites: 
where a Member State faces specific and disproportionate migratory challenges at particular areas of its 
external borders characterised by large, inward, mixed migratory flows the Member States should be 
able to rely on technical and operational reinforcements. This should be provided in hotspot areas by 
migration management support teams. These teams should be composed of experts to be deployed 
from the Member States by the Agency and by EASO and from the Agency, Europol or other relevant 
Union agencies. The Agency should assist the Commission in the coordination among the different 
agencies on the ground. Source: https://frontex.europa.eu/  
34 “In September 2015 the Council adopted two legally binding decisions which established a temporary 
and exceptional relocation mechanism for 160.000 applicants in clear need of international protection 
from Greece and Italy (…) As the flows continue in 2016, so far however only 937 people have been 
relocated from Italy and Greece, and only 4555 have been resettled. The unsatisfactory level of 
implementation of both schemes is due to a variety of factors, including the lack of political will of 
Member States to deliver in a full timely manner on their legal obligations to relocate” (European 




September 2016 and eventually did not pass due to a too low turnout (around 44% of Hungarian 
voters)35.  
Besides member states’ voluntary non-compliance with the supranational solutions to the 
migration crises, another mechanism that contributed to the diffusion of criticism toward the EU’s 
migration policy is the ‘EU-Turkey joint action plan’ on migration strongly endorsed by Angela Merkel 
who considered it as a ‘priority’ for the EU36. The agreement was thought to alleviate the migratory 
pressure in Greece through the re-allocation of Syrian refugees from both Greece to Turkey and from 
Greece to the EU following a 1:1 scheme: for every Syrian being returned to Turkey from the Greek 
islands, another Syrian will be resettled in the EU37. However, the operational support (in terms of 
specialized staff and personnel) was mainly left on the Greek shoulders (with some participation of the 
other member states of the European Asylum Support Office – EASO and of Frontex) 38 . The 
agreement lowered the fluxes of migrants to Greece even though the arrival of migrants to other 
member states’ coasts (especially to Italy) was not reduced. Furthermore, it has been perceived as a way 
for the EU institutions to force the entrance of Turkey in the EU, an issue that has always been 
rejected at least by right-wing parties.  
                                                        
35 After the referendum, both Hungary and Slovakia asked the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to 
annul the Council decision on mandatory migration quotas. According to both Hungary and Slovakia 
such decision are in fact both vitiated from a procedural point of view (article 78, comma 3 of the 
TFEU represents the legal basis of the decision) and neither suitable nor necessary to the handling of 
the migration crisis. The ECJ in its recent judgement (6th of September 2017) rejected the pledges by 
Hungary and Slovakia considering the Council decisions non-vitiated from a procedural point of view 
and important to the handling of the immigration crisis. The ECJ further notices that ‘the small 
number of relocations so far carried out under the contested decision can be explained by a series of 
factors that the Council could not have foreseen at the time when the decision was adopted, including, 
in particular, the lack of cooperation on the part of certain Member States’. See the complete text of the 
ECJ’s decision at: https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-
09/cp170091en.pdf  
36  Angela Merkel declared that: ‘The important statement for me today is that we have not only 
reaffirmed the EU-Turkey action plan, but we have said it is our priority’ see: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/19/refugee-crisis-eu-calls-extraordinary-summit-with-
turkey See also the ‘European Council Conclusions on Migrations (18th of February 2016) at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/02/18-euco-conclusions-migration/  
37 This agreement states among other points that: 1) all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to 
the Greek islands will be returned to Turkey, 2) for every Syrian being returned to Turkey from the 
Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled in the EU (following a 1:1 scheme), 3) Turkey will take 
all the necessary measures to prevent the use of new or old sea and/or land routes for irregular 
migrants, 4) once the fluxes of migrants from Turkey will be reduced then a Voluntary Admission 
Scheme will be activated, 5) the visa liberalization for Turkish citizens will be accelerated, 6) Turkey will 
receive 3 billion Euro under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey while other 3 billion Euro will be paid 
to Turkey after September 2018. 
38  For a detailed account of the Greek operational support to the EU-Turkey agreement see: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-963_en.htm  
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Despite member states voluntary non-compliance, the EC pushed for more supranational 
solutions to the migration crisis. On the one hand, Frontex (the European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Cooperation at External Borders founded on the 26th of October 2004 39 ) was 
transformed in the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG)40. This latter has the power to require 
member states to take timely corrective actions in the field of migration and, in case of failure to do so, 
the ECBG is empowered to intervene without the direct consent of Member States. On the other 
hand, in April 2016 the EASO has been transformed into the European Union Agency for Asylum 
having the main task to monitor Member States implementation of asylum policies (Börzel 2016). The 
migrants’ redistribution system foreseen by such changes would have to be activated whenever a 
member state receives a number of migrants that overwhelms its capacities. In such cases, migrants 
would be relocated according to member states’ absorption capacity. Those member states rejecting to 
welcome asylum seekers would have to pay a ‘relocation contribution’ to the hosting member states. 
Such relocation scheme breaks the Dublin regulation according to which Member states of ‘first arrival’ 
of migrants are those responsible to handle asylum applications. Despite the efforts to supra-nationalise 
the mechanism of relocation of asylum seekers and handling of migrants more generally, most of them 
(if not all) failed to be implemented again due to member states’ non-compliance.  
In summary, the migration crisis contributed to the development of two (mostly overlapping) 
distinctions between EU member states: the first regarding the role they play in handling the migration 
crisis (welcome and processing of asylum seekers but also more generally of migrants), thus 
distinguishing between ‘donors’ (especially Northwest European countries) and ‘recipient’ states 
especially South European countries). The second distinction is mainly related to the geographical 
position of EU member states. Indeed, those states more proximate to the routes used by migrants to 
reach the EU (e.g., those states bordering with the Mediterranean sea like Greece and Italy) are by 
nature more exposed to migration fluxes than their Northern counterpart. 
In parallel to these developments, as showed by Hooghe and Marks (2018) the salience of the 
immigration all around the EU has increased sharply and has been highly capitalised by extreme parties, 
especially by those on the right of the political spectrum that justify national unilateral responses to the 
alleged absence or failure of a supranational response to the migration crisis (Börzel 2016).  
 
To sum up, the observations presented in this section show that the two above-mentioned crises 
impacted differently on EU-member states. Due to the distinction between creditor/debtor and 
                                                        
39 Frontex was officially established by the Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004. See the complete text 
of the regulation at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Al33216 
40 Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 repealed the Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 and established the 
European Border and Coast Guard on the 14th of September 2016. The ECBG is still commonly 





donor/recipient member states created by the two crises, opposition to the increased politicised EU-
issue assumes the characteristics of a two-sided phenomenon. On the one hand, it is, in fact, imaginable 
that the harder effects of stringent austerity policies to face the economic crisis coupled with an 
increased share of migrants trigger criticism toward the EU in debtor/recipient member states. On the 
other hand, it is imaginable that creditor/donor member states less affected by the effects of the two 
crises reject to contribute to solidarity mechanism ‘imposed’ by the EU to help those countries more in 
need. In other words, criticism toward the EU in creditor/donor member states might be associated 
with their rejection of the constraints imposed by the EU in providing financial and material assistance 
to help those member states that are perceived as not able to face the crises. Other things being equal it 
is thus possible to formulate the following two hypotheses: 
 
H5: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by national parties within the EP vary as a function of 
their country’s level of exposure to both the economic and the migration crisis. The more 
debtor/recipient member states are vulnerable to both the economic and the immigration crises, 
the higher the EU-opposition of national parties coming from those member states will be.  
 
H6: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by national parties within the EP vary as a negative 
function of their country’s level of exposure to both the economic and the migration crisis. The 
less creditor/donor states are vulnerable to both the economic and the immigration crises, the 
higher the EU-opposition of national parties coming from those member states will be.  
 
3.5 Conclusion: summary of the theoretical approach and advantages deriving from 
its application  
 
This chapter focuses on the second aim of this work: explaining patterns of EU-opposition in the 
EP. It starts by revising and comparing the models explaining the phenomenon of Euroscepticism (the 
Sussex vs. North Carolina Schools), stressing their limitations especially in dealing with the 
development of Eurosceptic groups both in a transnational and in a pan-European perspective.  
Having done this, the chapter presents Usherwood’s framework centred on the concept of POS. 
As stated above, Usherwood’s model foresees three sets of factors (one endogenous – ideology – and 
two exogenous – institutions and events) contributing to the formation of a POS that can help the 
constitution and the performance of Eurosceptic groups both in a pan-European and in a transnational 
perspective.  
This model is then adapted to the study of national parties’ positioning on the EU within the EP 
underlining the three sets of factors summarized in Table 3.3 below.  
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Table 3. 3: Summary table presenting the formulated hypotheses and associations to explain patterns of EU-
opposition in the EP 
Summary representation of the model for the study of EU-opposition as expressed by national parties 
in the EP 
Factors  
Perspective 
with respect to 
the actor  
Hypotheses and Associations National vs. supranational level  
Ideology  Endogenous  
A1: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by 
national parties within the EP are associated with 
the degree of heterogeneity of the EPPG they 
belong to.  
Supranational level 
(ideological 
heterogeneity of the 
EPPG)  
A2: Patterns of EU-opposition are associated with 
the general ideological orientation of the EPPG to 
which national parties belong.  
Supranational – 
(ideology of the EPPG) 
H1: Patterns of EU-opposition vary as a function of 
each national party’s ideological extremeness, 
independently of the general ideological position of 
the EPPG. The more parties position themselves 
toward the extremes of the left-right ideological 
continuum the higher their degree of EU-
opposition will be. 
National (pertaining to 
the ideological 
characterization of each 
national party) 
Institutions Exogenous  
H2: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by 
national parties in the EP vary as a function of their 
‘marginality’ in political competition at the national 
level. Parties not belonging to governing coalitions 
at the national level (or not even eligible to cover 
governing positions at the national level) will display 




dynamics at the national 
level granting extra-
parliamentary access to 
other EU decision-
making bodies) 
H3: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by 
national parties represented in the EP vary as a 
function of the ‘marginality’ of the EPPG they 
belong to. The more marginal the EPPG the higher 
EU-opposition expressed by national parties 
belonging to that EPPG will be. 
Supranational 
(marginality of the 
EPPG in the 
supranational political 
competition)  
H4: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by 
national parties represented in the EP will vary as a 
negative function of the seniority of their MEPs. 
The less national parties’ MEPs are socialized within 
the EP the higher their EU-opposition will be.  
Supranational (MEPs’ 
seniority)  
Events  Exogenous  
H5: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by 
national parties within the EP vary as a function of 
their country’s level of exposure to both the 
economic and the migration crisis. The more 
debtor/recipient member states are vulnerable to 
both the economic and the immigration crises, the 
higher the EU-opposition of national parties 
coming from those member states will be.  
National level 
(concerning each 
country’s high degree of 
vulnerability to both the 
economic and the 
immigration crises)  
H6: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by 
national parties within the EP vary as a negative 
function of their country’s level of exposure to both 
the economic and the migration crisis. The less 
creditor/donor states are vulnerable to both the 
economic and the immigration crises, the higher the 
EU-opposition of national parties coming from 
those member states will be.  
National level 
(concerning each 
country’s low degree of 
vulnerability to both the 
economic and the 




The application of this model to explain patterns of EU-opposition presents three main 
advantages. First, from the perspective of the observed actors (political parties), this model enables the 
observation of the impact on EU-opposition of both endogenous and exogenous factors.  
Second, this framework considers both national and supranational dynamics of political 
competition. ‘Only an analysis that includes at least the two major levels (the supranational and the 
national level) and the manifold interdependencies between them, may hope to produce realistic 
insights into the working logic of European governance’ (Helms 2008, 213). This is especially true 
when looking at factors exogenous to parties, more specifically at institutions. In fact, on the one hand, 
taking into consideration the inter-institutional dynamics of the EU political sphere means considering 
the role played by national parties within their national environment, the government-opposition 
distinction. On the other hand, the EP as a supranational institution enables the existence of pure 
supranational dynamics of political competition that may impact EU-opposition.  
Third, the proposed framework encompasses elements that are present in both models 
formulated by previous literature in the field: the Sussex School and the North Carolina School. In fact, 
as just mentioned, on the one hand, national dynamics of party competition (considered by the current 
model under the second set of exogenous factors) are at the basis of the Sussex School’ s model, on the 
other hand, ideology (considered by the current model as the first set of factors endogenous to parties) 
is the core element of the North Carolina School.  
The next chapter focuses on the operationalization of both the dependent and independent 
variables of this work further detailing the research design of this work, the method, the time 
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This chapter presents the selected national parties on which the analysis is focused alongside the 
data and the methods used to assess national parties’ positioning on the various ‘targets’ of the EU.  
The first section delineates both constraints and criteria used to select the national parties to be 
included in the analysis, relying on quantitative data, the section proposes a description of the used 
cases with reference to their ideological stance, their positioning to the EU, and the role they play at 
both the national and the supranational level. The second section presents the data and the methods 
used to ‘build’ the dependent variables of the work. As further detailed below, this work uses MEPs’ 
speeches as the main source of data relying on two different methods of content analysis to understand 
both the ‘quantity’ and the ‘quality’ of opposition, alongside an in-depth review of the motivations used 
by parties opposing some specific targets of the EU. The third section of the work presents the 
independent variables used in the explanatory phase of the analysis providing answers to the 
hypotheses formulated in the previous chapter. 
 
4.2 Heterogeneous but equated by their EU-opposition: the selected national parties 
 
This work is a comparative study relying on a small/medium N sample of national parties 
represented in the EP. National parties’ positioning to the EU is derived from the analysis of textual 
data (speeches delivered by national parties’ representatives in the EP (see below for an extensive 
discussion of the included speeches). Consequently, the selection of the national parties to be included 
in the analysis is constrained by one major limitation: the languages in which the speeches are delivered. 
Due to a ‘spending review’, since 20121 the translation service of the EP does not translate anymore all 
                                                        
1 Since the 20th of November 2012, the EP approved the ‘decision on the amendment of Rule 181 of 
Parliament’s Rule of Procedure concerning verbatim reports of proceedings and Rule 182 concerning 
the audiovisual record of proceedings’. According to the approved amendment, ‘a verbatim report of 
the proceeding of each sitting shall be drawn up as a multilingual document in which all oral 






the speeches in all the official languages of the EU, for this reason, the work relies on speeches 
delivered in Italian, English, French, German and Spanish. Obviously enough, this restricted sample of 
languages influences also the choice of national parties to be included in the analysis.  
The selection of national parties to be included in the analysis starts from the choice of countries 
on which to focus the attention. The second main objective of this work is, in fact, to understand the 
effects of three sets of POS (both exogenous and endogenous to the national parties) on patterns of 
EU-opposition. As mentioned in chapter 3 (See Chapter 3, Section 3.4.3, pages 61-68), the effects of 
the two major crises (economic and immigration) are considered as POS shaping EU-opposition in the 
EP arena. Thus, the choice of national parties to be included in the analysis considers variations in the 
effects of the two crises on EU member states; this is done to assure variability in the included 
independent variables (see below for further details). The objective is to have countries where, on the 
one hand, the two crises have both stronger and lighter effects (keeping in mind the language 
restriction reported above), while on the other hand, so-called Eurosceptic formations from the left 
and the right of the political spectrum are present and ‘relevant’ in the EP (as further explained below). 
According to these indications, the countries whose national parties are selected for the analysis are 
Italy, France, Spain, Germany and the United Kingdom.  
Starting from the effects of the economic crisis, the three indicators presented in Figures 4.1 - 4.3 
below (Annual GDP growth Rate; annual Government gross debt as percentage of GDP and quarterly 
total unemployment rate2) distinguish countries where the economic crisis had stronger repercussions 
(Italy and Spain) from countries where the crisis’ effects were lighter. The annual GDP growth rate 
reports a neat distinction between Italy and Spain and the other included countries. Besides the fact 
that the economic crisis heavily impacted in all included countries in 2009, between 2010 and 2013 the 
two South European countries (Italy and Spain) show negative values of GDP growth rate, recovering 
since 2013 onwards (with Spain showing a stronger recovery). Similarly, looking at the trend of General 
Government gross debt, noticeably Italy shows the highest values on this indicator when compared to 
the other included countries. Furthermore, while Spain was showing the lowest level of government 
gross debt in the period between 2006 and 2011 when compared to the other countries, the levels of 
                                                        
2 The Annual GDP growth rate volume Gross domestic product (GDP) is a measure of the economic 
activity, defined as the value of all goods and services produced minus the value of any goods or 
services used in their creation. The calculation of the annual growth rate of GDP volume is intended to 
allow comparisons of the dynamics of economic development both over time and between economies 
of different sizes. The General Government gross debt is defined in the Maastricht Treaty as 
consolidated general government gross debt at nominal (face) value, outstanding at the end of the year 
in the following categories of government liabilities (as defined in ESA 2010): currency and deposits, 
debt securities and loans. The general government sector comprises the subsectors: central 
government, state government, local government and social security funds. The Quarterly total 
unemployment rate is the number of unemployed persons as a percentage of the labour force (the total 
number of people employed and unemployed) based on International Labour Office (ILO) definition. 
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this indicator steeply increase since 2008. On the contrary, apart from the just mentioned exception of 
Spain in the period between 2006 and 2011, Germany and the UK show the lowest levels of yearly 
Government gross debt to GDP when compared to the other countries while France positions itself 
between South and North European countries. Such considerations are furthermore confirmed by the 
last reported graph showing the percentage of total unemployment. In this case, Spain presents 
skyrocketing levels of unemployment reaching its peak in correspondence to the 1st quarter of 2013 
scoring 26.9% points), then following a decreasing trend but still remaining the country with the 
highest level of total unemployment among the five included. Spain is followed by Italy where the level 
of unemployment standing increases since the 3rd quarter of 2013 and reaches its peak during the 1st 
quarter of 2014. France closely follows Italy, even though the level of unemployment in this country is 
generally lower. In general, the graph shows a neat distinction between the three abovementioned 
countries and Italy and Spain.  
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Besides the effects of the economic crisis, the countries considered for the selection of national 
parties are also differently affected by the migration crisis. Figures 4.4 – 4.6 below report three 
indicators from the EUROSTAT dataset: the total number of migrants, the total number of Asylum 
applicants, and the total number of first-time asylum applicants. It is interesting to notice how 
Germany is an attractive country for migrants and refugees witnessing increasing trends in both the 
number of migrants and the total amount of asylum applications in the period between 2010 and 2016. 
Also the UK presents higher levels of total immigration when compared to Italy, Spain, and France, 
even though the trends of Asylum applications (both total and first-time applicants) are lower when 
compared to the other included countries. On the contrary, Italy, France, and Spain generally report 
lower levels of total immigration, even though Italy and France witness an increased number of Asylum 
applications especially in the period between 2014 and 2016. A further distinction is, however, to be 
done, in fact, the data reported in the three figures below generally refers either to asylum seekers or to 
so-called ‘legal migrants’. According to Frontex, there is currently no EU system in place capable of 
tracing each person’s movement following an illegal border crossing. This is to say that it is not 
possible to establish the precise number of persons who have illegally crossed the external borders of 
the EU. However, due to their geographical position, two out of five of the included countries (Spain 
and Italy) are ‘destination countries’ on two different migration routes: Spain is the destination country 
on the ‘Western Mediterranean route 3 ’ while Italy is in the middle of the so-called ‘Central 
Mediterranean route4’. According to Frontex, the number of detections of illegal border crossing for 
the Central Mediterranean route steeply increased between 2013 and 2016 moving from 40000 
detections in 2013 reaching its peak in 2016 with 181126 detections. Similarly, the trend of detections 
of illegal migrants on the Western Mediterranean route increased in the period between 2013 and 2016 
reaching its tipping point in 2016 with 10231 detections. This is to say that, besides the official statistics 
considering the total number of legal migrants or asylum seekers, countries may be divided between 
those facing the burden of rescuing migrants from the sea (mainly Italy but also Spain) and having 
external borders more ‘exposed’ to migration fluxes, and those countries that may be considered as 
‘final destination countries’ by migrants (like Germany, the UK or France). Furthermore, according to 
the ‘Reception condition directive’ (2013/33 EU), Member states where ‘asylum applicants’ are present 
shall ensure the ‘material condition’ and make them available to applicants (Art. 17.1 Directive 2013/33 
of the EU) granting asylum applicants ‘adequate standards of living’ (Art. 17.2 Directive 2013/33 of the 
EU), until the status of refugee is granted or rejected5. 
                                                        
3 The so-called ‘Morocco to Spain route’ see further information at https://frontex.europa.eu/  
4 As of October 2014, the Central Mediterranean route includes also the so-called Apulia and Calabria 
route. See further information at https://frontex.europa.eu/  
5 The determination of the member state responsible for processing the asylum application is laid down 
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Figure 4. 6: Trend of total number of first time asylum applicants (annual aggregated data).  
 
With ‘first time asylum applicants’ are meant all those people that applied for asylum for the first time in a 
specific country. Source EUROSTAT 
 
Once the countries are selected, it is important to stress another major constraint shaping this 
research: the time at disposal for an analysis of parties’ stances to the EU has implied a further 
restriction of the time-scope of the analysis. This study, in fact, focuses on a restricted time period 
taking the first two years of the current EP-legislature as the reference time-span. This choice has, 
drawbacks since it hinders the possibility to observe changes in parties’ attitude through time and in 
correspondence to events shaping the EU, like the ‘Big Bang enlargement’ to the CEE in 2004 or the 
period before and after the spread of the economic crisis (before and after 2007-2008). However, the 
choice to focus on a restricted time period enables an in-depth observation of national parties’ stances 
to the EU during the ‘normal’ activity of the EP. As further documented below, this study intends to 
analyse national parties’ positioning to the various aspects of the EU (its policies, its elite, its regime and 
the community), without focusing on specific debates where the level of opposition or support to the 
EU may be higher (e.g.: in the speeches concerning the Brexit referendum). In other words, the work 
studies EU-opposition in the EP without imposing a ‘selection bias’ on the proposed speeches (even 
























































it is true that so-called or self-declared Eurosceptics have been in the EP from the very beginning6, 
over a period of 30 years (from the first EP elections in 1979 to the elections in 2009) they had 
increased their combined seat-share by no more than 2 per cent (Leconte 2010: 130), in other words, 
they were a ‘residual’ category not attracting researchers’ attention (Cammino and Verzichelli 2016). It 
is after the last EP election in 2014, defined by the BBC as a ‘Eurosceptic earthquake’ rocking the EU7 
that the EU-opponents steeply increase their share of representatives in the EP.  
One last constraint applied to the selection of cases relates to the ‘parties’ relevance’ within the 
EP arena: in order to have ‘enough material’, this work relies on parties that have a sufficiently high and 
relevant number of representatives delivering speeches in the EP. Consequently, for the purpose of this 
study, only EU-opposition parties having 5 or more representatives in the EP are included. Following 
the selection criteria enumerated above, Table 4.1 below reports the seven EU-opponents included in 
the analysis alongside the results they obtained in the last two rounds of EP elections. The parties 
reported in Table 4.1 below scored well in the last EP election with only two exceptions: the Italian 
Northern League (LN), that lost 4 seats lowering its vote-share by 4.05% points and the German 
LINKE decreasing its national vote share by 0.1% points and losing one seat in the current EP 
legislature. 
                                                        
6 They entered the EP in waves with the communist and the nationalist-conservatives in the 70s 
followed by right-wing extremists in the 80s and some single-issue anti-EU parties in the 1994 election 
(See Fitzgibbon, Leruth and Startin 2017 for a historical overview about the representation of 
‘Eurosceptic’ delegations in the EP).  
7 ‘Eurosceptic earthquake rocks the EU’, this is how the BBC headed its online report on the EP 
election 2014, thereby accepting the label used by the leader of the French Front National (Marine Le 
Pen). See the report at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27559714  
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Italy - - - EFDD 21.15 17 +21.15 +17 
National 




Germany - - - ECR** 7.10 7 +7.10 +7 
The Left 
(LINKE) Germany GUE/NGL 7.5 8 GUE/NGL 7.40 7 -0.1 -1 
We can 






Kingdom EFD 16.09 13 EFDD 26.77 24 +10.68 +11 
 
ENF: Europe of the Nations and Freedom; EFD: Europe of Freedom and Democracy; GUE/NGL: Groupe Gauche Unitaire Européenne/Gauche Verte Nordique 
(Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left); EFDD: Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy. * The ENF formed only after the second 
half of 2015, **AFD stays in the ECR only until March 2016, then a splinter group, the ALFA, stayed in the ECR while two members of the EFD joined the ENF 





The parties reported in Table 4.1 above are generally classified as ‘Eurosceptic’ (Treib 2014; 
Cammino and Verzichelli 2016), even though displaying differences in the ‘intensity’ of their critique 
(see Table 4.3 below). However, such parties are heterogeneous from several viewpoints: 1) their origin 
and ‘age’; 2) their ideological orientation (alongside the party family they belong to); 3) the role played 
at national level; 4) their affiliation to the EPPG, and 5) the criteria used for the selection of their 
MEPs at the supranational level. Table 4.2 below provides a summary of such characteristics. To assess 
national parties’ positioning along the left-right continuum (and party family) three main data sources 
are used. First, the Comparative Manifesto Project dataset (CMP)8 reports the RILE index of left-right 
positioning which is given by the difference between the rightist codes and the leftist codes present in 
the latest version of parties’ manifestos issued in the occasion of national elections (for further 
information about the coded categories see Laver and Budge 1992). The RILE index values range from 
-100 (left) to 100 (right). Second, the Euromanifesto Study dataset (EMS)9 reports the coders’ rating of 
parties’ left-right positioning at European elections, a variable ranging from 0 (left) to 10 (right). Lastly, 
the CHES10 contains expert level judgements of 31 political parties (including all European member 
states). The variable indicating the general left-right position of the party ranges from 0 (extreme left) to 
10 (extreme right) while a value of 5 indicates centrist positioning. 
                                                        
8  Further information about the Comparative Manifesto Project may be found at 
https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/  
9 Further information about the latest edition of the Euromanifesto study (2014) may be found at 
http://europeanelectionstudies.net/european-election-studies/ees-2014-study/manifesto-study-2014  
10 Further information about the Chapel Hill Expert Survey at https://www.chesdata.eu/  
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Table 4. 2: Main characteristics of the included EU-opponents alongside their left right positioning. 
Party 
name Country 
Origin of the party (year 
and initial configuration 
of the party) 
Positioning of the party along the left-right continuum/ party family 
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Self-defined as a 
movement ‘anti-party-
party’ 
-49.03 Special issue party No answer Other 4.66 
Opposition party 
(109 seats in the 
Chamber of Deputies; 
54 seats the Senate after 
2013 national elections) 









Alliance of regionalist 
leagues 
3.81 Nationalist Parties 8 Regional parties 8.86 
Opposition party: 
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Opposition party (8 seats 
in the national assembly 
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the dissolution of the 
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Opposition party (94 
seats in the Bundestag 
after 2017 German 
federal elections) 
Mix of MEPs showing 
previous political 
experience and 
exponents from civil 
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UKIP United Kingdom 
Foundation: 1993 
Campaign platform 
preaching for UK 
withdrawal from the EU 







represented in national 






Source: author’s search and CMP, EMS, and CHES datasets. EMS and CHES data refers to 2014 European elections. CMP data refers to the latest available elections 





Starting from right-wing EU-opponents, the proposed selection includes the French Front 
National (FN), the Italian LN, the German AFD and the British United Kingdom Independence Party 
(UKIP).  
Many scholars consider the FN as the prototype of ‘populist radical right parties’ (Mudde 2007; 
Ivaldi 2018); it was founded in 1972 as ‘not much more than a confederation of extreme radical right 
groupuscules under the leadership of the veteran radical right politician Jean-Marie Le Pen’ (Mudde 2007, 
41). Initially, its position towards the EU was rather ambivalent, in fact, during the 1980s the party 
showed support for a common defence and currency, it is only in the 1990s, with the Maastricht 
Treaty, that the FN hardens its positions on the EU (Ivaldi 2018). As shown in Table 4.2 above, FN is 
a right-wing party (scoring 8 points on the RILE index, 10 points on the EMS coders’ rating and 9.6 
points for the CHES 11 ) being generally classified as belonging to the ‘Nationalist’ party family. 
However, since 2011, Marine Le Pen12 becomes the head of the party and employs a ‘stratégie de 
dédiabolisation’ - de-demonization strategy - to soften the party’s image, make it credible on issues 
other than immigration and diversify its electoral audience (Déze 2016, 36)13. This process enabled the 
party to score 17.9% of the national vote share in the first round of national presidential elections in 
2012 improving the result obtained by her father in the former presidential elections in 2007 by 1% 
points, despite not classifying herself for the second round14. Until 2012, FN had only 1 representative 
in the French national assembly after both the electoral turns in 1988 and 1997. Under Marine Le Pen’s 
presidency, FN obtains 2 seats and 8 seats in the national assembly after the French national elections 
in 2012 and 2017 respectively. However, the party neither had governing positions nor was ever 
                                                        
11 According to Budge (2013) parties mostly present policies in left-right terms, and RILE is a holistic 
index working as a summary indicator of policy tendencies over the whole of the party programme and 
it ranges from -100 (extreme left) to 100 (extreme right). For further information about the RILE index 
calculation see ‘The Standard Left-Right scale’ Budge Ian 2013 at 
https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/down/papers/budge_right-left-scale.pdf The EMS Coders’ rating is a 
variable ranging from 0 to 10 where 0 means extreme left and 10 means extreme right while the CHES 
indicators is given by mean values of responses provided by experts and it ranges from 0 to 10 where 0 
means ‘extreme left’ and 10 means ‘extreme right’. 
12 Marine Le Pen wins the position as head of the party winning 67.65% of the votes against Bruno 
Gollnisch.  
13 According to Déze, however, this de-demonization strategy is not new to the FN that has been 
founded following a similar strategy. What is really new in Marine Le Pen strategy is the use of a more 
widely accepted discourse relying on the notions such as: ‘national priority’, ‘secularism’ or ‘Republic’ 
(Déze 2016, 36)(see also Ivaldi 2018). 
14 Her strategy worked relatively well also during the last presidential election in 2017 (first round held 
on the 23rd of April 2017, second round held on the 7th of May 2017) where the FN was able to gain 
more than 21% of the national vote share in the first round. Despite being defeated by Immanuel 
Macron during the second round of the presidential election, the FN obtained more than 33% of the 
national vote share, an impressive result that definitely moves the party out of the margins of the 
national politics. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/8261969/Marine-Le-
Pen-becomes-Front-National-leader-A-pivotal-moment-for-French-politics.html  
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considered as a suitable partner to form a governing coalition. Marine Le Pen’s organizational turn is 
also mirrored by the representatives selected for the EP: among the new MEPs, generally showing 
previous political experience, it is possible to find Gilles Lebreton who in the past campaigned for the 
citizens movement led by Jean Pierre Chevèment and Aymeric Chauprade a political scientist belonging 
to the geopolitical school emphasizing realpolitik over ideology (Cammino and Verzichelli 2016). The 
French FN currently works in the same EPPG with the Italian LN, the Europe of Nations and 
Freedom (ENF). After some initial struggles, mainly related to the rules governing the formation of 
EPPG in the EP, the group was founded in June 2015.  
LN was first founded as an alliance of regionalist leagues in the North of Italy15 in 1989 and 
merged in the Northern League in 1991 (Tarchi 2002, Mudde 2007). According to Mudde, the league 
started as a fairly liberal party and became more authoritarian during the 90s. Furthermore, while the 
party is characterised by nativism, it has always oscillated between regionalism and nationalism (Mudde 
2007), developing from an exclusively populist regionalist party into a radical right party (Ruzza 2009; 
Verbeek and Zaslove 2015; Zaslove 2008). This is the main reason why several scholars have included 
LN (at least at its inception) among the category of (ethno)regionalist parties (Mudde 2007, Ignazi 
1992). This plurality of characterizations is also mirrored by the data reported in Table 4.2 above 
defining the LN as belonging to the family of either Nationalist party (CMP) or Regionalist parties 
(EMS). According to EMS and CHES indicators of left-right positioning the party belongs to the right, 
extreme-right-wing of the ideological spectrum (scoring 8 and 8.8 points in the EMS and CHES 
indicators respectively), while the CMP reports softer values of right-wing positioning (3.8 points on 
the RILE index). LN has a longer and stronger experience of representation at the national level. Since 
the 1992 Italian election, the party holds a considerable number of seats in both the Chamber of 
Deputies and the Senate. In the past, the party scored its highest result under Umberto Bossi’s 
leadership in coalition with the Pole of Freedom in 1994 (obtaining 117 seats in the Chamber of 
Deputies and 60 seats in the Senate), while the lowest score was obtained by the party during 2013 
Italian elections under the leadership of Roberto Maroni (gaining 20 seats in the Chamber of Deputies 
and 18 seats in the Senate). Nowadays, under the leadership of Matteo Salvini, the re-branded League 
scored its highest historical result attracting 17.8 per cent of the national vote share and formed a 
governing coalition with the FSM 16 . Furthermore, the Italian LN has already been a partner of 
government serving three times in centre-right governing coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi (briefly in 
                                                        
15 The alliance was first composed by the Lega Lombarda, the Liga Veneta, the Piemont Autonomista, 
the Union Ligure, the Lega Emiliano Romagnola and the Alleanza Toscana.  
16  After some coalition bargaining the two parties managed to propose a feasible yellow-green 
governing coalition. The coalition was firstly repelled by the Italian president of the Republic (Sergio 
Mattarella) due to the parties’ positions on both the Euro and the EU in general. Later on, the two 




1994 and more successfully from 2001 to 2006 and from 2008 to 2011). Lastly, LN’s MEPs show a 
long political experience also at the supranational level (see the case of Mario Borghezio present in the 
EP since 200117).  
Differently from the two above-mentioned parties, the AFD enters in the EP among the ranks of 
the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) thus presupposing ‘softer Eurosceptic’ stances to 
the EU (similarly to the British Conservatives). Unusually in the widely pro-European German political 
scene, the AFD was founded in 2013 (only some months before the general elections18) to campaign 
for the dissolution of the Eurozone and for a general reconfiguration of German foreign policy 
(Arzheimer 2015). Although the party has been considered as a right-wing populist party 19 , its 
categorization is still widely debated among the literature; interestingly both the CMP and the EMS 
consider the party as a ‘special issue’ or ‘special interest’ party. In terms of its left-right positioning 
AFD is classified as a right, extreme-right-wing party as the data in Table 4.2 confirm (AFD scores 8.9 
points on the CHES’ left-right scale and 8 points on the EMS left-right coders’ rating) with the only 
exception of the CMP’s RILE index that identifies AFD as a ‘centrist’ party scoring -2.7 points. The 
AFD starts its political life in 2012 thanks to three major exponents exiting from the CDU: the 
journalist Konrad Adam, the lawyer and journalist Alexander Gauland and the professor in economy 
Bernd Lucke. However, the AFD should not be considered as a splinter party of the CDU since its 
founding members are recruited from a broader centre-right political background constituted by 
university professors, entrepreneurs and managers and by a former Land party chair of the Free 
Democratic Party of Germany (Freie Partei Deutschland – FDP). The party was officially founded in 
February 2013, however only six months later an internal discussion began in order to broaden its 
programmatic platform moving away from the single anti-Euro issue. In parallel, the various factions 
(mainly conservatives, liberals and Christian-Democrats) were struggling to influence the party. In the 
occasion of its first EP election (see Table 4.1 above), the party was able to obtain 7 seats in the 
Strasburg Chamber, however, immediately after the elections, internal conflicts emerged to determine 
which EPPG should AFD belong to. The choice was, in fact, between the ECR and the EFDD. All 7 
elected MEPs eventually entered the ECR group in the EP, however, they were all expelled from the 
ECR on the 8th of March 201620; only on the 18th of March 2016, 5 of the 7 members were re-admitted 
                                                        
17  For further info see 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/21817/MARIO_BORGHEZIO_history.html  
18 During the first general election, the party obtained 4.7 % of the German vote share missing the 
opportunity to get a representative in the Bundestag due to the presence of a minimum 5% threshold.  
19 Both among the German media and among its party challengers, this party is generally considered as 
a populist radical right party since its inception, see as an example 
http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/alternative-fuer-deutschland-spd-und-gruene-
werfen-afd-populismus-vor/8061482.html  
20 See the official ECR note at http://136.173.159.70/newsletter/afd/ 
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in the group under the new political formation called the ALFA (Allianz für Fortschrift und 
Aufbruch)21 a splinter party from the AFD created on the 19th of July 2015 in Kassel (a city in the 
centre of Germany). The other two members, Beatrix von Stroch and Marcus Pretzell were included 
into two different groups, the EFDD (von Stroch) and the ENF (Pretzell)22. After the last general 
election in 2017, the AFD was able to get 12.6% of the national vote share finally obtaining 94 seats in 
the Bundestag but without being considered as a suitable partner for a governing coalition. 
The last selected party among the right wing EU-opponents is the British populist radical-right or 
right-wing anti-establishment party (Mudde 2007; Hayton 2010; Clarke et al. 2016), UKIP. It was 
founded in 1993 by Alan Sked a university lecturer involved in the Bruges Group23 and was mainly 
intended to contest EP election securing British withdrawal from the EU (Usherwood 2008). It was 
only in 1999 that the party was first able to gather a consistent support (16% of the national vote share) 
entering in the EP with a larger delegation of representative (12 MEPs). After a change in the party’s 
leadership with the election of Jeffrey Titford and Roger Knapman, the party started to find more 
stability and began to broaden its policy base while gathering support for the 2004 EP elections. 
However, it was only with the election of Nigel Farage in 2006 that UKIP’s leadership started to 
mainstream the party in the British political life (Usherwood 2008). In short, with Farage’s leadership 
UKIP broadens its political platform beyond the EU issue, casting doubts on climate change and 
supporting the cut of immigration (Bale 2018). However, according to the CMP and EMS data, UKIP 
is to be classified as a ‘single issue party’ (see Table 4.2 above). Despite being widely considered as a 
right, extreme-right-wing party, the CMP RILE index identifies UKIP as ‘centrist’ party scoring -7.78 
points. On the contrary, both the EMS and the CHES depict UKIP as a right, extreme-right wing 
party, scoring 8 and 8.9 points on the respective left-right scale. Similarly to the other right-wing EU-
opponents (with the only exception of the LN), UKIP covers no important role at national level. It is, 
in fact, a residual party occupying only one seat in the House of Commons in spite of losing it in the 
last national elections in 2017. With reference to its current delegation in the EP (the larger one 
belonging to the EFDD), its MEPs are a ‘patrol of populist exponents’ (Cammino and Verzichelli 
2016: 163), who generally show previous political experience.  
                                                        
21 Such distinctions are taken into consideration during the empirical analysis phase of this work.  
22 According to the declarations delivered by Beatrix von Storch, the expulsion of the two members 
was a conspiracy between Angela Merkel, trying to damage the party before the regional elections in 
Germany, and David Cameron who was trying to distance his party from AFD’s positioning before the 
referendum on the British EU-membership. See: http://www.politico.eu/article/ecr-afd-von-storch-
pretzell-two-members-of-german-far-right-party-asked-to-leave-voluntarily/ 
23  The Bruges Group is a think tank that produces discussion related to the EU and European 
integration issues. ‘Through its work, the Bruges Group spearheads the intellectual battle against 
European integration, EU federalism, centralization and enlargement. The Bruges Group promotes 
alternatives to membership of the European Union and the need to restore British sovereignty and 




Before moving to the left side of the Strasburg hemicycle, it is noteworthy to focus on the 
‘strange’ case of the Italian FSM. Formally constituted in 2012, the movement rejects to be defined as a 
party and challenges the traditional criteria of left-right24 positioning. This rejection is portrayed by the 
sources presented in Table 4.2 above; while EMS’ coders do not provide any answer to the FSM’s left-
right positioning, the CMP RILE index categorises the party as belonging to the left (scoring -49 
points) and CHES experts’ evaluations position the party more or less toward the centre of the political 
spectrum (leaning toward the left and scoring 4.6 points25). The party advocates direct democracy 
proposing to turn citizens into the protagonists of democracy (under the mantra ‘One is worth one’26), 
overcoming the mechanism of representation through the use of the Internet. It is extremely difficult 
to define FSM under a single label since it is fundamentally unclear how it is to be understood 
(Diamanti 2014). Some scholars define it as an ‘anti-party party’ (Diamanti and Natale 2014), other as 
‘anti-establishment party’ (Mosca 2014), or as an ‘ideologically hybrid organization’ (Pirro and van 
Kessel 2018), or as a ‘strange animal’, a ‘web-populist’ (Corbetta and Gualmini 2015) due to both the 
diffuse use of internet as mean of communication and the organisation of the party. This difficulty is 
clearly mirrored by the data reported in Table 4.2 above: while the CMP categorises FSM as a ‘special 
issue party’, the EMS identifies it under the ‘Other’ category. The party obtained its first successes 
participating in local elections and winning the majority in several municipalities (the biggest one was 
Parma) in 2012, and afterwards in the regional election in Sicily, obtaining 15% of the regional vote 
share and becoming the largest party in the region. However, FSM obtained its first important success 
during the Italian national election in 2013 scoring 25.6% of the national vote share and gaining 163 
seats in both Chambers (Parliament and Senate). FSM’s participation to governing coalition was initially 
hindered by the party’s rejection of any potential alliance with other parties, especially with mainstream 
ones27. Such position has changed after the results of the last Italian elections that saw a high increase in 
Italian voters’ consensus for the party (scoring more than 33% of the national vote-share). Luigi di 
Maio, FSM’s leader, declared, the day after the general election, that the party is open to the dialogue 
with any potential governmental partner stressing however that the FSM will play the leading role of 
the government following Italian peoples’ will. As abovementioned, FSM is currently in a governmental 
alliance with the LN. In the last EP election 2014 (Table 4.1 above), the party’s result was described as 
                                                        
24 The official blog of the ‘Movement’ states: ‘The time for ideologies is over. The Five Stars Movement 
is not fascist, it is neither right-wing nor left-wing’. (Italian version available at 
http://www.beppegrillo.it/2013/01/il_m5s_non_e_di_destra_ne_di_sinistra.html.  
25 It is, however, to be noted that FSM’s left-right position has a high standard deviation ±1,96 points 
thus potentially encompassing positioning ranging between 6.62 and 2.7 points.  
26 In other words, everyone has equal weight inside of the movement.  
27 The official blog of the Movement states: ‘ the FSM has allied with other movements sharing their 
objectives (…) While for parties (….) the doors are closed, locked forever”. See the Italian version at 
http://www.beppegrillo.it/2013/01/il_m5s_non_e_di_destra_ne_di_sinistra.html. 
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a ‘political setback’ (Bordignon and Ceccarini 2015) even though FSM competing in its first EP election 
scored 21.2% of the vote share and obtained 17 seats in the EP in a country described in the past as 
pro-EU (Carlotti 2017). With reference to the methods used for the selection of their representatives, 
the FSM has the objective to bring ordinary citizens into the institutions with a sort of online primaries 
called the ‘Parlamentarie’. In other words, the ‘ supporters’ of the FSM logged on the FSM online-
community have the right to vote for a list of self-determined candidates thus choosing their would-be 
representatives through the internet28. 
 
Moving now the attention to the left side of the Strasbourg hemicycle, the analysis focuses on 
both the German LINKE and the Spanish PODEMOS. The first one is generally identified as a radical 
left-wing party and also widely considered as a populist radical left party (Mudde 2008; Akkerman and 
Rooduijn 2015). It is the result of the fusion between the Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei des 
Demokratischen Sozialismus – PDS) the successor of the Communist Party and the Electoral 
Alternative for Labour and Social Justice (Wahlalternative Arbeit und Soziale Gerechtigkeit – WAGS) a 
breakaway movement of the left wing of the social democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschland – SPD). The mixed nature of the LINKE is perhaps portrayed by the data reported 
in Table 4.2: CMP and EMS define the party as belonging to the ‘socialist party family’ or the 
‘communist party family’ respectively. However, in terms of positioning along the left-right continuum 
all the measures reported above confirm that LINKE is a radical-left party (scoring 2 on the EMS 
coders’ rating and 1.2 on the CHES left-right scale), the only partial exception is the CMP RILE index 
that positions the party to the left (scoring -34) but still considers the Italian FSM as more ‘left-wing’ 
than the German LINKE. Despite their divergence (WAGS’ objective was to cover an opposition role 
at national level, while PDS sought to become a left-wing institutionalised actor) WAGS and PDS 
firstly united in 2005 (in the occasion of the anticipated federal elections in Germany) under the name 
Linkspartei (known in western Länder as LINKSPARTEI.PDS) (Damiani and Viviani 2015). A first 
good and unexpected electoral result at the federal level (the Linkspartei obtained 8.7% of the national 
vote share alongside 54 seats) represented an incentive for the foundation in 2007 of the LINKE. The 
‘rational marriage driven mainly for electoral reasons’ between ideologically divergent personalities, 
whose main goal was vote-seeking and the establishment of a relevant left-wing party in Germany 
(Coffé and Plassa 2010, 275), was fruitful in the 2009 federal election when the party increased its vote 
share by 3.2% (scoring 11.9%). On the contrary, during the subsequent federal election, the party saw a 
decrease of its vote share that, however, never went below 8.6% (LINKE scored 8.6% and 9.2% in 
2013 and 2017 federal elections respectively). LINKE’s delegation in the EP is composed by exponents 
                                                        





with previous political experience, probably the only exception in the current EP legislature is the case 
of Fabio De Masi, a lecturer in macroeconomics at the University of Berlin who nevertheless was 
already a candidate for the LINKE in 2009 EP elections29. 
The LINKE works in the GUE/NGL EPPG, similarly to the last included EU-opponent: the 
Spanish PODEMOS, a ‘new entry’ in the EP that is generally described as a left-wing populist party or 
radical-left-wing populist party (Kioupkiolis 2016; Ramiro and Gomez 2017). It finds its origins in the 
so-called 15-M movement, a protest movement formed in May 2011 accusing the financial elite to 
cause the material deprivation of the people at the expenses of democracy and proposing participatory 
democracy as an alternative to neoliberalism (Kioupkiolis 2016). While the movement failed to achieve 
its objectives, it opened up a political space for new actors thus giving way to a new institutional phase, 
where PODEMOS plays a leading role. This is clearly mirrored by the words of Miguel Urbán Crespo 
(co-founder of the party and current MEP for PODEMOS): ‘Podemos has been created at the time of 
greatest crisis of politics and it represents the biggest act of insubordination to those who thought to 
blackmail the country with the fear of the crisis’ (extract of the interview cited in Pucciarelli and Russo 
Spena 2014: 61). According to Kioupkiolis, PODEMOS was, in fact, able to merge together two 
aspects: the horizontal one, referring to the mobilization of the multitude on the streets and the web; and 
the vertical one, concerning the hierarchical and formal representative structure of party formations. In 
other words, PODEMOS is a mix of grassroots movements and coherent actions within institutions. 
Probably these are the reasons why the indicators mentioned in Table 4.2 associate the party with either 
‘(post) Communist party families’ (EMS) or ‘socialist party families’ (CMP), in line with the left (or 
extreme left) categorization of the party (PODEMOS scores -33.2 and 1.7 on the RILE, the EMS left-
right coders’ rating and the CHES left-right scale respectively). Officially founded in 2014, PODEMOS 
engaged in its first electoral competition during the 2014 EP election winning 8.98% of the Spanish 
vote and gaining 5 seats in the EP, while PP and PSOE scored their historical minimum confirming 
Spain as one of the few cases (alongside Greece) where mass realignment in party preferences 
translated in an increased support for populist radical left parties (Ramiro and Gomez 2016). The party 
then took part in two subsequent national elections in December 2015 and June 2016 (the elections 
were repeated since no party was able to conquer the majority and no possible governing alliance was 
formed), obtaining in the end 21% of the national vote share alongside 71 seats in the Chamber of 
Deputies and 23 seats in the Senate. Despite being potentially considered as a suitable partner of 
government, the party remained in the opposition after the results of the June 2016 elections when it 
confirmed itself as the third largest political force in Spain but was unable to impose itself against the 
mainstream PP. The MEPs composing PODEMOS’ delegation in the GUE-NGL group, have 
generally no previous political (institutional) experience but are active members of PODEMOS at 
                                                        
29 MEP Fabio De Masi ended his mandate in the EP in December 2017.  
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national level (or in some cases also co-founder of the party, as Miguel Urbán Crespo) and, in terms of 
professional experience, they generally come from the academic field. 
As mentioned before, despite being different from several viewpoints, the parties included in the 
analysis are generally critical of the EU and the European integration project and, consequently, defined 
as ‘Eurosceptic’. Table 4.3 below reports the most commonly used ‘quantitative’ indicators of party-
based Euroscepticism derived from the three data sources already mentioned in Table 4.1 and 4.2 
above. The CMP data report two indicators of parties’ negative or positive stances to the EU. The 
variable ‘EU positive’ includes positive mentions reported in the national manifesto of each party 
concerning 1) the desirability of the manifesto country joining or remaining a member of the EU; 2) the 
desirability of expanding the EU; 3) the desirability of expanding EU’s competencies, and 4) the 
desirability of expanding the competencies of the EP. The variable ‘EU negative’ encompasses negative 
mentions with reference to 1) the opposition to specific European policies which are preferred by 
European authorities, and 2) the opposition to the net contribution of their country to the EU budget. 
The variable EUP-EUN is a self-calculation of the difference between EU-positive and EU-negative 
values, in line with the methodology used by the CMP. The EUP-EUN variable potentially ranges from 
100 – the party is extremely in favour of the EU – to -100 – the party is extremely critical of the EU. 
The indicators taken from the EMS refer to the: 1) pro-anti EU stances of the party, an index which is 
given by the difference between the sum of pro-integration codes and the sum of integration-sceptic 
codes (ranging from -100 – anti-EU – to 100 – pro-EU), and 2) the pro-anti EU coders’ rating, a 
variable ranging from 1 (pro EU) to 10 (anti EU integration) which is derived from the coders’ 
evaluation of the parties. With reference to the CHES dataset, three different variables are included in 
Table 4.3: 1) the ‘EU-salience’ representing the experts’ judgements with reference to the relative 
salience of European integration in the party’s public stance in 2014 (the variable ranges from 1 – 
European integration is of no importance – to 10 – European integration is of great importance); 2) the 
‘EU-position’ referring to expert judgements on the overall orientation of the party leadership toward 
European integration in 2014 (ranging from 1 – strongly opposed – to 7 – strongly in favour), and 3) 
‘EU-benefit’ representing the expert judgements with reference to the position of the party leadership 
in 2014 on whether the country has benefited from being a member of the EU (1 – benefited – 2 – 














Table 4. 3 EU-opponents’ positioning toward the EU according to three data-sources: CMP, the EMS and CHES.  



















FSM Italy 0 0 0 0 8 8.85 1.42 3 
LN Italy 2.85 0 2.85 -30.99 8 8.85 1.14 3 
FN France 0 5.051 -5.051 -13.23 10 8.46 1.21 3 
AFD Germany 1.37 13.69 -12.32 -10.08 7 9.53 1.61 2.61 
LINKE Germany 0.485 0.60 -0.11 4.24 4 5.69 3 2.16 
POD Spain 0.22 0 0.22 1.69 6 6.2 4.4 2.33 
UKIP United Kingdom 0.66 16.53 -15.87 -3.12 10 9.14 1.14 3 
CMP data refers to the latest available elections for each considered country at the time of writing: 2013 elections for Germany and Italy; 2012 for France; 2015 for the 
UK and 2016 for PODEMOS. 
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Staring from CMP indicators, precisely the EUP-EUN indicator, the positioning of the selected 
parties is not clear, besides the fact that the Italian FSM does not mention the EU (or the European 
integration project) in the national manifesto, the other included parties show negative stances to the 
EU with the only exception of the LN and PODEMOS. It is noteworthy that the LN is more 
supportive of the EU (scoring 2.85 points) than the Spanish left-wing party (scoring only 0.22 points of 
support). Furthermore, according to CMP data, FN’s criticism of the EU is weaker than UKIP and 
AFD’s one. Interestingly, the LINKE only shows -0.11 points of criticism of the EU according to 
CMP dataset. As for the EMS pro-anti-EU indicators, while the Italian FSM does not report any 
mention of the EU in its manifesto (scoring 0 points), the LN shows the highest level of criticism of 
the EU when compared to all the other included parties (scoring -30.99) followed by the FN, the AFD 
and UKIP (scoring -13.23; -10.08 and -3.12 respectively). Interestingly, the EMS pro-anti-EU indicator 
classifies both the LINKE and PODEMOS as pro-EU parties even though scoring low levels of 
support (4.24 and 1.69 respectively). Such data are only ‘partially’ confirmed by the pro-anti EU coders’ 
rating indicator of the EMS dataset. In fact, while also according to the pro-anti-EU coders’ rating 
indicator, the LINKE should be considered as a party showing some degree of support for the EU, 
both the FN and UKIP score 10 points indicating an extreme level of anti-EU sentiments. This 
observation is not in line with the former variable that sees the Italian LN as the party most critical of 
the EU. Lastly, according to the CHES salience indicators, the EU issue is generally highly relevant for 
all the considered parties, besides the fact that some difference may be delineated. In fact, there is a 
neat distinction between the German LINKE and the Spanish PODEMOS scoring lower values of 
EU-salience when compared to the other included parties. Similarly, also the EU-position indicator 
reports some differences between LINKE and PODEMOS on the one hand and the other parties on 
the other hand. LINKE and PODEMOS display a higher level of endorsement of the EU (scoring 3 
and 4.4 points respectively30). The other considered parties are positioned closer to the value of 1 thus 
presenting a general strong opposition to the EU. The last indicator, the ‘EU-benefit’ shows that all the 
considered parties generally tend to see their countries’ EU-membership as a loss, the only exceptions 
are the LINKE, the AFD and PODEMOS. According to the experts’ judgements, these last three 
parties show a more ‘neutral’ position with reference to their countries’ EU-membership.  
In summary, the quantitative measures reported above show a partially contradictory 
classification of parties’ stances to the EU. However, for the purpose of this work, besides variations in 
degree, all the included parties may be considered as ‘positive’ cases exercising significant opposition to 
the EU. This is to say that all the included parties are cases where the outcome of interest (EU-
                                                        
30 Ray argues that all those parties recognised by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002) either as ‘soft’ or as 
‘hard’ Eurosceptic generally record values lower than 4 on this CHES indicator (Ray 2007). However, 




opposition) occurs (Della Porta 2008). Besides the fact that the general idea behind this case selection is 
to consider a sample of parties critical of the EU as representative as possible of the left-right 
continuum, the strategy of selecting positive cases has generally been criticised since cases are chosen 
upon the dependent variable. However, Mahoney and Goertz defend this strategy arguing that the 
selection of positive cases is a useful way to single out different paths of a certain outcome (Mahoney 
and Goerts 2006; Mahoney and Rushmeyer 2003). In other words, for the purpose of this study, 
different national parties critical of the EU (positive cases) are chosen to single out different patterns of 
EU-opposition expressed within the EP (the outcome of interest for this analysis). 
To strengthen the analysis, this work proposes to focus the attention not only on political actors 
critical of the EU but also on those actors that are generally regarded as mainstream pro-EU parties. To 
select such parties, this work relies on the definition of ‘mainstream governing parties’ proposed by de 
Vries and Hobolt according to which mainstream governing parties are: ‘the clearest example of what it 
means to be a political winner as they occupy political office and are likely to be close to both the mean 
party and the mean voter on the main dimension of political competition’31(de Vries and Hobolt 2012, 
250). Thus, drawing a parallel with parties critical of the EU, the mainstream parties may be considered 
as ‘negative cases’ where the outcome of interest (EU-opposition) does not occur or is highly probable 
that it does not occur. As mentioned in chapter 3 (See Chapter 3, section 3.2, pages 45-46), mainstream 
parties tend to position themselves toward the centre of the new politics dimension (the GAL/TAN 
dimension), consequently, they also tend to support the EU (EU-position indicator). For the purpose 
of this study, one mainstream governing party for each country is included. The work focuses on those 
mainstream parties covering the most important governing position at the moment when the analysis 
was carried on. Table 4.4 below presents the five mainstream parties included alongside the results they 
obtained in the last two rounds of EP elections.  
                                                        
31 De Vries and Hobolt study electoral losers’ attempt to restructure political competition by mobilizing 
previously non-salient issues to attract voters obtaining electoral gains. To do that they differentiate 
parties according to their position in the political space defining three types of parties: mainstream 
governing parties (definition mentioned in the text); mainstream opposition parties (those parties that has been 
in government before but are not currently holding governing positions) and challenger parties, those 
parties that has never cover governing positions. It is to be noted that, according to this classification, 
the Italian LN is to be considered as a ‘mainstream opposition party’ since it covered governing 
positions in the past. However, considering LN as a mainstream governing party may be 
counterintuitive since LN is unlikely to be close to both the mean party and the mean voter on the 












Table 4. 4: Mainstream parties’ electoral results of the last two rounds of EP elections, number of obtained seats and name of the corresponding EPPG.  

















PD Italy S&D 26.13 21 S&D 40.81 31 +14.68 +10 
PS-PRG France S&D 16.48 14 S&D 13.9 13* -2.58 -1 
CDU-CSU Germany EPP 37.9 42 EPP 35.30 34 -2.6 -8 
PP Spain EPP 42.23 23 EPP 26.9 16 -15.33 -7 
CON United Kingdom ECR 27 25 ECR 23.31 19 -3.69 -8 
Source: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-nl-2014.html. * The French PS runs for the EP election in coalition with the Party of 







All the mainstream parties included in the analysis lost seats (and vote share) between 2009 and 
2014 EP elections, with the only exception of the Italian PD that won 10 seats more in 2014 EP 
elections32. Similarly to the EU-opponents, also the included mainstream parties differ from several 
viewpoints, Table 4.5 below reports the three above-mentioned data sources (CMP, EMS and CHES) 
with indicators referring to mainstream parties’ positions both along the left-right continuum and on 
the EU.  
Starting from left-right positions, there is a neat distinction between centre-left and centre-right 
parties emerging from all the three used sources. The only exception is the CMP’s RILE index that 
classifies the CDU-CSU as the only centre-right party while all the other four considered parties show 
leftist values ranging from the -32.71 points scored by the French PS (the highest value of leftist 
positioning) to -1.63 points scored by the British CON thus situating in the centre – leaning toward the 
left - of the left-right continuum. EMS left-right positioning identifies centre-left parties (PD and PS) 
scoring values between 3 and 4, while centre-right parties are located closer to the value of 7 (CDU-
CSU, PP and CON). Similarly, also on the CHES left-right indicator, centre-left parties position 
between 3 and 4 (PD and PS) while parties leaning toward the right score values closer to 7 (CDU-
CSU, PP and CON). The included mainstream parties show positive stances to the EU according to all 
the reported indicators from the three data sources, the only visible exception is the British CON. This 
party scores a negative value both on the CMP EUP-EUN index (-4.03) and on the EMS pro-anti EU 
indicator (-9.83). Furthermore, the CON party scores 3.14 points on the CHES EU-position indicators, 
thus identifying some degree of criticism toward the EU. The only exception is the EMS pro-anti-EU 
coders’ rating that positions the British CON in the middle of the pro-anti-EU scale, thus denoting a 
neutral position of the CON on the EU.  
 
                                                        
32 The results of 2014 EP elections have been considered by the party as a major victory (scoring the 









Table 4. 5: Mainstream governing parties position along the left-right continuum and on the EU according to three main data sources, the CMP, the EMS and the 
CHES.  

























































7.14 ** 2.89** 2.29** 6.11** 6.85** 6.15** 1.12** 
PP Spain Conservative Parties -4.24 3.07 0 3.07 
Conservative 
Parties 7 8.28 3 7.3 6.9 6.8 1 
CON United Kingdom 
Conservative 




 5 7 7.42 3.14 2 
 
* EMS data referring to the French PS consider the party in coalition with the Radical Party of the Left. **EMS and CHES data referring to the coalition CDU-CSU 
are self-calculated as the average between the scores obtained on the various indicators weighted by the number of MEPs of each party. CMP data refers to the latest 









4.3 Data and methods used for the construction of the dependent variables: EU-
opposition  
 
This section presents the data and the methods used for the construction of the dependent 
variable. Section 4.3.1 presents the policy issues selected for the analysis and the collected speeches 
alongside a description thereof. Section 4.3.2 illustrates the methods used in the construction of the 
dependent variables: both deductive and inductive methods of content analysis are used to observe the 
‘quantity’ and the ‘quality’ of the expressed EU-opposition. 
 
4.3.1 Data used in the analysis: MEPs speeches to the fore  
 
As mentioned in section 4.2, this work proposes an analysis of EU-opposition expressed by 
‘Eurosceptic’ parties (taking mainstream parties as a baseline comparison) during their ‘normal’ activity 
in the pan-European arena of the EP. While this work does not rely on specific speeches where the 
level of expressed criticism or support might be higher (e.g.: EP debates about the outcome of the 
Brexit referendum), analysing the entirety of MEPs’ speeches held in the time framework selected for 
the analysis, would have overcome the capacity of a single researcher. For this reason, this work 
focuses on speeches concerning three policy areas: 
 
1. Immigration, asylum and borders control; 
2. Economy33; 
3. Environmental protection. 
 
The first two included policy issues are directly related to the two main crises that the EU is 
facing, thus constituting two ‘transnational, politically significant, nationally divisive and ideologically 
divisive’ policy areas (Braghiroli 2015, 110). The third chosen issue, environmental protection, is not 
directly related to the two main crises that the EU is experiencing, but is inserted in the analysis for 
four main reasons: firstly, issues related to the protection of the environment (e.g.: climate change) are 
pressing nowadays; secondly the EU generally plays a prominent role in this policy field; thirdly besides 
not being directly crisis-related, the economic crisis has had an impact on it (Burns and Tobin 2016); 
lastly including environmental protection enables the comparison of national parties’ positioning to the 
EU in crisis and non-crisis related policy issues. Since the Maastricht Treaty, the EU increased its 
powers in all these three policy fields; furthermore, since Lisbon, the decisions concerning these policy 
                                                        
33  This policy issue encompasses speeches mainly referring to macroeconomics and budgetary 
coordination thus excluding speeches related to the Single Market.  
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areas are taken under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure where both the Council of Ministers and the 
EP have a deciding vote in the legislative process34. Consequently, focusing the analysis on these three 
policy issues allows the observation of all potential aspects of EU-opposition (and patterns thereof) in 
crisis and non-crisis-related policy fields under the general expectation that opposition is higher in 
crisis-related issues rather than in non-crisis-related issues. 
Once the policy issues are selected, the work proceeds with the selection and collection of the 
data to be used in the subsequent steps of the analysis, thus to create the dependent variables of this 
work. Starting from the sample of national parties included in the analysis (see the previous section), 
the work collects the speeches that MEPs held during the EP plenary debates through a technique of 
automated data collection using Python35. Speeches are then filtered according to the policy area they 
belong to (immigration; economy and environmental protection) and aggregated by national parties. 
Thirty-six different corpora36, three for each of the included party, are thus created and stored. Table 
4.6 below reports the total amount of collected data by party while Table 4.7 presents the 36 created 
corpora alongside their average length expressed in tokens, each word in the corpus (the standard 
deviation is presented in parenthesis), and the average number of speeches by MEP.
                                                        
34 See article 77(2), 78(2) and 79(2) of the TFEU concerning immigration, asylum and borders control. 
See article 121(6) of the TFEU concerning economic policy and see article 192(1) of the TFEU for 
what concerns environmental protection.  
35 Appendix A further details the criteria used for the selection of the speeches and the techniques used 
for the download of the data through Python. Speeches are available online in the verbatim reports of 
the EP. According to Rule of Procedure of the EP no. 194 comma 1 ‘A verbatim report of the 
proceedings of each sitting shall be drawn up as a multilingual document in which all oral contributions 
appear in their original language’. Furthermore, verbatim reports are published in the Official Journal of 
the European Union, they are preserved in the record of the EP and publicly accessible through the EP 
website at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/minutes.html  
36 A corpus is a collection of spoken or written text, according to the Oxford dictionary a corpus may 
be defined as: ‘A collection of written or spoken material in machine-readable form, assembled for the 




Table 4. 6: Total number of collected speeches by party and average number of speeches by MEP. 
Total number of speeches by party 
Party name Country Total no. of speeches Average no. of speeches by MEPs 
FSM Italy 667 39.2 
LN Italy 493 98.6 
PD Italy 1241 40 
FN France 1840 80 
PS France 334 25.7 
AFD Germany 477 68.1 
LINKE Germany 42 6 
CDU-CSU Germany 495 14.5 
PODEMOS Spain 661 132.2 
PP Spain 328 20.5 
UKIP United Kingdom 976 40.6 
CON United Kingdom 259 13.6 
Total -- 7813 -- 
Source: own calculation 
 
Table 4. 7: Constructed corpora by party and policy issue. 
Party name Country Total number of speeches 
Average number of 
speech by MEP 
Average length of 
speeches (SD in 
parenthesis) 
Immigration/asylum/borders control 
FSM Italy 122 7.2 231.6 (97.1) 
LN Italy 142 28.4 162.7 (89) 
PD Italy 308 9.9 241.3 (111.7) 
FN France 398 17.3 180.9 (75.4) 
PS France 92 7.07 264.3 (89.3) 
AFD Germany 145 20.71 236.2 (50.9) 
LINKE Germany 17 2.4 352.4 (214.3) 
CDU-CSU Germany 120 3.5 303.9 (260.5) 
PODEMOS Spain 141 28.2 202 (95.8) 
PP Spain 86 5.4 254.5 (146.7) 
UKIP United Kingdom 293 12.2 161.2 (102.7) 
CON United Kingdom 65 3.4 288.5 (196.4) 
Total -- 1929 --  
Economy 
FSM Italy 322 18.9 214 (84.5) 
LN Italy 218 43.6 118.7 (59.2) 
PD Italy 548 17.7 220.7 (94.8) 
FN France 871 37.8 183 (64.6) 
PS France 141 10.8 249.4 (163.3) 
AFD Germany 236 33.7 108.5 (73.8) 
LINKE Germany 22 3.14 329.3 (141) 
CDU-CSU Germany 228 6.7 242.2 (167.8) 
PODEMOS Spain 295 59 158.8 (56.5) 
PP Spain 144 9 191 (98.7) 
UKIP United 424 17.6 122.2 (87.6) 




CON United Kingdom 97 5.1 200.5 (117.9) 
Total -- 3546 --  
Environmental protection 
FSM Italy 223 39.2 221.2 (82.7) 
LN Italy 133 26.6 108.3 (56.8) 
PD Italy 385 12.4 210.8 (68.5) 
FN France 571 24.8 182.4 (81.7) 
PS France 101 7.7 226.6 (109.7) 
AFD Germany 96 13.7 205.5 (52.8) 
LINKE Germany 3 0.5 272.8 (88.4) 
CDU-CSU Germany 147 4.3 223.7 (146.7) 
PODEMOS Spain 225 45 166.9 (62.9) 
PP Spain 98 6.1 199.5 (102.6) 
UKIP United Kingdom 259 10.8 149.3 (77.16) 
CON United Kingdom 97 5.1 245.8 (146.5) 
Total -- 2338 -- -- 
Total 
overall -- 7813 -- -- 
Source: own calculation. Number of speeches by party and policy issue, alongside information about the average 
number of speeches by MEP and the average length of speeches (expressed in tokens) (standard deviation in 
parenthesis) 
 
The largest corpora reported in Table 4.6 above encompass speeches related to the economy 
(scoring a total amount of 3546 speeches) followed by environmental protection and immigration, 
asylum and borders control in declining order. It is noteworthy that the included EU-opponents score a 
higher average number of speeches by MEP thus denoting a more ‘intense’ use of the EP arena to 
express their views than their mainstream counterparts. This consideration holds true in all the 
considered policy areas, the only exception among the EU-opponents is UKIP in the context of 
environmental policies. On the contrary, mainstream parties tend to speak less in the EP plenary, with 
the only exception of the Italian PD that shows average numbers of speeches by MEPs more similar to 
the one of the EU-opponents37.  
 
 
                                                        
37 This pattern is typical of opposition parties also in national parliamentary arenas. As demonstrated by 
Proksch and Slapin, opposition parties tend to use more the parliamentary arena when compared to 
governing parties’ exponents. Representatives from opposition parties are largely excluded from the 
decision-making process and they tend to use the parliamentary arena as a way to scrutinize 
government’s activity and propose alternatives to it (Slapin and Proksch 2015). The fact that a similar 
dynamic is found also in the EP might suggest that a sort of government/opposition distinction applies 




4.3.2 Deductive content analysis, index of EU-opposition and inductive coding of speeches  
 
‘Content analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or 
other meaningful matter) to the context of their use’ (Krippendorf 2012, 24). This work relies on both 
quantitative and qualitative techniques of content analysis applied to the speeches delivered by national 
parties’ representatives in the EP arena.  
The first part of the analysis uses a ‘deductive’ 38  technique of quantitative content analysis 
inspired by the CMP. This first phase detects both the directionality and the character of parties’ 
stances to the four main targets (and related sub-targets) of EU-opposition (with the main aim to detect 
the ‘quantity’ and ‘the quality’ of EU-opposition (or support) expressed by national parties in the 
speeches they deliver in the EP arena. To do that, the ‘preparation phase’ of the analysis implies choices 
with reference to: 1) the unit of analysis and 2) the definition of a codebook to be applied during the 
analysis alongside the clarification of coding rules39. 
The selected unit of content analysis is the so-called ‘quasi-sentence’ adopting the definition 
provided by the CMP’s coding instructions: ‘[O]ne quasi-sentence contains exactly one statement or 
“message”. In many cases, parties make one statement per sentence, which results in one quasi-
sentence (equalling one full sentence). Therefore the basic unitizing rule is that one sentence is, at 
minimum, one quasi-sentence. In no case can two sentences form a quasi-sentence. There are, 
however, instances when one natural sentence contains more than one quasi-sentence’40. 
After this first step, this work defines the codebook to be applied to the empirical evaluation of 
MEPs’ speeches. It is created starting from the definition of EU-opposition provided in chapter 2 and 
refers to 1) the addressed targets; 2) the directionality of the expressed position (positive, negative or 
neutral) indicating support or opposition (or neutral stance) for one of the proposed targets, and 3) the 
character used in the expression of opposition (or support) to the addressed target (either principled or 
pragmatic).  
With reference to the targets, four main categories of the codebook are formulated and refer to 
the four main targets of EU-opposition: EU-policies, EU-elite, EU-regime and EU-community. 
Further sub-categories are created to indicate the main sub-targets belonging to two of the just-
mentioned targets: the EU-regime that includes sub-targets referring to the main EU-institutions (the 
EP, the European Commission – EC –, the Council adding a further ‘Other institutions’ target 
                                                        
38 Deductive content analysis is used when the structure of analysis is operationalized on the basis of 
previous knowledge and the purpose of the study is theory testing (Elo and Kyngäs 2008).  
39 The complete version of the codebook alongside the applied coding instructions are presented in 
appendix A of this work.  
40  Definition taken from the “Handbook” of the Comparative Manifesto Project. The electronic 
version of the current handbook is available at 
https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/information/documents?name=handbook_v4  
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including institutions like the European Central Bank – ECB) and the EU-community for which two 
sub-targets are used to distinguish the EU (as a community) from the two main geometries deriving 
from the process of European integration (the Euro area and the Schengen area).  
The directionality of parties’ positioning to one of the just-mentioned targets is detected by 
creating three categories for each identified target and sub-target: directional negative, in case a quasi-
sentences expresses opposition; directional positive, in the case of support; and non-directional in case 
no specific directionality is expressed.  
To detect the last ‘property’ of EU-opposition, the character of each coded quasi-sentence (either 
principled or pragmatic), the codebook assigns values to each category such that: a value of 2 
corresponds to principled expression; a value of 1 corresponds to a pragmatic stance and a value of 0 
refers to a ‘neutral’ affirmation. As a result, a quasi-sentence expressed by a party X referring to the 
EU-policy target, assuming a negative direction and showing a principled character will be coded as 
‘EU-policy directional negative 2’.  
After the definition of the codebook MEPs’ speeches are analysed following three main steps: 1) 
texts are divided into quasi-sentences following the definition reported above; 2) each quasi-sentence is 
coded under one of the observed categories, and 3) a value is assigned to each coded quasi-sentence 
mirroring its character.  
CMP’s methodology is based on saliency theory stating that parties’ ‘[t]aking up of positions is 
done by emphasizing the importance of certain policy areas compared to others’ (Budge 1994, 455). 
The fact that a party does not hold any specific position with reference to some specific policy, is to be 
interpreted as a lack of saliency of that specific policy to the party. In fact, ‘operationally, “saliency” 
theory suggests that the relative mention of different policy areas in the manifesto provides a direct 
measure of their importance to the party’ (Lowe et al. 2011, 133). Similarly, this analysis assumes that 
national parties emphasise a specific target (either positively or negatively) the more that target is 
important to them. The fact that a party does not hold any specific position with reference to a specific 
target is taken as a lack of salience of that specific target to the party. In other words, the relative 
mentions of different targets provide a direct measure of their importance to the party (Lowe et al. 
2011). Once speeches are coded, the frequencies of the quasi-sentences aggregate by national party are 
used to build up an index of the ‘quantity’ of EU-opposition or support (𝑄𝑂) for each of the specified 
targets (and sub-targets). It is to be noted that the aggregation of MEPs speeches by party does not 
allow the observation of potential discrepancies among MEPs positioning on the EU and the related 
targets. In other words, the method applied does not allow the detection of different positioning vis-à-
vis the EU expressed by national parties’ factions. Future research in the field can accomplish this task. 






𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐶𝑁 + 1
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁 + 1 −
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑃 + 1
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁 + 1  
 
Where CN is the number of coded ‘directional negative’ quasi-sentences, CP represents the 
coded ‘directional positive’ quasi-sentences and N represents the total number of quasi-sentences 
included in each of the collected corpus described in section 4.3.141. The formulated index is an 
adaptation of Prosser’s re-elaboration of Lowe et al.’ ‘logit scale of position’ (Lowe et al. 2011; Prosser 
2014) that is, in turn, an improvement of CMP’s left-right scale (the so-called RILE index). The value 
of 1 is added to each component of the index because it ‘makes the value of no quasi-sentences in a 
component consistently 0’ (Prosser 2014, 96) since 𝑙𝑜𝑔(1) = 0. Moreover, the log element enables 
researchers to avoid centrist or extremist biases in the analysis. The obtained index refers to the 
‘quantity’ of expressed opposition or support to the related target; it ranges from -1 to 1, where -1 
indicates the total support for a specific target, while 1 designates the total opposition. Whenever the 
index takes value of 0 either no quasi-sentence is coded under the two categories (positive or negative), 
thus denoting either a lack of salience of that specific target to the party, or that the same proportion of 
coded ‘directional positive’ and coded ‘directional negative’ quasi-sentences referring to a specific target 
is present.  
The constructed index of the quantity of EU-opposition is used to provide a first quantitative 
description of parties’ stances to the EU both overall and across policy issues (see chapter 5 of this 
work). This first evaluation aims at understanding, which are the parties exercising opposition to the 
studied EU-targets and it is combined with a deeper evaluation of the motivations used by parties to 
exercise opposition (see below for further information about the inductive coding phase).  
Once the indexes of the ‘quantity of opposition’ are created (one for each EU-targets), the values 
related to the character of EU-opposition are used to quantitatively establish the ‘quality’ of the 
expressed opposition: if a party displays a positive value on the EU-opposition index (thus denoting the 
presence of opposition) and if the majority of the coded negative quasi-sentences are principled in 
character, then the party is exercising a principled opposition to that specific target.  
All these steps culminate in the creation of four main additive indexes of parties’ positioning to 
the EU (one for each of the four EU-targets) encompassing the three main characteristics of party 
positioning cited above (directionality, intensity – or quantity – and character – pragmatic or principled) 
according to the following formula:  
 
(𝑄𝑜 ± 𝑞𝑜) ∗ 100 
                                                        
41 It is to be noted that N includes quasi-sentences belonging to both non-directional and no match 
categories.  
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Where 𝑄0 represents the ‘quantity’ of expressed opposition or support to the four targets of the 
EU, and 𝑞𝑜 refers to the ‘quality’ of EU-opposition. The quality of EU-opposition takes the value of 1 
if the expressed positioning is principled and the value of 0 if the expressed positioning is pragmatic. 
The formula presents the ± operator to obtain a symmetric scale of opposition/support. In other 
words, if 𝑄𝑜 is positive (thus indicating that a party n is opposing one of the studied targets) the value 
of 𝑞𝑜 is added. On the contrary, if 𝑄𝑜 is negative (thus indicating that a party n supports a specific 
target of the EU) the value of 𝑞𝑜 is subtracted. The resulting index is a continuous variable ranging 
from -200 indicating the maximum degree of principled support to +200 indicating the maximum level 
of principled opposition, whereas a value of -100 relates to the maximum degree of pragmatic support 
and a value of +100 indicates the maximum degree of pragmatic opposition. If the index takes the 
value of 0 it indicates that either the party does not refer to that specific target or that an equal 
proportion of opposition and support is present42. The assumption behind the resulting EU-opposition 
index is that, if two parties express a similar ‘quantity’ of opposition or support, the final value of the 
index will vary as a function of the character of the expressed opposition or support, being always 
higher for a principle-driven opposition. The resulting indexes are used in the second phase of the 
analysis detailed in the next section.  
As mentioned above, the second step of the analysis aims at understanding the motivations 
guiding opposition to the analysed EU-targets. It is performed relying on a method of inductive 
content analysis that follows two main phases: firstly, coded negatively quasi-sentences are examined 
taking care of both the ‘manifest’ and ‘latent’ content. Each quasi-sentence reporting motivation for the 
opposition is classified in category expressed in ‘simple language’ (Cregan 2005). Whenever possible, 
this process is carried out through an evaluation of the motivations on the basis of their ‘manifest 
content’: the content physically present and countable (Gray and Densten 1998; Neuendorf 2002). Just 
to mention an example, all the quasi-sentences expressing opposition to the EU-policies in economic 
field citing the word austerity alongside similar motivations for their opposition (e.g.: austerity policies 
leading to higher levels of poverty) are placed under the same category. If it is not possible to evaluate 
the manifest content of a quasi-sentence, the analysis evaluates them on the basis of their latent 
content: the content which is hidden and needs to be interpreted by the researcher43. This first phase of 
the inductive analysis culminates in a large number of micro-categories that, during the second phase of 
inductive coding, are aggregated into broader categories (or macro-categories) and finally in themes44. 
                                                        
42 Appendix A further provides some examples of the constructed index.  
43 According to Neuendorf, manifest and latent content distinguish between the ‘surface’ and ‘deep’ 
structures of language and have its origin in Freud’s interpretation of dreams (Neuendorf 2002). 
44 Appendix C reports the created macro-categories and themes alongside further explanations about 




Once themes are detected a comparative analysis of the motivations used by parties is carried out in 
chapter 6 of this work. 
 
4.4 Data and method used in the second phase of the analysis: explaining EU-opposition, 
POS as independent variables.  
 
Starting from the concept of POS and translating it into three sets of factors both ‘endogenous’ 
and ‘exogenous’ to the considered parties, the second phase of the work relies on multivariate 
hierarchical regression analysis (OLS) to understand the drivers of patterns of EU-opposition in the 
EP. The next paragraph details the data used to operationalise the hypotheses presented in chapter 3.  
4.4.1 Operationalization of the independent variables  
 
Table 4.8 below reports a summary of the included independent variables (IVs) alongside the 
formulated hypotheses. The first set of POS refers to the endogenous characteristics of both the 
included national parties and the EPPG they belong to. A1 points toward a positive relationship 
between the degree of ideological heterogeneity of an EPPG and the degree of EU-opposition 
expressed by each national party belonging to that EPPG. The elaborated IV ‘measures’ the ideological 
heterogeneity45 of the EPPG and is calculated as the sum of the absolute values of the distances 
between each party’s ideological position and the ideological position of the EPPG according to the 
following formula: 
 







Where 𝑃𝑝 is the position of the national party along the left-right continuum; 𝑆𝑝𝑒 is the number of seats 
owned by the national party in the EPPG; 𝑀𝑒 is the weighted average left-right position of the EPPG 
(variable EPPGs’ left-right positioning) and 𝑆𝑒 is the total number of seats owned by the EPPG. 
The second generated association (A2) looks at the potential relationship between patterns of 
EU-opposition expressed in the EP and the general ideological orientation of the EPPG to which each 
national party belongs. To calculate the IV ‘general ideological orientation of the EPPG’ this work 
relies on the following formula: 
                                                        
45 The IV related to the ideological heterogeneity of an EPPG is elaborated on the basis of the index of 
‘ideological diversity’ of an EPPG proposed by Hix Noury and Roland in their study about cohesion 
and competition in the EP (Hix et al. 2005, 224).  
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𝑀𝑒 =  






Where 𝑃𝑝 is the position of each national party along the left-right continuum; 𝑆𝑝𝑒 is the total 
number of seats owned by each national party in the corresponding EPPG and 𝑆𝑒 is the total number 
of seats owned by the EPPG in the EP. The variable ranges from 0 – extreme left – to 10 – extreme 
right.  
Hypothesis 1 refers to the relationship between patterns of EU-opposition and the general 
ideological orientation of national parties. The IV included in Table 4.8 below refers to the centrist-
extreme positioning of each national party. The variable is constructed rescaling the CHES variable 
‘general left-right ideological orientation’ such that a value of 0 corresponds to centrist positioning and 
a value of 10 corresponds to both the extreme left and right of the ideological spectrum.  
Moving the attention to the second set of factors concerning the institutional POS shaping 
patterns of EU-opposition in the EP, Hypothesis 2 sustains that there is a positive relationship between 
higher levels of EU-opposition and the marginality of a political party in the national political 
competition. To answer this hypothesis the constructed IV is a dichotomous variable taking the value 
of 0 for parties covering governing positions at the national level and the value of 1 for parties not 
belonging to governing coalitions.  
Hypothesis 3 sustains that there is a negative relationship between the ‘marginality’ of the EPPG 
in the supranational political competition and the EU-opposition expressed by those national parties 
belonging to that marginal EPPG. As observed in chapter 3 of this work, generally larger established 
EPPGs play a dominant role in the decision-making process (working in the so-called giant or grand 
coalition) excluding smaller, more marginal, generally Eurosceptic EPPGs. As a consequence, a good 
indicator to operationalise the degree of ‘marginality’ of an EPPG is its size expressed as the number of 
MEPs composing each EPPG (yearly variations in the composition of each EPPG are taken into 
consideration when constructing the IV).  
With reference to ‘informal’ institutional POS, this work focuses its attention on the degree of 
expertise of MEPs belonging to the considered national parties arguing in hypothesis 4 that there is a 
negative relationship between national parties MEPs’ degree of experience in the EP and the expressed 
opposition. To assess this relationship, this work relies on the IV ‘seniority’ calculated as the average 
number of years spent in the EP by each MEP belonging to each national delegation46. 
The last set of factors potentially shaping EU-opposition in the EP refers to the effects of the 
two main crises (economic and immigration) on patterns of EU-opposition. H5 argues that higher 
                                                        
46 The variable is calculated on a yearly basis, taking variations in the composition of each national 





levels of vulnerability of parties’ country to both crises produce a higher degree of EU-opposition 
expressed by national parties coming from debtor/recipient member states. On the contrary H6 argues 
that the vulnerability of each country to the two crises is negatively associated with the degree of 
expressed EU-opposition, consequently, national parties coming from creditor/donor states will 
express a higher level of EU-opposition. To assess these relationships the work relies on both 
‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ measures of countries’ vulnerability to the two crises. As for the economy-
related independent variables the work includes two objective and one subjective measures. The first 
objective measure is the percentage difference in the total amount of the country’s GDP between time 
T2 and time T1. The second included objective measure is the percentage variation in the poverty and 
social exclusion index between time T2 and time T1 (e.g.: percentage variation in the national index of 
poverty and social exclusion between 2014 and 2013). The economy-related subjective measure is 
represented by the percentage of people in each included counties expressing a fairly bad or bad 
judgement of the national economy for each year included in the period of observation, this variable is 
formulated using data from the Eurobarometer47. With reference to the immigration crisis’ indicators, 
the two included objective IVs refer to 1) the percentage variation in the number of refugee present in 
each country between time T2 and time T1 (e.g.: percentage variation in the total number of refugees 
present in the country between 2014 and 2013) (variable Refugee population T2-T1) and 2) the 
percentage variation in the number of asylum applicants between time T2 and time T1 (e.g.: percentage 
variation in the total number of asylum applications presented in the country between 2014 and 2013) 
(variable Asylum applications T2-T1). As for the ‘subjective’ measures of country’s vulnerability to the 
immigration crisis, this work includes the variable ‘perception of immigration’ reporting the percentage 
of people in each of the included countries expressing a fairly negative or very negative judgement of 
immigration of peoples coming from outside the EU for each year included in the period of 





                                                        
47 The exact question used in the survey is: ‘How would you judge each of the following: the situation 
of the national economy? The available answers are: 1) very good; 2) fairly good; 3) rather bad: 4) very 
bad; 5) Don’t know  
48 The exact question of the Eurobarometer survey used in the analysis is: please tell me whether each 
of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you: Immigration of people from 
outside the EU. Available answers: 1) very positive; 2) fairly positive; 3) fairly negative; 4) very negative; 
5) Don’t Know. 
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Table 4. 8: Summary table reporting the formulated hypotheses and associations and the relative independent 
variables 
Type of POS 
(and perspective 
with reference to 
the party) 
Hypotheses and Associations IV’s name Source  
Ideology 
(endogenous) 
A1: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by national 
parties within the EP are associated with the degree 





A2: patterns of EU-opposition are associated with the 
general ideological orientation of the EPPG to which 
national parties belong.  
EPPGs’ left-
right positioning CHES  
H1: Patterns of EU-opposition vary as a function of 
each national party’s ideological extremeness, 
independently of the general ideological position of 
the EPPG. The more parties position themselves 
toward the extremes of the left-right ideological 
continuum the higher their degree of EU-opposition 
will be. 
Extreme left-




 group 1) 
H2: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by national 
parties in the EP vary as a function of their 
‘marginality’ in political competition at national level. 
Parties not belonging to governing coalitions at the 
national level (or not even eligible to cover governing 
positions at the national level) will display a higher 
degree of opposition to the EU.  




H3: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by national 
parties represented in the EP vary as a function of the 
‘marginality’ of the EPPG they belong to. The more 
marginal the EPPG the higher EU-opposition 
expressed by national parties belonging to that EPPG 
will be. 




using data from 
the EP website  
H4: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by national 
parties represented in the EP will vary as a negative 
function of the seniority of their MEPs. The less 
national parties’ MEPs are socialized within the EP 




using data from 








H5: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by national 
parties within the EP vary as a function of their 
country’s level of exposure to both the economic and 
the migration crisis. The more debtor/recipient 
member states are vulnerable to both the economic 
and the immigration crises, the higher the EU-
opposition of national parties coming from those 
member states will be.  
 
H6: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by national 
parties within the EP vary as a negative function of 
their country’s level of exposure to both the 
economic and the migration crisis. The less 
creditor/donor states are vulnerable to both the 
economic and the immigration crises, the higher the 
EU-opposition of national parties coming from those 
member states will be.  
 

























5.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter provides a comparative overview of the ‘quantity’ of EU-opposition1 expressed by 
different national parties through the speeches they held in the EP arena.  
Starting from the central research question - Which aspects of the EU do national parties oppose 
from within the arena of the EP? – the chapter provides descriptive answers also to further collateral 
questions: Does the expressed opposition differ across the three studied policy issues? Do mainstream 
parties show some signs of opposition to the EU? Does opposition change over time? 
Consequently, the core objective of this chapter is not explanatory but rather descriptive 
providing a first evaluation of the presence or absence of EU-opposition, which motivations will be 
further investigated in the next chapter. 
The chapter is structured around three main sections: section 5.2 starts analysing national parties’ 
positioning on the EU from an overall perspective both in a ‘static’ and in a ‘dynamic’ way, looking at 
its evolution across the observed time period. This section also compares the heterogeneous group of 
left and right-wing EU-opponents with the group of mainstream parties, allowing the detection of 
potential criticism expressed by the last mentioned actors. The following section 5.3 presents the 
quantity of EU-opposition across the three studied policy issues to observe how and if parties’ 
behaviour toward the EU changes in more – economy and immigration – or less – environmental 
protection – contentious policy fields. A conclusive section summarizes the obtained results.  
5.2 Patterns of EU-opposition: the overall picture  
 
The three Figures below portray three spider-plots presenting the quantity of EU-opposition 
with reference to 1) the four EU-targets: EU-policies, EU-elite, EU-regime, EU-community (Figure 
5.1); 2) the sub-targets of the EU-community – the EU, the Schengen area and Euro area geometries 
(Figure 5.2), and 3) the sub-targets of the EU-regime – the EC, the EP, the Council of Ministers and 
the ‘Other institutions’ targets (Figure 5.4). To each plots’ vertex corresponds one national party while 
                                                        
1 It is to be noted that the term EU-opposition is related to the index calculated through the analysis of 
textual data presented in the previous chapter. The term EU-opposition is generally used throughout 





the black patterned lines represent the quantity of expressed EU-opposition for each of the proposed 
targets. On the black continuous line (the 0 line) the quantity of EU-opposition takes the value of 0 
(either no opposition or support is expressed or an equal proportion of both opposition and support is 
reported in the speeches). Whenever a party opposes one of the proposed targets, the line is drawn in 
the positive side of the graph and vice versa2.  
 
Figure 5.1: Spider-plot of parties’ positions on the EU-targets from an overall perspective. 
 
Source: own calculation. Period of observation: 2014-2016. Data are reported in Table B.1 of Appendix B. 
 
                                                        
2 Detailed information about the obtained indexes of EU-opposition is reported in tabular form in 
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From Figure 5.1 above emerges an evident distinction between mainstream parties – left-hand 
side of the graph – and EU-opponents’ stances: EU-opponents generally oppose all the targets 
reported in the graph, even if noticeable differences among them exist.  
Interestingly, a relatively intense opposition to the EU-elite target equates all the considered EU-
opponents. The European establishment represents the first object of criticism for all left-wing parties 
alongside the Italian FSM. On the contrary, right-wing parties, particularly the FN and UKIP, focus 
their attention on the EU-community target. These two parties take the EU-community as the first and 
foremost addressee of criticism scoring 0.69 and 0.85 points respectively. Similarly to more left-leaning 
EU-opponents, both AFD and LN primarily focus their criticism on the EU-establishment – the AFD 
scores 0.56 and the LN scores 0.55 – while the EU-community is the second most addressed target by 
LN and AFD – 0.50 points scored by the AFD and 0.43 points scored by the LN.  
Interestingly, the EU-policy target is weakly criticised by EU-opponents that prefer to focus their 
attention on the other three studied targets with the only remarkable exception of the German LINKE. 
This party takes the EU-policy as its second most addressed target (scoring around 0.39 points) closely 
followed by criticism of the EU-regime (scoring 0.38 points).  
Furthermore, right-wing EU-opponents are generally more critical of all the studied EU-targets 
when compared to their left-wing counterpart. The only exception is the opposition to the EU-elite 
target that equates all the considered EU-opponents.  
From this first overall description, the EU-elite and the EU-community are the most criticised 
aspects of the EU. However, as mentioned in Chapter 2 (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4, page 38), 
differently from the EU-elite target, opposition to the EU-community involves also criticism directed 
to the two studied geometries deriving from the process of European integration: the Euro area and 
the Schengen area (see Figure 5.2 below). Also in this case, right-wing parties, particularly UKIP, FN 
and LN share their first object of criticism, the EU (scoring 0.82, 0.66 and 0.47 respectively). In spite of 
the fact that right-wing parties are critical of all the observed sub-targets of the EU-community, what 
differentiate them from left-wing parties, alongside the FSM, is their hard opposition to the Schengen 
area: the party most critical of the Schengen geometry is the FN followed by UKIP, LN and AFD in 
declining order. Neither the LINKE nor PODEMOS show any instances of opposition to this 
geometry, while some degree of criticism is present in FSM’s discourses, scoring 0.13 points on the 
index of the quantity of EU-opposition. Interestingly, all EU-opponents, independently from their 
ideological standpoint, are critical of the Euro area geometry (generally constituting the first target of 




Figure 5.2: Spider-plot of parties’ positions on the EU-community sub-targets from an overall perspective.  
 
Source: Own calculation. Period of observation: 2014-2016. Data are reported in Table B.1 of Appendix B. 
 
From an overall perspective, it is also interesting to dig deeper in parties’ stances to the EU-
regime sub-targets, see Figure 5.3 below. This work focuses on three main institutions, the EP, the EC 
and the Council, adding an ‘Other institutions’ target referring to institutions such as the ECB. As it is 
observable, EU-opponents positioning towards these sub-targets is more heterogeneous. However, two 
observations might be stressed: firstly, the targets attracting the higher levels of opposition are the EC 
and the ‘Other institutions’. Secondly, both PODEMOS and FSM, differently from the other observed 
EU-opponents show some law degree of support toward the EP (PODEMOS scores -0.14 and FSM 
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Figure 5.3: Spider-plot of parties’ positions on the EU-regime sub-targets from an overall perspective. 
 
Source: own calculation. Period of observation: 2014-2016. Data are reported in Table B.1 of Appendix B. 
 
A clear-cut distinction between EU-opponents and mainstream parties is visible in all the three 
graphs reported above. Mainstream parties generally support the analysed targets even though four 
considerations deserve more attention. Firstly, the British Conservative party is a visible outlier among 
the studied mainstream parties. This party behaves more similarly to the EU-opponents; it opposes all 
the four main targets of the EU (see Figure 5.1 above) designating the EU-community target as the first 
object of criticism (scoring 0.19 points). It follows a dynamic of opposition similar to UKIP’s one: 
CON’s quantity of expressed opposition is lower than UKIP’s one, however, the EU-targets are 
addressed in the same order thus confirming that the British Conservative party is an exceptional case 


































party is widely regarded by the literature as a ‘soft Eurosceptic party’ (e.g.: Treib 2014; Verzichelli and 
Cammino 2016) or as a ‘Eurorealist’ party (Leruth 2017), in line with the description of its EPPG’s – 
ECR – core ideology: ‘Our ideas are based on Eurorealism which distinguishes our agenda from the 
other political groups in the European Parliament. We do not look at each issue asking whether it will 
further EU integration, or promote EU breakup. We look at each issue asking whether it will help 
people that we represent in a practical everyday manner’3. 
Secondly, Figure 5.2 above highlights that all the included mainstream parties present some – 
even though generally law – opposition to the EU-elite target. As observed in Chapter 2 (Chapter 2, 
section 2.4, page 37), the definition of EU-elite is intentionally kept as broad as possible including all 
the politicians and functionaries working within the EU-institutions. As further stressed in the next 
chapter, mainstream parties blame their challengers of not offering feasible alternatives to the discussed 
policies accusing them to be Eurosceptic, extremist and populist. Thus, even if it is true that the 
expression of criticism of the EU-elite target exercised by mainstream parties could be seen as a normal 
adversarial dynamics within the EP (parties belonging to the ‘grand coalition’ blame their ‘challengers’), 
what renders such criticism ‘special’ is its content as further detailed in the next chapter.  
Thirdly, criticism of the EU exercised by mainstream parties is not only confined to the EU-elite 
target. As emerges from Figure 5.2, in fact, the Italian PD, the French PS and the Spanish PP show 
some signs of criticism of the Euro area geometry, differently from the German CDU-CSU that 
endorses this target.  
Lastly, when observing parties’ positioning towards the EU-regime’s sub-targets, criticism toward 
both the Council and the EC are present. What really differentiates mainstream parties’ stances toward 
the EU-regime from the one of the EU-opponents – especially from right-wing EU-opponents – is 
their strong support for the EP.  
 
To complete the observation of patterns of overall EU-opposition, Figure 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 below 
report the EU-opposition’s evolution over the observed time period for each considered party. On the 
y-axis of each line plot the index of the quantity of EU-opposition is reported (ranging from -1, total 
support, to 1, total opposition), while the numbers reported on the x-axis represent the five observed 
semesters4. The black solid line depicted in each line plot, the 0-line, is where the index of parties 
                                                        
3 For more information see ECR’s webpage at http://ecrgroup.eu/about-us/   
4 To calculate the index of EU-opposition by semester, the coded quasi-sentences are aggregated by 
semester of observation: the 1st semester goes from May-June 2014 to December 2014 included, the 2nd 
one ranges between January 2015 and June 2015 included; the 3rd one goes from July 2015 to 
December 2015; the 4th one refers to the period between January 2016 and June 2016 while the last one 
includes the months between July 2016 and December 2016. It is to be noted that the 1st, the 3rd and 
the 5th semesters include 5 months of activity, unlike the other semesters that last six months. This is 
due to the fact that the EP suspends its activity each year during August.  
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positioning takes the value of 0 – neutral position. A patterned line is drawn above the 0-line whenever 
a party is in opposition to a specific target (corresponding to the pattern of the line). 
Also the diachronic observation of parties’ stances to the EU mirrors a neat distinction between 
mainstream parties and EU-opponents. The former are generally supportive of the EU-targets while 
the latter generally oppose them. 
As for right-wing EU-opponents, it is interesting to notice that since their union in the same 
EPPG – the ENF in June 2015 – the French FN and the Italian LN’s opposition to the EU-
community tends to follow a similar trend increasing in correspondence to the third semester of 
observation, June-December 2015 (see Figure 5.4 above). Such a consideration is furthermore 
confirmed by FN and LN’s trend of opposition to the three sub-targets of the EU-community: while 
their opposition to the EU in general increases in correspondence to the third semester of observation, 
their negative stances to the Schengen area geometry peaks in correspondence to the third semester, 
decreasing afterwards. This relationship is, however, not confirmed with reference to the EU-regime 
sub-targets (see Figure 5.6 below). As further detailed below, EU-opponents’ stances to the EU-
institutions is less homogeneous and it is difficult to recognize common patterns among them. Right-
wing parties’ opposition to the Schengen area (see Figure 5.5 above) reaches its highest value in 
correspondence to the third semester of observation that is widely regarded as the peak of the 
migration crisis (June-December 2015) (See Chapter 3, Section 3.4.3, page 64). The only exception is 
represented by the British UKIP, which opposition to the Schengen area peaks in correspondence to 
the fourth semester of observation (January-June 2016). This party’s negative stances to both the EU-
community and the EU-regime follow an increasing trend and reach their highest point in 
correspondence to the fourth semester of observation – January-June 2016 – when Cameron, the 
Conservative party’s leader and Prime Minister of the UK, announced the Brexit referendum5. Such a 
trend in UKIP’s positioning is also confirmed by the findings reported in Figure 5.5 below, where 
UKIP’s negative stances to the EU alongside the two studied geometries follow a similar trend 
potentially highlighting a ‘strategic’ use of the EP political arena by the party to remark their rejectionist 
position vis-à-vis the EU.  
 
 
                                                        
5 David Cameron officially called for the Brexit Referendum on the 22nd of February 2016 in front of 






Figure 5.4: Trend of EU-opposition over time.  
 




Figure 5.5: Trend of EU-opposition: sub-targets EU-community over time.  
 





Figure5.6: Trend of EU-opposition: sub-targets EU-regime over time.  
 
Source: own calculation. Period of observation: May 2014-December 2016. Data are reported in Table B.4 of Appendix B. 
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Another interesting case is AFD’s opposition to the EU-community that experiences a steep 
increase moving from values close to 0 in the first and second semesters, reaching 0.77 points in the 
last observed semester, thus suggesting a radicalization of the parties’ stances toward the EU. This 
steep increase is also mirrored in Figure 5.5, where the EU, in general, is taken as the first objective of 
criticism by the AFD.  
Interestingly, more left-leaning EU-opponents, LINKE and PODEMOS, show a less stable 
opposition to the four EU-targets over time when compared to their right-wing counterpart. The two 
parties focus their negative stances to the EU-elite target in correspondence to the third semester of 
observation (June-December 2015), while for them the Schengen area geometry does not represent a 
target of criticism. As observed in the next chapter, in correspondence to the right-wing parties’ 
increased criticism vis-à-vis the Schengen area, left-leaning EU-opponents adopt an anti-xenophobic 
rhetoric accusing the EU-establishment to allow the diffusion of extremist positions on migration and 
migrants.  
The last included EU-opponent, the FSM, shows more stable levels of opposition to the EU 
when compared to both PODEMOS and LINKE. However, its criticism of the EU-elite follows an 
increasing pattern especially since the third semester of observation (see Figure 5.4 above). FSM’s 
opposition to the Euro area geometry (Figure 5.5 above) tends to increase over time, while similarly to 
both the LINKE and PODEMOS, the Schengen geometry does not constitute a salient target for the 
FSM.  
As mentioned above, the studied EU-opponents’ stances toward the EU-regime sub-targets are 
more heterogeneous and no common pattern between the considered parties is actually detectable (see 
Figure 5.6 above). However, EU-opponents tend to focus their negative stances on both the EC and 
the ‘Other institutions’ targets. Furthermore, there is a neat distinction between mainstream parties and 
EU-opponents, the former in fact tend to support the EU-institutions. The diachronic observation of 
parties’ positioning vis-à-vis the EU-regime confirms that both the FSM and PODEMOS show some 
signs of support toward the EP. 
This first overall observation of parties’ stances to the EU demonstrates that there is a neat 
distinction between mainstream and EU-opposition parties. However, some remarkable differences are 
observable also among the group of EU-opponents, which opposition seems shaped by a left-right 
ideological cleavage, with the only exception of the EU-elite target representing a common objective 
for both left and right-wing EU-opponents. Moreover, opposition to the EU is not a prerogative of 
EU-opponents, as above-mentioned, also mainstream parties show some instances of EU-opposition. 
Lastly, parties’ stances are not constant through time but varies also as a consequence of phenomena 




their union in the same EPPG, or UKIP’s increase of opposition to the EU community in 
correspondence to the Brexit campaign.  
5.3 Patterns of EU-opposition: a policy issue perspective  
 
This section presents patterns of EU-opposition comparing them across the three studied 
policies with the main objective to detect parties’ stances to the EU both within the group of EU-
opponents and between these latter and their mainstream counterparts. Figures 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 below 
report parties’ stances on the four main targets of EU-opposition for each of the three studied policy 
fields. 
 
Figure 5.7: Parties’ positioning on the EU in the field of immigration, asylum and borders control.  
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Figure5. 8: Parties’ positioning on the EU in the field of economy.  
 
Source: own calculation. Period of observation: May 2014-December 2016. Data are reported in Table B.5 of 
Appendix B. 
 
Figure5. 9: Parties’ positioning on the EU in the field of environmental protection.  
 
































































Firstly it is remarkable that there is a neat distinction between mainstream and EU-opposition 
parties in all the considered policy fields, with the only exception of the British CON that behaves 
more similarly to the EU-opponents (as further detailed below). This first general finding confirms the 
distinction between mainstream and non-mainstream parties found at the aggregated level. 
The policy issue where opposition to the four targets of the EU is higher is immigration, asylum 
and borders control, while the policy field that attracts a comparatively lower ‘quantity of opposition’ is 
environmental protection. Furthermore, EU-opponents’ criticism focuses on two targets: the EU-
community (the EU and the two studied geometries) and the EU-elite.  
Besides these general considerations, it is also noticeable that right-wing EU-opponents tend to 
behave more similarly when compared to more left-leaning parties, in all the three considered policy 
issues. This is particularly true for the French FN and the British UKIP, mostly addressing their 
criticism of the EU-community in all the studied policy areas. In fact, their critique is similar across the 
studied issues: the FN scores values ranging from 0.61 in environmental policies to 0.79 in immigration, 
asylum and borders control policies. Similarly, UKIP scores values ranging between 0.79 in 
environmental protection policies to 0.84 in the field of immigration. The EU-community is not always 
the first target of criticism for the LN and AFD, even though it always constitutes an important 
objective for them.  
As for the other three EU-opponents, FSM, LINKE and PODEMOS, their stances to the EU 
across the three policy issues are more heterogeneous when compared to right-leaning EU-opponents. 
Noticeably, the German LINKE focuses on the policies enacted by the EU in all the three analysed 
policy fields (scoring 0.74 in immigration policies, 0.42 in economic policies and 0.09 in environmental 
protection). The party generally does not address much criticism to the other proposed targets with the 
only exception of negative attitudes to the EU-elite expressed in the field of immigration, asylum and 
borders control (0.65). Interestingly, in environmental protection, the LINKE only addresses the EU-
policies target.  
The case of the FSM is of particular interest, as mentioned in chapter 4 (See Chapter 4, Section 
4.2, page 85), FSM works together with the UKIP in the same EPPG – the EFDD – however, its 
attitudes toward the EU are radically different when compared to UKIP’s one. The only noticeable 
exception is FSM’s behaviour in economic policy where the party displays a high level of criticism of 
the EU-community (0.66) more similarly to what UKIP does. Conversely, in the other two policy 
issues, the party mainly focuses on the EU-elite target. Furthermore, FSM’s criticism toward the EU in 
environmental protection is lower when compared to the other policy areas. 
The last included EU-opponent, PODEMOS, focuses its attention on the EU-elite target in all 
the three policy fields reaching its highest level in issues related to economy and immigration (scoring 
0.57 and 0.55 points respectively). 
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The observation of mainstream parties’ stances across policy issues confirms their different 
position on the EU. However, the CON party is still to be considered as an outlier among the 
mainstream cohort. Indeed, the party opposes all the four analysed EU-targets following a dynamic 
more similar to EU-opposition parties like UKIP: the first addressed target in both economic and 
immigration-related policies is the EU-community. However, CON’s opposition is lower in 
environmental protection where it lowly endorses the EU-community (-0.03 points). 
Secondly, all mainstream parties display a higher degree of opposition to the EU-elite in the field 
of immigration, asylum and borders control where the level of opposition exercised by the studied EU-
opponents is, on the overall higher. 
Lastly, there is a distinction in the support to the EU-community within the group of mainstream 
parties (except for the British CON). The centre-right PP and CDU-CSU report comparatively higher 
degrees of support to the EU-community when compared to the centre-left PS and PD.  
Figures 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12 below depict parties’ positioning vis-à-vis the EU-community sub-
targets in the three studied policy fields.  
 
Figure 5.10: Parties’ positioning on the EU-community sub-targets in the field of immigration, asylum and 
borders control 
 
























Parties' positions on the Sub-targets of  the EU-community in 








Figure 5. 11: Parties’ positioning on the EU-community sub-targets in the field of economy. 
 
Source: own calculation. Period of observation: May 2014-December 2016. Data are reported in Table B.6 of 
Appendix B. 
 
Figure 5. 12: Parties’ positioning on the EU-community sub-targets in the field of environmental protection 
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From an in-depth observation of parties’ positioning toward the EU-community sub-targets, the 
findings reported in the previous section are confirmed: opposition to the EU-community (and the two 
studied geometries) is higher in both immigration and economy-related discussions than in the field of 
environmental protection. Furthermore, from a first visual examination, right-leaning EU-opponents 
show higher levels of opposition to all the three considered sub-targets of the EU-community in all the 
included policy issues.  
Right-wing EU-opponents’ most addressed sub-target is the EU in all the three policy fields, the 
only exception being the LN that mainly targets the Euro area geometry in economic related 
discussions. Another highly addressed target of criticism by right-wing EU-opponents is the Schengen 
area geometry. Not surprisingly, the highest level of opposition to this geometry is present in 
immigration, asylum and borders control-related discussions. However, FN and UKIP use the EP 
arena to criticise the Schengen area geometry also in policy fields that are not strictly related to 
immigration. Similarly, also the Euro area geometry is mainly criticised in economy-related speeches 
(see Figure 5.11 above), however, right-wing EU-opponents criticise the Euro area also in policy fields 
related to both the environmental protection and immigration policies. 
As stressed before, FSM, PODEMOS and LINKE position themselves differently to the EU-
community target when compared to the right-wing group. Some degree of similarity is, however, to be 
found in the field of economic policy, where the Euro area is the first target of opposition for all the 
three parties (FSM – 0.61 points – LINKE – 0.37 points – and PODEMOS – 0.28 points). In the other 
two considered policy fields, neither the Euro area nor the Schengen area is addressed by PODEMOS, 
FSM, and LINKE – the only exception being a low criticism of the Schengen area expressed by the 
FSM in immigration-related speeches. Interestingly, PODEMOS is the only left-wing party that is 
always in opposition to the EU. On the contrary, some degree of support to the EU is showed by the 
German LINKE in immigration policies – -0.13 points – and by the FSM in environmental protection 
policies – scoring -0.06 points. Furthermore, the German LINKE does not address any of the sub-
targets of the EU-community in the field of environmental protection.  
Five considerations concerning mainstream parties’ positioning vis-à-vis the EU-community sub-
targets are noteworthy: firstly, differently from the EU-opponents – especially those right-wing parties 
– mainstream parties tend to talk about both the Schengen and the Euro areas in the corresponding 
policy fields. Secondly, the British CON confirms itself as an exceptional case of mainstream EU-
opposition party. Indeed the party opposes the EU, the Schengen area and the Euro area in economy 
and immigration-related speeches respectively. However, it is not critical of the EU-community’s sub-
targets in the field of environmental protection. On the contrary, some extremely low signs of support 




Thirdly, Figure 5.11 above confirms the findings reported in the previous section: the PD, the PS 
and the PP are critical of the Euro area geometry while being generally supportive of the EU. 
Fourthly, in immigration-related discussions, mainstream parties are extremely favourable of the 
Schengen area geometry, particularly the Italian PD that scores the highest degree of support for this 
geometry (-0.45 points).  
Lastly, in the field of environmental protection, apart from the British CON, mainstream parties 
strongly endorse the EU-community.  
To conclude this description of parties’ positioning on the EU, Figure 5.13, 5.14 and 5.15 below 
provide the reader with a detailed account of parties’ stances to the EU-regime sub-targets across the 
studied policy fields.  
 
Figure 5.13: Parties’ positioning on the EU-regime sub-targets in the field of immigration, asylum and borders 
control. 
 

























Parties' positions on the EU-regime sub-targets. Policy field: 
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Figure5. 14: Parties’ positioning on the EU-regime sub-targets in the field of economy.  
 
Source: own calculation. Period of observation: May 2014-December 2016. Data are reported in Table B.7 of 
Appendix B. 
 
Figure5.15: Parties’ positioning on the EU-regime sub-targets in the field of environmental protection.  
 

































































From the three figures above, the distinction between mainstream and EU-opposition parties is 
less clear and patterns of opposition or support to the EU-regime are more heterogeneous. However, 
similarly to the other graphs commented above, the CON confirms itself as an outlier among the 
mainstream parties behaving more similarly to the group of EU-opponents.  
Besides the fact that there is no clear distinction between left and right-wing EU-opponents, the 
observation of parties’ position vis-à-vis the EU-regime sub-targets across the three policy fields 
confirms the finding reported in the previous section. Indeed, EU-opponents tend to focus their 
attention mainly on two targets: the EC and the ‘Other institutions’.  
An interesting case is the one of AFD’s negative stances to the ‘Other institutions’ target in the 
field of economy. The fact that the AFD mainly addresses this targets when dealing with economy 
related issues is perfectly in line with the general stances of the party that would like to reform and 
reduce the current role played by the ECB in the European context6. Critical stances to the ‘Other 
institutions’ target in economy-related issues equate the AFD with left-leaning EU-opponents. What 
really differentiates right-wing from left-wing EU-opponents are their stances to the EP: right-wing 
parties oppose the EP while left-leaning parties and the Italian FSM are more supportive of this 
institution.  
As mentioned before the distinction between mainstream and EU-opposition parties is not as 
neat as in the other targets. Besides the fact that the CON represents an exception, mainstream parties 
are generally equated by their negative stances vis-à-vis the Council in both immigration and economy-
related discourses. What really differentiates mainstream parties from the EU-opponents group are 




This chapter has presented the patterns of the expressed quantity of EU-opposition, proposing 
two lines of comparison: 1) among EU-opponents, and 2) between EU-opponents and mainstream 
parties.  
The two Tables below summarize parties’ positioning toward the studied EU-targets both from 
an overall perspective (Table 5.1) and across the three studied policy issues (Table 5.2). Each target is 
reported in the first left-hand column while the second left-hand column is used to distinguish right-
wing EU-opponents (RO) from left-wing EU-opponents (LO) and mainstream parties (M).  
                                                        
6 In its electoral manifesto prepared for the EP elections in 2014 the party states that AFD calls for ‘a 
return to the independence of the ECB, stable currencies and budgetary discipline’. (Programm der 
Alternative für Deutschland für die Wahl zum Europäische Parlament, 22nd March 2014, p. 5). 
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From the results of the analysis a first general consideration is to be stressed: opposition to the 
EU is a complex phenomenon that only with difficulty can be observed through the lenses of a single 
indicator since it entails components that are not always linear and easily detectable.  
As mentioned several times in the previous section and as it is visible from both Table 5.1 and 
5.2 below, there is a neat distinction between EU-opponents and mainstream parties’ positioning vis-à-
vis the EU: the latter generally support the EU while the former are critical of several of its aspects. 
However, mainstream parties’ support of the EU-targets is not always guaranteed. On the one hand, 
the British Conservative Party might be considered as an exceptional case of ‘mainstream EU-
opposition party’ since it follows patterns of EU-opposition similar to UKIP’s one. On the other hand, 
centre-left mainstream parties – the PD and PS – show some signs of criticism of the Euro area 
geometry. Furthermore, mainstream parties express criticism of the EU-elite target that has to be 
observed from the perspective of its content as further detailed in the next chapter.  
The complexity of the phenomenon becomes even more apparent when observing parties’ 
positioning on the EU across the three studied policy issues. Taking into consideration the group of 
EU-opponents, a visible distinction between left and right-wing parties is detectable. The latters, in fact, 
behave more similarly across the three studied policy issues with the EU-community being among the 
first addressed target (especially for UKIP and FN). On the contrary, the behaviour of left-leaning 
parties (alongside the FSM) is more heterogeneous. For such parties, the EU-elite surely constitutes an 
important target, while the EU-community is criticised in a ‘softer way’. This difference is furthermore 
evident when comparing the stances of left and right-wing EU-opponents with reference to the sub-
targets of the EU. While all the studied EU-opponents are extremely critical of the Euro area (especially 
in economy-related speeches), differently from right-wing parties, the Schengen area is not a salient 
target for left-wing EU-opponents alongside the FSM. Furthermore, the EU-opponents differ also in 
terms of their stances to the EU-regime sub-targets. While, on the one hand, it is true that the main 
targets of criticism for both right and left-wing EU-opponents are the EC and the ‘Other institutions’, 
on the other hand, left-leaning parties alongside the FSM show also some degree of support vis-à-vis the 
EP, a difference that is further detailed in the next chapter.   
The observation of mainstream parties’ positioning across the three policy issues does not 
underline a strong left-right distinction. Interestingly and differently from the German CDU-CSU, all 
South-European mainstream parties – PD, PS and PP – are opposed to the EU immigration policies, 
and are critical of the Euro area. However, all mainstream parties are equated by their support to the 
Schengen area geometry. Moreover, mainstream parties tend to refer to the two studied geometries in 
those discussions concerning either economic – for the Euro area geometry – or immigration policies – 




criticise the two geometries even in policy fields that are not strictly connected to them, thus indicating 
an instrumental use of the EP for the promotion of negative stances to the EU.  
This chapter has also presented a dynamic view of the overall index of parties’ positioning (see 
Figure 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 above) demonstrating that parties’ stances to the EU are not stable through 
time. Firstly, the French FN and the British UKIP feature trends of opposition to the EU-community 
target (see Figure 5.5 above) that are much more stable over time when compared to the other included 
EU-opponents. Secondly, as reported in the previous sections, an increase, a decrease or a peak in the 
trend of opposition can potentially be associated with both institutional and external events. An 
example of the effects of the second type of events on EU-opposition is given by UKIP’s increasing 
trend of opposition to the EU-community (Figure 5.5 above) that peaks in correspondence to the 
beginning of the Brexit campaign during the 4th semester of observation. Furthermore, negative stances 
to the EU (especially to the EU-community and its sub-targets) peak in immigration-related speeches in 
correspondence to the third semester of the analysis, considered as the tipping point of the migration 
crisis. In correspondence to this enhanced negative stances to the EU, mainstream parties tend to 
increase their opposition to the EU-elite target, this is particularly visible in the case of the German 
CDU-CSU coalition and of the Spanish PP. 
The observation of the patterns related to the quantity of the expressed opposition to the EU is 
coupled with an in-depth analysis of both its character and the motivations used by parties to justify 
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Support Opposition None 
Policies 
RO  LN FN AFD UKIP  
LO  FSM LINKE PODEMOS  
M 
PP CDU-CSU PD CON PS  
Elite 








PD PP CDU-CSU PS CON  
Regime 
RO  LN FN AFD UKIP  
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Table 5. 2: Summary table of national parties’ positioning on the EU across the three considered policies 
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6.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter presents an in-depth description of the patterns of EU-opposition detected in the 
previous chapter providing a deeper understanding of the character and the motivations that parties use 
to oppose the EU-policies, the EU-elite, the EU-regime and the EU-community.  
To do that, all the parties exercising opposition to one of the studied targets are included in the 
analysis (both ‘Eurosceptics’ and mainstream parties1, see Table 5.1, Chapter 5, page 130). The chapter 
presents the findings resulting from the inductive coding procedure of negatively coded quasi-sentences 
(QSs) reported in the speeches delivered by MEPs during the studied EP plenary sessions (see Chapter 
4, Section 4.3.2, pages 103-104 for the details concerning the applied inductive coding technique).  
The chapter is divided into five sections each reporting the main motivations used by parties to 
oppose the studied targets. Section 6.2 focuses on parties’ positioning on the EU-policies in the three 
observed policy fields (immigration, economy and environmental protection). Section 6.3 details the 
character and the main motivations used by parties to oppose the EU-elite target. The following section 
(6.4) reports the finding of the inductive coding procedure with reference to the EU-regime target 
(character and motivations related to the exercised opposition). Section 6.5 focuses on the character 
and the motivations used by parties to oppose the EU-community target. Each section presents three 
word-clouds of the parties’ coded-negative QSs providing the reader with a global overview of the 
most frequently used words. Lastly, a conclusive section summarises the obtained results and points 




                                                        
1 Parties are classified as opposing one of the studied targets according to the results obtained in 
Chapter 5, see Table 5.1 on page 130. The chapter considers only the parties that show opposition to 
the EU from an overall perspective.  
2 A detailed description of the inductive coding scheme (macro-categories and themes emerging from 
the analysis) is reported in Appendix C of this work, alongside further specifications concerning the 





6.2 Justifying EU-opposition in the EP: the EU-policy target  
 
A neat distinction in the character of the exercised opposition between left and right-wing EU-
opponents emerges from the data. While in the field of environmental protection all the included 
parties generally pragmatically oppose the EU policies (with the only exceptions of the FSM and 
PODEMOS that support them). In the other two observed fields, right-wing EU-opponents propose a 
principled opposition differently from the other included parties pragmatically opposing this target (the 
only two exceptions are AFD’s pragmatic opposition to the economic policy and PODEMOS’ 
principled opposition to EU immigration policies as further detailed below). Interestingly, also 
mainstream parties show some signs of opposition to the EU-policies (PS in economic policies, PS, 
PD, PP and CON in immigration policies and CON in environmental protection), which has always a 
pragmatic character.  
The remaining of this section better disentangles parties’ motivation to oppose the EU-policy by 






Figure 6.1: Word-clouds of the coded-negative QSs related to the EU-policy target in the field of economic policy. 
 




The motivations used in the field of economy cluster around three broad themes: 1) EU’s 
regulation of the economy; 2) the supranational redistribution of resources between the Member States, 
and 3) the EU’s economic orthodoxy (i.e.: austerity). All the included EU-opponents devote most of 
their speeches to the first mentioned theme; however, there is a visible distinction between left and 
right-wing EU-opponents with the only exception of the German AFD (as further detailed below).  
Right-wing EU-opponents reject on a principled basis the EU’s regulation of the market, 
banking, financial, and fiscal sectors (words like ‘banques’ – banks –, ‘marché’ – market –, ‘finanziario’ 
– financial – and ‘istituzioni’ – institutions – are extremely frequent in both LN and FN’s word-clouds, 
see Figure 6.1 above). Particularly, FN and LN reject the regulation of such sectors because they 
perceive it as benefiting only banks and big financial or economic powers while heavily affecting 
European citizens. If it is true that also UKIP is critical of EU’s regulation of the above-mentioned 
sectors, the party emphasizes also its opposition to the harmonization of fiscal policies at the 
supranational level defined as an ‘anathema to what UKIP stands for’3 (‘harmonization’ is one of the 
most frequent words in UKIP’s speeches, Figure 6.1 above). The rejection of any form of EU’s 
regulation strongly emerges from FN’s speeches. According to the party, the only viable solution to 
solve Europe’s economic problems is to implement protectionist policies because it is the ‘anti-
protectionism dogmatism in the name of globalized free trade that leads to massive deindustrialization’ 
(Montel, FN’s MEP). Interestingly, alongside this first type of motivations, FN, AFD and UKIP are 
harshly opposed to the EU’s economic orthodoxy because it ‘recognises Member States’ policies as the 
only cause of the increase in public debt, while most of it comes from the transfer of private debts to 
the public national banks (…) reinforced by austerity policies demanded by Brussels’ (Bilde, FN’ MEP). 
These parties consider EU’s economic orthodoxy as detrimental since its ‘results are clear to anyone: 
long-term unemployment, social disease and Member States unable to make ends meet’ (Buonanno 
LN’s MEP).  
Contrary to the other right-wing EU-opponents (FN, LN and UKIP) the German AFD 
proposes a pragmatic opposition to the EU economic policies asking for a stronger planning of the 
economy by the EU and the respect of EU’s economic orthodoxy through the implementation of 
austerity policies. According to AFD’s representatives the main problem of EU’s economy is not ‘that 
too much is saved, but that too much debt is being made’ (Lucke AFD’s MEP). Stable public finance is 
the first and foremost mantra of the AFD, being against the violations of the thresholds imposed by 
the Stability and Growth Pact. The difference between AFD and the other right-wing parties is also 
                                                        
3 The cited segments alongside further information concerning both the debates and the speakers are 
reported in Appendix C of this work.  





visible from AFD’s word-cloud. Among the most frequent words it is possible to see 
‘Wirtschaftspolitik’ (political economy), ‘Verordnung’ (regulation) or ‘Aufsicht’ (supervision)4.  
On the contrary, left-wing EU-opponents (PODEMOS and LINKE) alongside the Italian FSM, 
express opposition to the EU-policies that is pragmatic in character and would like to see a stronger 
EU’s regulation of the market, banking, financial and fiscal sectors. According to them, the 
harmonization of fiscal policies and the increase of transparency and equity in taxation specifically 
targeting multinational enterprises is the only solution to achieve more equity and reduce the social 
dumping in the EU. Words like ‘trasparenza’ (transparency), ‘Investitionen’ (investments), and ‘fondos’ 
(funds) are highly frequent in FSM, LINKE, and PODEMOS’ word-clouds. Such parties ask for a 
‘complete structural reform of the banking system, separating credit from financial activities’ in order to 
‘bring the system back to its true function that is to guarantee credit to the real economy’ (Castaldo 
FSM’s MEP). Furthermore, these parties motivate their opposition to the EU-policies preaching for the 
redistribution of richness in the EU. According to them a ‘countercyclical bet is what the EU needs’ 
(Sanchez Caldentey, PODEMOS’ MEP) to counteract the effects of EU’s austerity measures identified 
as ‘[t]he cause of growing unemployment, especially among the youths, since they are undermining 
social systems in the field of education, healthcare and welfare, which should constitute the pillars of 
the European society’ (Ferrara FSM’s MEP). In other words, even if it is true that both left and right-
leaning parties reject austerity measures, left-leaning EU-opponents alongside the FSM propose 
solutions that foresee the implementation of redistributive policies rather than protectionist one.  
The only mainstream party opposing the EU-policies in the field of economy is the French PS. 
Similarly to FSM, PODEMOS, and LINKE, it criticises the lack of a common EU regulation in fiscal 
issues, particularly with reference to multinational enterprises: ‘we need to push the legislation a bit 
forward, asking for a common European taxation on multinational enterprises’ (Thomas PS’ MEP). 
Furthermore, the party is extremely critical of EU’s economic orthodoxy since EU’s austerity measures 
are having ‘disastrous consequences on EU’s peripheral countries’ (Balas PS’ MEP). PS’ word-cloud 
confirms these finding since words like ‘investissement’ (investments), ‘fiscale’ (fiscal) or 
‘multinationales’ (multinational enterprises) are widely used by the party. 
 
                                                        
4 The analysis provides a static picture of opposition to the EU-policies in the economic field. This is to 
say that it does not track changes in AFD’s stances before and after its exit from the ECR. 
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Figure 6.2: Word-clouds of the coded-negative QSs related to the EU-policy target in the field of immigration policy.
 
Detailed information about the motivations used by parties is provided in Table C.9 of Appendix C.  





In the field of immigration the studied parties cluster their opposition around three main themes: 
1) immigration control policies; 2) asylum seekers control, and 3) integration of migrants. Furthermore, 
a clear-cut distinction between left and right wing parties is visible. The former express a restrictive 
view on immigration control policies, while the latter are more permissive. 
The cornerstone of UKIP, LN, FN, and AFD’s opposition to the EU-policies is their negative 
stances toward illegal migrants and the identification and the eventual expulsion of those who do not 
enjoy asylum right. Words like ‘invasione’ (invasion), ‘clandestines’ (illegal migrants), ‘Grenzen’ 
(borders), ‘stop’ are highly frequent in AFD, FN, LN, and UKIP’s word-clouds (Figure 6.2 above). The 
rhetoric of the ‘invasion of migrants’ or ‘mass migration’ is widely used by these parties blaming EU 
immigration policies to be ‘foolish and useless to stop the invasion of illegal migrants’ (Bizzotto LN’s 
MEP) and to be ideologically in contrast with ‘the battle against mass migration that FN has been 
pursuing for more than 40 years’ (Lebreton FN’s MEP). AFD’ s position toward asylum seekers is even 
harsher, according to the party ‘[a]sylum right is not the solution to world’s poverty. (…) State asylum 
right should be replaced and framed on a private basis’ (Von Stroch AFD’s representative). 
Furthermore, this party sustains that ‘the repatriation is the first and the highest goal, for anyone who 
comes to us with asylum reason or even without’ (Pretzell AFD’s exponent). Another aspect of 
particular concern for right-wing EU-opponents is related to the integration of migrants in the 
European society. Migrants represent a cultural threat to the otherwise homogeneous European society 
and Islam is frequently associated with the issue of terrorism. However, UKIP, FN, and LN are mostly 
worried by the economic integration of migrants within the EU territory. According to these parties, 
the EU is facing the migration issue ‘in a superficial way without distinguishing between economic 
migrants and refugees’ (Bizzotto LN’s exponent) since economic migrants will ‘enter in concurrencies 
with European people especially for what concerns their access to the labour market’ (Goddyn FN’s 
exponent). 
As mentioned above left-wing parties (alongside the FSM) endorse a permissive approach to 
migration, this is clearly portrayed in their word-clouds where words like ‘diritti’ (rights), ‘Menschen’ 
(people), ‘refugiados’ (refugees) or ‘protección’ (protection) are highly frequent (Figure 6.2 above). The 
LINKE is mainly concerned with the need to increase humanitarian aid to migrants and asylum seekers 
stressing the necessity to guarantee ‘safe access routes’ to the EU, especially for vulnerable persons 
(‘Kinder’ – child in English – is one of the most frequent words in LINKE’s word-cloud): ‘the fact that 
there is no legal route to Europe exposes children to existential threat for their lives and bodies’ (Ernst 
LINKE’s MEP). Furthermore, LINKE sustains that the only way to solve the migration crisis is to 
deeply understand its roots and be ‘ready to accept the fact that our way of life, our standards should 




Also FSM is concerned with the lack of humanitarian corridors to safely access Europe, however 
the party mainly stresses the need of a ‘compulsory mechanism for the redistribution of migrants from 
those member states suffering an exceptional migratory pressure’ (Valli FSM’ s exponent) alongside a 
reform of the Dublin system (‘Dublino’ – Dublin – ‘regolamento’ – rule – and ‘modifica’ – modify – 
are recurrent expressions in FSM’s word-cloud). According to FSM’s representatives, the Dublin 
system currently penalizes ‘the first country of entry that still has the greatest responsibility in the 
examination of asylum applications and in the management of disembarkations’ (Ferrara FSM’s MEP). 
PODEMOS is the only party opposing EU’s policies on a principled basis due to its rejection of the 
externalization of European borders: ‘the xenophobic policies of the fortress Europe are transforming 
the Mediterranean Sea in the largest mass grave of the world’ (Urbán Crespo PODEMOS’ MEP). Such 
‘xenophobic policies’ are also criticized because they ‘systematically violate human rights, not only with 
the ‘hot returns’ but also by installing blades on fences, mistreating migrants in detention centres, 
charging with our patrol-both flimsy boats full of migrants, and there have been cases in which 
European authorities even pulled the trigger’ (Sanchez Caldentey PODEMOS’ exponent). 
Also some of the included mainstream parties are critical of the EU’s migration policy presenting 
interesting differences among them. Left-leaning mainstream parties have a more permissive approach 
to migration, while the British Conservatives and (partially) the Spanish PP show more restrictive 
stances to EU’s migration policies. Such differences are recognizable also from the word-clouds of 
these three parties. While CON and PP show words like ‘must’, ‘need’, ‘countries’ or ‘fronteras’ 
(borders), PS and PD’s word-clouds present ‘asile’ (asylum), ‘sistema’ (system) and ‘solidarietà’ 
(solidarity) among the most frequent words (see Figure 6.2 above). 
Similarly, to the other left-wing EU-opponents and to the FSM, both the PS and the PD 
underline that the ‘priority is the construction of both legal migration-channels for migrants and 
humanitarian corridors to let asylum seekers safely reach EU’s territory’ (Bonnefoy PS’ MEP), stressing 
the need for a common system for the redistribution of migrants. Differently, the CON endorses a 
position more similar to right-wing EU-opponents. Its exponents preach to ‘improve border security 
and functioning systems for the processing of migrants, including the return of those that are not 
genuine refugees’ (Van Orden CON’ MEP). PP’s position to the EU’ s migration policy only partially 
matches CON’s one. PP sustains the increase of external borders’ security as a way to ‘avoid the 
construction of new internal borders’ (Gonzales Pons PP’s MEP), however, differently from the CON, 
PP’s exponents ask for a holistic understanding of the migration issue calling for a Common Asylum 





Figure 6.3: Word-clouds of the coded-negative QSs related to the EU-policy target in the field of environmental policy 
 




In environmental protection, parties justify their pragmatic criticism of the EU-policies on the 
basis of two main themes: 1) the relationship between the environmental protection and economy, and 
2) the Dieselgate Scandal5. Generally, only right-wing parties (with the only exception of the German 
LINKE, as detailed below) oppose the EU-policies in this field. As shown in Figure 6.3 above, words 
like ‘produzione’ (production), ‘Automobilindustrie’ (automotive industry), ‘industrie’ (industry), 
‘market’ or ‘Absagskandal’ (emission scandal) are widely present in all the formulated word-clouds.  
Right-wing parties sustain that EU’s environmental efforts at the international level are useless 
because only the EU complies with environmental protection rules that contribute to the 
deindustrialization of the EU: ‘favouring a greener world does not mean to impose thresholds and 
disadvantages only to the EU and to its enterprises’ (Fontana LN’s MEP); ‘our green policies are 
forcing energy-intensive business out of Europe altogether, taking their jobs and their investments with 
them’ (Helmer UKIP’s MEP). 
As for the Dieselgate scandal, AFD, FN, and UKIP are concerned about the proposal of a 
common European regulation of the automotive sector since European solutions ‘lack any long-term 
evaluation of their impacts on the European automotive sector’ (Bilde FN’s MEP), thus ‘the potential 
hit to Volkswagen could damage all of us, especially if, as many expect, other companies are drawn into 
the scandal’ (Helmer UKIP’s MEP). Only the Italian LN favours a European solution of the Dieselgate 
scandal that should be based on stricter rules concerning real driving emissions tests. 
The German LINKE is the only left-wing party pragmatically opposing EU’s environmental 
policies. LINKE’s representatives do not deny EU’s efforts in environmental protection but contend 
that the European Emissions Trading System (ETS) 6  increases and reinforces the role played by 
financial markets in EU’s citizens’ everyday life. Furthermore, the LINKE endorses the achievement of 
a European solution for the Dieselgate scandal since ‘what we need are reliable processes and tests to 
implement our standards so that European cars will actually be low in emissions and energy efficient’ 
(Ernst LINKE’s MEP). 
                                                        
5 The expression ‘Dieselgate’ scandal refers to the Volkswagen (VW) scandal. In response to EPA Tier 
2 emission standards, all cars’ producers had to comply with very strict rules concerning the emission 
of NOx (chemical component made up of Nitrogen Oxide and Nitrogen Dioxide). To do that, VW 
cars model (particularly Jetta 2009 and Golf 2010) were equipped with a new LNT technology (Lean 
NOx Trap). However, the LNT NOx trap was not doing much. Instead, the cars were installed with 
software that detected when they were being tested and were programmed so that NOx emissions 
would indeed be minimal under test conditions. 
6 Defined as the ‘cornerstone’ of EU’s environmental policy, the ETS system works on the ‘cap and 
trade system’. The cap is set on the total amount of certain greenhouse gases that can be emitted by an 
installation. The cap is reduced over time such that the total emissions fall. Within the cap, companies 
receive or buy emission allowances that they can trade with one another as needed. Further info at 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en  





Among the mainstream parties, the British CON is the only one pragmatically opposing this 
target mainly focusing on the de-industrialization effects of EU’s environmental policies. Similarly to 
the Italian LN, it, however, endorses a European solution to the Dieselgate scandal. 
 
6.3 Justifying EU-opposition in the EP: the EU-elite target  
 
EU-opponents’ opposition to the EU-elite target is almost always principled independently from 
the discussed policy field. Interestingly, also part of the analysed mainstream parties proposes a 
principled critic to this target. However, as already mentioned in the previous chapter (Chapter 5, 
section 5.4, pages 128-129) and as further detailed below, their opposition is oriented to a specific part 
of the EU-elite: the challenger of the ‘grand coalition’, what mainstream actors define as populist and 
Eurosceptic parties. 
From an overall perspective, EU-opponents are extremely united in their opposition to the EU-
elite target. Generally, they all rely on similar motivations across the three studied policy issues. They 
accuse the EU-elite using motivations that target either the moral conduct of the establishment, or the 
inability of the EU-establishment to accomplish its duties, or some specific EU-politicians (e.g.: Jean 
Claude Juncker).  
 
 Turning to each policy field, parties’ opposition to the EU-elite in economy-related policies 
clusters around four main themes, the performance of the EU-elite, its moral conduct, its ideological 
orientation and the moral conduct of some specific members of the EU-elite: Jean Claude Juncker and 
Mario Draghi, whose names appears as most frequent words in the word-clouds presented in Figure 
6.4 below.  
The most widely used motivations relate to the moral conduct of the EU-elite that is criticized to 
favour ‘strong and hidden powers, financial but also political’ (Bizzotto LN’s representative) (the so-
called ‘poteri forti’ – strong powers – as emerges from LN’s word-cloud) and to impose un-democratic 
decisions on EU-citizens: ‘the other feature I have noticed here is the growth of what I can only 
describe as authoritarianism. You know, we actually saw the Prime Minister of Greece removed 
effectively by a coup d’état and we saw Mr Berlusconi removed by a coup d’état and in both cases 
represented by appointees who were former directors of the Goldman Sachs’ (Farage UKIP’s leader). 
To confirm this assertion, the word-clouds reported in Figure 6.4 below show that terms like ‘Betrüger’ 
(fraudster), ‘autorité’ (authority), ‘poteri forti’ (strong powers), ‘responsabilità’ (responsibility), 
‘multinazionali’ (multinational enterprises), and ‘lobby’ appear frequently in EU-opponents’ speeches.
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Figure 6.4: Word-clouds of the coded-negative QSs related to the EU-elite target in the field of economic policy 
 
 
Detailed information about the motivations used by parties is provided in Table C.11 of Appendix C 





Interestingly, both right and left-wing EU-opponents are equated by criticism addressing specific 
members of the EU-elite. FN, LN, LINKE, and FSM are extremely critical of Juncker’s moral conduct 
(see word-clouds above) accusing him to be the ‘main architect of the LuxLeaks affair7’ (Monot FN’s 
MEP). Juncker’ s moral integrity is criticised with reference to its role as the President of the EC: ‘you 
are the magician of facilitated Luxembourg’s taxation’ whose action has repercussions on the credibility 
of the entire EU: ‘With Juncker steering the European vessel the EU lacks credibility’ (Zanni FSM’s 
MEP). When talking about the LuxLeaks affair, LINKE’s MEPs not only blame Juncker for its direct 
complicity in the scandal but also address the EU elite for its complicity in building an ‘omertà wall of 
silence. When the finance ministers of the big member states – like Germany, my country – were silent 
about it because local companies profited. The finance ministers have been sleeping or looking away’ 
(De Masi LINKE’s exponent). Noteworthy, LINKE’s word-cloud reports the word ‘leaks’ among the 
most used expressions.  
The only right-wing EU-opponent not focusing on Juncker is the German AFD. In connection 
to its criticism of the ECB (as further detailed below), AFD harshly contests Mario Draghi’s moral 
conduct (Draghi is the central term of AFD’s word-cloud) perceiving his intention to do ‘whatever it 
takes to save the Euro’8 as illegal and performed outside of the ECB’s mandate: ‘You are making 
politics. You want to make labour policies, you want to impede Italy and Greece’ s exit from the Euro. 
You are making politics. You do not have the mandate to do so’ (Von Stroch AFD’s MEP).  
Apart from being critical of the EU-elite’ s moral conduct, the British UKIP also attacks its pro-
integrationist attitude. According to its MEPs, the mainstream elite is a group of hedonists concerned 
only about widening and deepening the scope of EU-integration: ‘Mr president, most people in this 
place talk about one of three things: themselves, their own amendments or how wonderful the EU is, 
or indeed the three at once’ (Coburn UKIP’s MEP). 
Differently from the other EU-opponents, the Spanish PODEMOS proposes a pragmatic 
opposition to the EU-elite being particularly critical of the ‘grand coalition’ between centre-left and 
centre-right EPPGs. According to PODEMOS’ MEPs the EU-elite is unable to listen to peoples’ 
needs and should change its attitude endorsing ‘the side that defends social rights and abandoning, 
once for all, that damn grand coalition that is leading us to the disaster’ (Iglesias PODEMOS’ leader). 
This assertion is confirmed by the high frequency of words like ‘socialistas’ (socialists), ‘popular’ 
                                                        
7 The expression LuxLeaks affair (or Luxembourg Leaks) refers to a financial scandal revealed in 
November 2014 by a group of journalists. The produced dossier reported a set of documents showing 
that Luxembourg’s tax authority has been systematically delivering secret deals to multinationals.  
8 At a speech held in the occasion of the ‘Global investment conference’ in London (26 July 2012) 
Mario Draghi (president of the ECB) announced that:’ Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do 
whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough’. See the entire verbatim 




(referring to the EPP), ‘grupos’ (groups) and ‘gran coalición’ (large coalition) in PODEMOS’ word-





Figure 6.5: Word-clouds of the coded-negative QSs related to the EU-elite target in the field of immigration policy
 




Also in the field of immigration EU-opponents tend to cluster the majority of their critique 
around the moral conduct of the EU-elite followed by a harsh criticism of their activity. Words like 
‘ipocrisia’ (hypocrisy), ‘Zynismus’ (cynicism), ‘vergognatevi’ (shame on you), and ‘volontà’ (will) are 
frequently used as emerges from the word-clouds reported in Figure 6.5 above. The EU-elite is accused 
to be hypocrite by both right and left-wing EU-opponents ‘in shedding tears for a day in front of a 
photograph without doing anything on the field’ 9 (Castaldo FSM’s exponent) to fight against the deep 
roots of the migration crisis. Furthermore, the mainstream elite is blamed to act on the basis of 
personal interest: ‘Is it that maybe someone is letting all those peoples in the EU out of personal 
interest? It looks like someone would like to create chaos. Creating chaos, I do not know why, but, 
evidently, there are important interests that someone does not wish to vanquish’ (Fontana, LN’s 
exponent).  
In spite of the common criticism of the EU-elite’s moral values, right and left-wing EU-
opponents’ motivations partially diverge. Left-wing parties alongside the Italian FSM criticize the 
mainstream EU-elite which exponents ‘ignore the anti-democratic drift in the heart of Europe and clear 
their consciences as ostriches do putting their heads in the sand’ (Ferrara FSM’s exponent) 10 . In 
relation to this anti-democratic drift, on the one hand, left-wing parties are concerned about 
mainstream inactivity vis-à-vis the ‘violence against refugees that spread like a virus’ (Ernst LINKE’s 
exponent) and ‘that demands immigration policies doomed to bunker Europe’ (Urbán Crespo 
PODEMOS’ representative) accusing the mainstream elite to be responsible for the diffusion of hate 
against migrants since they ‘remain silent, look away, cannot see the dead and do not want to look at 
victims’ families in the eyes’ (Ernst LINKE’s exponent). To confirm this position from PODEMOS 
and FSM’s word-clouds emerge words like ‘derecha’ (right) or ‘extrema’ (extreme).  
On the contrary, right-wing EU-opponents are critical of the ‘bleeding hearth liberalism’ of 
centre-left and centre-right mainstream parties that: ‘through their speeches give the impression that 
Europe is in a position to supply thousands and thousands of economic migrants’ (Pretzell AFD’s 
MEP).  
AFD’s attitude toward the EU-elite is peculiar, the party addresses most of its criticism toward 
the performance of a specific member of the EU-elite, Angela Merkel, accused to have fuelled the 
                                                        
9 The speech refers to the picture of the dead young Syrian boy found on the beach near Turkish resort 
of Bodrum. The boy, named Aylan Kurdi, was one of the twelve Syrian who drowned in the attempt to 
reach Greece’s borders. The diffusion of the pictures was followed by a wave of different types of 
reactions among the broad public. See: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/02/shocking-
image-of-drowned-syrian-boy-shows-tragic-plight-of-refugees  
10 The speech is related to the developments of the Hungarian situation in particular the speaker refers 
both to Orbán’s decision to construct a fence at Hungary’s border with Serbia (to impede the transit of 
migrants from the so-called Balkan route) and to the request of a popular referendum on the 
reintroduction of the death penalty in Hungary.  





migration crisis in Germany: ‘all migrants want to come to Germany since they have been invited by 
Chancellor Merkel’ (Von Stroch AFD’s MEP)11. The word ‘Merkel’ and ‘Bundeskanzlerin’ (Federal 
chancellor) are among the most used in AFD’s speeches. 
 
                                                        
11 The speech refers to Angela Merkel’s declaration about the capacity of Germany to welcome new 
migrants and/or asylum seekers in the German territory. The declaration of the German Chancellor 
‘Wir schaffen das’ (we can do this) held during the Chancellor’s summer press conference in August 2015 
marks the beginning of what the media define as the Willkommens-Kultur (welcome culture) toward 





Figure 6.6: Word-clouds of the coded-negative QSs related to the EU-elite target in the field of environmental protection policy 
Detailed information about the motivations used by parties is provided in Table C.13 of Appendix C 





The performance of the EU-elite, its moral conduct, and its characteristics are central to parties’ 
justifications of opposition in speeches related to the environmental protection issue.  
Right-wing EU-opponents focus on the technocratic and bureaucratic nature of the EU-elite that 
lacks democratic accountability: ‘the only people who should create laws are our democratically elected 
and accountable government, not unelected bureaucrats in Brussels’ (Batten UKIP’s exponent). 
Interestingly, right-wing parties’ word-clouds report a high frequency of words such as ‘bureaucrats’, 
‘technocrate’ (technocrat), ‘democratically’, ‘accountable’ and ‘elected’.  
Justifications concerning the EU-elite’s moral conduct favouring green lobbies equate both right-
wing EU-opponents and the FSM, especially in those speeches referring to the Dieselgate scandal. In 
this framework, the Italian LN laments the lack of a self-defense mechanism against the ‘undue 
pressure’ of the green lobbies also accusing part of the EU-elite to be VW’s accomplice. The supposed 
collusion between the EU-elite and more or less licit systems is mirrored in the word-clouds in Figure 
6.6 above reporting words like ‘interessi’ (interests), ‘fazioso’ (factious) and ‘lobby’. The rhetoric of the 
collusion between the EU-elite and green lobbies is present also in FSM’s speeches even if the party is 
also critical about the performance of the EU-elite accused to impose their views through their 
behaviour: ‘the bullying dictatorship of the majority transforms the only European elective institution 
in a disgusting horse trade between just two groups so that every parliamentary act, each fantastic New 
Deal that you will prepare will be spoiled by a progressive loss of a minimum common ethical 
denominator since its very beginning’ (Tamburrano FSM’s MEP). The Spanish PODEMOS 
pragmatically opposes the EU-elite accusing the action of the grand-coalition also in this field, while its 
EPPG’s partner, the LINKE, does not oppose the EU-elite in this policy field. Also in this case, 
PODEMOS’ word-cloud reports the words ‘grupos’ (political groups) among the most frequently used 
by the party. 
 
As for the mainstream parties, it is noticeable that some signs of criticism toward the EU-elite are 
present, particularly in the fields of immigration and economy where mainstream parties oppose a 
specific part of the EU-elite in a principled way: the EU-opponents. From both Figure 6.4 and 6.5 
above, mainstream parties’ word-clouds (the only exception is partially the CON’s one) show the 
presence of words confirming this dynamic: ‘Linke’ (left-wing), ‘Lucke’ (AFD’s exponent), ‘Tsipras’, 
‘Farage’, ‘Viktor Orbán’, ‘Fidesz’, ‘droite’ (right-wing), ‘antisémitisme’ (anti-Semitism), ‘paura’ (fear), 
‘extreme’, and ‘Populismus’ (populism). Mainstream parties accuse the EU-opponents to offer 
oversimplified solutions to complex phenomena without observing reality in the long run. For example, 
CDU-CSU’s MEPs state that EU-opponents are not ‘concerned with a substantive discussion, but use 





Most of mainstream parties’ criticism of the EU-opponents is related to the field of immigration. 
On the one hand, centre-right mainstream parties accuse the EU-opponents to be shallow proposing 
‘populist short-term solutions to the migration crisis that simply do not exist’ (Hohlmeier CDU-CSU’ S 
MEP). On the other hand, left-leaning mainstream parties (PD and PS) are worried about the 
‘continuous spread of racism anti-Semitism and xenophobia throughout the EU’ (Bonnefoy PS’ MEP), 
stressing the fact that such ‘populist parties’ ‘lose their time, lose our time in populist demagogic 
pledges only for their electoral interests’ (Giuffrida PD’s exponent). 
In the field of environmental protection, the mainstream opposition is pragmatic and blames the 
EU-elite for its professional activity in the framework of the Dieselgate scandal.  
 
6.4 Justifying EU-opposition in the EP: the EU-regime target 
 
If in terms of the expressed quantity of opposition to the EU-regime no precise pattern was 
detectable (see Chapter 5, section 5.2, pages 111-112), however, a closer analysis of the character and 
the motivations used by EU-opponents stresses some differences among them. In fact, right and left-
wing EU-opponents radically diverge in the character of the expressed opposition. While right-wing 
parties oppose the EU-regime on a principled basis, left-wing parties (alongside the FSM) propose a 
pragmatic opposition even though some exceptions are visible. The Italian right-wing LN exercises a 
pragmatic opposition to the EU-regime both in immigration and in environmental policies, the left-
wing Spanish PODEMOS expresses a principled opposition to the EU-regime in the field of 
immigration policies, and the German LINKE does not consider the EU-regime as a salient target in 
environmental protection-related speeches. Also some of the included mainstream parties exercise a 





Figure 6.7: Word-clouds of the coded-negative QSs related to the EU-regime target in the field of economic policy
 




Parties opposing the EU-regime in the field of economic policies use motivations that cluster 
around three broad themes: 1) the performance of the EU-regime (mainly left-wing EU-opponents); 2) 
the characteristics, the powers, and the competencies of the EU-regime (mainly right-wing EU-
opponents), and 3) the ‘Other institutions’ theme (both left and right-wing EU-opponents).  
Right-wing EU-opponents criticize the characteristics, powers and competencies of the EU-
regime on a principled basis (see the recurrence of words like ‘power’ and ‘supplémentaire’ 
(supplementary) in the word-clouds proposed in Figure 6.7 above). The power grab exercised by the 
EC toward member states is central to FN and UKIP MEPs’ criticism rejecting the ‘economic 
governance of the commission imposed on the Member States’ (Goddyn FN’s exponent) (the word 
‘commission’ is central to both UKIP and FN’s word-clouds). On the contrary, LN and AFD focus 
their attention on the ECB’s power grab toward member states and their national authorities (‘EZB and 
‘BCE’ are central to LN and AFD’s word-clouds). LN’s MEPs define the ECB monetary governance as 
a ‘monetary dictatorship’ (Borghezio LN’s exponent) on Eurozone member states lacking democratic 
accountability. Of particular interest in this respect is the position of the German AFD that dedicates 
the majority of its criticism to this institution. As observed in the previous section, for this party Mario 
Draghi represents a central target of criticism. The rhetoric of Mario Draghi’s power-abuse is indeed 
connected to AFD’s rejection of the ECB’s independence. According to AFD’s MEPs, the ‘ECB 
should be controlled and forced, through legal action, to limit its activity within the boundaries of its 
mandate’ (von Stroch AFD’s representative) rather than doing ‘whatever it takes’ to save the Euro. 
Interestingly, LN’s exponents address the whole complex of EU-institutions for their lack of 
‘democracy, transparency and respect for the principle of subsidiarity’ (Bizzotto LN’s representative).  
Left-wing parties alongside the FSM focus on the EU-regime’s performance. Interestingly 
enough, there is a neat distinction between FSM and UKIP’s opposition to this target even if the two 
parties belong to the same EPPG. LINKE and FSM contest the performance of the EC stressing the 
‘severity used by the European Commission to impose stifling rules on Member states’ (Zullo FSM’s 
exponent) advocating austerity measures ‘since more than 5 years (…) without obtaining any results 
other than producing record levels of unemployment, poverty and inequality’ (Valli FSM’s 
representative). The performance of the ECB is the second broader source of concern for left-wing 
EU-opponents alongside the FSM sustaining that ECB’s activity favours big financial powers to the 
detriment of households and SMEs: ‘We need public investment because the FED may raise interest 
rates tomorrow and because the ECB’s cheap money12 ends up in the financial markets and not in 
investment companies and households’ (De Masi LINKE’s exponent). Criticism to the ECB is 
                                                        
12The speech refers to the quantitative easing (QE) operation by the ECB. With the expression QE is 
intended the action of the ECB that since March 2015 started to buy assets from commercial banks as a 
part of non-standard monetary policy measures. The aim of the asset purchase is to support economic 
growth across the Euro area and help keep inflation levels below 2%.  





particularly important for PODEMOS13 in relation to the Greek crisis. The party argues against ECB’s 
power abuse vis-à-vis the democratically elected Greek government: ‘the ECB will incur in a clear 
overreach of its functions by using the means at its disposal to exert a political pressure on the Greek 
government’ (Zilagua PODEMOS’ MEP). The fact that both the ‘commission’ and the ‘ECB’ are 
central to the criticism of left-wing parties and the FSM is moreover confirmed by the central position 
of these two words in their word-clouds (see Figure 6.7 above).  
 
Similarly to the previous policies field, also in immigration right-wing EU-opponents generally 
propose a principled opposition to the EU-regime (the only exception being the Italian LN). On the 
contrary, left-wing EU-opponents express a pragmatic criticism to this target (the only exception being 
the Spanish PODEMOS).  
UKIP and FN address the EU-regime focusing on the characteristics, powers and competencies 
of the EC that is described as a bureaucratic institution lacking democratic accountability. Words like 
‘commission’, ‘unaccountable’ or ‘dictated’ have a central position in both UKIP and FN’s word-clouds 
(Figure 6.8 below). These parties reject ‘advocating even more power to the European Commission, in 
particular through the creation of a common European Asylum system’ (Le Pen FN’s leader). In a 
similar vein, the British UKIP is against the whole complex of EU-institutions since procedures related 
to immigration should not ‘be decided or dictated by unaccountable EU institutions’ (Seymour UKIP’s 
MEP). Interestingly, UKIP is particularly critical of a specific institution of the EU, the European 
Borders and Coast Guard (EBCG 14 ) which construction is regarded as a squander of European 
taxpayers’ money (see the presence of the ‘EBCG’ acronym in UKIP’s word-cloud in Figure 6.8 
below). 
As above-mentioned, beside the fact that the LN and FN share the same EPPG, LN contests 
EU-institutions out of pragmatic reasons focusing on the slowness of the EU-regime’s decision-making 
process in the field, as further confirmed by words such as ‘scarsi’ (low) and ‘risultati’ (results) reported 
in LN’s word-cloud (Figure 6.8 below). 
 
                                                        
13 PODEMOS dedicates all of the negative QSs coded under the EU-regime target to the performance 
of the ECB, see Appendix C, Table C.15, page xlviii.  
14 The ECBG is a European agency that was officially launched in 2015 to extend the Frontex mandate 
in response to the migration crisis. 
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Figure 6. 8: Word-clouds of the coded-negative QSs related to the EU-regime target in the field of immigration policy 
Detailed information about the motivations used by parties is provided in Table C.15 of Appendix C 





Differently from the other right-wing EU-opponents, AFD’s opposition is centred on the EC’s 
ideological orientation criticized for its naïve behaviour in relation to the migration crisis and for its 
‘left-liberal’ orientation (Von Stroch AFD’s exponent) (‘linksliberale’ as indicated in AFD’s word-cloud 
in Figure 6.8 above).  
FSM and LINKE’s opposition is focused on the performance of the EU-regime; FSM 
concentrates on the EC’s inability to formulate ‘proposals or concrete measures to improve the 
management of migration fluxes’ (Ferrara FSM’s exponent). On the contrary, the LINKE addresses the 
whole complex of the EU-regime stating that it should stop delaying taking decisions and ‘finally tackle 
a common human EU policy on refugees’ (Michels LINKE’s MEP). Interestingly, FSM’s MEPs preach 
for an increase in EP’s competencies and powers: being aware of the fact that the EP is the ‘maximum 
democratic institutions representing EU’s citizens’ (Ferrara FSM’s exponent) they think that its role is 
still marginal in the supranational institutional arrangement and wish to see it expanded. As mentioned 
before, PODEMOS is the only left-wing EU-opponent criticizing the EU-regime on a principled basis. 
In connection with its position concerning the EU migration policy, PODEMOS concentrates all the 
negative QSs coded under the EU-regime target to reject the creation of a new EBCG since it 
‘reinforces the idea of the construction of the fortress-Europe and represents one step ahead in closing 
the borders’ (Urban Crespo PODEMOS’ MEP). This last consideration is strengthened by the central 
presence of the words ‘Frontex’ and ‘GEFC’ (Spanish acronym of EBCG) in PODEMOS’ word-cloud.  
 
Also in the field of environmental protection right-wing parties criticise the EU-regime on a 
principled basis (the only exception being the LN) focusing the majority of their criticism on the 
characteristics, powers and competencies of the EC, a consideration further confirmed by the fact that 
‘commission’ and ‘European commission’ are among the two most widely used words in all the word-
clouds presented in Figure 6.9 below. 
Similarly to the other policy fields, the EC is criticized for its lack of accountability, for its power 
grab toward member states (AFD, UKIP and FN) but partially also for its ‘ultraliberal’, ‘integrationist’ 
and ‘pro-global’ orientation (particularly for the French FN). In connection to their hard opposition to 
the EU-elite in this field, UKIP’s exponents are concerned about the EC’s role within the framework 
of the Dieselgate scandal asking for ‘answers to the tough questions about the emissions scandal – not 




Figure 6. 9: Word-clouds of the coded-negative QSs related to the EU-regime target in the field of environmental protection policy.
Detailed information about the motivations used by parties is provided in Table C.16 of Appendix C





As mentioned before, LN is the only right-wing party pragmatically opposing the EU-regime in 
environmental protection arguing against the performance of both the EC and the EP and 
pragmatically criticizing the ideological orientation of the EC with reference to its support for the 
GMO (confirmed by the presence of words such as ‘OGM’ – Italian acronym for GMO – and 
‘insoddisfacente’ – unsatisfactory in LN’s word-cloud in Figure 6.9 above). 
Both the FSM and PODEMOS propose a pragmatic critique to the EU-regime while the LINKE 
does not address this target. Criticism of the performance of the EC with reference to the Dieselgate 
scandal represents the first and foremost objective of both parties. Interestingly, however, FSM and 
PODEMOS are aware of the centrality of the EP within the supranational level and would like to see 
the realization of a ‘democratic decision-making process in which the Parliament holds more powers 
than it currently has’ (Lola Sanchez Caldentey, PODEMOS’ representative). Furthermore, PODEMOS 
also addresses the Council of Ministers as highlighted by the centrality of the word ‘consejo’ – council – 
in the word-cloud in Figure 6.9 above.  
 
Mainstream parties generally propose a pragmatic critique to the EU-regime in all the included 
fields. The French PS criticises the EU-regime in the field of immigration and environmental 
protection policies while the Italian PD, the Spanish PP and the German CDU-CSU oppose the EU-
regime target only in the field of environmental protection. An interesting case, as also stressed in 
Chapter 5 is the one of the British Conservative party. The party opposes the EU-regime target in all 
the included policy fields referring to the characteristics, powers, competencies, and performance of the 
EP. Its opposition is pragmatic in economic and immigration policies, apart from being principled in 
the field of environmental protection, where the party accuses the EC to grab power vis-à-vis member 
states. Furthermore, the British CON is particularly critical of the EP’s seat in Strasbourg questioning 
the ‘extra climate effect of the Strasbourg circus’ (Girling CON’s MEP). 
 
6.5 Justifying EU-opposition in the EP: the EU-community target 
 
 
The distinction between right and left-wing EU-opponents is visible also with reference to the 
EU-community target. While right-wing parties generally oppose the EU-community on a principled 
basis, left-wing EU-opponents and the FSM tend to pragmatically oppose this target in all the included 
policy fields. The only exceptions are PODEMOS and FSM that criticise the EU-community on 
principled basis in the field of economy; PODEMOS that proposes a principled critique to the EU-
community in the field of environmental protection, and the LINKE that supports the EU-community 




environmental protection-related speeches. Furthermore, criticism of the EU-community is present 
also in the speeches held by the British CON as further detailed below.  
 
Opposition to the EU-community in the field of economy is motivated around four broad 
themes: 1) the powers and competencies of the EU vis-à-vis member states; 2) the characteristics of the 
EU; 3) expressions of reformist positions, and 3) the Euro area geometry.  
Interestingly, in this policy field, all the included parties (with the only exception of the German 
LINKE) propose a principled critique of the EU. However, while right-wing EU-opponents focus their 
attention on the EU’s power grab vis-à-vis member states, left-wing parties (alongside the FSM) are 
mainly concerned about the Euro area geometry (the only exception being PODEMOS as further 
detailed below). This distinction between right and left-wing EU-opponents is visible also from the 
word-clouds presented in Figure 6.10 below. While AFD, FN, LN, and UKIP’s word-clouds (alongside 
the British CON) report the word ‘member state’ as most frequent one, PODEMOS, LINKE, and 
FSM’s word-clouds highlight terms like: ‘Europa’ (Europe) for the LINKE; ‘unión’ (union) for 






Figure 6. 10: Word-clouds of the coded-negative QSs related to the EU-community target in the field of economic policy 




AFD, FN, and LN are concerned about the erosion of national sovereignty, particularly with 
reference to the European Semester allowing ‘the establishment of a federal and ultraliberal economy at 
the EU level’, thus considering EU’s action in economy as an ‘intolerable attack to the sovereignty of 
member states’ (Bilde FN’s MEP). Interestingly, the AFD frames the erosion of member states’ 
sovereignty in terms of its rejection of the so-called transfer union15: ‘if we go back to the principle of 
non-assistance, then each state will have its sovereignty to make its fiscal and economic decisions on its 
own, such that it will be that member state to pay for its own debt’ (Lucke AFD’s exponent). These 
assertions are further confirmed by the presence of words such as ‘souveraineté’ (sovereignty), 
‘semester’, ‘sovranità’ (sovereignty), ‘Kompetenzen’ (competencies), ‘Souveränität’ (sovereignty), 
‘gouvernance’ (governance) in right-wing EU-opponents’ word-clouds. 
Surely enough, also UKIP is worried about EU’s erosion of national sovereignty that is also 
framed in terms of secession from the EU for both the UK and for other EU’s member states: ‘Britain 
will not be the first. It will not be the last either, come the revolution’ (Aker UKIP’s exponent). 
However, the party prefers to stress the impossibility for the EU to reach unity and harmonization 
among its members: ‘it is a nonsense to think that the North and the South of Europe would converge; 
that we would all start to love each other; that we would all begin to feel a European identity; that we 
would all begin to show allegiance to the flag and the anthem’ (Farage UKIP’s leader). Interestingly, in 
UKIP’s word-clouds are present words such as ‘sovereignty’, ‘Southern’, but also words such as 
‘bilateral’. This last term refers to UKIP’s wish to see an intergovernmental community of member 
states working and trading together on a bilateral basis.  
On the contrary, UKIP’s EPPGs political partner the FSM is worried about the lack of unity 
among member states not because it sees it as an impossible achievement but because it represents a 
‘dangerous direction leading to a Two-speed Europe, to a deep cleavage between less and more 
developed States’ (D’Amato FSM’s exponent).  
Even if right-wing parties are more worried about EU’s power grab toward nation states, they 
share a common opposition to the Euro area geometry with their left-leaning counterpart. All the 
included EU-opponents stress the bad consequences of the Euro on European economy defining the 
EMU as the ‘cardinal mistake of the European economic policy today’ (Lucke AFD’s exponent). This 
consideration is further reinforced by the word-clouds in Figure 6.10 above reporting words such as: 
‘moneta unica’ (common currency), ‘Eurozone’, ‘monetaria’ (monetary), ‘monétaire’ (monetary). 
According to the right-wing EU-opponents, the Euro area is to be considered as an economic 
and financial ‘dictatorship’, that is contributing to creating macroeconomic divergences both between 
those states within and outside of the Euro-zone and among those member states belonging to the 
                                                        
15 ‘Transfer union’ is a term referring to the transfer of resources among member states depending on 
their specific needs. 





Euro area: ‘those European countries outside of the euro are doing much better. The poor are getting 
poorer, the rich are getting richer, the tensions are rising and the people are standing against each other’ 
(Philippot FN’s MEP). According to right-wing parties: ‘the continent is now divided from North to 
South: there is a Berlin Wall and it is the euro’ (Farage UKIP’s Leader). 
Right-wing parties, alongside the FSM sustain that the only solution to get an economic recovery 
in the EU is to ‘introduce a democratic mechanism to allow countries to exit from the Euro area and to 
prepare a plan for a controlled and coordinated dissolution of the Eurozone’ (Valli FSM’s exponent) 
such that member states will ‘get back their national sovereignty and take democratic decisions 
concerning their fiscal and monetary policy’ (Valli FSM’s MEP).  
Besides the fact that both the LINKE and PODEMOS are against the Euro area, they do not 
reject it tout court but rather offer some possibility of reformation. On the one hand, PODEMOS states 
that ‘the monetary union as it exists today is a source of imbalances and it is doomed to failure if it 
continues to be subordinated to the interests of the large Central European Banks’ (Torres Martinez 
PODEMOS’ MEP). On the other hand, the LINKE states that this Euro as it is today ‘is not 
democratic, this Euro only serves the interests of Le Pen’ (De Masi, LINKE’s MEP). However, 
similarly to the French FN, PODEMOS is concerned about national sovereignty especially with 
reference to the role of the European Semester as an instrument to ‘submit governments’ budgets to 
the fiscal oversight of the European Commission that ensures compliance with certain macroeconomic 
objectives and the implementation of the badly-defined structural reforms’ (Gonzales Penas 
PODEMOS’ representative). 
The only party that directly proposes a reform of the EU in the field of economy is the German 
LINKE, clearly stating that: ‘what we need is a Europe with social justice, with good work from which 
people can leave independently and without poverty, good education for all, more public services and a 
more economically and ecologically sustainable economy’ (Händel LINKE’s exponent). 
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Figure 6. 11: Word-clouds of the coded-negative QSs related to the EU-community target in the field of immigration policy
 
Detailed information about the motivations used by parties is provided in Table C.18 of Appendix C 





In the field of immigration, the cleavage between left and right-wing parties in justifying their 
opposition to the EU-community is stronger than in economy. This is also mirrored in the word-clouds 
reported in Figure 6.11 above. Right-wing EU-opponents’ word-clouds report words such as: ‘member 
states’, ‘Außengrenzen’ (external borders), ‘Schengen’, ‘schützen’ (protect) and ‘souveraineté’ 
(sovereignty). On the contrary, PODEMOS and FSM’s word-clouds highlight words such as 
‘solidarietà’ (solidarity), ‘fortaleza’ (fortress), ‘derechos’ (rights) and ‘Europa’ (Europe).  
AFD, FN, LN, and UKIP relate their opposition to the EU-community to: 1) the EU’s power 
grab towards member states; 2) the characteristics of the EU, and 3) the Schengen area geometry. The 
rhetoric of EU’s dictatorship is present also in the speeches related to the immigration crisis: ‘What has 
been made clear here, with Greece and indeed with Portugal, is that a country has democratic rights if it 
is in favour of the project. (…). There can be no democratic choice against the European Treaties’ 
(Farage UKIP’s leader). According to these parties each member state ‘should be freed from the EU’s 
solidarity system’ (Pretzell AFD’s MEP) in the redistribution of migrants, favouring an 
intergovernmental approach to the issue: ‘each country should manage its own policy and work 
together on a bilateral basis to deal with the current crisis’ (Parker UKIP’s exponent). What emerges 
clearly from UKIP’s speeches, thus confirming the findings reported in chapter 5 of this work (see 
Chapter 5, section 5.3, page 124), is that its MEPs use the EP arena to campaign for the ‘upcoming’ 
Brexit referendum: ‘I say to the British people: if you want your voice to be heard, if you want direct 
democracy on a whole range of subjects where referenda could and really make a difference, if you 
want freedom, then when this referendum does come on our membership of the EU, take note of the 
example of how they have treated Hungary and let us get out: vote to leave!’ (Etheridge UKIP’s MEP). 
Furthermore, in almost all UKIP’s word-clouds appears the word ‘people’ as if the party uses the EP 
arena to achieve a direct contact with its potential electorate.  
About the Schengen area, there are a variety of opinions expressed by right-wing parties: the 
Italian LN is harshly critical of the Schengen agreement. However, its exponents propose a reform of it 
but without providing precise indications of the way such reform should be performed: ‘about 
Schengen we cannot limit ourselves to update it, a complete reform of the agreement is needed’ 
(Buonanno LN’s exponent). Also the German AFD does not ask for the suspension of the agreement, 
however, it encourages those member states ‘that either do not want or are not able to protect the 
Schengen borders, to leave the Schengen area’ (von Stroch AFD’s representative). Indeed, also in this 
field, the party rejects the implementation of solidarity measures between member states (see above 
their rejection of the so-called transfer union). Lastly, the French FN is the party showing the stronger 
opposition to the Schengen agreement. According to the FN such an agreement is ‘not anymore 




pressure is to re-establish controls at European borders, dismantle Schengen and bring migrants back 
to their countries of origin’ (Boutonnet FN’s MEP). 
On the contrary, PODEMOS and FSM show a diametrically different position about the EU-
community in this policy field. Besides the fact that they both recognize that the EU has worsened the 
immigration crisis instead of solving it, from their speeches emerges a desire of ‘another Europe’ a 
‘different Europe, a Europe that is less strong with the weakest and less compliant with the strongest, 
(…) a social Europe, a democratic Europe, an Europe that respects human rights’ (Iglesias 
PODEMOS’ leader). However, FSM’s MEPs are disillusioned by ‘member states egoism in front of a 
global emergency, in front of an historical moment when Europe should show its solidarity’ (Corrao 
FSM’s MEP) further arguing that EU’s values of ‘solidarity and cooperation are recognized only on 
paper and on the Treaties but need to be put in practice’ (Ferrara FSM’s MEP). 
 
Moving the attention to the last included policy field, environmental protection, opposition to 
the EU-community is almost an exclusive prerogative of right-wing EU-opponents with the only 
exception of PODEMOS. 
EU’s erosion of member states’ power is the core element of right-wing EU-opponents also in 
this field. Words like ‘member state’ and ‘sovereignty’ are among the most frequently used (see Figure 
6.12 below). Such parties are worried about EU’s power grab toward member states in international 
arenas rejecting to be represented by the EU at international conferences like the COP2116. FN and LN 
relate this rejection to a manifest anti-Americanism since the EU: ‘is subject to the American power’ 
(Buonanno LN’s exponent). UKIP is extremely critical of the one-way-ever-growing integration 
process in this field. According to UKIP’s MEPs, in the EU ‘any success is seen as a green light for 
further harmonization, whereas any failure requires harmonisation as the solution’ (Arnott UKIP’s 
MEP).
                                                        
16 The abbreviation COP21 refers to the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference held in Paris 
from the 30th of November to the 12th of December 2015. It was the 21st yearly session of the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and the 11th session of the Meeting of the Parties to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The 
main objective of the conference was to negotiate on the Paris Agreement, a global agreement on the 





 Figure 6.12: Word-clouds of the coded-negative QSs related to the EU-community target in the field of environmental protection 




PODEMOS is the only exception among left-leaning EU-opponents also because of the 
motivations it uses to justify its positioning. On the one hand, part of its opposition refers to EU’s 
subjection to big economic powers and to the ‘interests of oil producers’ (Sanchez Caldentey 
PODEMOS’ MEP). On the other hand, instances of opposition to the EU’s power grab are 
majoritarian. Words like ‘soberanía’ (sovereignty), ‘pueblos’ (people) and ‘defiende’ (defends) are 
frequently used by PODEMOS (see Figure 6.12 above). However, such expressions are confined to 
discussions on the production and distribution of GMOs in the EU. PODEMOS’ exponents state 
clearly that: ‘our group stand for peoples’ sovereignty and, why not, also for our alimentary sovereignty’ 
(Sanchez Caldentey PODEMOS’ representative). It is, however, noteworthy that PODEMOS’ MEPs 
do not refer to the ‘Spanish people’ but more generally to ‘the people’ differently from the other right-
wing EU-opponents (see as an example the presence of the word ‘British’ in UKIP’s word-cloud).  
 
Differently from the analysed EU-opponents, mainstream parties tend to support the EU-
community in all the observed policy fields with the only exception of the British CON opposing this 
target in both economy and immigration-related issues (principled and pragmatic opposition 
respectively).  
Conservatives’ MEPs are concerned about the EU’s erosion of member states’ competencies 
especially in fiscal policies since they do not wish the EU to act on member states’ place. They criticise 
the effects of the Euro (and the Euro area) on EU’s economic situation arguing that the EU should ‘let 
those states that cannot keep up with the Deutschmark, such as Cyprus and Greece, go in an organised 
manner, or rich countries are going to have to pay them very large sums of money, as happens in the 
United States’ (Fox CON’ MEP). Interestingly, among the most frequent words used by the 
Conservatives in economic policy, the word-cloud in Figure 6.10 reports: ‘member state’, ‘monetary’ 
and ‘national’. However, in the immigration field, the Conservatives oppose the EU-community on a 
pragmatic base criticising Schengen that ‘like the euro, was a fair-weather system. Neither has survived 
its first crisis. They worked perfectly well when the sun was shining. They have crumbled beneath the 
storms’ (Hannan CON’ MEP). Also in this case, the Conservatives’ word-cloud in Figure 6.11 confirms 
these findings reporting words such as ‘Schengen’, ‘borders’ and ‘national’. However, CON’s MEPs 
generally endorse a reformist position vis-à-vis the EU in line with ECR’s position: ‘my Group does not 













This chapter provides an in-depth description of the motivations guiding parties’ opposition to 
the EU (the EU-policies, the EU-elite, the EU-regime and the EU-community) in three policy fields 
(economy, immigration and environmental protection). To do that, it reports the result obtained 
through the inductive codification of MEPs speeches’ negatively-coded QSs. It is possible to draw five 
main conclusions from the obtained results.  
Firstly, EU-opponents’ positioning to both the EU-policies and the EU-regime targets is mainly 
guided by their ideological orientation. Such distinction is most evident in economic policies: right-wing 
EU-opponents reject EU’s economic policies on a principled basis. The only partial exception is the 
German AFD that through its pragmatic critique sustains an ‘ordo-liberal’ position and endorses the 
respect of the rules and the application of austerity measures. On the contrary, PODEMOS, LINKE, 
and FSM propose a pragmatic critique favouring the implementation of redistributive, Keynesian-
oriented policy measures. However, EU-opponents share their criticism of EU’s austerity measures 
with the just-mentioned exception of the AFD. Similarly, in the field of immigration, right-wing parties 
criticise the EU-policies on a principled basis endorsing a restrictive position toward both ‘immigration 
control policies’ and the economic integration of migrants in the European labour market. On the 
contrary, FSM and LINKE’s MEPs express a pragmatic opposition to the EU’s migration policy. 
Indeed, they endorse a permissive approach to the control of immigration and ask for an increased 
respect of human rights particularly for asylum seekers (e.g.: the creation of humanitarian corridors). 
PODEMOS is the only left-wing party opposing the EU migration policies on a principled basis being 
against the construction of a ‘fortress Europe’ and endorsing a permissive approach to immigration in 
general. In environmental protection, all the observed EU-opponents express a pragmatic opposition 
based on different motivations: right-wing EU-opponents criticise EU’s environmental protection 
because it hinders EU’s economic development, while left-leaning EU-opponents alongside the FSM 
endorse EU’s action in environmental protection even if it goes at the detriment of the economic 
growth. As for the EU-regime target, right-wing parties criticise it on a principled basis while left-wing 
parties and the Italian FSM generally exercise a pragmatic opposition. In terms of the used motivations, 
left and right-wing EU-opponents are similar only in the field of economic policies, where the ECB 
represents the main target of criticism (even questioning its existence as the FN does). In immigration 
right-wing EU-opponents focus on the EC’s characteristics, powers and competencies blaming the 
institution to grab powers vis-a-vis elected national authorities. On the contrary, the FSM and LINKE 
are concerned about the performance of EU’s institutions asking for the increase of EP’s powers since 
it is the only truly democratic supranational institution. The only exception is PODEMOS focusing its 




policies, right-wing parties again propose a principled critique to the EU-regime centred on the 
characteristics, powers and competencies of the EC and on its alleged collusion with lobbies especially 
in connection with the Dieselgate scandal. On the contrary, FSM and PODEMOS ask for an increase 
of EP’s powers. 
Secondly, right and left-wing EU-opponents show a similar opposition to the EU-community in 
economy-related speeches. In fact, all the included parties (with the only exception of the German 
LINKE) criticise the EU-community on a principled basis, specifically targeting the Euro area (and 
proposing its eventual dismantling). Interestingly and differently from PODEMOS and FSM, the 
theme of EU’s erosion of Member states’ sovereignty is central to right-wing EU-opponents. Both 
PODEMOS and FSM’s positioning toward the EU-community in the field of immigration is more 
moderate and never targets the Schengen area differently from UKIP, AFD, FN, and LN that harshly 
criticise the Schengen agreement. Furthermore, in the field of environmental protection, all right-wing 
EU-opponents (alongside PODEMOS) criticise the EU-community on a principled basis.  
Thirdly, what really equates EU-opponents (independently from their ideological orientation) is 
their positioning toward the EU-elite target in all the observed policy fields. This observation holds true 
also with reference to the argumentations used to motivate their opposition. Indeed, both left and 
right-wing parties (alongside the FSM) are critical of the EU-elites’ moral conduct (either generally or in 
relation to specific members of the EU-elite like Mario Draghi, Jean-Claude Juncker or Angela Merkel). 
Accuses of alleged corruption and collusion with economic and financial powers are present in all the 
observed policy areas. The only thing that differentiates right-wing parties from the other EU-
opponents is their criticism of the pro-European orientation of the EU-elite. In fact, while right-wing 
parties despise the pro-European orientation of the EU-elite, for left-wing parties (alongside the FSM) 
this motivation does not play a significant role.  
Fourthly, while the findings portray a general convergence of the stances expressed by parties 
working within the same EPPG like the FN and LN (ENF) and PODEMOS and LINKE (united in 
the GUE/NGL EPPG), the case of the Italian FSM and UKIP (working in the EFDD) represents a 
remarkable exception. Their positioning, the character of their opposition, and the motivations they use 
are partially divergent. Two aspects equate them: firstly, their positioning vis-à-vis the EU-elite target. 
Indeed, both parties endorse a principled critique of the EU-targets in all the observed policy fields and 
use similar motivations criticising the EU’s elite’s moral conduct. Secondly, both UKIP and FSM show 
a similar positioning toward the EU-community in the field of economy. Specifically, both parties are 
extremely critical of the Euro area geometry aiming at dismantling it even if UKIP’s main focus is still 
the EU’s erosion of national sovereignty. These considerations are in line with recent findings of the 
literature pointing toward a ‘utilitarian’ union between the two parties within the same EPPG (Carlotti 
2017).  





Lastly, the included mainstream parties are critical of the analysed EU targets. In relation to this, 
three further considerations might be stressed: firstly, mainstream parties’ positioning is guided by their 
ideological standpoint particularly with reference to the EU-policy target. This is evident in the field of 
immigration: the left-leaning Italian PD and French PS justify their pragmatic opposition showing a 
permissive approach to ‘immigration control policies’ contrary to the right-leaning British CON and 
the Spanish PP endorsing a more restrictive approach. Secondly, in both the fields of economy and 
immigration, mainstream parties’ opposition to the EU-elite is generally principled and based on a 
harsh critique of the so-called populist, Eurosceptic, extreme parties (left and right-wing) pointing 
toward the presence of a sort of ‘counter-extremist-parties rhetoric’ in mainstream parties’ speeches. In 
other words, if, on the one hand, EU-opponents criticise the EU-elite for its moral conduct, on the 
other hand, mainstream parties shift their blames on EU-opponents’ ‘glibness’, considering them 
unable to propose serious alternatives and to use the EP arena for their electoral purposes. Even if it is 
true that the contraposition between mainstream parties and their challengers might be considered as 
belonging to the normal adversarial dynamics between ‘governing’ and ‘non-governing’ parties in 
parliamentary arenas (see Chapter 2, section 2.4, page 37), what is peculiar of mainstream parties’ 
criticism of this target is the content of their speeches. In other words, mainstream parties criticism of 
part of the EU-elite is not to be equated to a generalized anti-EU-elite attitude of these parties but to a 
form of specific mainstream blame-shifting upon their challengers (Vasilopoulou et al. 2014). Thirdly, as 
emerges also from the findings presented in chapter 5, the British CON is an exceptional case of 
mainstream EU-opposition party. On the one hand, the party tends to pragmatically oppose the EU 
alongside all its targets in all the included policy fields; on the other hand, instances of principled 
opposition are present. Particularly significant is CON’s principled opposition to the EU-community in 
the field of economy, where the party justifies its criticism using motivations against both the EU’s 
erosion of member states’ sovereignty and the Euro area geometry similarly to what UKIP does.  
Starting from the finding presented in both this chapter and in the previous one, the next chapter 
uses the obtained indexes of EU-opposition to propose an analysis of the causes potentially shaping 
this phenomenon.  
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7.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter explores the potential drivers of EU-opposition in the EP providing an answer to 
the hypotheses and associations formulated in chapter 3 of this work. To do that, the chapter explores 
the relationship between the ‘final version’ of the index of parties’ positioning on the EU-targets and 
the three sets of Political Opportunity Structures (POSs) presented in chapter 3 (see Chapter 3, section 
3.4, pages 53-68). The indexes encompass two main components: the ‘quantity’ – total amount of 
opposition or support – and the ‘quality’ – either principled or pragmatic – of the expressed positioning 
on the various EU-targets: the policies, the elite, the regime and the community (see Chapter 4, section 
4.3.1, pages 101-103). The chapter is structured around three main sections: the first one details the 
formulated dependent and independent variables (DVs and IVs) proposing a summary of the 
hypotheses and the associations to be tested and the method applied. The second section reports the 
obtained findings with reference to the impact of the proposed predictors on patterns of parties’ 
positioning on the EU-policies (sub-section 7.3.1), the EU-elite (sub-section 7.3.2), the EU-regime 
(sub-section 7.3.3), and the EU-community (sub-section 7.3.4). A conclusive section discusses and 
summarizes the obtained results.  
 
7.2 Data and method used in the analysis 
 
This chapter uses four DVs ‘measuring’ support or opposition to the four EU-targets: the EU-
policies, the EU-elite, the EU-regime and the EU-community. Each DV results from the calculation of 
the ‘final version’ of the index according to the formula presented in chapter 4 (See Chapter 4, section 
4.3.1, page 102). To recap: the index it is a continuous variable ranging between -200, indicating the 
maximum degree of principled support, and +200 indicating the maximum degree of principled 
opposition. A value of -100 relates to the maximum degree of pragmatic support and a value of +100 
indicates the maximum degree of pragmatic opposition whereas a value of 0 indicates a neutral 
position. The assumption behind the resulting positioning index is that, if two parties express a similar 
‘quantity’ of opposition or support, the final value of the index will vary as a function of the character 




opposition. Table 7.1 below reports the values of the index for each of the EU-targets aggregated by 




Table 7.1: Table presenting the ‘final version’ of the index of EU-opposition for each observed EU-target.  
Party name Target 
Parties’ positioning to the EU-opposition’ targets by policy field 
Immigration Economy Environmental protection 
Positioning EU-opposition Positioning EU-opposition Positioning EU-opposition 
EU-opposition parties 
AFD 
EU-policy Principled opposition 144 Pragmatic opposition 38 Pragmatic opposition 19 
EU-elite Principled opposition 158 Principled opposition 156 Principled opposition 139 
EU-regime Principled opposition 154 Principled opposition 150 Principled opposition 143 
EU-community Principled opposition 160 Principled opposition 172 Principled opposition 132 
 
FN 
EU-policy Principled opposition 137 Principled opposition 110 Pragmatic opposition 15 
EU-elite Principled opposition 159 Principled opposition 153 Principled opposition 137 
EU-regime Principled opposition 130 Principled opposition 133 Principled opposition 130 
EU-community Principled opposition 179 Principled opposition 172 Principled opposition 161 
 
LN 
EU-policy Principled opposition 125 Principled opposition 117 Pragmatic opposition 12 
EU-elite Principled opposition 158 Principled opposition 157 Principled opposition 137 
EU-regime Pragmatic opposition 47 Principled opposition 147 Pragmatic opposition 18 
EU-community Principled opposition 168 Principled opposition 141 Principled opposition 135 
 
UKIP 
EU-policy Principled opposition 129 Principled opposition 127 Pragmatic opposition 13 
EU-elite Principled opposition 153 Principled opposition 165 Principled opposition 152 
EU-regime Principled opposition 144 Principled opposition 171 Principled opposition 169 
EU-community Principled opposition 184 Principled opposition 183 Principled opposition 179 
 
FSM 
EU-policy Pragmatic opposition 17 Pragmatic opposition 19 Pragmatic support  -1 
EU-elite Principled opposition 140 Principled opposition 146 Principled opposition 119 
EU-regime Pragmatic opposition 6 Pragmatic opposition 23 Pragmatic opposition 16 
EU-community Pragmatic opposition 29 Principled opposition 166 Pragmatic support -7 
 
LINKE 
EU-policy Pragmatic opposition 74 Pragmatic opposition 42 Pragmatic opposition 9 
EU-elite Principled opposition 165 Principled opposition 139 No mentions 0 
EU-regime Pragmatic opposition 33 Pragmatic opposition 39 No mentions 0 
EU-community Pragmatic support -13 Pragmatic opposition 22 No mentions 0 
 
PODEMOS 
EU-policy Principled opposition 109 Pragmatic opposition 14 Pragmatic support -5 
EU-elite Principled opposition 155 Pragmatic opposition 57 Pragmatic opposition 54 
EU-regime Principled opposition 108 Pragmatic opposition 22 Pragmatic opposition 4 
EU-community Pragmatic opposition 51 Principled opposition 121 Principled opposition 123 
 
Mainstream parties 
CDU-CSU EU-policy Pragmatic support -2 Pragmatic support -2 Pragmatic support -7 
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EU-elite Principled opposition 129 Principled opposition 106 Pragmatic opposition 3 
EU-regime Pragmatic support -12 Pragmatic support -2 Pragmatic opposition 6 
EU-community Principled support -148 Pragmatic support -24 Pragmatic support -41 
 
PS 
EU-policy Pragmatic opposition 6 Pragmatic opposition 1 Pragmatic support -10 
EU-elite Principled opposition 122 Pragmatic support -4 Pragmatic opposition 6 
EU-regime Pragmatic opposition 2 Pragmatic support -3 Pragmatic opposition 3 
EU-community Principled support  -106 Principled support -103 Principled support -113 
 
PD 
EU-policy Pragmatic opposition 8 Pragmatic support -7 Pragmatic support -4 
EU-elite Principled opposition 113 Pragmatic support -5 Pragmatic support -7 
EU-regime Pragmatic support -9 Pragmatic support -18 Pragmatic opposition 1 
EU-community Principled support -123 Pragmatic support -3 Pragmatic support -45 
 
PP 
EU-policy Pragmatic opposition 7 Pragmatic support -15 Pragmatic support -14 
EU-elite Pragmatic opposition 21 Neutral 0 Pragmatic opposition 4 
EU-regime Pragmatic support -3 Pragmatic support -2 Pragmatic support -11 
EU-community Principled support -137 Principled support -119 Pragmatic support -43 
 
CON 
EU-policy Pragmatic opposition 29 Pragmatic support -5 Pragmatic opposition 3 
EU-elite Pragmatic opposition 30 Principled opposition 109 Pragmatic opposition 11 
EU-regime Pragmatic opposition 35 Pragmatic opposition 12 Pragmatic opposition 12 
EU-community Pragmatic opposition 38 Principled opposition 144 Pragmatic support -3 
 
The values of the index are calculated on an aggregate basis (for the three years under consideration) for each included party and presented both by EU-target and by 
policy field. Source: own calculation.  
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The chapter uses multivariate hierarchical regression analysis (OLS) to understand the impact of 
the three sets of POSs on the four main DVs reported in Table 7.1 above, to allow the use of 
multivariate linear regression, the DVs are disaggregated on annual basis1. This is to say that the index 
of EU-opposition is observed for each of the three years (2014, 2015 and 2016) of national parties’ 
activity within the EP arena. While the unit of analysis is always the national party (delegation) 
represented in the EP, the disaggregation of the index on an annual basis allows having a sufficiently 
large N to perform regression analysis (N=108)2. Table 7.2 below reports a summary of the tested 
hypotheses and of the correspondent IVs. 
In estimating the regression models, several problems are considered. First, multicollinearity 
between the IVs is a potential source of concern since it may force one or more IVs to not be 
significant, this is particularly true for two of the included IVs: ‘Marginality of the national party’ and 
‘Marginality of the EPPG’. To check for robustness of the obtained results one of the two correlated 
variables is excluded in separated models (see the next section for further indications). Furthermore, 
tests to check for the assumptions at the basis of the OLS regression are also performed3. 
 
Table 7. 2: Summary table presenting the formulated Hypotheses and Associations alongside the used IVs 
Type of POS 
(and perspective 
with reference to 
the party) 
Hypotheses and Associations IVs’ name Source  
Ideology 
(endogenous) 
A1: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by 
national parties within the EP are associated 
with the degree of heterogeneity of the EPPG 





A2: patterns of EU-opposition are associated 
with the general ideological orientation of the 





H1: Patterns of EU-opposition vary as a 
function of each national party’s ideological 
extremeness, independently of the general 
ideological position of the EPPG. The more 
parties position themselves toward the extremes 
of the left-right ideological continuum the higher 









H2: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by 
national parties in the EP vary as a function of 





                                                        
1 Even if the data are nested (different level of observation are present – i.e.: party level and country 
level observations), the number of included observations (i.e.: 108 cases) does not allow the application 
of hierarchical linear model (HLM) that requires larger samples for an adequate power. 
2 The calculation of the index has not been done semester-wise – as in chapter 5 of this work because 
some of the included IVs are available only on an annual basis.  




national level. Parties not belonging to 
governing coalitions at the national level (or not 
even eligible to cover governing positions at the 
national level) will display a higher degree of 
opposition to the EU.  
parties 
H3: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by 
national parties represented in the EP vary as a 
function of the ‘marginality’ of the EPPG they 
belong to. The more marginal the EPPG the 
higher EU-opposition expressed by national 





using data from 
the EP website  
H4: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by 
national parties represented in the EP will vary 
as a negative function of the seniority of their 
MEPs. The less national parties’ MEPs are 
socialized within the EP the higher their EU-
opposition will be.  
Seniority  
Own elaboration 
using data from 







H5: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by 
national parties within the EP vary as a function 
of their country’s level of exposure to both the 
economic and the migration crisis. The more 
debtor/recipient member states are vulnerable 
to both the economic and the immigration 
crises, the higher the EU-opposition of national 
parties coming from those member states will 
be.  
 
H6: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by 
national parties within the EP vary as a negative 
function of their country’s level of exposure to 
both the economic and the migration crisis. The 
less creditor/donor states are vulnerable to both 
the economic and the immigration crises, the 
higher the EU-opposition of national parties 
coming from those member states will be.  




















7.3    Results of the analysis 
 
This section presents the result obtained from the multivariate hierarchical regression analysis 
(OLS) for the four used DVs of parties’ positioning on: the EU-policies (section 7.3.1); the EU-elite 
(section 7.3.2); the EU-regime (section 7.3.3) and the EU-community (section 7.3.4).  
The IVs will be inserted in each multivariate OLS model following a similar scheme: 1) Model 1: 
null model; 2) Model 2 adds the first group of IVs related to POSs endogenous to the analysed parties 
(i.e.: ideology); 3) Model 3 inserts in the regression those variable exogenous to the party and related to 
the institutional architecture both at the national and at the supranational level (exogenous POS – 
group 1) excluding the variable ‘Marginality of the EPPGs’ due to multicollinearity reasons; 4) Model 4 
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considers the institutional POS but excludes the variable ‘Marginality of the national parties’ due to 
multicollinearity reasons; 5) Model 5 adds to the analysis those IVs exogenous to the party and related 
to the degree of vulnerability of each national country to the two main crises that the EU is facing 
(economic and immigration crises) excluding the variable ‘Marginality of the EPPGs’ due to 
multicollinearity reasons; 6) Model 6 includes the last set of exogenous POS but excludes the variable 
‘Marginality of the national parties’ to avoid multicollinearity. 
 
7.3.1 Opposition to the EU-policies explained  
 
Table 7.3 below reports the results of regression analysis with reference to the DV opposition to 
the EU-policies. The input of the three sets of predictors related to the three sets of POS contributes to 
the increase the R-squared of the models that moves from 0.47 (accounting for the 47% of the total 
explained variance) in the model 2 to 0.53 both in models 5 and 6. However, the largest increase in the 
total amount of explained variance is detectable between model 2 and model 3 and 4, thus, from an 
overall perspective it is possible to state that the third set of predictors related to the third set of POS, 
(Model 5 and 6) have a restricted impact on the DV and weakly contribute to explaining variation in 




Table 7. 3: Regression analysis for the DV opposition to the EU-policies. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Variables name b β b β b β b β b β b β 





























National parties’ ideological 












Marginality of the national parties  -- -- -- -- 15.74 ° (14.75) 0.14 -- -- 
14.78 ° 
(18.54) 0.25 -- -- 
Marginality of the EPPGs -- -- -- -- --  -0.07 ° (0.08) -0.10 -- --- 
-0.08 ° 
(0.09) -0.11 








GDP T2 T1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.18 (1.06) -0.01 
-0.40  
(2.34) -0.03 
Poverty risk T2 T1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.19  (1.67) 0.01 
0.62  
(1.58) 0.03 
Perception of national economy (yearly) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.10  (0.17) 0.06 
0.14  
(0.18) 0.08 
Refugee population T2 T1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.03  (0.17) 0.02 
0.10  
(0.15) 0.06 
Asylum application T2 T1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.05  (0.09) -0.05 
-0.02  
(0.08) -0.02 























N 108 108 108 108 108 108 
R-squared -- 0.47 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.53 
Adjusted R-squared -- 0.44 0.48 0.48 0.46 0.47 
Significance codes: p-values<0.001 ‘***’; p-value <0.01 ‘**’; p-value<0.05 ‘*’; p-value<0.1‘°’. b and beta coefficients are reported in the table, standard error (SE) are 
reported in parenthesis. Source: own calculation.  
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Model 2 shows that all the three observed indicators are statistically significant and positively 
associated with the DV. The variable ‘EPPGs ideological heterogeneity’ has the largest impact on the 
DV (one unit increase in the degree of heterogeneity of an EPPG produces an increase of 21.82 points 
of EU-opposition, p<0.01), thus confirming Association 1: national parties belonging to ideologically 
heterogeneous party groups tend to perform a higher opposition to the EU-policies. This latter is also 
influenced by the degree of extremeness of the parties’ ideological orientation as formulated in 
Hypothesis 1 (one unit increase in the degree of extremeness of the national party produces an increase 
of 13.35 points of opposition to the EU-policies, p-value<0.001) and by the general ideological 
orientation of the EPPG as stated by Association 2 (b-coefficient +2.85 p<0.05). This is to say that 
parties positioning toward the extreme (both left and right) of the ideological spectrum and those 
parties belonging to right-leaning EPPGs are more opposed to the EU-policies than their counterparts. 
Adding to the regression equation those predictors related to the institutional POS, Models 3 and 
4 confirm the relationship found in the model 2 especially with reference to the ‘National parties’ 
ideological extremeness’ (in a positive relationship with the DV and statistically significant, p-
value<0.001). With reference to the institutional POS, model 3 shows a positive relationship between 
parties’ marginality in the national political competition – Hypothesis 2 – and the degree of opposition 
to the EU-policies. Indeed, if a party belongs to the opposition flanks at the national level its degree of 
opposition to the EU-policy increases by 15.74 points – p-value<0.05. Model 4 presents the variable 
‘marginality of the EPPGs’ – Hypothesis 3 – that is negatively related to the DV (p-value<0.1) but has 
a markedly restricted effect on it: one unit increase in the size of the EPPG thus a decrease of its 
marginality in the supranational political competition contributes to reducing the expressed opposition 
to the EU-policies by 0.07 points. Interestingly, the variable ‘Seniority’ is statistically significant (p-
<0.10) in both models (3 and 4) and negatively associated with the DV, thus confirming Hypothesis 4 
stating that the national parties which MEPs have on average a longer political experience within the 
EP tend to be less opposed to the EU-policies.  
The last two models (Model 5 and 6) insert in the regression equation those predictors referring 
to the effects of both the economic and the immigration crises on national parties’ countries – 
Hypotheses 5 and 6. As it is visible from Table 7.3 above, the impact of such variables on opposition to 
the EU-policies is generally scarce and most of the variables are not statistically significant. However, in 
both model 5 and 6 the variable ‘Perception of immigration’ is positively associated with the DV, thus 
indicating that one unit increase in the percentage of the national country’s population perceiving 
immigration of people from outside the EU as a ‘very negative’ or ‘negative’ issue contributes to 





One last observation is of interest for this research, both control variables are in a statistically 
significant relation with the DV. The ‘Issue-ID’ variable (p-value<0.001) is always negatively associated 
with the DV and displays the same b-coefficient throughout the six presented models. This signals that 
national parties are more opposed to the EU-policies when they deal with economy and immigration 
issues rather than with environmental protection related policies. The relationship between the control 
variable ‘Year’ and the DV is negative and statistically significant (p-value<0.10) reporting similar b-
coefficients in all the six calculated models: other things being equal, the opposition to the EU-policies 
follows a decreasing trend over time.  
 
7.3.2 Opposition to the EU-elite explained 
 
Table 7.4 below reports the results of the regression analysis for the DV opposition to the EU-
elite. The inclusion of the three sets of predictors related to the three sets of POS contributes to 
increasing the models’ R-squared that moves from 0.37 in Model 2 to 0.53 in Model 5 (+16 % of the 
total explained variance). From an overall perspective, it is to be noted that those models accounting 
for national parties’ marginality show a higher R-squared when compared to those models inserting in 
the analysis the IV ‘Marginality of the EPPGs’. Furthermore, the largest increase in the amount of the 
total explained variance happens between Model 2 and Model 3 when the institutional POS are inserted 
in the analysis (+ 12 % of the total explained variance). The crises-related variables presented in Model 
5 and 6 account for a smaller increase in the explained variance (0.04 points difference between model 
3 and Model 5 and 0.06 points difference between Model 4 and 6). 
Turning the attention to Model 2, all the included IVs are statistically significant and positively 
associated with the DV. The IV ‘EPPGs’ left-right positioning’ – Association 1 – plays the largest 
effect on the DV: one unit increase in the EPPG’s left-right positioning (indicating a more right-leaning 
EPPG) contributes to increase opposition to the EU-elite by 10.01 points. In other words, those 
national parties belonging to right-leaning EPPGs are keener to oppose the EU-elite. A similar effect 
on the DV is played by both the variable ‘National parties’ ideological extremeness’ – Hypothesis 1 –, 
statistically significant (p-value <0.001) and positively associated with the DV, and by the variable 
‘EPPG ideological heterogeneity’ – Association 2 –, statistically significant (p-value 0.10) and positively 
associated with the DV. Thus, other things being equal, on the one hand, those parties positioning 
themselves toward the extreme of the left-right ideological continuum tend to display a higher 
opposition to the EU-elite, and, on the other hand, those national parties belonging to heterogeneous 
EPPGs are associated with higher levels of opposition to the EU-elite.  
Moving the attention to the models adding to the analysis the IVs related to the second set of 
POS (institutional), the model that best fits the regression analysis is Model 3 presenting the 
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independent variable ‘Marginality of the national parties’ – Hypothesis 2. The variable is statistically 
significant (p-value<0.001) and positively associated with the DV, suggesting that if parties do not 
cover governing position at the national level, they are 69.97 points more opposed to the EU-elite 
target than their governing counterpart. It is interesting to notice that once the variable ‘Marginality of 
the national parties’ is inserted in the analysis, the variables related to both the degree of extremeness of 
the national parties along the left-right ideological continuum – Hypothesis 1 – and to the ideological 
heterogeneity of the EPPG – Association 2 – are not anymore statistically significant and negatively 
related to the DV. On the contrary, once the regression accounts for the variable ‘Marginality of the 
EPPG’ – Hypothesis 3 – (statistically significant – p-value<0.01 – and negatively associated with the 
DV, even though exercising a lower effect on the DV) both the variables ‘National parties’ ideological 
extremeness’ and ‘EPPG ideological heterogeneity’ are positively associated with the DV even though 
they are not statistically significant. This might suggest that those parties belonging to the opposition 
flanks at the national level (Model 3) tend to display a higher degree of opposition to the EU-elite 
target independently from their degree of extremeness along the left-right ideological continuum or 
from their membership to heterogeneous EPPGs. Thus, opposition to the EU-elite is mainly shaped by 
the marginality of national political parties in the national political competition (governing vs. non-
governing parties at the national level). Furthermore, a similar dynamics is detectable also with 
reference to political competition at the supranational level: one unit increase in the size of the EPPG, 
thus a decrease in its marginality at the supranational level is negatively associated with the DV. 
Consequently, the effect of supranational political competition on the DV ‘opposition to the EU-elite’ 
formulated in Hypothesis 3 is confirmed by the regression analysis.  
Adding to the regression equation the third set of event-related predictors – Hypotheses 5 and 6 
– contributes to increasing the total amount of explained variance by 4% points in the case of model 5 
(when compared to the respective model 3) and by 6 % points in the case of model 6 (when compared 
to its corresponding model 4). The effects of such variables on patterns of opposition to the EU-elite 
are generally smaller when compared to the one of the other two sets of IVs. Focusing the attention on 
model 5, the only variable among the economic indicators that is statistically significant (p-value<0.10) 
and negatively associated with the DV is the Poverty risk T2-T1: one unit increase in the percentage of 
people at poverty risk in each country contributes to decreasing the opposition to the EU-elite by 2.13 
points. This relationship can be explained by the fact that the presence of EU-opposition parties is 
higher and more consolidated in those Northern European countries (e.g.: France and the UK) where 
the national economy is sounder. In other words, opposition to the EU is higher in those creditor 
member states. The effects of the predictors associated with the immigration crisis (both objective and 
subjective) are generally irrelevant. The only variable that presents a relatively higher effect on the DV 




amount of the national population considering immigration of people from outside the EU as a 
negative or very negative issue, contributes to increasing the opposition to the EU-elite by 0.97 points. 
With reference to Model 6, the only two IVs belonging to the third set of predictors that are statistically 
significant (both showing a p-value<0.05) and positively associated with the DV are the ‘Asylum 
application T2-T1’ and the ‘Perception of immigration’. However, their effect on the DV opposition to 
the EU-elite is extremely scarce. All in all, Hypotheses 5 and 6 are not confirmed by the results 
obtained in the analysis. In fact, factors related to countries’ vulnerability to the two crises (economic 
and immigration crises) plays a marginal effect on parties’ opposition to the EU-elite target.  
Two further considerations related to the two inserted control variables – ‘Issue-ID’ and ‘Year’ –
are of interest for this work. Firstly, the control variable Issue-ID is always negatively associated with 
the DV, statistically significant (p-value<0.01) and shows the same b coefficient in all the six included 
models: in all the calculated models, one unit increase on the control variable Issue-ID corresponds to 
a decrease in opposition to the EU-elite by 20.39 points. Consequently, other things being equal, the 
opposition to the EU-elite is higher in economy and immigration-related issues rather than in 
environmental protection-related discussions. Secondly, the control variable ‘Year’ is positively 
associated with the DV and is statistically significant (p-value<0.05) in all the six included models. 
Considering model 5, presenting the highest R-squared, one unit increase in the variable ‘Year’ 
corresponds to an increase by 21.19 points of the DV. Differently from the opposition to the EU-
policies, opposition to the EU-elite expressed by national parties represented in the EP arena increases 




Table 7. 4: Regression analysis for the DV opposition to the EU-elite. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Variables name b β b β b β b β b β b β 





























National parties’ ideological 












Marginality of the national parties -- -- -- -- 69.97*** (18.44) 
0.51 -- -- 69.69** 
(22.53) 0.50 -- -- 
Marginality of the EPPGs -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.23 * (0.11) 
-0.25 -- --- -0.19* (0.11) -0.11 








GDP T2 T1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.30 (1.28) 0.01 
-0.53 
(1.32) -0.03 
Poverty risk T2 T1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -2.13° (2.03) -0.09 
-0.11  
(1.99) 0.03 
Perception of national economy (yearly) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.05 (0.21) -0.02 
0.03 
(0.22) 0.08 
Refugee population T2 T1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.19° (0.20) -0.10 
0.07 
(0.20) 0.06 
Asylum application T2 T1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.08° (0.11) 0.06 
0.21* 
(0.11) -0.02 























N 108 108 108 108 108 108 
R-squared -- 0.37 0.49 0.44 0.53 0.50 
Adjusted R-squared -- 0.33 0.45 0.40 0.46 0.42 
Significance codes: p-values<0.001 ‘***’; p-value <0.01 ‘**’; p-value<0.05 ‘*’; p-value<0.1‘°’. b and beta coefficients are reported in the table, standard error (SE) are 





7.3.3 Opposition to the EU-regime explained 
 
Table 7.5 below reports the results of the regression analysis taking opposition to the EU-regime 
as the DV. As it is visible from the constructed models, the input of the three sets of independent 
predictors both endogenous and exogenous to the national parties contributes to increasing the R-
squared of the models that moves from 0.62 in model 2 to 0.71 in model 5 and 6 (+9% points). 
However, the highest increase in the amount of the total explained variance happens between model 2 
and model 3 (+7 per cent of the total explained variance) while between model 3 and model 5 or 6 the 
total explained variance increases only by 2 per cent points.  
Starting from model 2, all the independent predictors associated with the endogenous 
characteristics of political parties (ideology) are always positively related to the DV and statistically 
significant (p-value<0.001). The variable ‘EPPG’s ideological heterogeneity’ – Association 1 – is the 
one showing the stronger effect on the DV: one unit increase in the degree of ideological heterogeneity 
of the EPPG increases the index of opposition by 27.99 points. In summary, other things being equal, 
parties belonging to heterogeneous EPPGs display a higher opposition to the EU-regime, a similar 
dynamic is detected also for parties belonging to right-leaning EPGGs – Association 2 – or positioning 
themselves toward the extreme of the left-right ideological continuum – Hypothesis 1.  
Once the IVs related to the institutional POS are inserted in the analysis (Model 3 and Model 4) 
the relationship observed in model 2 are still valid and statistically significant (p-value<0.001 or p-
value<0.01). Interestingly and differently from the results related to the EU-policy and the EU-elite 
targets, both the variable ‘Marginality of the national parties’ – Hypothesis 2 – (Model 5) and ‘ 
Marginality of the EPPGs’ – Hypothesis 3 – (Model 6) are not statistically significant. While the 
variable 'Seniority' – Hypothesis 4 – is statistically significant and negatively associated with the DV (p-
value<0.001) in both models 3 and 4. This indicates that parties’ MEPs having on average a longer 
political career within the EP tend to be less opposed to the EU-regime than their ‘less experienced’ 
counterpart. 
Once the predictors related to the third set of POS (exogenous events as POS) are added to the 
regression equation, there is an overall weak increase of total variance explained by the models (as 
mentioned before the total amount of explained variance increases by 2% points between Model 3 and 
Models 5 or 6), thus indicating that the variables related to the countries' vulnerability to both the 
economic and the immigration crises – Hypotheses 5 and 6 – are of little contribution for the 
explanations of patterns of opposition to the EU-regime. However, two conclusions may be drawn. 
First, in both models 5 and 6 both the variable ‘poverty risk’ and ‘perception of the national economy’ 
are statistically significant and negatively associated with the DV: parties from countries where the 
economic situation is objectively worse (Poverty risk T2-T1) or perceived as such (Perception of 
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national economy) tend to present a lower degree of opposition to the EU-regime target. A conclusion 
similar to the one drawn for the models taking opposition to the EU-elite as DV might be formulated: 
in countries where the economic situation is worse or perceived as such, thus in debtor member states, 
EU-opponents propose a lower opposition to the EU-regime when compared to EU-opponents from 
creditor member states – Hypothesis 5. Conversely, those variables related to the immigration crisis – 
Hypothesis 6 – play an extremely low effect on the DV both in model 5 and 6.  
The two inserted control variables behave similarly to the model explaining opposition to the 
EU-elite: firstly, the control variable ‘Issue-ID’ is statistically significant (p-value<0.05) and negatively 
associated with the DV (the relationship shows the same b-coefficient throughout all the six calculated 
models). Thus, opposition to the EU-regime is higher in issues related to both economy and 
immigration policies than in issues related to the environmental protection. Secondly, the control 
variable 'Year' is positively associated and statistically significant (p-value<0.05) in all the six considered 





Table 7. 5: Regression analysis for the DV opposition to the EU-regime. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Variables name b β b β b β b β b β b β 





























National parties’ ideological 












Marginality of the national parties -- -- -- -- -19.92 (13.07) 
-0.15 -- -- -12.83 
(16.16) -0.10 -- -- 
Marginality of the EPPGs -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.008 (0.07) 
-0.01 -- --- 0.05  (0.08) 0.06 






 (1.69) -0.39 
 
GDP T2 T1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.08 (0.92) -0.005 
0.09 
(0.91) 0.006 
Poverty risk T2 T1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -1.16° (1.45) -0.05 
-1.53° 
(1.38) -0.07 
Perception of national economy (yearly) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.26* (0.15) -0.14 
-0.29* 
(0.15) -0.15 
Refugee population T2 T1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.17° (0.14) -0.09 
-0.23° 
(0.13) -0.12 
Asylum application T2 T1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.03 (0.08) -0.02 
-0.05° 
(0.07) -0.04 























N 108 108 108 108 108 108 
R-squared -- 0.62 0.69 0.68 0.71 0.71 
Adjusted R-squared -- 0.60 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.66 
Significance codes: p-values<0.001 ‘***’; p-value <0.01 ‘**’; p-value<0.05 ‘*’; p-value<0.1‘°’. b and beta coefficients are reported in the table, standard error (SE) are 
reported in parenthesis. Source: own calculation. 
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7.3.4 Opposition to the EU-community explained  
 
Table 7.6 below reports the results obtained from the analysis of the opposition to the EU-
community. The three sets of predictors included in the analysis significantly contribute to increasing 
the total variance explained by the model, which R-squared is 0.52 in Model 2 and reaches its maximum 
in model 6 (0.75 thus explaining the 75 per cent of the total variance). 
Turning the attention to model 2, all the independent predictors related to the parties’ ideology 
are positively associated with the DV and statistically significant (p-value<0.001). The variable showing 
the highest impact on opposition to the EU-community is the one related to the degree of EPPG’s 
heterogeneity – Association 1 -: one unit increase in the degree of heterogeneity of the EPPG produces 
an increase of 47.51 points in the index of opposition to the EU-community. Similarly, both the degree 
of extremeness of national parties’ positioning along the left-right ideological continuum – Hypothesis 
1 – and the general ideological positioning of the EPPG – Association 2 – are statistically significant (p-
value<0.001) and positively associated with the DV. In summary, it is thus possible to state that parties 
belonging to highly heterogeneous EPPGs or, positioning themselves toward the extreme of the left-
right ideological continuum or belonging to right-leaning EPPGs tend to show a higher degree of 
opposition to the EU-community. 
Once those factors related to the institutional POS are inserted into the regression equation 
(Model 3 and 4), the relationship between the first set of predictors and the DV holds true. Moreover, 
the variable ‘Marginality of national parties’ – Hypothesis 2 – is statistically significant (p-value<0.01), 
positively associated with the DV and has a great impact upon it: those parties not covering governing 
positions at the national level report a degree of opposition to the EU-community that is 69.39 points 
higher than their governing counterpart. Furthermore, similarly to patterns found in the regression 
analysis studying the determinants of opposition to the EU-elite, the variable ‘Marginality of the 
EPPGs’ – Hypothesis 3 – is statistically significant (p-value<0.001) and negatively associated with the 
DV, however, its impact upon it is more restricted: one unit increase in the size of the EPPG, thus a 
decrease in its marginality produces a decrease of 0.70 points of opposition to the EU-community. In 
any case, this relationship points toward the fact that, other things being equal, national parties 
belonging to EPPGs that are more marginal in the supranational political competition tend to perform 
a lower opposition to the EU-community.  
Interestingly, the variable ‘Seniority’ is negatively associated with the DV and statistically 
significant in both Model 3 (p-value<0.05) and 4 (p-value<0.10). This is to say that national parties’ 
MEPs having shorter political careers within the EP tend to express a higher degree of opposition to 




Model 5 and 6 insert in the analysis the set of predictors related to the effects of exogenous 
shocks (economic and immigration crises) on national parties’ countries. Model 5’s R-squared increases 
by 5% points when compared to the corresponding Model 3, while Model 6’s R-squared increases by 
only 1% point when compared to the corresponding Model 4. Looking at model 5, the effect played by 
the marginality of political parties in the national competition – Hypothesis 2 – is confirmed: parties 
not covering governing positions at national level express a 130.25 points higher opposition to the EU-
community when compared to their governing counterpart. Interestingly, while both the variable 
‘EPPGs’ left-right positioning’ – Association 2 – and ‘National parties’ ideological extremeness’ – 
Hypothesis 1 – are positively associated with the DV (although the variable ‘National parties’ 
ideological extremeness’ is not anymore statistically significant), the variable ‘EPPG ideological 
heterogeneity’ – Association 1 – is negatively associated with the DV. This suggests that, independently 
from the degree of heterogeneity of the EPPG, national parties covering an opposition role at the 
national level display a higher degree of opposition to the EU-community. With reference to the last set 
of predictors inserted in both models 5 and 6, also in this case the contribution to the overall fit of the 
model of this last set of predictors is small. Two conclusions might, however, be drawn: first, with 
reference to the economy-related variables, the reported results for both Model 5 and 6 show that 
opposition to the EU-community expressed by parties from debtor member states tends to be weaker. 
Second, similarly to the previous conclusions, national parties coming from recipient member states 
tend to display a lower degree of opposition to the EU-community (see Model 5 results). In summary, 
opposition to the EU-community expressed by parties from creditor/donor member states is generally 
higher when compared to opposition exercised by parties from debtor/recipient member states.  
Similarly to the models having opposition to the EU-elite and the EU-regime as DVs, also in this 
case the two inserted control variables behave in the same way. The control variable ‘Issue-ID’ is 
statistically significant (p-value<0.05) and negatively associated with the DV (showing the same b-
coefficient in all the six calculated models). This suggests that opposition to the EU-community is 
generally higher in economy and immigration-related issues rather than in policies referred to the 
environmental protection. Second, the control variable ‘Year’ is statistically significant (p-value<0.10) 
and positively associated with the DV in all the studied models, this consideration points toward the 




Table 7. 6: Regression analysis for the DV opposition to the EU-community. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Variables name b β b β b β b β b β b β 





























National parties’ ideological 












Marginality of the national parties -- -- -- -- 69.39** (22.96) 
0.32 -- -- 130.25*** 
(26.84) 0.60 -- -- 
Marginality of the EPPGs -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.70*** (0.12) 
-0.49 -- --- -0.74*** (0.12) -0.50 








GDP T2 T1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.20° (1.53) 0.08 
0.24 
(1.45) 0.005 
Poverty risk T2 T1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -5.79* (2.42) -0.16 
-1.99° 
(2.19) -0.02 
Perception of national economy (yearly) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.005 (0.25) 0.001 
0.34° 
(0.25) 0.10 
Refugee population T2 T1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.66** (0.24) -0.21 
-0.07 
(0.22) -0.03 
Asylum application T2 T1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.29* (0.13) -0.14 
-0.01 
(0.12) -0.03 























N 108 108 108 108 108 108 
R-squared -- 0.52 0.67 0.74 0.72 0.75 
Adjusted R-squared -- 0.50 0.65 0.72 0.69 0.71 





7.4 Discussion and conclusion  
 
To further disentangle and summarize the effects of the used predictors on patterns of EU-
opposition two main operations are done. Firstly, Table 7.7 and 7.8 below classify national parties’ 
opposition according to the character it takes (either principled – higher opposition – or pragmatic – 
lower opposition). Table 7.7 presents the parties according to the character of their opposition in a 
target-oriented way (how parties oppose each observed target): if party A proposes a principled 
opposition to one of the included targets in the majority of the considered policy issues (two out of 
three) then party A exercises a principled opposition to that specific target. On the contrary, Table 7.8 
below presents parties according to the character of their opposition by policy field: if a party B 
opposes the majority of the analysed targets (three out of four) in a principled way then its opposition 
is classified as principled and vice versa. Secondly, for each IV the mean is calculated and parties are 
classified as having values either below or above the mean on each IVs4. Parties are then inserted in the 
following tables (Tables 7.9-7.14) according to both the type (quantity and quality) of the exercised 
opposition and their positioning with reference to the used IVs.  
 
Table 7. 7: Classification of parties’ opposition according to the related EU-target.  
Target Character of the expressed opposition Principled Pragmatic 
EU-policies UKIP; LN; FN 




UKIP; LN; FN; AFD; FSM; 
LINKE; 
 CDU-CSU 
PP; PS; CON; PODEMOS 
EU-Regime UKIP; AFD; FN LN; FSM; PODEMOS; LINKE PS; CON 
EU-Community UKIP; AFD; LN; FN; PODEMOS 
LINKE; FSM 
CON 
Only parties exercising opposition are considered (both mainstream and non-mainstream parties) 
 
                                                        
4 More specifically parties are classified as 1) belonging to right-leaning EPPG if their value on the 
‘EPPG’s left-right positioning’ variable is above the average; 2) belonging to heterogeneous EPPGs if 
their corresponding value is above the sample’s average; 3) extreme if the value of their positioning 
along the ‘national parties ideological extremeness’ variable is above the sample’s average; 4) belonging 
to less marginal EPPGs if their correspondent value on the variable ‘Marginality of the EPPGs’ is 
above the sample’s average; 5) ‘more experienced’ if the level of experience scored by their 
representatives is above sample’s average; 6) coming from countries highly exposed to the economic 
crisis if the majority of the used indicators (two out of three) are worse than the sample’s average 
(lower GDP, higher poverty risk, higher negative feeling about the national economy); 7) coming from 
countries highly exposed to the immigration crisis if the majority of the used indicators (two out of 
three) are above the sample average (higher number of refugees, higher number of asylum applications, 
and higher percentage of people judging immigration from outside the EU as a very negative or 
negative phenomenon).  
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Table 7. 8: Classification of parties’ opposition according to the related policy field. 
Policy issue Character of the expressed opposition Principled Pragmatic 
Immigration UKIP; LN; FN; AFD; PODEMOS 
LINKE; FSM 
PS; PP; CON 
Economy UKIP; FSM; FN; LN; AFD; PODEMOS 
LINKE 
CON 
Environmental protection UKIP; FN; LN; AFD FSM; PODEMOS; LINKE CON; CDU-CSU 
 
Table 7.9 and 7.10 below show the relationship between patterns of opposition and parties positioning 
along the IVs belonging to the first set of POS both in a target-oriented way (Table 7.9) and by policy 
issue (Table 7.10). 
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Table 7. 9: Relationship between parties’ opposition and the IVs related to the first set of POS.  
Target 
 









Extremeness of the national party  





leaning LN FN  UKIP   AFD   CON FSM  
Non right-
leaning     
LINKE 
PODEMOS   PS  













leaning AFD LN FN  UKIP  FSM    CON  
Non right-
leaning LINKE  CDU-CSU  PODEMOS  PS PP   














leaning AFD FN  UKIP   LN   CON FSM  
Non right-
leaning     
LINKE 
PODEMOS  PS  









   
Extremeness of the national party  





leaning AFD FN LN  UKIP     CON FSM  
Non right-
leaning PODEMOS    LINKE     
 Non-het. Heterogeneous Non-het. Heterogeneous Non-het. Heterogeneous Non-het. Heterogeneous EPPG Heterogeneity 




Table 7. 10: Relationship between parties’ opposition and the IVs related to the first set of POS.  
Policy 
issue   









Extremeness of the national party  









  PODEMOS  LINKE  PS; PP  

















    LINKE; PODEMOS    

























    LINKE PODEMOS  CDU-CSU PS  
 Non-het. Heterogeneous Non-het. Heterogeneous Non-het. Heterogeneous Non-het. Heterogeneous EPPG Heterogeneity 




From Table 7.9 above six general conclusions might be drawn. First, the highest levels of 
opposition to the EU-policies, the EU-regime and the EU-community are performed by those national 
parties positioned toward the extremes of the ideological continuum (specifically extreme right), 
belonging to right-leaning EPPGs that are both heterogeneous (EFDD) and non-heterogeneous 
(ENF): UKIP, FN, LN, and AFD, with the only exception of both the German AFD that shows 
pragmatic opposition to the EU-policies and the Italian LN pragmatically opposed to the EU-regime. 
On the contrary, lower values of opposition (pragmatic opposition) are performed by parties belonging 
to non-heterogeneous and non-right-leaning EPPGs (GUE/NGL) independently from their degree of 
extremeness along the left-right continuum: the LINKE and PODEMOS (the only exception being the 
Spanish PODEMOS showing principled opposition to the EU-community). 
Secondly, it is noticeable that those parties belonging to the same EPPG (e.g.: the GUE/NGL 
and the ENF) tend to oppose the EU-targets in a similar way (see for example the principled 
opposition expressed by partiers belonging to the ENF – FN, LN, and AFD). However, this 
consideration does not hold true in the case of the EFDD. In fact, FSM and UKIP show a different 
character (thus a different degree of intensity) of their opposition (pragmatic the first and principled the 
latter) even though they belong to the same EPPG. This consideration is a further confirmation of 
their strategic (rather than ideological) union in the EFDD (Franzosi, Marone, Salvati 2015, Carlotti 
2017).  
Thirdly, factors belonging to the first set of POS only partially explain opposition to the EU-elite. 
This is to say that parties, independently from their degree of ideological extremeness along the left-
right continuum, the degree of ideological heterogeneity of their EPPGs, and the general ideological 
position of their EPPGs tend to display a principled opposition to the EU-elite. In fact, as observed in 
model 3 of section 7.3.2 above (Table 7.4), the factor that mostly shapes opposition to the EU-elite is 
parties’ marginality in political competition at the national level.   
Fourthly, the results reported in Table 7.9 suggest that opposition to the four main targets of the 
EU is not only a prerogative of so-called Eurosceptic parties but also of their mainstream counterpart. 
As it is visible, the British CON is pragmatically opposed to all the four EU-targets and its opposition 
is mainly guided by ECR’s general ideological orientation (right-leaning). The French PS shows a 
pragmatic opposition to the EU-policies, the EU-elite and the EU-regime targets even if it does not 
belong to the extremes of the left-right continuum or to heterogeneous EPPGs and if its EPPG is non-
right-leaning. Interestingly, the CDU-CSU reports a principled opposition to the EU-elite, this is 
related to the fact that the EU-elite target is intentionally kept as broad as possible encompassing both 
‘governing’ and ‘opposition’ representatives alongside the complex of personnel working within the 
EU-institutions. As observed in the previous chapter (See Chapter 6, section 6.6) mainstream parties 
shift their blames to their challengers identified as populist, Eurosceptic parties.  
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Lastly, the results reported by policy issue in Table 7.10 above, confirm the just-mentioned 
conclusions stressing the fact that opposition to the EU is generally higher in issues related to both 
economic and immigration policies, in connection to the negative, statistically significant relationship 
between the control variable ‘Issue-ID’ and all the studied DVs.  
 
Turning to the second group of predictors (Table 7.11 and Table 7.12 below) it is possible to 
draw five general conclusions. Firstly, opposition to the various EU-targets (with the only exception of 
the EU-elite target as further detailed below) is generally higher for non-governing national parties 
belonging to more marginal EPPGs which MEPs are either less experienced (FN and AFD) or more 
experienced (UKIP and LN). Similarly to the findings reported for the first set of IVs, LN and AFD 
are two exceptional cases. In fact, AFD proposes a pragmatic opposition to the EU-policies while LN 
pragmatically opposes the EU-regime. In connection to this observation, the non-governing national 
parties belonging to less marginal EPPGs (LINKE and PODEMOS) propose a pragmatic opposition 
to the EU-policies, the EU-regime and the EU-community, the only exception being PODEMOS 
opposing the EU-community on a principled basis. 
Second, national parties belonging to the same EPPG tend to follow similar patterns of 
opposition in relation to the various EU-targets (with the only exception of the EU-elite). However, 
this is not the case for parties belonging to the EFDD (UKIP and FSM) further confirming that their 
union within the EP is mainly driven by opportunistic reasons rather than by their ideological 
orientation. 
Third, patterns of opposition to the EU-elite target are a special case. In fact, as it is observable 
from Table 7.11, all non-governing parties, independently from their MEPs’ degree of experience in the 
EP and from the marginality of their EPPG, display a higher (principled) level of opposition to the 
EU-elite. Interestingly, as emerges from the results of the regression analysis, pattern of political 
competitions at the national level play a stronger role on the DV opposition to the EU-elite, then 
patterns of political competition at the supranational level. In fact, even if a lower degree of ‘marginality 
of the EPPGs’ is related to a lower level of EU-opposition, the effect of the IV on the DV is weaker.  
Fourth, some signs of opposition to the various EU-targets are present also with reference to 
mainstream parties. If, on the one hand, mainstream parties tend to perform a pragmatic (lower) 
opposition, the German CDU-CSU exercises a principled opposition to the EU-elite target, confirming 
the above-mentioned assertions.  
Lastly, the results reported in Table 7.12 below confirm the fact that opposition to the various 
EU-targets tends to be higher in economy and immigration-related policy issues rather than in 
environmental related policies where the only parties performing an overall principled opposition are 
FN, LN, AFD, and UKIP. 
 
 197 
Table 7. 11: Relationship between parties’ opposition and the IVs related to the second set of POS.  
Target 
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Table 7. 12: Relationship between parties’ opposition and the IVs related to the second set of POS.  
Policy 
issue   
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Moving now the attention to the third set of factors included in the regression analysis no clear pattern 
is detectable; see Tables 7.13 and 7.14 below. This is to say that national parties tend to perform either 
a principled or a pragmatic opposition to the various targets of the EU in the EP independently from 
the degree of exposure (low or high) of their country to both the economic and the immigration crisis. 
This consideration confirms the results of the regression analysis showing that the third set of predictor 
exercises only a limited impact upon the used DVs. However, Table 7.14 below confirms that parties 
tend to exercise a higher opposition in both the fields of economy and immigration than in 
environmental protection. 
 
Table 7. 13: Relationship between parties’ opposition and the IVs related to the third set of POS.  













High LN  PODEMOS FSM   
Low FN  UKIP AFD LINKE PS  CON 
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Low FN AFD UKIP LINKE PS  CON 
















High LN PODEMOS  FSM   
Low AFD FN  UKIP LINKE CON 
 High Low High Low Country vulnerability to the immigration crisis 
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Table 7. 14: Relationship between parties’ opposition and the IVs related to the third set of POS.  














High LN PODEMOS   FSM PP  
Low FN AFD UKIP LINKE PS  CON 











High LN  FSM  PODEMOS  
Low FN AFD UKIP LINKE  CON 


















High LN    
FSM 
PODEMOS  





 High Low High Low 
  Country vulnerability to the immigration crisis 
Source: own calculation. The relationships are presented by policy field 
 
Table 7.15 below summarizes the obtained findings in correspondence to the formulated 
associations and hypotheses for each of the studied DVs. The table reports the word ‘confirmed’ if the 
related hypotheses or associations are confirmed by the regression models calculated in the previous 
sections (model 5 and 6) and vice versa.  
 
Table 7. 15: Summary table of the studied hypotheses and associations 
Hypotheses and Associations 
Results of the analysis for each dependent 
variable aggregated 
EU-policy EU-elite EU-regime EU-community 
First set of POS 
A1: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by 
national parties within the EP are associated 
with the degree of heterogeneity of the EPPG 
they belong to.  
Confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed Confirmed 
A2: patterns of EU-opposition are associated 
with the general ideological orientation of the 
EPPG to which national parties belong.  
Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed 
H1: Patterns of EU-opposition vary as a 
function of each national party’s ideological 
extremeness, independently of the general 
ideological position of the EPPG. The more 
parties position themselves toward the extremes 




of the left-right ideological continuum the 
higher their degree of EU-opposition will be. 
Second set of POS 
H2: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by 
national parties in the EP vary as a function of 
their ‘marginality’ in political competition at 
national level. Parties not belonging to 
governing coalitions at the national level (or not 
even eligible to cover governing positions at the 
national level) will display a higher degree of 
opposition to the EU.  
Confirmed Confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed 
H3: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by 
national parties represented in the EP vary as a 
function of the ‘marginality’ of the EPPG they 
belong to. The more marginal the EPPG the 
higher EU-opposition expressed by national 
parties belonging to that EPPG will be. 
Confirmed Confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed 
H4: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by 
national parties represented in the EP will vary 
as a negative function of the seniority of their 
MEPs. The less national parties’ MEPs are 
socialized within the EP the higher their EU-
opposition will be.  
Confirmed Not confirmed Confirmed Confirmed 
Third set of POS  
H5: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed by 
national parties within the EP vary as a function 
of their country’s level of exposure to both the 
economic and the migration crisis. The more 
debtor/recipient member states are vulnerable 
to both the economic and the immigration 
crises, the higher the EU-opposition of national 










H6: Patterns of EU-opposition expressed 
by national parties within the EP vary as a 
negative function of their country’s level 
of exposure to both the economic and the 
migration crisis. The less creditor/donor 
states are vulnerable to both the economic 
and the immigration crises, the higher the 
EU-opposition of national parties coming 











All in all, six general conclusions may be drawn: firstly, patterns of EU-opposition vary as a 
function of the first two sets of factors that are central to the theses of both the Sussex and the North 
Carolina Schools (see Chapter 3, section 3.2, pages 42-47). By and large, those parties opposing the 
analysed targets: 1) position themselves toward the extreme of the left-right continuum; 2) belong to 
heterogeneous and right-leaning EPPGs; 3) are marginal in political competition at the national level; 4) 
belong to marginal EPPGs, and 5) are represented by ‘less experienced’ MEPs.  
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Secondly, the third set of POS including variables related to both the objective and the perceived 
effects of the two crises on each studied member states either creditor/donor or debtor/recipient does 
not influence opposition to the EU expressed by national parties in the EP, thus leading to the 
rejection of Hypotheses 5 and 6.  
 Thirdly, patters of opposition to the EU-elite target are a special case. In fact, no particular 
relationship between the considered ideological factors (Associations 1 and 2 and Hypothesis 1) and 
the DV opposition to the EU-elite is found. On the contrary, opposition to this target is related to the 
role played by national parties and their respective EPGG in both the national and the supranational 
political competition – Hypotheses 2 and 3. In other words, parties at the opposition at the national 
level and belonging to more marginal EPPGs in the EP propose a higher (principled based) opposition 
to the EU-elite. This consideration might be a signal of the relationship between the ‘populist’ nature of 
the analysed EU-opponents and their negative stances to the EU-establishment. In fact, one of the 
characteristics of populist parties is their strong use of the ‘us vs. them’ rhetoric when referring to the 
governing political establishment (Mudde 2004).  
Fourthly, institutional POS only poorly influence criticism toward the EU-regime. In fact, 
national parties opposing the EU-regime do that independently from their marginality in the national 
political competition and from the marginality of their EPPG. Interestingly, however, the role of 
seniority shapes patterns of opposition to the EU-regime that is lower in correspondence to an average 
higher degree of experience of parties’ MEPs within the EP.  
Fifthly, opposition to the EU-community is shaped by both ideological and institutional factors. 
National parties belonging to more heterogeneous EPPGs – Association 1 –, to more right-leaning 
EPPGs – Association 2 –, and positioning themselves toward the extreme of the left-right ideological 
continuum – Hypothesis 1 – are keener to express higher levels of opposition (principled) to the EU-
community and the related geometries. Furthermore, a higher degree of marginality of both the 
national parties in the national political competition – Hypothesis 2 – and of the EPPGs in the 
supranational political competition – Hypothesis 3 – translates itself in a higher opposition to the EU-
community. However, national parties’ marginality in the national political arena plays a stronger role 
when compared to the marginality of the EPPG. Moreover, those national parties represented in the 
EP by more experienced MEPs – Hypothesis 4 – tend to be less in opposition to the EU-community.   
Lastly, as resulting from the regression analyses reported in the previous section one further 
noticeable conclusion is to be stressed. The control variable ‘Year’ is in a negative relationship only 
with the DV associated with parties’ opposition to the EU-policies. This indicates that while opposition 
to the EU-policies decreases over time, parties’ negative stances to the other three studied targets tend 
to increase over time. This points toward a potential institutionalization of opposition to ‘what the EU 




same community and/or to different EU-geometries) rather than ‘what the EU-does’ (the policies 
enacted by the EU). 
Further research is however needed to assess the generalizability of the reported findings, the 
impossibility to perform the analysis on a larger sample of data (due to linguistic barriers) and on a 












Is Euroscepticism still an adequate concept to understand the variegated nature of criticism 
toward the EU, which has developed over the last decade or so? This was the central theoretical 
starting point of this work. The answer to this central question is: No, it is not. In fact, the lack of a 
univocally shared and precise definition of Euroscepticism hinders the possibility to disentangle the 
different aspects of opposition to the EU, thus equating stances that should, on the contrary, be 
differentiated. This consideration is particularly important nowadays that forces critical of the EU are 
gaining more visibility and are increasingly represented in the institutional political arenas both at the 
national and at the European levels. 
As stressed in the introductive chapter and further detailed in chapter 2 of this work, initially 
‘Eurosceptics’ were confined to the ‘margins’ of national political systems, at the extremes of the 
ideological continuum. However, nowadays those national systems of ‘limited contestation’1 (Taggart 
and Szczerbiak 2008b, 349) are not anymore so common in Europe. A recent example is given by the 
results scored by two parties differently critical of the EU during the last Italian national election (4th of 
March 2018): Salvini’s re-branded League and Di Maio’s FSM. The two parties scored unprecedented 
results – 17.8 per cent the former and 32.8 per cent the latter – stealing consensus from the governing 
mainstream counterparts. The former main governing party, the PD, scored the lowest result in its 
history getting approximately 18.7% of the national vote share, similarly to the centre-right ‘Go Italy’ 
(Forza Italia) that scored its lowest results getting 14.01 per cent of the national vote-share. As 
mentioned several times in this work, the case of Italy exemplifies a common trend regarding most of 
the EU member states; indeed criticism toward the EU is now an integral part of European political 
systems. Thus, on the one hand, the media and the literature should not consider it anymore as a 
passing phenomenon, a grit in the system (Usherwood and Startin 2013), or as a temporary malaise of 
democracy (Leconte 2015), but as something that is here to stay and that in some sense ‘re-injects 
politics into a large depoliticised polity’ (Leconte 2015: 256, Neunreither 1994). On the other hand, a 
                                                        
1 Three aspects characterize the political systems where contestation of the EU is limited: 1) the major 
parties in the party system display a pervasive commitment to the European integration project; 2) 
European integration is not an issue of political competition; and 3) Euroscepticism is an issue that is 




better understanding of such political actors’ stances to the EU is needed with a view to the important 
challenges that the EU is facing after a long period of crises and also to the upcoming 2019 EP 
elections when EU-opponents will probably score even better results. 
To deeply understand this phenomenon, this work has reconceptualised Euroscepticism by using 
the ‘more neutral’ and less contested concept of political opposition. This enables to distinguish 
criticism toward the EU addressed to ‘what the EU does’ – the policies enacted by the EU – from 
criticism toward ‘what the EU is’ – the EU-elite, the EU-regime and the EU-community alongside the 
geometries deriving from the process of European integration. This reconceptualization of 
Euroscepticism helps to answer this work’s central research question: Which aspects of the EU do 
national parties oppose from within the arena of the EP? 
The concept of EU-opposition facilitates an in-depth observation of both the ‘quantity’ (chapter 
5) and the ‘quality’ (chapter 6) of criticism toward the EU and allows the formulation of an index of 
positioning on the EU-targets, a step that is extremely important to further understand the drivers of 
such criticism (chapter 7). Furthermore, the observation of EU-opposition in the EP allows a cross-
national comparison of parties that are differently critical of the EU with their mainstream 
counterparts. The EP is the perfect laboratory to study critical stances to the EU since it is the arena 
where MEPs from different parties and countries can freely express their positioning through their 
speeches (Brack 2012; 2013) while working together on the same topics at the same time. 
The rest of the chapter is divided in two main sections. Section 8.2 describes how political parties 
position themselves on the EU-targets highlighting two main dimensions of competition shaping EU-
opposition mainly differentiating parties between anti-EU-establishment and anti-EU-system parties. 
Furthermore, it summarizes how the three sets of factors considered in Chapter 7 impact on patterns 
of parties positioning. The conclusive section, 8.3, summarizes the found patterns of EU-opposition 
while the next chapter reports the general conclusions of this work.  
 
8.2 Understanding patterns of EU-opposition and their determinants  
 
It is difficult, if not even impossible, to provide a single definition of criticism toward the EU as 
much as it is difficult if not even impossible to formulate a typology of parties’ positioning on the EU. 
Four general remarks emerge from the findings: firstly, the analysis confirms the fact that the so-called 
Eurosceptic parties can be redefined as EU-opponents (see Figure 8.1 below); secondly and connected 
to this observation, there are important differences between EU-opponents; thirdly, criticism toward 
the EU (alongside its targets) is a phenomenon that does not have to be confined to the EU-
opponents, as also mainstream parties are differently critical of the EU; lastly, EU-opposition is a 
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moving target, a changing phenomenon varying according to the issue at stake (Ray 1999; Flood 2002; 
Taggart 2006; Leconte 2010, 2015; Usherwood and Startin 2013). 
Starting from the guidelines presented in chapter 2 (see Chapter 2, section 2.4, pages 35-36), this 
section relies on previous literature on parties and parties’ systems (Sartori 1976, Dahl 1966, 
Kirchheimer 1966) to conceptualize and categorize parties’ stances to the EU.  
Figure 8.1 below graphically represents EU-opponents’ positioning to the various EU-targets in 
the three studied policy fields according to the ‘quality’ and the ‘quantity’ of EU-opposition, thus 
providing the reader with a visual representation of the above-mentioned guidelines. For each of the 
graphs presented in the following Figures (8.1-8.4), the ‘quantity’ of opposition is depicted on the y-axis 
and ranges between -1 – highest degree of the quantity of opposition – and +1 – highest degree of the 
quantity of support – while the ‘quality’ of opposition, depicted on the x-axis, is a dichotomy 
distinguishing pragmatic stances (values of 0) from principled ones (value of 1)2. 
Following chapter 2’s guidelines, the upper right-hand quadrant of each graph indicates a ‘Total 
rejection’ of the related EU-target. On the contrary, those parties showing ‘Principled support’ of the 
specific target are portrayed in the lower right-hand quadrant of each graph. The ‘Conditional support’ 
– support with a pragmatic character – is reported in the lower left-hand quadrant of each graph, while 
parties showing a ‘Partial rejection’ (opposition with a pragmatic character) toward the studied EU-
targets are depicted in the upper left-hand side of each graph. Lastly, on the x-axis, the ‘No-
commitment’ position is illustrated3.  
 
                                                        
2 Note that the graphs have been constructed using the software R and the package ‘ggplot2’. The 
representation of parties’ position on the x-axis (the quality of opposition) intentionally reports some 
‘noise’ to better distinguish parties that would have otherwise clustered along a single vertical line due 
to the dichotomous nature of the x variable. This is obtained using the ‘jitter’ function from the base 
package in R.  
3 Please note that for visual purposes the origin of the y and x axes in the proposed graphs is set at x, 
y=(0.5; 0.5).  
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Figure 8. 1: EU-opponents’ positioning toward the four main EU-targets.  
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As it is visible from Figure 8.1 above (focusing its attention only on EU-opponents), apart from 
some residual exceptions, all the studied parties oppose all the reported EU-targets thus confirming the 
consideration mentioned above: these parties may be considered as EU-opponents even though some 
visible differences among them exist. Starting from the first graph in Figure 8.1 above, as confirmed by 
the empirical analysis performed in both chapter 6 and 7, the ideological left-right cleavage strongly 
shapes parties’ positioning vis-à-vis the EU-policies: right-wing parties tend to express a harsher 
opposition to the EU-policies in both the economic and the immigration fields. As a matter of fact, 
parties’ opposition to both EU’s economic and migration policies is higher than criticism toward the 
EU environmental protection policies4. According to Hooghe and Marks (2018), in fact, the rise in 
importance of the EU and the immigration issues, coupled with the aftermath of the economic crisis, 
are creating a transnational cleavage potentially resulting in a new decisive critical juncture for parties 
and party systems around Europe. Thus, it is of no surprise that EU-opposition is shaped around the 
economic and the immigration issues rather than the issue of environmental protection. Indeed, in this 
last policy field, EU-opponents cluster in the ‘Partial rejection’ quadrant, denoting a lower and 
pragmatically oriented opposition to the EU-policies 5 . These considerations confirm the general 
expectation reported in chapter 4 of this work: opposition to the EU is higher in more adversarial and 
crisis-related issues rather than in less adversarial and non-crisis-related issues. The case of the FSM is a 
peculiar one: the party describes itself as a sort of ‘post-ideological party’ but endorses positions very 
similar to the ones of left-wing EU-opponents (LINKE and PODEMOS) both in terms of the 
‘quantity’ and the ‘quality’ of its opposition and in terms of the used motivations. For example, as 
observed in chapter 6, when talking about the EU immigration policy, and by asking for the 
construction of safe access routes to Europe for migrants, the FSM endorses positions very similar to 
the ones of the Italian PD and the French PS.  
If parties’ positioning toward the EU-policies is mainly driven by their ideological platform, this 
consideration does not hold true in the case of the EU-elite target. Independently from their ideological 
standpoint (see Chapter 7, section 7.3.2, page 180), EU-opponents are similarly critical of the EU-elite 
target. These parties cluster in the upper-right hand side of the EU-elite graph in Figure 8.1 above and 
configure a ‘Total rejection’ of the EU-elite with the ‘residual’ exceptions of PODEMOS in both 
                                                        
4 As observed in chapter 7 (See Chapter 7, section 7.4) the control variable ‘issue ID’ is statistically 
significant and negatively associated with the dependent variable ‘opposition to the EU-policies’. In 
other words, parties’ opposition to both economic and migration policies is higher when compared to 
opposition to the EU environmental policies.  
5 This is not to say that left and right-wing parties’ positioning on the EU’s environmental policies relies 
on similar motivations. On the contrary, as noted in chapter 6 (See Chapter 6, section 6.2, page 142) 
right-wing parties oppose EU’s intervention in environmental protection if it hinders economic 
development, while, left-wing parties and the FSM endorse the protection of the environment even if it 




environmental protection and economic policies, and of the LINKE in environmental protection. 
Criticism toward the EU-elite is hard and based on its moral quality, eventually contesting also the 
potential collusion between the EU-elite and illicit systems or, more generally, big financial and 
economic powers. The way such parties blame the EU-elite for the current EU’s situation is 
comparable to their harsh criticism toward the political elite at the national level. This is to say that 
there is a common denominator alimenting these parties’ stances to the national and the EU 
establishment: it is their fervent opposition to the establishment, their contestation of both alleged 
corruption and of the doubtful moral quality of the elite that has covered governing positions at the 
national and, consequentially, at the supranational level up to now. This is also confirmed by the 
findings reported in Chapter 7 (see Chapter 7, section 7.3.2, page 181) that show the lack of association 
between the opposition to the EU-elite and both the degree of extremeness and ideological 
heterogeneity of the EPPGs, but also the lack of a relationship between criticism toward the EU-elite 
and the degree of national parties’ ideological extremeness. Conversely, the analysis confirms a positive 
relationship between high levels of opposition to the EU-elite and the marginality of parties in the 
national political competition as well as the marginality of the EPPGs to which parties belong in the 
political competition at the supranational level.  
In summary, the parties constantly opposing the EU-elite on a principled basis might be defined 
as ‘anti-EU-establishment parties’ since they embody the ‘politics of opposition to those wielding 
power’ (Barr 2009, 31). The term ‘anti-establishment parties’ has been used and specified in several 
ways (anti-party parties, anti-political-establishment parties, anti-establishment parties) by academics in 
the field (Scarrow 1996; Schedler 1996; Ignazi 1996) to identify the conflict between the ‘ruled’ and the 
‘rulers’ (Schedler 1996) 6 . According to Schedler those anti-establishment actors ‘accuse the 
establishment of forming an exclusionary cartel, unresponsive and unaccountable, and they portray 
public officials as a homogenous class of lazy, incompetent, self-enriching and power-driven villains’ 
(Schedler 1996, 291). This definition is perfectly in line with the results of the inductive coding of the 
speeches performed in chapter 6 of this work: the European elite is perceived as a cartel of parties 
(what PODEMOS calls the ‘maldita gran coalición’ – damned grand coalition – Chapter 6, section 6.3, 
page 145), unaccountable, unresponsive and caring only about their business and not about the 
interests of the broader European people (the use of words like ‘European’ and ‘people’ is extremely 
common in all the analysed EU-opponents’ speeches, see Chapter 6, section 6.3, pages 143-152).  
                                                        
6 This contraposition is regarded by scholars in the field as one of the core elements of populism 
(Canovan 1981, de la Torre 2000, Mudde 2004). Besides the fact that it is not the central business of 
this work to establish which are the core elements of ‘populism’, one clarification is needed here. 
According to Schedler, populism sums up the whole variety of discourses that contrast the ‘friends of 
the people’ against their enemies (Schedler 1996). In this case, the concept of anti-establishment party 
(declined in the European arena as anti-EU-establishment party) refers to parties’ contrast vis-à-vis the 
‘enemies of the people’ understood as the EU-elite.  
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However, if the parties represented in the upper right-hand quadrant of the second graph in 
Figure 8.1 propose a principled opposition to the EU-elite, not all of them reject the EU-political 
system tout court. In fact, generally anti-establishment parties do not go so far as to advocate the 
replacement of the system per se even if they frequently propose improvements to the system (Barr 
2009). In other words, to further understand EU-opponents’ stances to the EU, it is fundamental to 
observe parties’ positioning vis-à-vis the last two included EU-targets, the EU-regime and the EU-
community. To better explain this point, anti-establishment-parties (consequently also anti-EU-
establishment parties) may ‘invoke criteria to assess the performance of a political system’ (Scarrow 
1996, 301) appealing to potential avenues of change. According to Scarrow (1996) such avenues of 
change might either be connected to ‘pluralist’ motivations thus invoking the fair access to the 
decision-making process (‘representative democracy should be representative’ – Scarrow 1996, 301) or to 
‘inclusive’ argumentations judging how institutions are able to give individuals a direct role in the 
decision-making process (‘representative democracy should be democratic – Scarrow 1996: 301). Indeed, 
the parties that do not reject the EU polity (the political system of the EU represented by both the EU-
regime and the EU-community targets – See Chapter 2, section 2.4, pages 32-38) tout court but strive to 
change it, also endorse a pragmatic criticism toward both the EU-regime and the EU-community thus 
positioning themselves in the ‘Partial rejection’ quadrant of the graph reported in Figure 8.1 above. 
Getting into more detail, Figure 8.1 above portrays a neat distinction between AFD, UKIP, and FN 
and all the other studied EU-opponents with reference to the EU-regime target. This is to say that the 
first group of parties rejects the EU-regime on a principled basis questioning the authority of EU-
institutions in all the analysed policy fields. The case of the Italian LN is somewhat exceptional since 
the party proposes a pragmatic (thus pro-active) opposition to the EU-regime in both environmental 
and immigration-related policies. The results reported in the last graph of Figure 8.1 (EU-community 
target), depict a somewhat mixed situation. In fact, both PODEMOS and the FSM appear in the upper 
right-hand quadrant of the graph (FSM in economy-related issues and PODEMOS in both economy 
and environmental-related issues). However, once the target EU-community is further disaggregated 
(see Figure 8.2 below), a distinction between the EU-opponents that is similar to the one presented for 
the EU-regime target emerges. LN, FN, UKIP, and AFD constantly position themselves in the upper 
right-hand quadrant of the each graph presented in Figure 8.2 below, thus delineating a ‘Total rejection’ 
of the EU and of the two studied geometries. On the contrary, FSM, LINKE, and PODEMOS are 
critical of the EU but in a more pragmatic way. Interestingly, the LINKE supports the EU in a 
principled way in the field of immigration and the FSM pragmatically endorses the EU in 
environmental protection. FSM, PODEMOS, and LINKE cluster together with the other EU-
opponents in the graph referring to the Euro area geometry. This is to say that such parties do not 
configure a rejection of the EU as such but rather a strong rejection of the Euro area.  
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Figure 8. 2: EU-opponents’ positioning toward the three sub-targets of the EU-community  
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Consequently, FSM, PODEMOS, and LINKE might be considered both as purely anti-EU-
establishment parties and as anti-Euro parties: firstly, similarly to the other included EU-opponents, 
they strenuously oppose the EU-elite in a principled way but, differently from the other parties, they 
leave some room for manoeuvre in proposing changes to the EU-regime and the EU-community. 
Secondly, they position themselves in the upper right-hand quadrant of the Euro area graph, thus 
indicating a ‘Total rejection’ of the Euro area independently from their positioning vis-à-vis both the 
Schengen area and the EU as such. As observed in chapter 6, FSM, LINKE, and PODEMOS (apart 
from some exceptional cases) are generally pragmatically critical of the activity of the EC (the ECB in 
relation to economic policies) and ask for an increase of EP’s powers. According to them, the EP still 
plays a marginal role in the supranational decision-making process while it should be the centre of it 
since it is the only directly elected EU-institution and represents the will of European citizens: 
European democracy should be more representative. Furthermore, when addressing the EU – excluding 
both the Euro area and the Schengen area geometries – these three parties clearly endorse a reformist 
position particularly in the field of immigration. Interestingly, such parties ask for a solidarity-oriented 
community that is able to go beyond member states’ peculiar interest and egoism (see for example 
Chapter 6, section 6.5, page 166). In this vein, it is thus difficult to classify such parties under the 
‘umbrella concept’ of Euroscepticism. Indeed, they ask for an increased integration between member 
states, begging for a more inclusive (social oriented) and pluralist (democratic) community. 
If it is true that FN, UKIP, LN, and AFD share their anti-EU-establishment attitude with the 
other EU-opponents, their principled criticism does not stop at the EU-elite target but moves further 
toward the central components of the European political system: the EU-regime – EU-institutions 
alongside their functioning and funding values – and the EU as a community (see the upper right-hand 
quadrant of the EU’s graph in Figure 8.2 above). These parties might not be considered as purely anti-
EU-establishment since they reject any sort of potential change to both the EU-regime and the EU-
community: ‘they would not change – if they could – the government but rather the very system of 
government’ (Sartori, 1976: 133). The extension of the concept of anti-system parties 7  to the 
supranational sphere seems to be most adequate to describe the behaviour of these parties. According 
to Sartori, an anti-system party might work both from inside and from outside the system (Sartori 1976) 
because democratic systems are based on the assumption that political dissent should be 
institutionalized (Ionescu and de Madariaga 1968) no matter how strong such dissent is (Capoccia 
2002). Indeed, looking at the EU, it is clear that such parties are institutionalized – they regularly 
                                                        
7 Originally used to identify those parties (especially communist, Nazis and fascist parties) participating 
‘in order to destroy’ the system (Capoccia 2002: 11), such concept has been attributed to Sartori, 
however, according to Capoccia (2002) it already existed among the academic community and might be 
compared to the concept of major structural opposition (Dahl 1966), opposition of principle 




participate to the decision-making arenas of the EU – even though their actions and propaganda aim at 
delegitimizing the EU political system alongside its funding values and norms. Consequently, a term 
that can be used to identify these parties is anti-EU-system parties. As showed in chapter 6, the 
criticism expressed by UKIP, FN, LN, and AFD vis-à-vis the EU-elite is similar to the one expressed by 
the other EU-opponents blaming the moral quality of the European ruling class. On the contrary, 
when dealing with both the EU-regime and the EU-community, these parties behave differently from 
FSM, LINKE, and PODEMOS. They reject the authority of the supranational institutions accusing 
them to erode member states authorities’ sovereignty and to lack the respect for the principle of 
subsidiarity. In some cases, their exponents also clearly express the rejection of some specific EU-
institution – as in the case of the FN that rejects the existence of the ECB, see Chapter 6, section 6.4, 
page 154. Such ‘principled rejection’ is clearly visible also with reference to the EU-community. Not 
only these parties reject to widen and deepen the EU but also its current status quo. These 
considerations do not aim at proposing a ‘normative’ judgment of such parties, on the contrary, it is 
crystal clear that the positioning of such parties goes against one of the fundamental aims of the EU as 
expressed in article 1 comma 1 of the common provisions of the TEU marking a ‘new stage in the 
process of creating an ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe’. As emerges from the content of 
their speeches, such parties, in fact, wish to reduce the degree of EU integration getting back to a more 
‘intergovernmental’ collaboration between states, alias eliminating the EU as it currently is. This is 
clearly stated by Farage who wishes to see a European Union of member states working and trading 
together on a bilateral basis but without the flag and without the anthem (See Chapter 6, section 6.5, 
page 162). A similar conception is also clearly present in ENF EPPG’s charter stating that ENF MEPs’ 
alliance is based on the ‘sovereignty of states and their citizens, relying on the cooperation between 
nations, therefore rejecting any policy designed to create a supra-state or supra-national model’8. Other 
two examples are: firstly, the re-branded League’s electoral program stating that ‘Italy cannot exit from 
Europe. Italy geographically belongs to the European continent. However, the European Union is 
another thing. It is a giant supranational body without democratic legitimacy having a tentacular 
bureaucratic structure dictating the agenda to our governments’9. Secondly and similarly, AFD’s current 
position toward the EU confirms the finding reported in this work. According to the party, the 
‘Lisbon-Europe might step back to an organization of States that defend their interests and perform 
their tasks on the basis of the International law’10. 
As it is visible from Figure 8.2 above, FN, UKIP, LN, and AFD are also similarly hardly opposed 
                                                        
8 The complete text of the ENF’s charter is available at: http://www.enfgroup-ep.eu/about/  
9  The Italian version of the League electoral program is downloadable at: 
http://www.leganord.org/politiche2018  
10 The German version of AFD’s electoral program (2017) is available at: http://www.bundestagswahl-
bw.de/wahlprogramm_afd_btwahl2017.html  
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to the two studied EU-geometries: they reject the Schengen area (also in relation to their positioning vis-
à-vis EU’s migration policy) and the Euro area (similarly to PODEMOS, LINKE, and FSM). 
Furthermore, these parties tend to use the EP arena to express their opposition to the EU-geometries 
even in policy fields that are not strictly related to the corresponding geometry. This is to say that, for 
example, FN, LN, and UKIP express a total rejection of the Euro area also in immigration-related 
discussions (FN does it also in environmental protection-related speeches). This last consideration 
confirms the ‘opportunistic’ use of the EP as a public arena to diffuse their claims to a broader 
audience. Interestingly, the ideological factors play a central role in shaping patterns of opposition to 
the EU-community and the EU-regime. In fact, a high degree of opposition to these targets is generally 
associated with parties’ ideological extremeness and, particularly, with the right extreme-right 
ideological position of the EPPGs to which parties belong. It is, however, noteworthy that also factors 
related to the marginality of parties and EPPGs in the political competition are fundamental to 
understand patterns of opposition to the EU-community. In fact, those right-leaning parties not 
belonging to governing coalition at the national level and belonging to marginal EPPGs at the 
supranational level propose a higher, generally principled, opposition to the EU-community. Table 8.1 
below summarizes EU-opponents’ positioning toward the EU-targets.   
 
Table 8. 1: Categorization of the EU-opponents’ stances to the EU.  
Parties’ categorization Parties name 
Anti-EU-policy party 
Economy FN, LN, UKIP 
Immigration, asylum and borders 
control 
AFD, FN, LN, UKIP, 
PODEMOS 
Environmental protection --- 
Anti-EU-establishment party FSM, PODEMOS*, LINKE, AFD, FN; LN, UKIP 
Anti-EU-system party AFD, FN, LN**, UKIP 
Anti-Euro-party AFD, FN, LN, UKIP, PODEMOS, LINKE, FSM 
Anti-Schengen-party AFD, FN, LN, UKIP 
*PODEMOS proposes a pragmatic position to the EU-elite in two out of three of the studied policy fields, 
however the motivations it uses to oppose the EU-establishment in economy are similar to the one used by the 
other parties. ** See the text above. 
 
This work explores also the mainstream parties’ positioning vis-à-vis the EU as detailed in Figure 
8.3 and 8.4 below. Mainstream parties generally pragmatically support the policies enacted by the EU in 
all the three studied policy fields. However, some exceptions are present as in the cases of the PD and 
PS in immigration policy or of the British CON as discussed later on. Furthermore, similarly to the 




the EU-policies is driven by their ideological orientation.  
 Interestingly, the findings demonstrate that no principled pro-EU-establishment position 
expressed by mainstream parties allegedly exists. In fact, some of the studied mainstream parties show a 
principled opposition to the EU-elite especially in relation to the economic and immigration policies. 
As explained in chapter 2 and empirically supported in chapter 5 and 6, this result is connected to a 
broad-definition of the EU-elite target encompassing both ‘governing’ and ‘opposition’ elite. This is to 
say that even if some of the considered mainstream parties are depicted in the upper right-hand side of 
the EU-elite graph in Figure 8.3 below, they should not be considered as anti-EU-establishment. In 
other words, mainstream parties shift their blames on a specific set of actors, the populist Eurosceptic 
parties, accusing them to be unable to propose feasible alternatives to the discussed policies and to be 
there only to campaign and attract voters’ attention. In other words, while the group of EU-opponents 
diffusely directs its criticism toward the ‘governing’ EU-establishment, mainstream parties specifically 
propose a sort of ‘counter-extremist-party rhetoric’ directed against a specific part of the EU-elite: left 
and right-wing EU-opponents. In a nutshell, even if the contraposition between mainstream and EU-
opponents might be framed as a normal adversarial dynamic of parliamentary arenas, mainstream 
parties exercise a mainstream blame shifting vis-à-vis their political challengers, the group of EU-opponents.  
Contrary to the anti-EU-system parties (UKIP, FN, LN, and AFD), mainstream parties endorse 
the EU on a principled basis thus configuring a pro-EU-system position. However, differently from the 
anti-EU-system flank, this positioning also includes a pragmatic – thus pro-active – criticism to the EU-
regime. In fact, if it is true that, as emerges from Figure 8.3 below, mainstream parties do not show a 
principled support for the EU-regime their stances to the EU clearly go in the direction of a ‘Total EU-
support’ (see also Figure 8.4 below disaggregating the EU-community target). In other words, 
mainstream parties, differently from part of the EU-opponents accept the EU political system as it is 
but also propose some avenues of change to its institutions. The pro-EU-system position of 
mainstream parties is confirmed by the content of their more recent national electoral manifestos. The 
French PS sustains that the only way to relaunch France is ‘to invest in the European Project. Europe 
has to be stronger, more social and more democratic’ 11. Similarly, in its 2017 Bundestag electoral 
program, the CDU-CSU coalition defines its objective to achieve a ‘stronger, self-conscious and 
dynamic Europe’12. The Italian PD pushes its pro-European and pro-integration stance even further. 
Similarly to the Spanish PP, the party preaches for the United States of Europe proposing to overcome 
                                                        
11 The 2017 electoral program of the French PS has been consulted from the Comparative manifesto 
project dataset (https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/)  
12  The German version of the CDU-CSU electoral program (2017) is available at: 
http://www.bundestagswahl-bw.de/wahlprogramm_cdu_btwahl2017.html   
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EU’s institutional fragmentation through the direct election of an EU-president13.  
Some criticism toward the Euro area (pragmatic) is present also among the mainstream parties 
(CDU-CSU, PD and PS) that instead support the Schengen area on a principled basis, thus configuring 
a pro-Schengen-area position (see the fourth quadrant of the corresponding graph in Figure 8.4 below).  
As mentioned above, the case of the British CON is peculiar: the party is to be included among 
the EU-opposition flank since it always exercises either a pragmatic or a principled opposition to all the 
studied targets. In summary, the party is an outlier when compared to the other mainstream parties and 
shall be classified as a mainstream-EU-opposition party. 
8.3 Conclusion  
 
This chapter summarizes the finding obtained from the empirical research carried out in this 
work. It highlights how the reconceptualization of Euroscepticism in terms of political opposition 
using the tools of the comparative politics literature is useful to single out similarities and differences 
between EU-opponents. More specifically, it highlights how EU-opposition can be conceived as a 
‘cumulative’ concept entailing various aspects of criticism toward the EU political system: political 
actors might decide to endorse negative positions on the EU-targets in a cumulative way.  
Other three points deserves more attention. Firstly, the analysis of EU-opponents’ positions on 
the EU-targets enables to single out two main dimensions of competition distinguishing them. The first 
one relates to the anti-pro EU-establishment axis configuring those parties rejecting the EU-
establishment on principle and motivating their opposition relying on judgements of their moral values 
and integrity. While, the second one concerns to the pro-anti EU-system position and refers to those 
parties not only opposing the EU-establishment on principle but also rejecting the very system of the 
EU and wishing to take back national control.  
Secondly, both endogenous (ideology) and institutional factors contribute to explain patterns of 
EU-opposition. This points toward the fact that the cross-fertilization between both the thesis of the 
North Carolina (highlighting the role of ideology) and of the Sussex (relying on strategy) Schools are 
crucial to understand parties’ positioning on the EU.  
Lastly, the pure pro-EU position (principled support for all the aspects of the EU political 
system) is not confirmed by the results. In other words, there is no party represented in the EP that 
supports the EU in all its aspects on a principled basis.  
Next chapter systematises parties’ EU-opposition highlighting the conditions useful to identify 
them and stresses how factors both endogenous and exogenous to political parties influence them. 
Furthermore, it highlights three main avenues of further research in the field. 
                                                        








Figure 8.4: Mainstream parties’ positioning toward the three sub-targets of the EU-community 
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9.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter provides a systematization of the patterns of EU-opposition described in Chapter 8 
of this work. Section 9.1 delineates the conditions useful to distinguish political parties’ EU-opposition 
furthermore pointing toward the factors enabling such positioning. Moreover, the section stresses the 
higher heuristic value of the concept of EU-opposition when compared to the normativity of 
Euroscepticism further detailing the main contributions to the literature in the field. The following 
section – 9.2 – identifies the avenues for further research clustering around three main objectives. The 
first one aims at providing a broader understanding of patterns of EU-opposition’s evolution within 
the EU multi-level governance. The second research avenue accounts for a broader understanding of 
the factors impacting on patterns of EU-opposition within the EU governance. The last one concerns 
the development of a theoretical framework able to conceptualize the interconnections between two 
broadly discussed and ‘contested’ concepts: Euroscepticism and populism. 
 
9.2 An assessment of parties’ EU-opposition 
 
The core objective of this work was to understand toward which targets parties represented in 
the EP express their opposition. From such an evaluation it is now possible to trace some guidelines 
useful to classify parties’ opposition to the EU. It is, however, important to stress that such guidelines 
are not meant to be considered as a fixed and stable typology since, as mentioned several times in this 
work, EU-opposition varies through time. Furthermore, as mentioned in the previous chapter EU-
opposition should be considered as a cumulative concept: various aspects of the EU are criticisable and 
parties shape their opposition to the EU choosing which aspects to criticise. Table 9.1 below 
summarizes the conditions to identify the paths of political parties’ EU-opposition: such conditions are 
either necessary or non-necessary but possible or impossible (see below for further explanations).  
However, before detailing the patterns of parties’ EU-opposition, it is important to stress that a 
party can always express some form of ‘soft’ criticism toward one of the EU-targets. Once such 
criticism is pragmatically oriented – pragmatic opposition – it has to be framed as a normal feedback 










EU-policy EU-elite EU-regime EU  Euro area Schengen area 
Pragmatic Principled Pragmatic Principled Pragmatic Principled Pragmatic Principled Pragmatic Principled Pragmatic Principled 
Anti EU-policy X ✓  O O O O O O O O O O 
 
Anti-EU-
establishment O O X ✓  O X O X O O O O 
 
Anti-EU-
system  O O X ✓  X ✓  X ✓  O O O O 
 
Anti-Euro O O O O O O O O X ✓  O O 
 
Anti-Schengen O O O O O O O O O O X ✓  
Legend  
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Starting from the first target of EU-opposition, a party can be classified as anti-EU-policies if it 
exercises a principled opposition to this target discharging any pro-active – pragmatic – criticism. Such 
opposition depends mainly upon both the treated policy and the ideological platform of the party per 
se. This conclusion resembles the one reached by the North Carolina School distinguishing 
‘Eurosceptics’ according to their positioning along the GAL-TAN axis. Left and extreme-left wing 
parties oppose the EU-policies because they fundamentally threaten ‘cherished radical left goals’ 
(Hooghe et al 2004, 128). This is to say that radical-left-wing parties oppose EU-policies that go in the 
direction of market-driven EU-integration but discharge social-oriented and market-corrective policies 
(Scharpf 1996, 1999), furthermore endorsing the social inclusion of the ‘outsider’ groups like 
immigrants or asylum seekers. On the contrary, right-wing parties link their opposition to the EU-
policies to the defence of the national community threatened by ‘immigrants, foreign cultural influence, 
cosmopolitan elites and international agencies’ (Hooghe et al. 2004, 131). Furthermore, they oppose the 
market-oriented EU-policies because they threaten the national economic development, thus 
identifying protectionist policies as a solution. Interestingly, however, the only necessary condition for a 
party to be considered as anti-EU-policy is that it opposes the EU-policies on a principled basis. This is 
to say that a party can express a principled opposition to the EU-policies independently from its 
position on the other EU-targets. Generally, however, whenever a party opposes the whole EU 
political system – anti-EU-system party – it tends to oppose also the output of the system, the EU-
policies, on a principled basis.  
Moving now to the second target, the EU-elite, as emerges from Table 9.1 above, an anti-EU-
establishment-party: 1) must reject the EU-establishment on a principled basis; 2) might propose 
pragmatic changes to both the EU and its institutions; 3) must accept the existence, the values and the 
norms of both the EU and its institutions. While the first and the third conditions are compulsory for a 
party to be considered as anti-EU-establishment (necessary conditions), the second one is not. In fact, 
an anti-EU-establishment party may preach for an assessment of the performance of the political 
system by appealing to potential avenues of change. However, an anti-EU-establishment party is not 
forced to do that. This is to say that a pragmatic criticism addressed toward the EU-regime is a ‘non-
necessary but possible condition’ for a party to be classified as anti-EU-establishment. This type of 
parties’ stances is mainly reflected in the thesis exposed by the Sussex School identifying 
‘Euroscepticism’ as ‘the politics of opposition’ (Sitter 2001). The distinction between pro and anti-EU-
political-establishment is rooted in the differentiation between the ‘ruled’ and the ‘rulers’ or, 
alternatively ‘the conflict between audience and politics, audience and parties, citizens and politicians, 
society and state, electorate and elected, (silent) majority and political establishment, private men and 
public officials, simple men and power elite, or civil society and partitocrazia’ (Schedler, 1996, 294). This 




are ‘self-referential and exploit (or create) an intra-political conflict’ between the mainstream governing 
elite and the non-governing elite (Schedler 1996, 307).  
With reference to the third target, the EU-community, an anti-EU-system party has to: 1) reject 
the EU-establishment on a principled basis; 2) reject the EU-regime; and 3) reject the EU-community. 
As mentioned above, an anti-EU-system party is not forced to reject the EU-policies, however, it is 
logical to think that an anti-EU-system party will exercise a principled opposition also to the policy 
output of the system it opposes. In other words, proposing a principled or pragmatic critique toward 
the EU-policies is a ‘non-necessary but possible’ condition for a party to be defined as ‘anti-EU-
system’. Interestingly, the anti-EU-system positioning is explained relying on the theses of both the 
North Carolina (ideology) and the Sussex Schools (strategy). From a strategy point of view, those 
parties excluded from the governing circle (mainstream governing elite) tend to be opposed to a project 
which nature is fundamentally elite-driven and perceived as distant from citizens’ needs. However, the 
ideological factor plays a crucial role in determining a potential rejection of the EU. In fact, left-leaning 
parties are worried about the market-oriented nature of the EU but they still endorse solidarity among 
EU member states to achieve a social-oriented Union able to guarantee European citizens’ fundamental 
rights and social inclusion. On the contrary, right wing parties reject the EU supranational system 
because it fundamentally threatens the nation state autonomy thus preaching for the abolition of the 
EU as it exists today asking for a more ‘intergovernmental approach’ to European integration. They ask 
for the cooperation between autonomous member states (e.g.: on a bilateral basis) and recognize the 
EU as an unwanted and undemocratic supranational body forcefully imposing its decisions on 
sovereign member states.  
Finally, the only necessary condition for a party to be considered either as anti-Euro area or as 
anti-Schengen area is that it rejects on a principled basis the existence of the geometry itself.  
From these conditions, it emerges that EU-opposition is a cumulative concept: parties might be 
opposed to: ‘the activity of the EU’; the people inhabiting the EU institutions; the complex of the EU-
institutions; the very idea of the EU-community, or the geometries deriving from the process of 
European integration. For example, an anti-EU-establishment party opposes the EU-elite on a 
principled basis potentially proposing changes to both the EU-regime and the EU-community. 
Furthermore it may choose to oppose also the EU-policies, the Euro area and the Schengen area either 
on principle or pragmatically.  
In conclusion, the main contribution of this work is to propose a way to avoid being ‘[t]rapped in 
the theoretical deadlock’ of Euroscepticism (Leconte 2015, 254) that presupposes a subjective 
definition of the EU. The reconceptualization of Euroscepticism in terms of EU-opposition, in fact, 
relies on the assumption that the EU fulfils the conditions to be considered as a political system 
(Kreppel 2002; Hix and Høyland 1999 and 2011; Hix 2005). As all political systems, also the EU entails 
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specific objects (Easton 1975) – the four EU-targets – that political actors might oppose or support 
either in a principled or in a pragmatic way. The conceptualization of EU-opposition along the four 
main EU-targets allows to further separate differences and similarities among political actors, enabling 
to categorize them more accurately. From this renewed categorization it emerges that, on the one hand, 
there is no party among the ones studied that accepts and supports all the aspects of the EU on a 
principled basis, this is to say that the pure pro-EU position is not empirically supported by the 
findings of this study. This confirms Usherwood’s statement that there is probably no one in the EP 
accepting the EU in all its aspects (Usherwood 2017). On the other hand, the differentiation between 
anti-EU-establishment and anti-EU-system parties reveals the fundamental heterogeneity of the EU-
opponents studied here. Similarly to what Ignazi does in his analysis of the Italian political system 
(Ignazi 2017), it is possible to state that the so-called Eurosceptic parties – especially the new ones like 
the FSM – brought a new dimension, or axis, of conflict in the EU political competition: the ‘pro-
establishment vs. anti-establishment’ one. Such dimension has become more pronounced since those 
parties competing upon it gained electoral consensus both at the national and at the European level. 
However, this dimension of competition is not the only one defining them. Indeed, there is a neat 
difference between those political actors that reject the EU-elite but accept the system – eventually 
proposing to change it – and those actors rejecting the elite, the institutions and the EU as a 
community alongside its funding values and norms. Some of the parties that are opposed to the current 
‘shape of the EU’ – like PODEMOS or the FSM – propose solutions going in the direction of more 
but different EU integration – more solidarity and harmonization among member states – rather than 
rejecting the EU and the European integration project tout court. Consequently, the political competition 
in the EP is also shaped around the pro-political-system vs. anti-political-system axis. The detection of 
these two axes of conflict – the pro-anti EU-establishment and the pro-anti EU-system – only partially 
confirms Mair’s assertion of the absence of opposition in the EU. On the one hand, it is true that an 
institutionalised government vs. opposition distinction does not exist at the EU level (as also confirmed 
by studies relying on RCVs – Braghiroli 2015). However, on the other hand, if most of the EU-
opposition in the EP is opposed to the EU and rejects it, some of the EU-opponents are exercising an 
opposition in the EU aiming at changing the EU. In other words, some parties are not simply opposed 
to the EU but are critical of the EU, do not reject it but aim at changing it. As long as such criticism 
remains unheard, those opposition parties proposing a ‘constructive’ criticism toward the EU will 
probably move toward a harsher position: opposition will transform itself into rejection. This is to say 
that if every criticism to the EU is framed in terms of Euroscepticism and considered as negative, then 
the system loses an important function of opposition: receiving feedback and reacting to them (Kaniok 
2012). This last assertion leaves room for the study of what Weßels defines as the ‘cumulation 




translate into generalised discontent and should spill over from authorities to regime’ or to the political 
community itself (Weßels 2007, 290). 
 
9.3 Where to go from here? 
 
Three main avenues for further research emerge from this study. The first one aims at providing 
a broader understanding of the evolution of parties’ paths of EU-opposition within the EU multilevel 
governance through time. The second one concerns the understanding of the factors shaping parties’ 
positions on the EU in the EU multilevel governance also with reference to the EU’s future 
developments. The last one deals with the development of new theoretical models able to link the 
phenomenon of populism to the one of Euroscepticism. In what follows, the chapter details how 
further research could address each of these three objectives.  
 
First, starting from the observation of EU-opposition within the EP, further studies could 
include a wider sample of national parties (e.g.: parties coming from different regions of the EU like 
CEE countries) and enlarge the time framework of the analysis focusing on a smaller sample of 
keynote speeches. This would allow observing the development of EU-opposition hand-in-hand with 
the development of the EU itself, especially with reference to key intentional (e.g.: Treaty reforms) and 
unintentional (e.g.: crises) events (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.1, pages 51-52) that contributed to burst 
criticism toward the EU. Did opposition to the EU evolve as a function of key intentional and 
unintentional events over time? This branch of research is extremely important with a view to the 
future developments of the EU. In fact, the next EP elections in 2019, will, probably, partially change 
the dynamics within the EP and, more broadly, within the general EU institutional architecture. In this 
sense, a study dealing with EU-opposition over a longer time period will help scholars to better 
understand criticism within the ‘consensual’ arena of the EP and to start questioning if a higher 
presence of critical voices in the EU institutions could signify the end or the modification of the EP as 
a consensual institution and of the EU as a consensual political system.  
Furthermore, as stressed in the methodological chapter of this work (see Chapter 4, section 4.3.1) 
the parties’ positioning vis-à-vis the EU is elaborated on the overall production of the speeches by the 
national parties (the main unit of analysis), excluding the evaluation of intra-parties divergences. An 
alternative procedure is to propose case-study analyses on specific parties to observe if internal parties’ 
factions position themselves differently toward the EU and if their position changes in relation to both 
the reference context and the time framework. Are national parties homogeneous in their stances to the 
EU? Does the degree of homogeneity of internal parties factions’ positions on the EU change 
depending on the context and the time framework of the analysis?  
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Considering the evolution of EU-opposition in the EP, future research could also investigate the 
relationship between patterns of EU-opposition expressed by MEPs through their speeches and MEPs’ 
voting behaviour. Brack and Costa (2017) argue that mainstream parties are generally able to compose a 
stabilized majority on key political issues in the EP, which enables them to avoid cooperation with so-
called Eurosceptic EPPGs. However, the same scholars note that the main political groups (EPP and 
S&D) lost approximately 10% of their seat share in the EP after the last EP elections and, to secure 
their majority in the EP, they needed to increase the number of RCVs held together: ‘during the first 
year of the 8th term, the two main groups voted together in four out of five times’ (Brack and Costa 
2017, 377). Consequently, it is imaginable that variations in the number of representatives from so-
called Eurosceptic parties will influence also the patterns of votes in the EP. But, are such votes related 
to the patterns of EU-opposition expressed in the EP? Do MEPs vote like they speak? Is there any 
mismatch between the position expressed in their speeches and the way MEPs vote? Further research 
in the field could look at the interaction between patterns of EU-opposition deriving from MEPs’ 
speeches and patterns of voting behaviour considering different types of RCVs where the EP has an 
‘institutional power’ like in the case of the investiture or censure of the commission.  
Furthermore, the proposed reconceptualization of Euroscepticism in terms of EU-opposition is 
flexible enough to allow researchers to understand how the various aspects of the EU are politicised 
within the institutional arenas at the national level and how such politicisation evolves through time. A 
comparison of parties’ positioning on the EU in two political arenas, national and supranational, could 
provide insights about the development of this phenomenon in the multilevel system of the EU. A 
comparison between the two levels will provide scholars with a more detailed picture of EU-opposition 
in Europe since ‘only an analysis that includes at least the two major levels (the supranational and the 
national level), and the manifold interdependencies between them, may hope to produce realistic 
insights into the working logics of European governance’ (Helms 2008, 213). Data availability, like 
freely consultable speeches held in the various national arenas, provides researchers with sufficient 
empirical resources to enable this comparison: do parties oppose the EU in a similar way between the 
two levels? How do their stances on the EU evolve trough time between the two levels? New 
researches could also question whether there is a mismatch in parties’ positioning vis-à-vis the European 
and their national political systems. As above-mentioned, a party like the Italian League – former LN – 
endorses a different stance toward the national and the supranational political systems. Consequently, 
further investigations could aim at understanding how EU-opponents around Europe behave vis-à-vis 
the European and their national political systems and if their behaviour toward the national system 
changes through time as in the case of the Northern League (the current League). At the national level, 
the League does not anymore oppose the political system. In fact, its position toward the national 




the independence of the Padania1 – to a sovereigntist position, which became even stronger during the 
last national election (see the study by Ignazi 2017 for further insights). On the contrary, at the 
supranational level, the League shows strong signs of principled rejection of the EU. Consequently, if a 
mismatch is detected, what shapes such mismatch?  
Studying the evolution of patterns of EU-opposition between the two main levels of the EU 
multilevel governance (national and supranational) opens a further avenue for future research 
concerning the impact of such patterns on the policy output of the political system where forces critical 
toward the EU operate. It is, in fact, imaginable that the presence of voices critical toward the EU in 
the decision-making arenas of the EU multilevel governance might exercise a long-term effect on the 
policies formulated within such arenas.  
 
As for the factors shaping patterns of EU-opposition, the analysis performed in chapter 7 of this 
work points toward the central role played by two sets of factors: parties’ ideological orientation 
(endogenous characteristic of parties) and parties’ marginality within the national political system (i.e. 
governing or non-governing position). The parties positioning toward the extremes (left and right) of 
the political spectrum or belonging to right-leaning EPPGs tend to express a higher opposition to all 
the included EU-targets. Similarly, the parties that are marginal to the national political competition 
and, consequently, do not cover governing positions at national level exercise a higher opposition to 
the studied EU-targets than their governing counterpart. The cross-fertilization between the theses of 
both the North Carolina and the Sussex School is thus fundamental to understand criticism toward the 
EU in connection with the renewed relevance of ideologically extreme forces at the national level (see 
Chapter 3, section 3.2, pages 42-47). In fact, the possibility that ‘Eurosceptic’ parties will cover 
governing positions in some EU member states is not anymore to be a priori discarded: how will this 
change in the composition of both national and European institutions impact on their EU-opposition? 
The current case of Italy is an example of this mechanism. On the one hand, the recently formed 
yellow-green alliance between the FSM and the League enables these two parties to be represented 
both in the EP (see the results of the last EP elections in 2014) and in the Council of Ministers, 
covering roles that are typical of mainstream pro-EU parties. On the other hand, following the 
conclusion drawn in the previous chapter, the League and FSM’s positions on the EU have already 
changed. This can be seen in the so-called ‘Contract for the government of change’ 2 a document 
written by the two parties and containing the guidelines for the activity of the newly formed Italian 
                                                        
1 The term ‘Padania’ refers to the invented macro-region of the Centre-North extending as far as 
Tuscany in the South and Umbria in the South-East (Tarchi 2002)  
2 The Italian name of the document is ‘Contratto per il Governo del cambiamento’, the Italian version 
of the document is available at https://s3-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/associazionerousseau/documenti/contratto_governo.pdf 
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government3. From this document, it emerges that both parties have mitigated their position vis-à-vis the 
Euro area and foresee the objective to change ECB’s statute according to the model of the most 
important central banks in the world with the main objective to achieving a ‘monetary union that is 
more adequate to face both geopolitical and economic imbalances and that is coherent with the 
objectives of the economic union’. However, both parties in the period between May 2014 and 
December 2016 rejected the Euro area and asked for its dissolution. Consequently, their position 
concerning the Monetary Union has drastically changed. Furthermore, the League has also mitigated its 
intergovernmentalist position vis-à-vis the EU-community accepting to share with the FSM the political 
objective to achieve a common ‘European identity in the international scene avoiding the supremacy of 
one or more Member states over the others that is fundamentally in contrast with a democratic Union’. 
An objective that is further highlighted in one of the subsequent points of the above-mentioned 
contract stressing the need to comply with the Lisbon Treaty’s objective to achieve an ‘European 
citizenship that is the expression of the European citizens’ equality in terms of their interests and 
rights’. From these considerations, it is thus possible to hypothesise that patterns of EU-opposition 
expressed in the EP will be affected by future changes in EU-opponents’ role in the national political 
competition, thus by changes in the institutional Political Opportunity Structure (POS) shaping the 
composition of both the national and the supranational arenas.  
In a similar vein, it is also imaginable that the renewed strength gained by parties critical of the 
EU, both at the national and at the supranational level, will exercise an impact on mainstream political 
actors. Further research should thus investigate this potential question: are mainstream parties 
becoming more critical of the EU political system as a consequence of the increased strength gained by 
their ‘Eurosceptic’ political challengers? This study shows that mainstream parties are critical of some 
of the analysed EU-targets, particularly addressing a principled critique to a specific component of the 
EU-elite: their populist ‘Eurosceptic’ challengers. While this finding could be framed as a normal 
adversarial dynamic in the EP (See Chapter 5, section 5.2, page 113), the analysis of the used 
motivations points toward the presence of a counter-extremist-party rhetoric in mainstream parties’ 
speeches. But, has this rhetoric developed as a function of the increased presence of ‘populist-
Eurosceptic’ representatives in the EP? One way to answer to this question is to propose a fine-grained 
definition of the EU-elite target differentiating between its various components (Halikiopoulou et al 
2018): functionaries; mainstream ruling parties; non-governing parties; economic elite, and so on. 
Doing that, further research in the field will also achieve a deeper understanding of what does the EU-
                                                        
3 After several months of post-electoral bargaining, the winning centre-right coalition did not have 
enough seats to secure a majority in the Parliament and in the Senate. Consequently, both the FSM (the 
party most voted during the last national election) and the LN (currently the League, the most voted 
among the parties composing the centre-right coalition) agreed to form a governing coalition based on 




elite means to different types of parties and how they politicize this target.  
Apart from the institutional POS deriving from the marginality of national delegations in the 
national political competition, the empirical findings reported in chapter 6 and 7 stress the role played 
by supranational institutional POSs. In fact, the parties’ belonging to the same EPPG in the EP tend to 
express a similar criticism toward the EU – see the example of the FN and LN working in the ENF.  
However, such consideration is true only for some of the analysed parties. The case of the FSM and 
UKIP’s union in the EFDD is of particular interest. As highlighted several time in this work, these two 
parties show a ‘quantitatively’ and ‘qualitatively’ different position on the EU-targets thus confirming 
their ‘opportunistic’ union within the EP, they work in the same EPPG to receive funding from the 
EP. However, future EP elections could contribute to further change these dynamics: EU-opponents 
scoring better electoral results in the next EP elections could increase the number of seats allocated to 
these parties, thus contributing either to the numerical expansion of already existing EPPGs or to the 
creation of new EPPGs. Further research could thus provide an in-depth analysis of similarities and 
differences between parties working in the same EPPG, speculating also about their future 
aggregations.  
Besides the effect of ‘formal institutional’ POSs on patterns of EU-opposition (i.e. the 
marginality of both national parties and EPPGs in the political competition at the national and the 
supranational level respectively), this work considers also ‘informal institutional’ POSs. Chapter 7 
shows that there is a negative relationship between MEPs’ degree of political experience and their level 
of opposition to the EU-targets. In other words, there is a sort of ‘socialization effect’ (Navarro 2007) 
played by MEPs’ seniority on parties’ stances to the EU4. However, as mentioned in chapter 3 (See 
Chapter 3, section 3.3.1, page 51) it is fundamental to consider different sources of informal 
institutional POS: this is particularly true with reference to the media, both ‘traditional’ and social. 
Public media play a fundamental role in making European citizens ‘more aware’ of the EU issue thus 
potentially shaping the politicization of the EU issue and increasing its salience (Statham and Trenz 
2014; Börzel and Risse 2017). For example, as observed by Berry (2016) the use of both types of media 
helped the ‘leave’ campaign in the context of the Brexit referendum in two main ways. On the one 
hand, the Leave campaign was able to deliver simpler and more direct messages than its pro-EU 
counterpart, relying on the so-called KISS strategy5 (Keep it simple, stupid). On the other hand, the 
short-term effect of the leave campaign – particularly effective in the social media sphere – was coupled 
with the long-term process of political socialization where voters are exposed several times to the same 
                                                        
4 This is particularly evident with reference to the EU-regime targets, where parties, which MEPs are 
more experienced – politically ‘older’ – are less opposed to the EU-regime in general. 
5 The message ‘Take back control’, repeated by pro-Leave political actors at each available occasion is 
an example of effective message that could be easily understood by the broad public and open to 
multiple interpretations.  
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message. According to Berry, in fact, the short-term effect of the Leave campaign – through both 
traditional and social media – is coupled with the long-term negative picture delivered by the media, 
especially tabloid, of key issues like immigration and the EU. This is to say that when confronted with 
in-out options, British voters were unable to weight up the ‘costs’ and the ‘benefits’ of the EU 
membership in a rational and informed way. In summary, further research could explore the interaction 
between patterns of EU-opposition expressed in he EP and the politicization of political issues – like 
the EU – in the media. Is there a relationship between the way media in different countries politicise 
the EU issue and patterns of EU-opposition in the EP? Is there a relationship between patterns of EU-
opposition and parties’ use of social media like Facebook, Twitter or Instagram?  
 
The last avenue for further research emerging from this study deals with the development of new 
theoretical models able to link the phenomenon of populism with the one of EU-opposition. From a 
theoretical perspective, the anti-EU-establishment attitude of the EU-opponents points toward a 
broader research agenda concerning the interconnection between two increasingly discussed concepts: 
‘Euroscepticism’ and populism as more recent researches propose 6. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the contrast between the ‘ruling’ and the ‘ruled’ might be associated with an ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ 
populist parties’ rhetoric7 (Mudde 2004, Carlotti 2015, Caiani and Graziano 2016), a consideration that 
is furthermore confirmed by the fact that all the analysed parties are widely regarded as populist. In 
fact, the EU-opponents’ anti-establishment rhetoric lies in the contrast between the ‘pure people’ and 
the corrupted elite. As emerges from this study the EU-elite is mainly criticized for its lack of morality 
and contrasted to the pure people that are subjected to the selfish behaviours of the governing EU-
elite. Being Euroscepticism and populism two ‘variegated’ political phenomena (Pirro and Taggart 
2018), further research could investigate the link between the varieties of EU-opposition and the 
varieties of populist stances formulating a theoretical framework to analyse them simultaneously: is 
there any relationship between populist stances and EU-opposition? Is EU-opposition to be considered 
as a ‘component’ of populism? 
 
                                                        
6  See the special issue edited by Pirro and Taggart (2018) proposing the elaboration of an initial 
theoretical framework to understand the connection between populism and Euroscepticism in the 
midst of the multiple crises hitting the EU (Great Recession, migration crisis and the broad political 
crisis epitomized in the Brexit referendum).  
7 In contrast to Mudde’s ideological interpretation of populism, some other scholars have proposed a 
strategic understanding of the concept, according to which ‘populist ideas’ are empty signifiers 
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This appendix is divided into five sections: the first one (A.1) details the method used for the 
collection of the data alongside further insights distinguishing the collected speeches between the three 
analysed policy areas. The second section (A.2) provides the coding rules applied to the codification of 
the speeches, while the third section (A.3) details the codebook applied to the deductive coding of the 
speeches. The fourth section A.4 accounts for the validity and reliability checks applied to the deductive 
coding procedure. Lastly, section A.5 summarizes how the index of parties’ positioning on the EU-
targets is constructed providing the reader with further examples thereof.  
A.1 Data-collection criteria  
 
For the purposes of this analysis, a total amount of 7813 speeches has been collected for the 
period between May 2014 and December 2016 (first two years of the VIII EP legislature). A speech by 
a MEP is considered as: 
 
Each written or spoken intervention held in the plenary sitting of the European Parliament 
(EP) or related to the voting time in the plenary sitting of the EP.  
 
Speeches have been collected using a Python-based script available at 
https://github.com/alexeygridnev/MEPs-speeches 
The original version of the script allows the collection of the first 100 speeches by each MEP. To 
enable the collection of all the speeches delivered by each MEP, this work, instead of relying on pages 
URLs, uses the HTML page sources of each MEPs’ webpage following these steps: 
1. the HTML page sources reporting all the speeches for MEP are downloaded and saved in .txt 
file format;  
2. the .txt files are then used to download the entire collection of speeches through the Python 
shell. 
To filter the speeches according to the three used policy areas, a qualitative research has been 
conducted on the EP’s agenda of the meetings1. Furthermore, speeches have been divided into three 
main policy areas according to two main criteria: 
 
                                                        





1. The parliamentary committee responsible for presenting a report (e.g. ECON committee 
defines the speech as belonging to the macro-areas of economy); 
2. The subject of the speech held in the plenary sitting as indicated by the procedural files 
available on the webpage of the EP. The image below shows an example of speech belonging 
to the macro-area of ‘Immigration, asylum and borders control’ policies.  
 
Figure A. 1: Example of classification criteria for a specific speech held in the plenary session of the EP.  
 
Source of the image: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2015/2095(INI)  
 
A.2 Coding instructions 
 
The deductive analysis of the collected speeches is divided into two phases: first, speeches are 
split into quasi-sentences (QSs) according to the definition provided by the Coding scheme of the 
Comparative Manifesto Project: 
 
‘One quasi-sentence contains exactly one statement or “message”. In many cases, parties make one statement per 
sentence, which results in one quasi-sentence. Equalling one full sentence. Therefore the basic unitizing rule is that 
one sentence is, at minimum, one quasi-sentence. In no case can two sentences form a quasi-sentence. There are, 
however, instances when one natural sentence contains more than one quasi-sentence’2 
 
                                                        
2 Definition taken from the “Handbook” of the Comparative Manifesto Project. Electronic version of 






In the second phase, each QS is coded in one and only one of the categories belonging to the 
coding scheme presented below. 
The general scheme of the codebook is divided according to the four main targets of EU-opposition: 
1. EU-policies: to this target belong all the references that MEPs do with respect to the policies 
under discussion, the implementation of the specific policy or the analysis of the obtained 
results. 
2. EU-elite: to this target belong all the references expressed by MEPs toward politicians (at the 
EU level) like for example some specific commissioner or groups of people like ‘technocrats’. 
Such mentions encompass both the evaluation of EU-elite’s performance and judgements of 
the moral conduct or values of the EU-elite. It is to be noted that the definition of elite is 
intentionally kept as broader as possible and that it encompasses also non-elected authorities 
playing a role in the activity of the EU.  
3. EU-regime: to this target belong all the references done to the institutions of the EU, to their 
values, their norms and their activity. It is essential that the quasi-sentences either report the 
name of the institution or a substitute thereof. It is to be noted that the target ‘EU-regime’ 
is further subdivided into 4 main sub-targets: 
a. European Parliament; 
b. European Commission; 
c. Council of Ministers; 
d. Other institutions (e.g. European Central Bank). 
 
4. EU-community: to this targets belong all the references that deal with: 
a. The current state of the EU; 
b. The competencies of the EU along the national vs. supranational axis; 
c. The ‘values’ of the EU (as expressed by the Treaties); 
d. The state of democracy at the EU level; 
e. The geometries resulting from the process of European integration (e.g. the Euro area 
or the Schengen area, main recipient of opposition in this work).  
 To sum up, this target includes all the references that can be detected along the alienation-
integration continuum expressing the position of every single orator with reference to the 
community.  
 
The identified QSs belonging to one of the four targets mentioned above are coded in one of the 
categories proposed in the codebook (presented below) according to their directionality:  




2. Directional Negative: QSs expressing a negative judgement;  
3. Non-directional (this category has been inserted to collect all the quasi-sentences that do not 
report a judgement by the orator, but only a description of facts).  
 
Besides recognizing the targets of support or opposition, this work aims at 
understanding the character of the expressed positioning (either pragmatic or principled). To 
do that it assigns different values to each quasi-sentence during the coding procedure: 1 for 
pragmatic expressions; 2 for principled expressions; and 0 for neutral assertions. Details about 
the used values are provided below for each category. Examples of coded quasi-sentence will 
be provided whenever possible.  
 
A.3 Codebook  
 
A.3.1 EU-POLICIES  
 
x EU-policy positive: 
o Positive mentions of the policy under discussion or of some of its aspects (the 
endorsement of specific technical aspects is included); 
o Positive mentions regarding the results obtained through the implementation of the 
specific policy under discussion or aspects thereof (even metaphors may be accepted). 
o The QSs coded under this category use expressions of support like: ‘I support’, ‘I 
endorse’, ‘I am favourable’. 
x EU-policy negative: 
o Negative mentions of the policy under discussion or of some of its aspects (specific 
technical aspects are included); 
o Negative mentions of the results obtained through the implementation of the specific 
policy under discussion or aspects thereof. Negative mentions of the lack of 
implementation of the specific policy under discussion (or aspects thereof) are also 
included (even metaphors may be accepted). 
o The QSs coded under this category use expression of opposition like: ‘I oppose’; ‘I am 
not favourable’, ‘I regret’.  
x EU-policy non-directional: 
o Explanation of what has been debated, voted or treated during the plenary session; 




policies. These explanations do not provide the position of the orator but an ‘aseptic’ 
description of the potential results of a specific policy; 
o Rhetorical questions regarding the policies but not expressing a precise direction 
(positive or negative). 
 
Values applied to the quasi-sentences referring to the target of EU-policies: 
x EU-policy positive: 
o Value of 1: defines a pragmatic character of the expressed support. The evaluation is 
based on ‘means-ends’ rationality according to the given utility (the speaker wants to 
maximize the utility). The speaker expresses support for the substantial policy under 
discussion. Generally, the speaker refers positively – thus using positive expressions – to 
specific details of the policy under discussion. Example: ‘I support this report that allows 
the EP to indicate the European Commission which are the points to be added to the 
legislation regarding the circular economy’ (Marco Zullo’s speech on the ‘Resource 
efficiency, moving toward a circular economy’ 9th July 2015); 
o Value of 2: defines the principled character of the expressed support. The speaker 
expresses support deriving from the ideological stance of the party itself. Such 
evaluations are based on normative arguments about values and moral standards. 
Example: ‘I voted firmly in favour of EU adhesion to the Convention on international 
trade in Endangered spices of Wild Fauna and Flora because I believe that the moment 
has come for the EU to work in this direction’ (Marco Zullo Speech on the 
‘Convention on International Trade in Endangered Spices-CITES’, 16th December 
2014, emphasis added). 
x EU-policies negative: 
o Value of 1: defines the pragmatic character of the expressed opposition. The speaker 
expresses opposition for a substantial policy under discussion, generally proposing the 
implementation of changes. Example: ‘the funds for the reception of migrants and 
management of immigration fluxes allocated by the EU and by each Member State must 
be subjected to stricter surveillance in order to prevent frauds, speculations and wastes’ 
(Laura Agea’s speech on the ‘Summary expulsions and the proposed legalization of “hot 
returns” in Spain’ 25th November 2014); 
o Value of 2: defines the principled character of the expressed opposition. The speaker 
expresses opposition for the substantial policy under discussion that is based on 
principle. Such evaluations are based on normative arguments about values and moral 




of climate alarmism’ (Roger Helmer’s speech ‘Towards a new international climate 
agreement in Paris’ 14th of October 2015, emphasis added). 
x EU-policies non-directional: 
o Value of 0: the coded quasi-sentences belonging to the ‘non-directional’ category are 
provided with a neutral value (0) since no evaluation of the specific character of the 
expressed party positioning is to be detected. Example: ‘With regard to the motion for a 
resolution on the EU strategic objectives for the 17th meeting of the Conference of the 
Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES), to be held in Johannesburg (South Africa) from 24th September to 
5th October 2016, this vote is not about CITES itself’ (Diane James’ speech on the ‘Key 
objectives for the CITES CoP17 meeting in Johannesburg’, 15th September 2016).  
A.3.2 EU-ELITE 
 
x EU-elite positive: 
o Positive mentions of the activity of one or more specific politician part of the EU-elite 
(functionaries are included in the definition of EU-elite); 
o Positive mentions concerning the moral conduct and/or the values of a specific 
politician or group thereof (functionaries are included in the definition of EU-elite). 
o Positive references to a set of people who do not strictly belong to the political sphere 
but are, nevertheless, considered as a sort of powerful elite ruling Europe, like in the 
case of lobbyists. 
x EU-elite negative:  
o Negative mentions of the activity of one or more specific politician part of the EU-elite 
(functionaries are included in the definition of EU-elite); 
o Negative mentions concerning the moral conduct and/or the values of a specific 
politician or group thereof (functionaries are included in the definition of EU-elite); 
o Negative references to a set of people not strictly belonging to the political sphere but 
are, nevertheless, considered as a sort of powerful elite ruling Europe, like in the case of 
lobbyists. 
x EU-elite non-directional  
o Non-directional references to the elite, like explanations of what a specific group of 
people or a specific member of the EU-elite do or say in the EP plenary sittings or in 






Values applied to the quasi-sentences regarding the EU-elite target: 
x EU elite positive: 
o Value of 1: defines the pragmatic character of the expressed support. The evaluation is 
based on ‘means-ends’ rationality according to the given utility (the speaker wants to 
maximize the utility). In this case, it refers to pragmatic support for the activity 
exercised by either a specific authority or group thereof. Example: ‘Mister President, 
honourable colleagues, I will use these two minutes to thank the colleagues who gave 
me the opportunity to show that it does not matter where one seat in this Parliament if 
one really wants to represent citizen’s needs’ (Laura Agea’s speech on the ‘Green 
employment initiative- Guidelines for the employment policies of Member States’, 7th 
July 2015); 
o Value of 2: defines the principled character of the expressed support. In this case, it 
refers to the principled support for either a specific authority or group thereof (e.g. 
positively stressing their moral value or their moral conduct). Such evaluations are based 
on normative arguments about values and moral standards. 
x EU-elite negative:  
o Value of 1: defines the pragmatic character of the expressed opposition. The evaluation 
is based on ‘means-ends’ rationality according to the given utility (the speaker wants to 
maximize the utility). In this case, it refers to the pragmatic opposition of the activity 
exercised either by a specific component of the elite or group thereof. Example: ‘So one 
lesson that I want to leave with you all is that you have created mass unemployment by 
pushing forward this legislation that kills jobs and kills British industry’ (Tim Aker’s 
speech concerning the ‘Limitation of emissions of certain pollutants into the air’, 7th 
October 2015); 
o Value of 2: defines the principled character of the expressed opposition. This criticism 
is centred on the evaluation of the moral conduct and/or the values of the specific 
component of the EU-elite or group thereof. Such evaluations are based on normative 
arguments about values and moral standards. Example: ‘Instead of censure of politicians 
like Mr Juncker, who were involved in allowing corporations to extract exceedingly large 
profits from the ordinary citizens of Europe (…)’ (Steven Woolfe’s speech on ‘Tax 








x EU-elite non-directional: 
o Value of 0: the coded quasi-sentences belonging to the non-directional category are 
provided with a neutral value (0) since no evaluation of the specific character of the 
expressed party positioning is to be detected.  
A.3.3 EU-REGIME  
 
As stressed before, this target is split into sub-targets to enable the observation of parties’ 
attitudes to the three most important institutions of the EU (the EC, the Council and the EP) 
including also an ‘Other institutions’ category (encompassing institutions like the ECB). 
Nevertheless, it is to be noted that positive, negative or non-directional mentions can refer to 
the whole complex of EU-institutions. During the coding procedure, also these mentions are 
taken into consideration. Here we have an example.  
 
x Helmer UKIP (10/2015) ENVIRONMENT: ‘These decisions and these targets 
should be taken and set by democratically elected parliaments at the national level, 
and not by unrepresentative, unaccountable bureaucratic institutions in foreign countries’ 
(emphasis added). 
 
A.3.3.1  EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT  
x European Parliament positive: 
o Positive mentions of the EP in general (e.g. references to the values of the EP); 
o Positive mentions of the activity and the competencies of the EP; 
o Positive mentions of the powers and role played by the EP; 
o Positive mentions of a potential implementation of the role and powers of the EP. 
x European Parliament negative: 
o Negative mentions of the EP in general (e.g. references to the values of the EP); 
o Negative mentions of the activity and the competencies of the EP; 
o Negative mentions of the powers and role played by the EP; 
o Negative mentions of the potential implementations of the role and powers of the EP. 
x European Parliament non-directional: 
o References to the activity of the EP, to its role and/or its powers that do not express 







A.3.3.2  EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
x Commission Positive: 
o Positive mentions of the Commission in general; 
o Positive mentions of the activity and the competencies of the Commission; 
o Positive mentions of the powers and role played by the Commission;  
o Positive mentions of a potential implementation of the role and powers of the 
Commission. 
x Commission negative  
o Negative mentions of the Commission in general; 
o Negative mentions of the activity and the competencies of the Commission; 
o Negative mentions of the powers and role played by the Commission (e.g. a power grab 
accusation directed toward the Commission);  
o Negative mentions of the potential implementations of the role and powers of the 
Commission. 
 
x Commission non-directional:  
o References to the activity of the Commission, to its role and/or its powers that do not 
express any kind of evaluation; 
 
A.3.3.3  COUNCIL  
x Council Positive: 
o Positive mentions of the Council in general; 
o Positive mentions of the activity and the competencies of the Council; 
o Positive mentions of the powers and role played by the Council; 
o Positive mention of a potential implementation of the role and powers of the Council. 
x Council negative:  
o Negative mentions of the Council in general; 
o Negative mentions of the activity and the competencies of the Council (e.g. lack of 
transparency); 
o Negative mentions of the powers and role played by the Council (e.g. interference or 
imposition of the Council over other institutions of the EU); 







x Council non-directional: 
o Reference to the activity of the Council, to its role and/or its powers that do not 
express any kind of evaluation. 
 
A.3.3.4  OTHER INSTITUTIONS: 
x Other institutions positive: 
o Positive mentions of other institutions in general; 
o Positive mentions of the activity and the competencies of other institutions; 
o Positive mentions of the powers and role played by other institutions; 
o Positive mention of a potential implementation of the role and powers of other 
institutions.  
x Other institutions negative: 
o Negative mentions of other institutions in general; 
o Negative mentions of the activity and the competencies of other institutions (e.g. lack 
of electoral accountability); 
o Negative mentions of the powers and role played by other institutions; 
o Negative mentions of the potential implementations of the role and powers of other 
institutions.  
x Other institutions non-directional  
o References toward other institutions that do not express any judgement concerning 
their activity or their roles and/or powers. 
 
Values applied to the quasi-sentences coded under the category EU-regime: 
x EU-regime positive: 
o Value of 1: pragmatic support for one or a group of EU institutions. The evaluation is 
based on ‘means-ends’ rationality according to the given utility (the speaker wants to 
maximize the utility). The speaker generally proposes endorsement for the activity done 
by each EU institution or group thereof. Example: ‘This revision has been improved 
thanks to the EP’ (Marco Zanni’s speech on the ‘Access to anti-money-laundering 
information by tax authorities’ 22nd October 2016); 
o Value of 2: principled support for one or a group of EU institutions. Such evaluations 
are based on normative arguments about values and moral standards. The speaker 
expresses principled support for the values underpinning the specific institutions, 
favouring also a potential enlargement of the competencies of the specific institution. 




democratically elected by citizens, it represents, de facto, European citizens’ will’ (Laura 
Ferrera’s speech on the ‘Provisional measures in the area of international protection for 
the benefit of Italy and Greece’, 8th September 2015, emphasis added). 
x EU-regime negative: 
o Value of 1: pragmatic opposition to one or a group of EU institutions. The evaluation 
is based on ‘means-ends’ rationality according to the given utility (the speaker wants to 
maximize the utility). In these quasi-sentences, the speaker opposes the activity of that 
specific institution or group thereof, without contesting its existence. Example: ‘we 
denounced the management of the Supervision Mechanism by the ECB, demanding to 
the ECB a higher transparency’ (Marco Valli’s speech regarding the ‘European Central 
Bank annual report 2014’, 25th February 2016); 
o Value of 2: principled opposition to one or a group of EU-institutions. Such 
evaluations are based on normative arguments about values and moral standards. In 
these quasi-sentences, the speaker opposes the values underpinning that specific 
institution and/or contests its existence. Example: ‘We do not trust the unelected EU 
Commission to decide on the protection of the environment and animal welfare’ 
(Gerard Batten’s speech on the ‘Mid-term review of the EU biodiversity strategy’, 2nd 
February 2016, emphasis added).  
 
A.3.4 EU-COMMUNITY  
x Community positive:  
o Positive mentions of the current state of the EU; 
o Positive mentions of the competencies of the EU (the national vs. supranational debate 
on EU competencies); 
o Positive mentions of the current state of democracy in the EU; 
o Positive mention of some geometries deriving from the process of European 
integration (i.e., Euro area or Schengen area); 
o Positive mentions of the values of the EU; 
o Positive mentions of the process of European integration.  
x  Community negative: 
o Negative mentions of the current state of the EU; 
o Negative mentions of the competencies of the EU (the national vs. supranational 
debate on EU competencies); 




o Negative mentions of some geometries deriving from the process of European 
integration (e.g. Euro area or Schengen area); 
o Negative mentions referring to values of the EU; 
o Negative mentions of the process of European integration. 
x Community non-directional:  
o References toward the EU in general or some of its specific configurations that do not 
imply any judgement. 
 
Values applied to the quasi-sentences coded under the category EU-community: 
N.B: Since this target (EU-community) encompasses also the two main geometries deriving from the 
process of EU-integration (Euro and Schengen area) a further variable is created such that it is possible 
to understand when a quasi-sentence refers to the EU in general or to one of its different geometries. 
To do that three further values are defined during the coding procedure: 
x Value of 5: for all the quasi-sentences that refer to the EU-community in general; 
x Value of 3: for all the quasi-sentences that refer to the Euro area; 
x Value of 4: for all the quasi-sentences that refer to the Schengen area. 
All the quasi-sentences coded under the main category of the ‘EU-community’ (thus also to the ones 
referring to the various EU geometries) report a value to distinguish between principled and pragmatic 
positioning:  
 
x EU-community positive:  
o Value of 1: pragmatic support for the EU or for some of its geometries. The evaluation 
is based on ‘means-ends’ rationality according to the given utility (the speaker wants to 
maximize the utility). The speaker refers positively to some aspects of the EU or to 
some of its geometries. These quasi-sentences are positive in nature: ‘The EU can play 
an ambitious role taking the responsibility to act as an example in the important field of 
climate change’ (Marco Zullo’s speech on the ‘UN Climate change Conference in 
Marrakesh’ 6th October 2015); 
o Value of 2: principled support for the current state of the EU, its values and the state 
of democracy in the EU (also principled support for one or some of the geometries 
deriving from the process of European integration have a value of 2). Such evaluations 
are based on normative arguments about values and moral standards. Example: ‘Yet, 
belonging to the CITES 3  will enable the Union to act with a single voice in facing 
                                                        




international actors that have a less advanced legislation in the field, thus reinforcing its 
vision aiming at protecting plants and animals’ (Marco Zullo’s speech on the 
‘Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species- CITES’, 16th October 2014, 
emphasis added). 
x EU-community negative:  
o Value of 1: pragmatic opposition to the EU. These quasi-sentences are negatively 
constructed, however, the expressed critique is pragmatic in the sense that it is open to 
potential changes of the EU. In other words, these negatively coded quasi-sentences 
referring to the EU community do not refer to a rejection of the EU as such but 
proposes to change it. The evaluation is based on ‘means-ends’ rationality according to 
the given utility (the speaker wants to maximize the utility). The same value is used also 
for quasi-sentences referring to one or some EU’s geometries. Example: ‘The EU 
cannot be transformed in an under siege fortress for those people living on the other 
side of the Mediterranean’ (Laura Agea’s speech on the ‘Summary expulsions and the 
proposed legislation of ‘hot returns’ in Spain’, 25th November 2014); 
o Value of 2: principled opposition expressed to the EU community. Such opposition is 
not open to compromises but delineates a rejection per se of the EU (and/or of its 
geometries). Such evaluations are based on normative arguments about values and 
moral standards. Example: ‘Madam President, having been to the camps along the 
northern coast of the Schengen area, I can tell you it is a bonanza for criminal gangs and 
terrorists’ (Jane Collins and Diane James’ speech on the ‘Situation in the Mediterranean 
and the need for a holistic approach to migration’, 12th April 2016, emphasis added).  
 
A.3.5 NO-MATCH 
o Formally addressing gratitude toward some rapporteurs, commissioners or other 
political actors for the work done in preparation of the plenary sitting (generally done 
by all MEPs and should be considered as lacking specific meaning, like a formal 
address); 
o Simple points of order are generally regarded as no-match; 
o Sentences that remains incomplete (e.g. due to cuts of the speaking time); 
o Statistical data or descriptions of the state of the specific policy field; 
o Citations are generally also considered as a no-match category; 






A.4 Assessing reliability and validity of the deductive coding procedure  
 
An in-depth definition of the codebook is done to minimize the measurement error. However, 
the deductive coding procedure also relies on two different methods to assess the validity and intra-
coder reliability (consistency of the coding between time T1 and time T2).  
Apart from the in-depth definition and exemplification of the codebook reported in the previous 
section, the validity of the executed coding is ensured by two operations: firstly, a one-by-one in-depth 
analysis of the identified QSs ensure a higher validity of the coding procedure. Secondly, the word-
clouds presented in chapter 6 of this work represent a further instrument of ‘face-validity’ applied to 
the coded-negative quasi-sentences. Furthermore, relying on a double process of coding (deductive and 
inductive) enable to further reduce measurement errors. 
Unfortunately, the work relies on a single coder during both phases of coding, thus it is not 
possible to assess the inter-coder reliability. However, to provide further insights into the soundness of 
the used method of measurement, the coder’s reliability is assessed by comparing the same sub-sample 
of data coded at time T1 and at time T2.  
To do that, the reliability check is done on 5% of the analysed segments: 390 speeches are 
randomly extracted between the three policy issues and are coded both at time T1 and at time T2.   
The comparison between the samples of segments coded at time T1 and the sample of segments 
coded at time T2 provides 91% segments agreement. A percentage that is enough high to confirm the 
reliability of the coding procedure. The percentage of segments agreement is calculated relying on 
MaxQDA’s inbuilt function.  
 
A.5 Formulation of the index of EU-opposition: further examples  
 
As mentioned in chapter 4 of this work (see Chapter 4, section 4.3.1, pages 100-102), the index 
of EU-opposition is created starting from the frequencies of the coded QSs to calculate the ‘quantity’ 
of opposition according to the following formula  
 
𝑄𝑂  =
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐶𝑁 + 1
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁 + 1 −
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑃 + 1
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁 + 1  
 
Where CN is the quantity of coded-negative QSs, CP is the quantity of coded-positive QSs and 
N is the total number of QSs present in each corpus (each corpus relates to a target of the EU), thus 
including also the neutral QSs and those QSs belonging to the ‘No-match’ category reported in the 




maximum degree of support for a specific target) and +1 (indicating the maximum degree of 
opposition to a specific target). Once the quantity of opposition is calculated, the final version of the 
index takes into consideration also the ‘quality’ of opposition – deriving from the codification of the 
character of the expressed opposition either principled, taking the value of 1, or pragmatic, taking the 
value of 0. This is to say that a party endorses a principled opposition if the majority of the coded-
negative QSs for each target are coded under the principled character. The final version of the index is 
then calculated adding to the ‘quantity’ of opposition the ‘quality’ of opposition according to the 
following formula:  
 
(𝑄𝑜 ± 𝑞𝑜) ∗ 100 
 
Where 𝑄𝑜 represents the ‘quantity’ of expressed opposition or support to the four targets of the EU, 
and 𝑞𝑜 refers to the ‘quality’ of EU-opposition. The quality of EU-opposition takes the value of 1 if the 
expressed positioning is principled and the value of 0 if the expressed positioning is pragmatic. The 
formula presents the ± operator to obtain a symmetric scale of opposition/support. In other words, if 
𝑄𝑜 is positive (thus indicating that a party n is opposing one of the studied targets) the value of 𝑞𝑜 is 
added. On the contrary, if 𝑄𝑜 is negative (thus indicating that a party n supports a specific EU-target) 
the value of 𝑞𝑜  is subtracted. The resulting index is a continuous variable ranging between -200 
indicating the maximum degree of principled support and +200 indicating the maximum level of 
principled opposition, whereas a value of -100 relates to the maximum degree of pragmatic support and 
a value of +100 indicates the maximum degree of pragmatic opposition. If the index takes the value of 
0 it indicates that either the party does not refer to that specific target or that an equal proportion of 
opposition and support is present. 
The following examples help the reader to further understand the construction of the index:  
x Case 1: consider a party expressing a maximum ‘quantity’ of opposition to one of the used 
targets (thus scoring the value of 1), which opposition is pragmatic (thus scoring the value of 0), 
the creation of the additive index provides a total value of opposition of 100 (maximum 
pragmatic opposition).  
x Case 2: consider a party expressing a ‘quantity’ of opposition of 0.5, which opposition is 
principled (thus scoring the value of 1). The creation of the additive index provides a total value 
of opposition of 150. This is to say that even if the quantity of opposition expressed by ‘case 2’ 
is lower then the one expressed by ‘case 1’, an opposition based on principled considerations 




x Case 3: consider a party expressing a maximum ‘quantity’ of support (thus scoring a value of -
1), which support is pragmatic (thus scoring 0), the creation of the additive index provides a 
total value of support of -100 (maximum pragmatic support).  
x Case 4: consider a party expressing a ‘quantity’ of support of -0.5, which support is principled 
(scoring 1). The creation of the additive index provides a total value of support of -150. This is 
to say that even if the quantity of support expressed by case 4 is lower than the one expressed 
by ‘case 3’, a support based on principled considerations will be stronger than a support based 





This appendix presents the values of the EU positioning index used for the construction of the figures presented in chapter 5 of this work (see tables’ 
captions for further information). 
 
 




Overall Index of EU-opposition by party and target 
AFD FN LN UKIP FSM LINKE PODEMOS PP CDU-CSU PS PD CON 
EU-
policies 0.28 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.11 0.39 0.05 -0.06 -0.03 -0.001 -0.02 0.07 
EU-elite 0.56 0.48 0.55 0.58 0.33 0.45 0.62 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.16 
EU-regime 0.51 0.29 0.36 0.70 0.18 0.38 0.11 -0.04 -0.02 -0.003 -0.10 0.17 
 
EP 0.26 0.07 0.28 0.44 -0.03 0.06 -0.14 -0.16 -0.19 -0.29 -0.36 0.24 
EC 0.45 0.44 0.28 0.65 0.30 0.27 0.04 -0.06 -0.03 0.11 0.03 0.09 
Council 0.10 0.16 0.05 0 0.34 0.11 0.40 0.18 0.18 0.37 0.23 0.05 
Other 





0.50 0.69 0.43 0.85 0.22 0.13 0.26 -0.28 -0.31 -0.05 -0.16 0.19 
 
EU 0.46 0.66 0.47 0.82 0.15 0.06 0.28 -0.33 -0.41 -0.10 -0.18 0.14 
Euro area 0.50 0.53 0.25 0.60 0.56 0.34 0.24 0.03 -0.18 0.14 0.03 0.42 
Schengen 
area 0.32 0.55 0.45 0.49 0.13 0 0 -0.24 -0.27 -0.07 -0.38 0.34 
Source: Own calculation. The table reports both the EU-regime sub-targets and the EU-community sub-targets (grey cells). The data presented in the table have been 












Parties’ index of EU-opposition  
AFD FN LN UKIP FSM LINKE PODEMOS PP CDU-CSU PS PD CON 
EU-policy 
1 0.40 0.13 0.29 0.45 0.24 0.74 0.29 0.15 -0.03 0.15 0.06 0.07 
2 0.41 0.27 0.31 0.19 0.21 0.44 0.25 0.01 -0.03 0.09 -0.07 0.01 
3 0.31 0.13 0.11 0.20 0.12 0.31 -0.03 -0.09 -0.04 0.002 -0.05 0.10 
4 0.21 0.12 0.31 0.23 0.15 0.63 0.05 -0.10 -0.04 -0.01 -0.001 0.14 
5 0.39 0.12 0.14 0.23 0.08 0.80 0.07 -0.18 -0.06 -0.07 -0.01 0.05 
 
EU-elite 
1 0.45 0.46 0.30 0.44 0.45 0 0 0.34 0.20 0.04 -0.03 -0.10 
2 0.50 0.57 0.67 0.62 0.31 0.65 0.42 -0.08 0.16 -0.04 0.09 0.15 
3 0.57 0.56 0.66 0.65 0.32 0.63 0.64 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.01 0.21 
4 0.46 0.36 0.52 0.43 0.42 0.20 0.52 0.14 0.13 0.27 0.04 0.30 
5 0.64 0.58 0.41 0.51 0.56 0 0.43 0.02 0.10 -0.04 0.02 0.20 
 
EU-regime 
1 0.45 0.40 0.56 0.51 0.35 0.48 0.55 0.07 -0.10 0.05 -0.07 0.03 
2 0.41 0.45 0.46 0.52 0.26 0.35 0 0 -0.02 -0.12 -0.26 0.26 
3 0.58 0.33 0.29 0.68 0.12 0.29 -0.16 -0.03 0.04 0.04 -0.10 0.17 
4 0.46 0.30 0.36 0.63 0.25 0.41 0.57 -0.06 -0.11 0.06 -0.08 0.13 




1 0.09 0.68 0.17 0.69 0.20 0 0.54 -0.23 -0.46 -0.11 -0.30 0.15 
2 0.009 0.73 0.66 0.63 0.17 0.24 0.11 -0.29 -0.27 0.11 -0.13 0.15 
3 0.37 0.62 0.46 0.82 0.25 0.34 0.26 -0.27 -0.17 -0.03 -0.14 0.29 
4 0.59 0.71 0.545216537 0.82 0.28 0.05 0.48 -0.37 -0.52 -0.13 -0.19 0.26 
5 0.77 0.74 0.65 0.79 0.26 0 0.31 -0.61 -0.45 -0.11 -0.26 0.35 












Parties’ index of EU-opposition 
AFD FN LN UKIP FSM LINKE PODEMOS PP CDU-CSU PS PD CON 
EU 
1 0.07 0.66 0.44 0.62 0.13 0 0.42 -0.47 -0.35 -0.15 -0.32 -0.21 
2 0.53 0.68 0.59 0.71 0.13 0.24 0.11 -0.29 -0.30 0 -0.17 0.14 
3 0.59 0.55 0.40 0.80 0.24 0.13 0.24 -0.29 -0.33 -0.11 -0.21 0.29 
4 0.69 0.69 0.48 0.78 0.18 0.08 0.47 -0.33 -0.50 -0.13 -0.17 0.25 
5 0.63 0.72 0.50 0.77 0.16 0 0.51 -0.43 -0.43 -0.13 -0.27 0.33 
 
Euro area 
1 0 0.18 0 0.54 0.27 0 0 0.13 -0.43 0.41 -0.07 0.55 
2 0.46 0.54 0.47 0.53 0.30 0 0 0 0 0.34 0.08 0.12 
3 0.40 0.47 0.25 0.54 0.35 0.39 0.26 0.11 0.02 0.33 0.08 0 
4 0 0.27 0.38 0.56 0.49 0.14 0.11 -0.18 -0.15 0.22 -0.03 0 




1 0 0.31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.11 0 
2 0 0.41 0.19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0.20 0.56 0.45 0.31 -0.10 0 0 -0.11 -0.09 0.10 -0.21 0 




0 0 -0.18 -0.29 -0.08 -0.41 0.12 
5 0 0.36 0 0.40 0 0 0 -0.19 -0.10 -0.17 -0.21 0 













Table B. 4: Evolution of parties’ index of EU-opposition toward the four sub-targets of the EU-regime calculated for each of the five semesters of observation.  











Parties’ index of EU-opposition 
AFD FN LN UKIP FSM LINKE PODEMOS PP CDU-CSU PS PD CON 
EP 
1 0.14 0.11 0.23 0 -0.13 0 0 0 -0.25 -0.33 -0.39 -0.19 
2 0 0.28 0.19 0.36 -0.12 0 0 -0.20 0.14 -0.24 -0.50 0.41 
3 0.44 0.06 0.17 0.49 0.01 0 -0.45 -0.14 -0.15 -0.27 -0.42 0.27 
4 0.20 -0.06 0.11 0.16 -0.04 0.14 0 0 -0.39 -0.44 -0.23 0.11 
5 0.24 0.09 0 0 -0.04 9 0.02 -0.31 -0.29 -0.35 -0.44 0.37 
 
EC 
1 0 0.33 0.29 0.44 0.21 0 0 -0.13 -0.17 0.19 0.10 -0.05 
2 0.33 0.49 0.23 0.34 0.34 0.15 0 0.07 -0.05 -0.28 -0.20 0.30 
3 0.35 0.48 0.20 0.61 0.38 0.34 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.30 0.09 0.02 
4 0.29 0.44 0.32 0.58 0.25 0.08 0.35 -0.09 -0.01 0.28 0.12 0.18 
5 0.39 0.44 0.25 0.58 0.27 0.30 -0.14 -0.12 0 -0.10 -0.02 0.07 
 
Council 
1 0 0.11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.11 0 -0.11 0.13 
2 0 0.11 0 0 0.37 0 0 0 0.03 0.28 0.10 0 
3 0.13 0.28 0.11 0 0.19 0 0 0 0.46 0.36 0.19 0.11 
4 0 0 -0.11 0 0.163 0.14 0 0.18 0 0.28 0.24 -0.11 




1 0.63 0.31 0.46 0.32 0.42 0.48 0.62 0.20 0 0.13 -0.14 0 
2 0.54 0.55 0.35 0.27 0.46 0.24 0.23 -0.41 0 -0.19 -0.28 -0.12 
3 0.20 0.15 0 0.28 0.10 0.13 0.44 0 0.05 0 -0.05 0.17 
4 0.35 0.27 0.41 0.37 0.49 0.49 0.51 -0.19 -0.07 0.22 -0.19 0 








Index of EU-opposition by policy issue: four main targets 
AFD FN LN UKIP FSM LINKE PODEMOS PP CDU-CSU PS PD CON 
Immigration, asylum and borders control 
EU-policies 0.44 0.37 0.25 0.29 0.17 0.74 0.09 0.07 -0.02 0.06 0.08 0.29 
EU-elite 0.58 0.59 0.58 0.53 0.41 0.65 0.55 0.21 0.29 0.22 0.13 0.30 
EU-regime 0.54 0.30 0.47 0.44 0.06 0.33 0.08 -0.03 -0.12 0.02 -0.09 0.35 
Community 0.60 0.79 0.68 0.84 0.29 -0.13 0.51 -0.37 -0.48 -0.06 -0.23 0.38 
Economy 
EU-policies 0.38 0.09 0.17 0.27 0.19 0.42 0.14 -0.15 -0.02 0.01 -0.07 -0.05 
EU-elite 0.56 0.53 0.57 0.65 0.46 0.39 0.57 0 0.06 -0.04 -0.05 0.09 
EU-regime 0.50 0.33 0.47 0.71 0.23 0.39 0.22 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.18 0.12 
Community 0.72 0.72 0.41 0.83 0.66 0.22 0.21 -0.19 -0.24 -0.03 -0.03 0.44 
Environmental protection 
EU-policies 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.13 -0.0004 0.09 -0.05 -0.14 -0.07 -0.10 -0.04 0.03 
EU-elite 0.40 0.37 0.37 0.52 0.19 0 0.55 0.05 0.03 0.06 -0.07 0.11 
EU-regime 0.43 0.30 0.19 0.69 0.16 0 0.05 -0.11 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.12 
Community 0.32 0.61 0.35 0.79 -0.07 0 0.23 -0.43 -0.41 -0.13 -0.45 -0.03 
Source: own calculation. The data presented in the table have been used for the construction of the three spider-plots presented in Figures 5.7 (policy field: 
immigration, asylum and borders control, see Chapter 5, section 5.3, page 118); 5.8 (policy field: economy, see Chapter 5, section 5.3, page 119); and 5.9 (policy field: 





















Index of EU-opposition by policy field: sub-targets of the EU-community 
AFD FN LN UKIP FSM LINKE PODEMOS PP CDU-CSU PS PD CON 
Immigration, asylum and borders control 
EU 0.54 0.73 0.62 0.82 0.26 -0.13 0.52 -0.35 -0.46 -0.06 -0.21 0.32 
Euro area 0 0.36 0.17 0.10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Schengen 
area 0.40 0.66 0.51 0.53 0.17 0 0 -0.28 -0.32 -0.08 -0.45 0.40 
Economy 
EU 0.67 0.69 0.47 0.77 0.52 0.13 0.26 -0.30 -0.32 -0.20 -0.06 0.38 
Euro area 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.69 0.61 0.37 0.28 0.03 -0.20 0.17 0.03 0.50 
Schengen 
area 0 0.23 0 0.36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Environmental protection 
EU 0.32 0.60 0.34 0.79 -0.06 0 0.26 -0.43 -0.41 -0.13 -0.45 -0.03 
Euro area 0 0.37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Schengen 
area 0 0.24 0.12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: own calculation. The data presented in the table have been used for the construction of the three spider-plots presented in Figures 5.10 (policy field: 
immigration, asylum and borders control); 5.11 (policy field: economy); and 5.12 (policy field: environmental protection) of chapter 5 of this work (see Chapter 5, 




















Index of EU-opposition by policy field: sub-targets of the EU-regime 
AFD FN LN UKIP FSM LINKE PODEMOS PP CDU-CSU PS PD CON 
Immigration, asylum and borders control  
EP 0.45 0.08 0.27 0.28 -0.09 0 -0.17 -0.11 -0.17 0.10 -0.40 0.33 
EC 0.31 0.42 0.33 0.31 0.14 0.13 0 -0.09 -0.37 -0.29 -0.15 0.30 
Council 0 0.31 0.17 0 0.24 0 0 0.17 0.12 0.32 0.21 0.11 
Other 
institutions 0.19 0.35 0.27 0 0 0 0.25 0 -0.10 0 0 0.06 
Economy 
EP 0.10 0.06 0 0.43 0.005 0.07 -0.17 -0.25 -0.18 -0.31 -0.43 0.24 
EC 0.40 0.47 0.45 0.63 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.04 -0.043 0.03 -0.01 0.02 
Council 0.10 0.23 -0.10 0 0.30 0.12 0 0.11 0.40 0.38 0.20 0 
Other 
institutions 0.62 0.28 0.49 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.60 -0.21 0 0.03 -0.21 0.06 
Environmental protection  
EP 0.12 0.08 0.19 0.41 -0.12 0 -0.13 -0.10 -0.23 -0.32 -0.27 0.15  
EC 0.37 0.45 0.12 0.65 0.50 0 -0.05 -0.11 0.13 0.32 0.16 0.07 
Council 0 -0.08 0 0 0.20 0 0.46 0 0.07 0.27 0.21 0 
Other 
institutions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.17 0 0 
Source: own calculation. The data presented in the table have been used for the construction of the three spider-plots presented in Figures 5.13 (policy field: 
immigration, asylum and borders control); 5.14 (policy field: economy); and 5.15 (policy field: environmental protection) of chapter 5 of this work (see Chapter 5, 







The first section – C.1 – of this appendix details the structure of the inductive coding procedure for 
each of the analysed targets of EU-opposition: the EU-policies; the EU-elite; the EU-regime and the 
EU-community.  
Section C.2 reports the assessment of both validity and reliability of the inductive coding 
procedure applied in this work. Section C.3 details the construction of the word-clouds presented in 
chapter 6 of this work. Section C.4 reports the tables indicating the result of the inductive coding 
procedure for each included target of EU-opposition.  
The conclusive section C.5 reports the speeches’ segments cited in Chapter 6 in their original 
language following their order of appearance and providing further information concerning the 
speeches. 
 
C.1 Structure of the inductive coding procedure 
 
The inductive coding for the EU-policy target is the only one presenting three different schemes, 
one for each of the included policy issue: economy, immigration, asylum and borders control and 
environmental protection.  
Starting from the field of economic policy, 23 macro-categories aggregated in 6 broad themes 
have been created (see Table C.1 below). The first theme classifies QSs depending on parties’ stances 
on EU’s regulation of the economic policy. Parties’ motivation are classified as belonging to the 
categories of: freedom of enterprise; private property rights; the supranational economic planning; EU’s 
control over prices; the introduction of a European minimal wage; EU’s action to encourage enterprise 
(incentives) and European regulation of the market, banking, financial and fiscal sectors.  
A second theme emerging from the analysis relates to parties’ stances on the redistribution of 
resources in the EU’s horizontal (transnational) dimension. Depending on their wish to redistribute 
resources across member states, parties’ negative stances can either oppose or support a Keynesian 
management of the economy by the EU alongside the implementation of transnational solidarity 
mechanisms to help the member states experiencing a difficult economic situation. Due to the 
importance played by austerity measures in the EU’s economic crisis, the third theme encompasses 
motivations endorsing or not ‘EU’s economic orthodoxy’ and relates to parties’ negative or positive 
stances to both the implementation of austerity measures and structural reforms. Three ‘residual’ 
themes are created to collect justifications of opposition related to 1) EU’s economic imperialism 




it is damaging the society and the environment – pro EU’s economic imperialism – or disapproving it – 
against EU’s economic imperialism); 2) EU’s protectionism encompassing motivations either favouring 
or rejecting the implementation of protectionist policies at the EU level, and 3) general non-specified 
(critique to technical aspects of the policy under discussion).  
 
Table C. 1: Scheme of the inductive coding procedure related to negatively coded QSs addressing the EU-policy 
target in the field of economic policy. 
Inductive coding scheme: opposition to the EU-policy in the field of economy 
Macro category Theme 
Pro free enterprise (laissez-faire) 
EU’s regulation of economic policy 
 
Against EU’s economic planning 
Against EU’s controlled economy 
Against EU’s economic incentives 
Against EU’s regulation of market/banking/financial and fiscal sectors 
Against free enterprises (lasses faire) 
Pro EU’s economic planning 
Pro EU’s controlled economy 
Pro EU’s economic incentives 
Pro EU’s regulation of market/banking/financial and fiscal sectors 
 
Against EU’s Keynesian management 
Redistribution of resources at the EU level  Against transnational solidarity among EU member states Pro EU’s Keynesian management 
Pro transnational solidarity among EU member states 
 
Against EU’s austerity measures 
EU’s economic orthodoxy 
 
Against EU’s structural reforms 
Pro EU’s austerity measures 
Pro EU’s structural reforms 
 
Against EU’s economic imperialism EU’s Economic imperialism Pro EU’s economic imperialism  
 
EU’s Protectionism positive EU’s Protectionism EU’s Protectionism negative 
 
General technical critique General non specified 
 
Also in the field of immigration policies, 6 broad themes are created. Interestingly, such themes 
mirror the distinction between ‘immigration control’ and ‘immigrant’ policies already formulated by 
scholars in the field (see Hammar 1985). The theme ‘immigration control policies’ concerns the 
regulation of the entry and stay of foreigners in the EU, thus the control of external borders, ‘illegal’ 
migrants crossing, illicit systems connected to the entrance of migrants in the EU territory (e.g.: 
migrants’ smugglers); the redistribution of migrants within the EU territory; the resources used 
alongside a ‘law and order’ dimension concerning the effects (real or perceived) of migrants’ entrance 
on EU’s internal security. Parties can either endorse a restrictive or a permissive approach to the 
‘immigration control policies’ as reported in Table C.2 below.  
The second broad theme reports motivations concerning ‘asylum seekers’ including the 
recognition of the status of asylum seeker; alternative ways to help asylum seekers (even help in their 




the EU territory. Also in this case, national parties may endorse either a restrictive or a permissive 
approach. The choice to separate this thematic from the general ‘immigration control policies’ (either 
restrictive or permissive) is done to track parties’ stances to an issue (asylum) that rose in importance 
during the last three years in connection with both the Syrian and the so-called ‘migration crisis’ 
reaching its peak in mid-2015.  
The third broad theme concerns the ‘immigrants policies’ reported above referring to the 
integration of migrants within the EU territory from several perspectives: the economic integration 
(e.g.: integration of migrants in the labour market); the impact of migrants on EU’s welfare state, and 
the cultural and religious integration of migrants. Even in this case, parties’ motivations can be coded 
either as restrictive or as permissive.  
Other three ‘residual’ themes are constructed to include motivations for: 1) EU’s agreement with 
Turkey (general references to the EU-Turkey agreement, the internal Turkish situation and the respect 
of human rights in Turkey); 2) Effects of the EU policies on the immigration crisis (e.g.: EU policies’ 
effects on Africa), and 3) general technical critiques (related to technical aspects of the policies under 
discussion).  
 
Table C. 2: Scheme of the inductive coding procedure related to negatively coded QSs addressing the EU-policy 
target in the field of immigration policy.  
Inductive coding scheme: opposition to the EU-policies in immigration/asylum and borders control policies 
Macro-categories Theme 
 
Restriction of borders control (identification of migrants at border) 
Immigration control policies  
Illegal migrants  
Collusion with illicit systems (e.g.: human trafficking)  
Help migrants in third or origin countries  
Restrictive approach toward the redistribution of migrants within the EU 
territory  
Restrictive approach in the use of resources to welcome migrants  
Restrictive approach to the transfer of resources to other MS in difficult 
situations  
Enlarging security control  
Permissive approach to Borders control (identification of migrants at the 
borders). 
Increased guarantee of human rights and application of humanitarian 
measure to welcome migrants.  
Collusion with illicit systems (e.g.: human trafficking) 
Permissive approach to the redistribution of migrants within the EU 
territory  
Permissive approach to the use of resources to welcome migrants  
Deepening the understandings of the migration’s roots  
 
Stricter rules for the recognition and eventual expulsion of Asylum seekers 
(at borders)  
Asylum seekers’ control  
 
Help asylum seekers in their country of origin  
Connection between asylum seekers’ arrival and increase of immigration  
Negative effects of asylum seekers’ entrance on the EU territory  




Reform of the Dublin system to ensure more protection for asylum seekers  
Increase of humanitarian aid targeting asylum seekers’ arrival  
 
General restrictive address to the integration of migrants  
Integration of migrants  
 
Negative perception of economic integration of migrants  
Negative effects of integration of migrants on the welfare state  
Restrictive approach to the cultural and religious integration of migrants  
General permissive address to the integration of migrants  
Positive perception of the economic integration of migrants  
 
General addresses  
Agreement with Turkey Relationship between the Turkish agreement and ‘mass migration’  
Turkish internal situation  
Human rights (protection) in relation to the Turkish agreement  
 
Role of the EU in foreign countries  Effects of EU policies within the 
immigration crisis  
Cooperation with third countries permissive  
Cooperation with third countries restrictive 
 
General technical critique  General non specified 
 
Turning to environmental protection, the inductive coding procedure highlights the presence of 
10 macro-categories that are aggregated into four broad themes (see Table C.3 below).  
Parties that justify their opposition using motivations belonging to the first broad theme refer to 
the relationship between European environmental protection policies and economy; the use of 
alternative energy resources and the European Emissions Trading System (ETS).  
The second included theme relates to the genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and includes 
motivations either sustaining or opposing the production and distribution of GMOs within the EU 
territory. The analysis creates this ‘ad hoc’ theme for GMOs because they represent a highly politicised 
issue in the EU creating deep divisions among EU member states (Mühlböck and Tosun 2017).  
The third created broad theme refers to all the motivations either endorsing or rejecting a 
European solution of the so-called ‘Dieselgate’ scandal.  
Lastly, a ‘residual’ theme includes the motivations reporting a general technical critique of the 
procedure under discussion. 
 
Table C. 3: Scheme of the inductive coding procedure related to the negatively coded QSs addressing the EU-
policy target in the field of environmental policy 
Inductive coding scheme: opposition to the EU-policies in environmental protection policies  
Macro-categories Theme 
Opposing EU’s environmental protection at the expenses of the economic 
growth (e.g.: EU climate policy) 
Relationship between environmental 
protection and economy 
Opposing EU’s action in the implementation of alternative energy 
resources 
Opposing the EU ETS (Emission Trading System) 
Favouring EU’s environmental protection even at the expenses of the 
economic growth (e.g.: EU climate policy) 
Favouring EU’s action in the implementation of alternative energy 
resources 





Against GMOs’ distribution and/or production in the EU GMO Favouring GMOs’ distribution and/or production in the EU 
 
Opposing the EU’s solution of the ‘Dieselgate’ scandal Dieselgate scandal Favouring the EU’s solution of the ‘Dieselgate’ scandal 
 
General technical critique General non specified 
 
Moving the attention to the EU elite target the inductive coding procedure highlights 12 macro-
categories that are aggregated into five broader themes (valid for all the analysed policy issues, see Table 
C.4 below). 
Parties may motivate their opposition to the EU-elite evaluating their ‘performances’ – how 
much the elite is competent, skilful, and productive in carrying out its duties (theme 1). Alternatively, 
the EU-elite can be judged for its moral conduct (e.g.: accuses of collusion between the EU-elite and 
illicit systems), for its general ideological orientation (e.g.: pro-Europeanism, liberalism, pro-
globalization and so on), or for the characteristics, powers and competencies related to its role (e.g.: 
democratic accountability or lack thereof). The analysis stresses the presence of a ‘residual’ category 
including motivations targeting the performance, the characteristics, powers and competencies and the 
moral quality of specific members of the EU-elite (e.g.: Jean Claude Juncker).  
 
Table C. 4: Summary table of the inductive coding procedure referred to the negative coded QSs related to the 
EU-elite target in all the three considered policy fields. 
Macro-categories and themes deriving from the inductive coding procedure of negatively coded segments 
related to the EU-elite target (three policy fields considered) 
Macro-category Theme 
 
Activity of the EU-elite Performance of the EU elite 
 
Ethical behaviour of the EU-elite 
Moral conduct of the EU elite Collusion of the EU-elite with illicit systems  
EU elite favours particular/personal interests  
 
Federalist attitude of the EU-elite 
Ideological orientation of the EU elite 
Attitude of the EU-elite toward integration 
Attitude of the EU-elite toward globalization  
Extremist orientation of the EU-elite  
General ideological orientation of the EU elite in the three 
policy fields 
 
Democratic accountability of the EU-elite 
Characteristics powers and competencies of the EU elite Technocratic/bureaucratic nature of the EU-elite 
EU-elite’s authority  
 
Performance of specific members of the EU-elite (e.g.: 
Merkel, Draghi, Juncker)  Specific members of the EU elite Moral conduct of specific members of the EU-elite (e.g.: 
Merkel, Draghi, Juncker) 
 
For the third included target, the EU-regime, the inductive coding procedure highlights the 
presence of five broad themes valid for all the discussed policy fields (see Table C.5 below). 
 Parties judging the EU-regime on the basis of the first theme are critical of its performance 




Alternatively, parties express judgements of the characteristics, the powers and the competencies 
of the EU-regime using motivations belonging to the second theme (e.g.: evaluations concerning the 
lack of democratic accountability of the EC). 
 The third broad theme encompasses accuses of collusion between the EU-regime and illicit 
systems (e.g.: involvement of the EC in the Dieselgate scandal) while the fourth theme refers to parties’ 
judgement concerning the general ideological orientation of the EU-regime (e.g.: the liberal orientation 
of the EC).  
Similarly to what have been done for the previous targets, also in this case a ‘residual’ theme is 
constructed to collect motivations targeting other EU’s institutions (like the ECB, Frontex and so on), 
their performance, their values, their characteristics, powers and competencies, their potential collusion 
with illicit systems and their ideological orientation.  
 
Table C. 5: Summary table of the inductive coding procedure referred to the negative coded QSs related to the 
EU-regime target in all the three considered policy fields. 
 
Macro-categories and themes deriving from the inductive coding procedure of negatively coded segments 
related to the EU-regime target (three policy fields considered) 
Macro-categories Themes 
 
Performance of the EC  
Performance of the EU-regime  Performance of the EP  Performance of the Council  
Performance of the EU-regime in general  
 
Characteristics powers and competencies of the EC 
Characteristics powers and competencies of the EU regime  
Characteristics powers and competencies of the EP  
Characteristics powers and competencies of the Council  
Characteristics powers and competencies of the EU regime 
in general 
 
EC and illicit systems 
EU regime in general and illicit systems EP and illicit systems 
Council and illicit systems 
 
Ideological orientation of the EC 
Ideological orientation of the EU-regime Ideological orientation of the EP 
Ideological orientation of the Council  
 
Performance of specific institutions (ECB, Frontex and so 
on)  
Other institutions Characteristics powers and competencies of other specific institutions (ECB, Frontex and so on)  
Other specific institutions and illicit systems  
Ideological orientation of other specific institutions 
 
As for the last included target, the EU-community, 6 broad themes (alongside 24 macro-
categories) are created (see Table C.6 below).  
Parties’ contestation of the EU-community on the basis of the allocation of competencies and 
accuses of power grab toward member states and international organizations are coded under the first 
broad theme. Alternatively, parties criticise the EU on the basis of its current (and future) 




motivations targeting EU’s unity and harmonization, the values of the EU as emerging from its funding 
Treaties (e.g.: democracy, rule of law, subsidiarity, solidarity), the perceived ideological orientation of 
the EU-community (e.g.: multiculturalism, liberal orientation) and the degree of ‘complexity’ of the EU 
(e.g.: perception of the EU as a bureaucratic construct). 
 Parties justifying their opposition referring to the role that the EU plays within the relative policy 
field use motivations belonging to the third theme.  
The fourth included theme collects justifications related to the widening and deepening of the 
EU, thus reporting motivations addressing either the EU enlargement or the process of European 
integration.  
The fifth created theme gathers all those motivations expressing a wish to reform the EU (even 
vague motivations, like the expression of the need of ‘another Europe’ are included in this theme).  
Conversely, a sixth theme collects parties’ justifications expressing the rejection and the potential 
secession from the EU. 
Two further themes account for the two geometries studied in this work: the Euro area and the 
Schengen area. The first one collects all those motivations dealing with: the role of the Euro in the 
economic crisis; the need to reform the Euro area; the wish to take back national currencies’ control, 
and the rejection of the Euro alongside the proposals to exit from the Euro area. The theme ‘Schengen 
area geometry’ includes all those instances dealing with: the role of Schengen in the migration crisis 
(effects of Schengen); the need to reform the Schengen area; the wish to take back national borders’ 
control and the rejection of the Schengen area alongside demands for suspension or abolition of the 
Schengen agreement.  
 
Table C. 6: Summary table of the inductive coding procedure referred to the negative coded QSs related to the 
EU-community target in all the three considered policy fields. 
Macro-categories and themes deriving from the inductive coding procedure of negatively coded segments 
related to the EU-Community target (three policy fields considered) 
Macro-categories Theme 
 
Power grab of the EU vis-à-vis member states  Powers and competencies of the EU vis-à-vis national and 
supranational bodies Power grab of the EU vis-à-vis international bodies  
 
Unity and harmonisation among member states.  
Characteristics of the EU 
Perceived ideological orientation of the EU (e.g.: liberal, 
socialist union)  
EU as a technocratic/bureaucratic construct  
EU’s values (democracy, rule of law, solidarity etc.)  
 
Role of the EU in the economic crisis  
Role of the EU in the three analysed policy fields Role of the EU in the immigration crisis  
Role of the EU in environmental protection  
 
EU integration Widening and deepening of the EU EU enlargement  
 
Need to reform the EU  Reformist position 
 
Rejection of the EU  Rejectionist position Rejection and secession from the EU  
 




Reform of the Euro area 
National currency control  
Rejection of the Euro and the Euro area (exit)  
 
Role of the Schengen agreement in the current immigration 
crisis  
Geometry Schengen Reform of the Schengen agreement National borders’ control 
Rejection of the Schengen agreement (exit from the 
Schengen area)  
 
C.2 Validity and reliability of the inductive coding procedure 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4 of this work (See Chapter 4, section 4.3, page 102-103), the applied 
inductive procedure relies on the analysis of both the ‘manifest’ and the ‘latent’ content of the coded-
negative QSs.  
As for the manifest content, it creates few problems of reliability because of its relative 
objectivity: a quasi-sentence showing the word ‘austerity’ associated with words like ‘creation’ and 
‘unemployment’ objectively points toward the negative consequences of the application of austerity 
policies on the labour market. 
On the contrary, the analysis of the latent content is less reliable because of the higher level of 
the coder’s subjectivity. However, as mentioned in appendix A with reference to the deductive phase of 
coding, also the inductive phase rests on careful case-by-case examination. In other words, in spite of 
the large amount of coded-negatively QSs inductively examined (see Table C.7 below), it was possible 
to analyse all of them applying the same personal evaluation (Neuendorf 2002; Creagan 2005). 
Furthermore, a higher standard of accuracy has been achieved thanks to a three-steps examination 
implying: 1) sorting segments into micro-categories; 2) aggregating the identified micro-categories into 
macro-categories, and 3) aggregating the identified macro-categories into broader themes (see Tables 
C.1-C.6 above reporting the aggregation of macro-categories into broader themes). Indeed, a higher 
standard of accuracy is enforced by iterative data examination and analysis done by the same researcher, 
thus preserving self-reliability.  
Unfortunately, as mentioned for the deductive coding procedure, also the inductive coding 
procedure relies on a single coder, thus inter-coder reliability cannot be assessed. However, the work 
relies on the instrument of ‘word-clouds’ – see the next section – which provide the reader with a sort 








Table C. 7: Frequency of the coded-negative QSs used in the inductive coding analysis.  
  Number of coded negative QSs by policy target  
Issue Party name EU-policy EU-elite EU-regime EU-community Row total 
Economy 
AFD 217 81 90 109 497 
FN 1031 158 364 401 1954 
LN 209 44 44 118 415 
UKIP 326 110 167 439 1042 
FSM 820 169 161 164 1314 
LINKE 140 38 30 18 226 
PODEMOS 469 54 58 56 637 
CDU-CSU SUPPORT 110 SUPPORT SUPPORT 110 
PS 288 SUPPORT SUPPORT SUPPORT 288 
PD SUPPORT SUPPORT SUPPORT SUPPORT --- 
PP SUPPORT SUPPORT SUPPORT SUPPORT --- 
CON SUPPORT 18 19 65 102 
Total coded-negative QSs 






AFD 110 26 13 29 178 
FN 588 184 75 393 1240 
LN 232 138 19 86 475 
UKIP 333 79 25 353 790 
FSM 297 28 12 65 402 
LINKE 105 32 5 SUPPORT 142 
PODEMOS 197 35 19 31 282 
CDU-CSU SUPPORT 123 SUPPORT SUPPORT 123 
PS 220 21 29 SUPPORT 270 
PD 603 88 SUPPORT SUPPORT 691 
PP 168 27 SUPPORT SUPPORT 195 
CON 250 75 27 37 389 
Total coded-negative QSs 
immigration, asylum and 
borders control 




AFD 87 8 11 26 132 
FN 1050 58 125 238 1471 
LN 131 8 11 24 174 
UKIP 305 38 122 249 714 
FSM SUPPORT 58 48 SUPPORT 106 





PODEMOS SUPPORT 41 37 15 93 
CDU-CSU SUPPORT 38 43 SUPPORT 81 
PS SUPPORT 14 33 SUPPORT 47 
PD SUPPORT SUPPORT 45 SUPPORT 45 
PP SUPPORT 15 SUPPORT SUPPORT 15 
CON 186 43 15 SUPPORT 244 
Total coded-negative QSs 
environmental protection 1770 321 490 552 3133 
Total number of coded 
negative QSs 8373 1959 1647 2916 14895 
Source: own calculation. Frequencies are presented by party, issue and target of opposition. Row and column 







C.3 Word-clouds  
 
The word-clouds presented in Chapter 6 of this work have been constructed relying on the R-
studio software using both the package ‘tm’ and the package ‘wordcloud’1.  
To construct the word-clouds, different corpora corresponding to each party’s negative coded 
QSs have been constructed. Texts have been pre-processed following some standard guidelines: 
1. Elimination of the so-called stop-words2 for each of the five included languages (English, 
Spanish, German, French and Italian, see the lists of stop-words reported below)  
2. Texts have then been lowercased and cleaned from eventual punctuation signs, double spaces 
and numbers; 
3. A list of so-called n-grams3 has been created to allow the word-cloud taking into consideration 
n-grams as single words.  
 
The lists of removed stop-words for each of the five included languages are the following: 
 
English stop-words: ("i"; "me"; "my"; "myself"; "we"; "our"; "ours"; "ourselves"; "you"; "your"; 
"yours”; "yourself"; "yourselves"; "he"; "him"; "his"; "himself"; "she"; "her"; "hers"; "herself"; "it"; 
"its"; "itself"; "they"; "them"; "their"; "theirs"; "themselves"; "what"; "which"; "who"; "whom"; "this"; 
"that"; "these"; "those"; "am"; "is"; "are"; "was"; "were"; "be"; "been"; "being"; "have"; "has"; "had"; 
"having"; "do"; "does"; "did"; "doing"; "would"; "should"; "could"; "ought"; "i'm"; "you're"; "he's"; 
"she's"; "it's"; "we're"; "they're"; "i've"; "you've"; "we've"; "they've"; "i'd"; "you'd"; "he'd"; "she'd"; 
"we'd"; "they'd"; "i'll"; "you'll"; "he'll"; "she'll"; "we'll"; "they'll"; "isn't"; "aren't"; "wasn't"; "weren't"; 
"hasn't"; "haven't"; "hadn't"; "doesn't"; "don't"; "didn't"; "won't"; "wouldn't"; "shan't"; "shouldn't" 
"can't"; "cannot"; "couldn't"; "mustn't"; "let's"; "that's"; "who's"; "what's"; "here's"; "there's"; "when's"; 
"where's"; "why's"; "how's"; "a"; "an"; "the"; and"; "but"; "if"; "or"; "because"; "as"; "until"; "while"; 
"of"; "at"; "by"; "for"; "with"; "about"; "against"; "between"; "into"; "through"; "during"; "before"; 
"after"; "above"; "below"; "to"; "from"; "up"; "down"; "in"; "out"; "on"; "off"; "over"; "under"; 
"again"; "further"; "then"; "once"; "here"; "there"; "when"; "where"; "why"; "how"; "all"; "any"; "both"; 
"each"; "few"; "more"; "most"; "other"; "some"; "such"; "no"; "nor"; "not"; "only"; "own"; "same"; 
"so"; "than"; "too"; "very")  
 
French stop-words: ("au"; "aux"; "avec"; "ce"; "ces"; "dans"; "de"; "des"; "du"; "elle"; "en"; "et"; 
"eux"; "il"; "je"; "la"; "le"; "leur"; "lui"; "ma"; "mais"; "me"; "même"; "mes"; "moi"; "mon"; "ne"; "nos"; 
"notre"; "nous"; "on"; "ou"; "par"; "pas"; "pour"; "qu"; "que"; "qui"; "sa"; "se"; "ses"; "son"; "sur"; 
"ta"; "te"; "tes"; "toi"; "ton"; "tu"; "un"; "une"; "vos"; "votre"; "vous"; "c"; "d"; "j"; "l"; "à"; "m"; "n"; 
                                                        
1  Further information about the R package ‘tm’ can be found at: https://cran.r-
project.org/web/packages/tm/tm.pdf Further information about the R package ‘wordcloud’ can be found at: 
https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/wordcloud/wordcloud.pdf  
2 Stop words are the words that are generally filtered out before or after processing of natural language 
data (texts). The term stop-words refers to the most common words in a language that can be 
considered as ‘empty words’. Some examples are conjunctions, articles, modal verbs and so on.  
3 N-grams can be defined as a contiguous sequence of n items from a given sample of text or speeches. 
In this case, n-grams are a contiguous sequence of words (bigrams or trigrams generally). Such 
sequence of words has a meaning per se that differs from the meaning of each single component of the 




"s"; "t"; "y"; "été"; "été"; "étés"; "étés"; "étant"; "suis"; "es"; "est"; "sommes"; "êtes"; "sont"; "serai"; 
"seras"; "sera"; "serons"; "serez"; "seront"; "serais"; "serait"; "serions"; "seriez"; "seraient" "étais"; 
"était"; "étions"; "étiez"; "étaient"; "fus"; "fut"; "fûmes"; "fûtes"; "furent"; "sois"; "soit"; "soyons" 
"soyez"; "soient"; "fusse"; "fusses"; "fût"; "fussions" "fussiez" "fussent”; “ayant"; "eu"; "eue"; "eues"; 
"eus"; "ai"; "as"; "avons"; "avez"; "ont"; "aurai"; "auras"; "aura"; "aurons"; "aurez"; "auront"; "aurais"; 
"aurait"; "aurions"; "auriez"; "auraient" "avais"; "avait"; "avions"; "aviez"; "avaient" "eut"; "eûmes"; 
"eûtes"; "eurent"; "aie"; "aies"; "ait"; "ayons"; "ayez"; "aient"; "eusse"; "eusses"; "eût"; "eussions" 
"eussiez" "eussent" "ceci"; "cela"; "celà"; "cet"; "cette"; "ici"; "ils"; "les"; "leurs"; "quel"; "quels"; 
"quelle"; "quelles"; "sans"; "soi") 
 
German stop-words: ("aber"; "alle"; "allem"; "allen"; "aller"; "alles"; "als"; "also"; "am"; "an"; "ander"; 
"andere"; "anderem"; "anderen"; "anderer"; "anderes"; "andrem"; "andern"; "andere"; "anders"; "auch"; 
"auf"; "aus"; "bei"; "bin"; "bis"; "bist"; "da"; "damit"; "dann"; "der"; "den"; "des"; "dem"; "die"; "das"; 
"daß"; "derselbe" "derselben" "denselben"; "desselben" "demselben" "dieselbe" "dieselben" "dasselbe" 
"dazu"; "dein"; "deine"; "deinem"; "deinen"; "deiner"; "deines"; "denn"; "derer"; "dessen"; "dich"; 
"dir"; "du"; "dies"; "diese"; "diesem"; "diesen"; "dieser"; "dieses"; "doch"; "dort"; "durch"; "ein"; "eine"; 
"einem"; "einen"; "einer"; "eines"; "einig"; "einige"; "einigem"; "einigen"; "einiger"; "einiges"; "einmal"; 
"er"; "ihn"; "ihm"; "es"; "etwas"; "euer"; "eure"; "eurem"; "euren"; "eurer"; "eures"; "für"; "gegen"; 
"gewesen"; "hab"; "habe"; "haben"; "hat"; "hatte"; "hatten"; "hier"; "hin"; "hinter"; "ich"; "mich"; 
"mir"; "ihr"; "ihre"; "ihrem"; "ihren"; "ihrer"; "ihres"; "euch"; "im"; "in"; "indem"; "ins"; "ist"; "jede"; 
"jedem"; "jeden"; "jeder"; "jedes"; "jene"; "jenem"; "jenen"; "jener"; "jenes"; "jetzt"; "kann"; "kein"; 
"keine"; "keinem"; "keinen"; "keiner"; "keines"; "können"; "könnte"; "machen"; "man"; "manche"; 
"manchem"; "manchen"; "mancher" "manches"; "mein"; "meine"; "meinem"; "meinen"; "meiner"; 
"meines"; "mit"; "muß"; "mußte"; "nach"; "nicht"; "nichts"; "noch"; "nun"; "nur"; "ob"; "oder"; 
"ohne"; "sehr"; "sein"; "seine"; "seinem"; "seinen"; "seiner"; "seines"; "selbst"; "sich"; "sie"; "ihnen"; 
"sind"; "so"; "solche"; "solchem"; "solchen"; "solcher"; "solches"; "soll"; "sollte"; "sondern" ;"sonst"; 
"über"; "um"; "und"; "uns"; "unser"; "unserm"; "unsern"; "unser"; "unsers"; "unter"; "viel"; "vom"; 
"von"; "vor"; "während"; "war"; "waren"; "warst"; "was"; "weg"; "weil"; "weiter"; "welche"; "welchem"; 
"welchen"; "welcher"; "welches"; "wenn"; "werde"; "werden"; "wie"; "wieder"; "will"; "wir"; "wird"; 
"wirst"; "wo"; "wollen"; "wollte"; "würde"; "würden"; "zu"; "zum"; "zur"; "zwar"; "zwischen").  
 
Spanish stop-words: ("de"; "la"; "que"; "el"; "en"; "y"; "a"; "los"; "del"; "se"; "las"; "por"; "un"; 
"para"; "con"; "no"; "una"; "su"; "al"; "lo"; "como"; "más"; "pero"; "sus"; "le"; "ya"; "o"; "este"; "sí"; 
"porque"; "esta"; "entre"; "cuando"; "muy"; "sin"; "sobre"; "también"; "me"; "hasta"; "hay"; "donde"; 
"quien"; "desde"; "todo"; "nos"; "durante"; "todos"; "uno"; "les"; "ni"; "contra"; "otros"; "ese"; "eso"; 
"ante"; "ellos"; "e"; "esto"; "mí"; "antes"; "algunos"; "qué"; "unos"; "yo"; "otro"; "otras"; "otra"; "él"; 
"tanto"; "esa"; "estos"; "mucho"; "quienes"; "nada"; "muchos"; "cual"; "poco"; "ella"; "estar"; "estas"; 
"algunas"; "algo"; "nosotros"; "mi"; "mis"; "tú"; "te"; "ti"; "tu"; "tus"; "ellas"; "nosotras"; "vosotros"; 
"vosotras"; "os"; "mío"; "mía"; "míos"; "mías"; "tuyo"; "tuya"; "tuyos"; "tuyas"; "suyo"; "suya"; "suyos"; 
"suyas"; "nuestro"; "nuestra"; "nuestros"; "nuestras"; "vuestro"; "vuestra"; "vuestros"; "vuestras"; 
"esos"; "esas"; "estoy"; "estás"; "está"; "estamos"; "estáis"; "están"; "esté"; "estés"; "estemos"; "estéis"; 
"estén"; "estaré"; "estarás"; "estará"; "estaremos"; "estaréis"; "estarán"; "estaría"; "estarías"; 
"estaríamos"; "estaríais"; "estarían"; "estaba"; "estabas"; "estábamos"; "estabais"; "estaban"; "estuve"; 
"estuviste"; "estuvo"; "estuvimos"; "estuvisteis" "estuvieron" "estuviera"; "estuvieras"; "estuviéramos" 
"estuvierais" "estuvieran"; "estuviese"; "estuvieses"; "estuviésemos" "estuvieseis" "estuviesen"; 
"estando"; "estado"; "estada"; "estados"; "estadas"; "estad"; "he"; "has"; "ha"; "hemos"; "habéis"; 
"han"; "haya"; "hayas"; "hayamos"; "hayáis"; "hayan"; "habré"; "habrás"; "habrá"; "habremos"; 
"habréis"; "habrán"; "habría"; "habrías"; "habríamos"; "habríais"; "habrían"; "había"; "habías"; 
"habíamos"; "habíais"; "habían"; "hube"; "hubiste"; "hubo"; "hubimos"; "hubisteis"; "hubieron"; 
"hubiera"; "hubieras"; "hubiéramos"; "hubierais"; "hubieran"; "hubiese"; "hubieses"; "hubiésemos"; 
"hubieseis"; "hubiesen"; "habiendo"; "habido"; "habida"; "habidos"; "habidas"; "soy"; "eres"; "es"; 




"seréis"; "serán"; "sería"; "serías"; "seríamos"; "seríais"; "serían"; "era"; "eras"; "éramos"; "erais"; "eran"; 
"fui"; "fuiste"; "fue"; "fuimos"; "fuisteis"; "fueron"; "fuera"; "fueras"; "fuéramos"; "fuerais"; "fueran"; 
"fuese"; "fueses"; "fuésemos"; "fueseis"; "fuesen"; "siendo"; "sido"; "tengo"; "tienes"; "tiene"; 
"tenemos"; "tenéis"; "tienen"; "tenga"; "tengas"; "tengamos"; "tengáis"; "tengan"; "tendré"; "tendrás"; 
"tendrá"; "tendremos"; "tendréis"; "tendrán"; "tendría"; "tendrías"; "tendríamos"; "tendríais"; 
"tendrían"; "tenía"; "tenías"; "teníamos"; "teníais"; "tenían"; "tuve"; "tuviste"; "tuvo"; "tuvimos"; 
"tuvisteis"; "tuvieron"; "tuviera"; "tuvieras"; "tuviéramos"; "tuvierais"; "tuvieran"; "tuviese"; "tuvieses"; 
"tuviésemos"; "tuvieseis"; "tuviesen"; "teniendo"; "tenido"; "tenida"; "tenidos"; "tenidas"; "tened"). 
 
Italian stop-words ("ad"; "al"; "allo”; “ai"; "agli”; “all”; “agli"; "alla"; "alle"; "con”; “col”; “coi”; “da"; 
"dal”; “dallo”; “dai”; “dagli”; “dall”; “dagli”; “dalla”; “dalle”; “di"; "del”; “dello”; “dei”; “degli”; “dell”; 
“degli"; "della”; “delle”; “in”; “nel”; “nello”; “nei”; “negli”; “nell”; “negli”; “nella”; “nelle”; “su”; “sul”; 
“sullo”; “sui”; “sugli”; “sull”; “sugli”; “sulla”; “sulle”; “per”; “tra”; “contro”; “io”; “tu”; “lui”; “lei”; 
“noi”; “voi”; “loro”; “mio”; “mia”; “miei”; “mie”; “tuo"; "tua”; “tuoi”; “tue”; “suo”; “sua”; “suoi”; 
“sue”; “nostro”; “nostra”; “nostri”; “nostre”; “vostro”; “vostra”; “vostri"; "vostre”; “mi"; "ti"; "ci"; 
"vi"; "lo"; "la”; “li"; "le"; "gli”; “ne"; "il"; "un"; "uno”; “una”; “ma"; "ed"; "se"; "perché”; “anche”; 
“come”; “dove”; “dove”; “che”; “chi”; “cui”; “non”; “più”; “quale”; “quanto”; “quanti”; “quanta”; 
“quante”; “quello”; “quelli"; "quella”; “quelle”; “questo”; “questi”; “questa”; “queste”; “si”; “tutto”; 
“tutti”; “a"; "c"; "e"; "i"; "l"; "o"; "ho"; "hai”; “ha"; "abbiamo"; "avete”; “hanno”; “abbia”; “abbiate"; 
"abbiano"; "avrò”; “avrai”; “avrà”; “avremo"; "avrete”; “avranno"; "avrei”; “avresti"; "avrebbe"; 
"avremmo"; "avreste"; "avrebbero"; "avevo”; “avevi”; “aveva”; “avevamo"; "avevate"; "avevano"; 
“ebbi”; “avesti”; “ebbe”; “avemmo”; “aveste”; “ebbero”; “avessi"; "avesse”; “avessimo"; "avessero"; 
"avendo”; “avuto”; “avuta”; “avuti”; “avute”; “sono”; “sei”; “è"; "siamo”; “siete”; “sia”; “siate”; 
“siano”; “sarò”; “sarai”; “sarà”; “saremo”; “sarete”; “saranno"; "sarei”; “saresti"; "sarebbe"; "saremmo"; 
"sareste"; "sarebbero"; "ero”; “eri”; “era”; “eravamo"; "eravate"; "erano”; “fui”; “fosti”; “fu"; "fummo”; 
“foste”; “furono”; “fossi”; “fosse"; "fossimo"; "fossero"; "essendo"; "faccio”; “fai”; “facciamo"; 
"fanno"; "faccia”; “facciate"; "facciano"; "farò”; “farai”; “farà”; “faremo"; "farete”; “faranno"; "farei”; 
“faresti"; "farebbe"; "faremmo"; "fareste"; "farebbero" "facevo”; “facevi”; “faceva”; “facevamo"; 
"facevate"; "facevano"; "feci”; “facesti"; "fece”; “facemmo"; "faceste"; "fecero”; “facessi"; "facesse"; 
"facessimo"; "facessero"; "facendo"; "sto”; “stai”; “sta"; "stiamo”; “stanno”; “stia”; “stiate”; “stiano”; 
“starò”; “starai”; “starà”; “staremo"; "starete"; "staranno"; "starei”; “staresti"; "starebbe"; "staremmo"; 
"stareste"; "starebbero"; "stavo”; “stavi”; “stava”; “stavamo"; "stavate"; "stavano"; "stetti”; “stesti”; 
“stette”; “stemmo”; “steste"; "stettero"; "stessi”; “stesse”; “stessimo"; "stessero"; "stando") 
 
The final part of this section reports the R-script containing the n-grams constructed to build the 
word-clouds. It is to be noted that n-grams are translated in all the used languages to assure 
comparability between the word-clouds.  
 
 for (j in seq(docs)) 
{ 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("steven maijoor", "steven_maijoor", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("front national", "front_national", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("national front", "national_front", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("movimento cinque stelle", " movimento_cinque_stelle ", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("five stars movement", " five_stars_movement ", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("lega nord", " lega_nord ", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("liga nord", " liga_nord ", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("liga norte", " liga_norte ", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("northern league", " northern_league ", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("european parliament", "european_parliament", docs[[j]]) 




  docs[[j]] <- gsub("europäische parliament", "europäische_parliament", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("parlamento europeo", "parlamento_europeo", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("consiglio europeo", "consiglio_europeo", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("europäische rat", " europäische_rat ", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("europäischer rat", " europäische_rat ", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("european council", " european_council ", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("consejo europeo", " consejo_europeo ", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("comisión europea", "comisión_europea ", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("european commission", "european_commission ", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("europäische kommission", "europäische_kommission ", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("commission européenne", "commission_européenne ", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("commissione europea", "commissione_europea ", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("european union", "european_union", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("europäische union", "europäische_union", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("unión europea", "unión_europea", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("unione europea", "unione_europea", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("union européenne", "union_européenne", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("member state", "member_states", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("member states", "member_states", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("états membre", "états_membres", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("états membres", "états_membres", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("état membre", "état_membres", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("états membre", "états_membres", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("estado miembro", "estados_miembros", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("estados miembros", "estados_miembros", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("estado miembro", "estados_miembros", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("stato membro", "stati_membri", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("stati membri", "stati_membri", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("banking union", "banking_union", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("unión bancaria", "unión_bancaria", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("union bancaire", "union_bancaire", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("unione bancaria", "unione_bancaria ", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("capital market union", "capital_market_union", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("mercato unico", "mercato_unico", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("mercado único", "mercado_único", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("common market", "common_market", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("poteri forti", "poteri_forti", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("gran coalición", "gran_coalición", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("bail in", "bail_in", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("bail out", " bail_out ", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("politiche economiche", "politiche_economiche", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("politica economica", "politiche_economiche", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("politique économique", "politiques_économiques", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("politiques économiques", "politiques_économiques", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("políticas económicas", "políticas_económicas", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("política económica", "políticas_económicas", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("bilancio europeo", "bilancio_europeo", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("european budget", "european_budget", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("porsupuesto europeo", "porsupuesto_europeo", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("riforme strutturali", "riforme_strutturali", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("riforma strutturale", "riforme_strutturali", docs[[j]]) 




  docs[[j]] <- gsub("réforme structurelle", "réformes_structurelles", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("réformes structurelles", "réformes_structurelles", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("reforma estructural", "reformas_estructurales", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("reformas estructurales", "reformas_estructurales", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("structural reform", "structural_reforms", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("structural reforms", "structural_reforms", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("strukturelle reform", "strukturelle_reformen", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("strukturelle reformen", "strukturelle_reformen", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("settore bancario", "settore_bancario", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("banking sector", "banking sector", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("shadow banking", "shadow_banking", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("banca sombra", "bancas_sombra", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("bancas sombra", "bancas_sombra", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("gue ngl", "gue_ngl", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("deutsche bank", "deutsche_bank", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("europäische zentralbank", "ezb", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("banca centrale europea", "bce", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("european central bank", "ecb", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("banco central europeo", "bce", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("banque centrale européenne", "bce", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("banca centrale", "banca_centrale", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("banco central", "banco_central", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("central bank", "central_bank", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("european borders coast guard","ebcg", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("guardia europea fronteras costas", "gefc", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("european border coast guard", "ebcg", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("zona euro", "area_euro", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("area euro", "area_euro", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("euro area", "euro_area", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("euro zone", "euro_area", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("zone euro", "zone_euro", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("area schengen", "area_schengen", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("zona schengen", "area_schengen", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("schengen area ", "schengen_area", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("espacio schengen", "espacio_schengen", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("grandes grupos", "grandes_grupos", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("grandi gruppi", "grandi_gruppi", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("espace schengen", " espace_schengen", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("schengen raum", " schengen_raum", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("schengen raums", " schengen_raum", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("emissions trading system", "ets", docs[[j]]) 
  docs[[j]] <- gsub("emissionshandelssystem", "ets", docs[[j]]) 




C.4 Tables presenting the inductive coding procedure’ s results.  
 
As mentioned before this section presents the tables related to the results obtained during the 




field. The tables presented in this section refer to the analysis reported in chapter 6 of this work and to 
the constructed word-clouds (see Figures 6.1-6.12 presented in chapter 6 of this work).  
The constructed Tables (C.8-C.19) report the two most used themes by each party to oppose the 
corresponding target alongside the corresponding percentage and frequency of the coded-negative QSs; 
the main used motivations alongside the related percentage and frequency of the coded-negative QSs; 
and the character of the exercised opposition (principled or pragmatic) alongside the relative percentage 
of QSs)4.  
                                                        
4  As observed in chapter 4 (see Chapter 4, section 4.2, page 101), a party exercises a principled 
opposition if the majority of the coded negative QSs display a principled character; otherwise its 
opposition is classified as pragmatic.  
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Table C. 8: Results of the inductive coding analysis of the coded-negative QSs for the EU-policy target (economic policy field) 
Theme National parties 
Percentage of QSs 
belonging to the 
theme (frequency 
in parenthesis) 
Main used macro-category 
Percentage of QSs 
for each macro-
category in 






Overall percentage of 
negative QSs showing the 
related character 














FN 35 (183) 
Against EU’s regulation of market, 





LN 10 (15) 
Against EU’s regulation of market, 





UKIP 85 (184) 
Against EU’s regulation of market, 





FSM 53 (323) 
Pro EU’s regulation of market, 
banking, financial and fiscal sectors 
71 
 (230) Pragmatic 
74 
(605) 820 
LINKE 83 (75) 
Pro EU’s regulation of market, 
banking, financial and fiscal sectors 
77 
 (58) Pragmatic 
64 
(90) 140 
PODEMOS 62 (170) 
Pro EU’s regulation of market, 
banking, financial and fiscal sectors 
78 
 (133) Pragmatic 
59 
(276) 469 
PS 52 (120) 
Pro EU’s regulation of market, 
banking, financial and fiscal sectors 
75 






at the EU 
level  





PODEMOS 13 (37) Pro EU’s Keynesian management 
97 
 (36) Pragmatic 
59 
(276) 469 
FSM 8 (47) Pro EU’s Keynesian management 
76 







AFD 12 (16) Pro EU’s austerity measures 
75 
 (12) Pragmatic 
61 
(135) 217 




















Source: Own calculation. Table connected to the word-clouds presented in Figure 6.1 of chapter 6, section 6.2, page 134. 
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Table C. 9: Results of the inductive coding analysis of the coded-negative QSs for the EU-policy target (immigration policy field) 
Theme National parties 
Percentage of QSs 
belonging to the 
theme (frequency in 
parenthesis 
Main used macro-category 
Percentage of QSs 
for each macro-
category in relation 






of negative QSs 































FSM 71 (166) 
Permissive approach to the 






LINKE 30 (19) 






PODEMOS 32 (36) 
Permissive approach to Borders 






PS 51 (101) 
Permissive approach to the 






PD 49 (266) 
Permissive approach to the 






PP 54 (89) 
Restriction of borders control 





CON 43 (104) 
Restriction of borders control 










AFD 19 (16) 
Stricter rules for the recognition and 






LINKE 42 (26) 
Increase of humanitarian aid targeting 





FSM 15 (35) 
Reform the Dublin system to ensure 





PODEMOS 25 Increase of humanitarian aid targeting 60 Principled 56 197 
 
 xli 
(28) asylum seekers’ arrival (17) (110) 
PS 19 (39) 






PD 13 (69) 
Reform the Dublin system to ensure 





PP 14 (23) 






CON 11 (27) 
Stricter rules for the recognition and 









FN 15 (76) 
Negative perception of economic 
integration of migrants 
75 
(57) Principled 83 588 
LN 15 (25) 
Negative perception of economic 





UKIP 11 (31) 
Negative perception of economic 



























Table C. 10: Results of the inductive coding analysis of the coded-negative QSs for the EU-policy target (environmental protection policy field) 
Theme National parties 
Percentage of 




Main used macro-category 
Percentage of 
QSs for each 
macro-
category in 






















AFD 54 (28) 
Opposing EU’s environmental protection 
at the expenses of economic growth (e.g.: 





FN 74 (431) 
Opposing EU’s environmental protection 
at the expenses of economic growth (e.g.: 





LN 57 (41) 
Opposing EU’s environmental protection 
at the expenses of economic growth (e.g.: 





UKIP 79 (178) 
Opposing EU’s environmental protection 
at the expenses of economic growth (e.g.: 





LINKE 62 (5) 






CON 49 (91) 
Opposing EU’s environmental protection 
at the expenses of economic growth (e.g.: 









AFD 25 (13) 






FN 6 (34) 






LN 3 (2) 






UKIP 4 (8) 






LINKE 38 (3) 






CON 16 (30) 











Table C. 11: Results of the inductive coding analysis of the coded-negative QSs for the EU-elite target (economic policy field) 
Theme National parties 
Percentage of 




Main used macro-category 
Percentage of QSs for 
each macro-category 
in relation to each 






of negative QSs 









Performance of the 
EU-elite  PODEMOS  
100 






Moral conduct of 
the EU elite 
































orientation of the 
EU elite 

















of the EU elite 
AFD 37 (23) 
Moral conduct of specific members of the EU 





FN 20 (23) 
Moral conduct of specific members of the EU 





LN 33 (10) 
Moral conduct of specific members of the EU 





LINKE 32 (11) 
Moral conduct of specific members of the EU 
elite: Jean Claude Juncker 
100 
(11) Principled  
64 
(34) 38 
FSM 34 (43) 
Moral conduct of specific members of the EU 











Table C. 12: Results of the inductive coding analysis of the coded-negative QSs for the EU-elite target (immigration policy field) 
Theme National parties 
Percentage of 




Main used macro-category 
Percentage of 










Overall percentage of 
negative QSs showing 







the EU-elite  
 


























Moral conduct of 
the EU elite 
FN 42 (67) 






LN 58 (73) 






UKIP 75 (52) 






LINKE 79 (19) 






PODEMOS 39 (11) 






FSM 96 (20) 


















orientation of the 
EU elite 
AFD 37 (9) 
General ideological orientation of the EU 










LINKE 16 (4) 
General ideological orientation of the EU 







PODEMOS 46 (13) 
General ideological orientation of the EU 



























of the EU elite AFD 
33 
(8) 
Performance of specific members of the EU 
































Table C. 13: Results of the inductive coding analysis of the coded-negative QSs for the EU-elite target (environmental protection policy field) 







Main used macro-category 
Percentage of QSs 
for each macro-
category in 





Overall percentage of 
negative QSs showing 

















































of the E U elite 





LN 60 (3) 






UKIP 29 (6) 






FSM 61 (25) 
EU elite favours particular, personal 
interests 
100 




the EU elite 
CON 26 (10) 
General ideological orientation of the 









the EU elite 
AFD 40 (2) 






FN 26 (13) 
Technocratic, bureaucratic nature of the 
EU elite (13) Principled 
84 
(49) 58 
UKIP 52 (11) 








members of the 
EU elite 
FN 26 (13) 
Moral conduct of specific members of 









Table C. 14: Results of the inductive coding analysis of the coded-negative QSs for the EU-regime target (economic policy field) 







Main used macro-category 
Percentage of 
QSs for each 
macro-category in 






Overall percentage of 
negative QSs showing 


































s of the EU 
regime 
AFD 12 (6) 






FN 43 (103) 






LN 39 (9) 
Characteristics powers and competencies of the 





UKIP 75 (105) 






CON 62 (10) 









AFD  86 (46) 
Characteristics powers and competencies of 





FN 41 (100) 
Characteristics powers and competencies of 





LN 43 (10) 
Characteristics powers and competencies of 





UKIP 14 (20) 
Characteristics powers and competencies of 
























Table C. 15: Results of the inductive coding analysis of the coded-negative QSs for the EU-regime target (immigration policy field) 
Theme National parties 
Percentage of 




Main used macro-category 
Percentage of QSs 
for each macro-
category in relation 

















Performance of the 
EU-regime 





FN 24 (13) Performance of the EC 
54 
 (7) Principled 
72 
(54) 75 





























the EU regime 
FN 37 (20) 






UKIP 52 (12) 
Characteristics powers and competencies of 





FSM 33 (3) 








orientation of the 
EU-regime 





LINKE 20 (1) 








LN 40 (4) Other specific institution: European Council 
100 
(4) Pragmatic  
52 
(10) 19 
UKIP 26 (6) 
Other specific institutions: European Borders 





PODEMOS 100 (12) 
Other specific institutions: European Borders 





CON 9 (2) 
Other specific institutions: European Borders 










Table C. 16: Results of the inductive coding analysis of the coded-negative QSs for the EU-regime target (environmental protection policy field) 









Main used macro-category 
Percentage of QSs 
for each macro-
category in 






Overall percentage of 
negative QSs showing 









AFD 20 (2) 






LN 86 (6) Performance of the EC (4) Pragmatic 
63 
(7) 11 
PODEMOS 88 (24) Performance of the Council  (18) Pragmatic 
73 
(27) 37 
FSM 80 (20) Performance of the EC  (16) Pragmatic 
52 
(25) 48 





PS 90 (19) Performance of the EC (12) Pragmatic 
64 
(21) 33 
PD 100 (41) Performance of the EC  (29) Pragmatic 
91 
(41) 45 










s of the EU 
regime 
AFD 80 (8) 
Characteristics powers and competencies 
of the EC (7) Principled 
90 
(10) 11 
FN 76 (89) 
Characteristics powers and competencies 
of the EC (82) Principled 
93 
116 125 
UKIP 83 (90) 
Characteristics powers and competencies 
of the EC (75) Principled 
88 
(108) 122 
FSM 8 (2) 
Characteristics powers and competencies 
of the EP (2) Pragmatic 
52 
(25) 48 
PODEMOS 11 (3) 
Characteristics powers and competencies 
of the EP (2) Pragmatic 
73 
(27) 37 
CON 60 (6) 
Characteristics powers and competencies 
































Performance of specific institutions 
(ESMA) 
100 
(1) Pragmatic  
64 
(21) 33 

































Table C. 17: Results of the inductive coding analysis of the coded-negative QSs for the EU-community target (economic policy field) 
Theme National parties 
Percentage of QSs 
belonging to the 
theme (frequency 
in parenthesis) 
Main used macro-category 
Percentage of 










Overall percentage of 
negative QSs showing 








competencies of the 
EU vis-à-vis national, 
supranational and 
international bodies 
AFD 56 (59) 






FN 64 (250) 






LN 35 (31) 






PODEMOS 74 (23) 






CON 73 (38) 









UKIP 28 (122) 






FSM 2 (2) 














AFD 30 (32) 
Role of the Euro (and the Euro 






FN 19 (74) 
Role of the Euro (and the Euro 






LN 37 (33) 
Role of the Euro (and the Euro 






UKIP 29 (123) 
Role of the Euro (and the Euro 






FSM 84 (91) 
Role of the Euro (and the Euro 






LINKE 47 Role of the Euro (and the Euro 85 Pragmatic 83 18 
 
 lii 
(7) area) in the current economic 
crisis 
(6) (15) 
PODEMOS 16 (5) 
Role of the Euro (and the Euro 






CON 19 (10) 
Role of the Euro (and the Euro 





































Table C. 18: Results of the inductive coding analysis of the coded-negative QSs for the EU-community target (immigration policy field) 
Theme National parties 
Percentage of 




Main used macro-category 
Percentage 










Overall percentage of 
negative QSs 













AFD 43 (12) 






FN 51 (200) 






UKIP 39 (138) 







Role of the EU in 
the three analysed 
policy fields 












the EU LN 
29 
(25) 












































UKIP 18 (65) 
Role of the Schengen agreement in the 





CON 36 (10) 
Role of the Schengen agreement in the 










Table C. 19: Results of the inductive coding analysis of the coded-negative QSs for the EU-community target (environmental protection policy field) 
Theme National parties 
Percentage of 
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C.5 Cited segments  
 
This section contains the details concerning the segments cited in chapter 6 of this work. The 
segments are reported in the original language of the speaker. Further information concerning each 
speech is contained in the bold parts. Such information concerns the date and place of the plenary 
session, the title of the related speech and the name of the speaker alongside the name of the national 
party to which the speaker belongs.  
 
Wednesday, 16 December 2015, Strasbourg. ‘Bringing transparency, coordination and 
convergence to corporate tax policies’. Speaker: Jonathan Arnott (UKIP). 
‘Finally, the call for a common consolidated corporate tax base is an anathema to what UKIP stands 
for’. 
 
Wednesday, 26 November 2014, Strasbourg. Collection of statistical information by the 
European Central Bank. Speaker: Sophie Montel (FN). 
‘Nous considérons que cela ne doit pas se faire au profit de la Banque centrale européenne, dont nous 
rejetons les orientations en matière de gouvernance monétaire et le dogmatisme ultralibéral. ‘ 
 
Wednesday, 28 October 2015, Strasbourg. European Structural and Investment Funds and 
sound economic governance. Speaker: Dominique Bilde (FN). 
‘D’autre part, ce rapport fait reposer l’augmentation de la dette publique uniquement sur les politiques 
des États membres, alors que la majeure partie vient d’un transfert de dette privée vers le public 
(notamment depuis l’euro ou les lois interdisant l’emprunt à 0% auprès des banques nationales), 
renforcée par la politique austéritaire exigée par Bruxelles’. 
 
Wednesday, 24 June 2015, Brussels. Review of the economic governance framework: 
stocktaking and challenges. Speaker: Gianluca Buonanno (LN). 
‘I risultati delle politiche europee sono sotto gli occhi di tutti: disoccupazione di lunga durata, disagio 
sociale e Stati membri che non riescono a far quadrare i conti’.  
 
Thursday, 30 April 2015, Strasbourg. European Investment Bank annual report 2013. speaker: 
Bernd Lucke (AFD). 
‘Entschuldigung, das Problem in Europa ist nicht, daß zu viel gespart wird, sondern daß zu viele 
Schulden gemacht werden’.  
 
Tuesday, 10 March 2015. Strasbourg. European Central Bank annual report for 2013. speaker: 
Fabio Massimo Castaldo (FSM). 
‘Per sviluppare una politica monetaria realmente efficace, sarebbe necessaria una ristrutturazione 
completa del sistema bancario, che separi l'attività di credito da quella finanziaria, al fine di riportare il 
sistema stesso alla sua vera funzione, ovvero quella di garantire credito all'economia reale’ 
 
Wednesday, 24 June 2015, Brussels. European Fund for Strategic Investments. Speaker: Lola 
Sanchez Caldentey (PODEMOS). 
‘Votamos en contra de la propuesta de la Comisión ya que, si bien el resultado del diálogo tripartito 
mejoró la intolerable propuesta de la Comisión, este Fondo no constituye en absoluto, ni por su 
dimensión ni por sus formas de administración, la apuesta contra cíclica que Europa necesita’.  
 
Thursday, 25 February 2016. Brussels. European Central Bank annual report for 2014. Speaker: 




‘Sono causa di una crescente disoccupazione, soprattutto giovanile, e stanno minando i sistemi sociali in 
materia di istruzione, sanità e welfare, che dovrebbero costituire i pilastri della società europea’. 
 
Tuesday, 27 October 2015 – Strasbourg. Mandatory automatic exchange of information in the 
field of taxation. Speaker: Isabelle Thomas (PS).  
‘Mais nous devons aller plus loin en adoptant une taxe européenne sur les multinationales, seul 
instrument capable de mettre fin à la course au moins-disant fiscal en Europe’. 
 
Wednesday, 11 March 2015 – Strasbourg. European Semester for economic policy coordination: 
employment and social aspects in the Annual Growth Survey 2015 - European Semester for 
economic policy coordination: Annual Growth Survey 2015 - Single market governance within 
the European Semester 2015. Speaker: Guillaume Balas (PS).  
‘En effet, le rapport concernant l'emploi et les aspects sociaux dans le cadre de l'examen annuel de la 
croissance dresse une analyse lucide des conséquences désastreuses des politiques d'austérité ayant sévi 
dans les pays périphériques de l'Union mais aussi des mesures accélérées de consolidation budgétaire 
qui ont cassé la mécanique de la reprise’.  
 
Thursday, 15 September 2016, Strasbourg. Prospectus to be published when securities are 
offered to the public or admitted to trading. Speaker: Mara Bizzotto (LN).  
‘Tuttavia questa relazione insiste sul fatto che la colpa del fallimento di questo meccanismo degli Stati 
membri e non della UE, che con le sue folli politiche non fa nulla per fermare l'invasione di clandestini 
in corso in Italia’.  
 
Wednesday, 16 September 2015 – Brussels. Conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs 
Council on migration (14 September 2015). Speaker Beatrix von Stroch (AFD). 
‘Asyl ist nicht die Antwort auf die Armut in der Welt. Wir müssen darüber reden, das staatliche 
Asylrecht durch ein privates zu ersetzen. Die Kirche soll Kirchenasyl gewähren. Wir müssen anfangen, 
das Asylrecht neu zu denken!’. 
 
Wednesday, 14 September 2016 – Strasbourg. Travel document for the return of illegally staying 
third-country nationals. Speaker: Markus Pretzell (AFD).  
‘Die Rückführung ist das erste und das oberste Ziel, und zwar für jeden, der mit Asylgrund zu uns 
einreist oder auch ohne’. 
 
Tuesday, 8 September 2015 – Strasbourg. Provisional measures in the area of international 
protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece. Speaker: Mara Bizzotto (LN).  
‘Questa decisione, però affronta il problema immigrazione in modo del tutto superficiale: basti pensare 
che l'Europa non solo non distingue fra migranti economici e profughi, ma che nell'affrontare il nodo 
centrale della ricollocazione, non terrà conto degli arrivi di clandestini precedenti alla sua entrata in 
vigore’.  
 
Wednesday, 9 September 2015 – Strasbourg. Provisional measures in the area of international 
protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece. Speaker: Sylvie Goddyn (FN).  
‘Ces nouveaux arrivants, motivés le plus souvent par des raisons économiques, entreront en 
concurrence directe avec les Européens les plus démunis dans le domaine de l’accueil au travail, à la 
santé et au logement’.  
 
Wednesday, 26 October 2016 – Strasbourg. EU policies and actions to protect children in the 
context of migration. Speaker: Cornelia Ernst (LINKE).  
‘Und die Tatsache, daß es eben keine legalen Wege nach Europa gibt, setzt diese Kinder existentiellen 





Wednesday, 20 May 2015 – Strasbourg. European Agenda on Migration. Speaker: Gabriele 
Zimmer (LINKE).  
‘Sind wir bereit, zu akzeptieren, daß wir uns selber, unser Leben, unseren Standard ja auch verändern 
müssen, um den Menschen wirklich die Hilfe anzubieten, die sie brauchen?’ 
 
Wednesday, 16 September 2015 – Brussels. Conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs 
Council on migration. Speaker: Marco Valli (FSM). 
‘Senza un meccanismo di ricollocazione obbligatorio e permanente per tutti quegli Stati membri che 
subiscono un'eccezionale pressione migratoria’ 
 
Wednesday, 11 May 2016 – Strasbourg. Decision adopted on the Common European Asylum 
System reform. Speaker: Laura Ferrara (FSM).  
‘Come si tutela il primo paese d'ingresso, che continua ad avere ancora il maggior onere nella 
responsabilità e nell'esame delle richieste di asilo e nella gestione degli sbarchi?’ 
 
Wednesday, 5 October 2016 – Strasbourg. Preparation of the European Council meeting of 20 
and 21 October 2016. Speaker: Miguel Urbán Crespo (PODEMOS).  
‘Las políticas xenófoba de la Europa fortaleza están convirtiendo el Mediterráneo en la mayor fosa 
común del mundo’. 
 
Wednesday, 11 February 2015 – Strasbourg. Way forward for Frontex and the European Asylum 
Support Office. Speaker: Lola Sánchez Caldentey (PODEMOS). 
‘Estamos violando sistemáticamente derechos humanos, no solo con devoluciones en caliente, sino 
también instalando cuchillas en las vallas, maltratando en centros de internamiento para extranjeros, 
embistiendo con nuestros barcos patrulla endebles embarcaciones repletas de migrantes, e incluso ha 
habido casos en los que las autoridades europeas han apretado el gatillo’. 
 
Tuesday, 13 January 2015 – Strasbourg. Recent human smuggling incidents in the 
Mediterranean. Speaker: Christine Revault D’Allonnes Bonnefoy (PS).  
‘La vraie priorité, c'est le développement de canaux légaux de migration pour les migrants et la 
définition de voies d'accès sûres vers l'UE pour les demandeurs d'asile’. 
 
Tuesday, 8 September 2015 – Strasbourg. Provisional measures in the area of international 
protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece. Speaker: Geoffrey van Orden 
(CONERVATIVES). 
‘Instead of making the problem worse we should focus on improving border security and a functioning 
system for the processing of migrants, including the return of those that are not genuine refugees’.  
 
Wednesday, 25 November 2015 – Strasbourg. Outcome of the Valletta summit of 11 and 12 
November 2015 and of the G20 summit of 15 and 16 November 2015. Speaker: Estéban 
Gonzáles Pons (PP).  
‘Debemos reforzar nuestras fronteras exteriores para que nadie caiga en la tentación de levantar nuevas 
fronteras interiores’. 
 
Wednesday, 10 June 2015 – Strasbourg. Conclusion of the Doha amendment to the Kyoto 
Protocol. Speaker: Lorenzo Fontana (LN). 
‘Ribadiamo il voto contrario. Essere a favore di un mondo più verde non significa imporre solo 
all'Europa e alle proprie imprese dei limiti e degli svantaggi’.  
 
Wednesday, 26 November 2014 – Strasbourg. 2014 UN Climate Change Conference - COP 20 




‘Our green policies are forcing energy-intensive business out of Europe altogether, taking their jobs and 
their investment with them’.  
 
Wednesday, 3 February 2016 – Strasbourg. Objection pursuant to Rule 106 on emissions from 
light passenger and commercial vehicles (Euro 6). Speaker: Dominique Bilde (FN). 
‘J'ai souhaité voté contre cette proposition de résolution, une nouvelle fois née d'un scandale politico-
médiatique et sans aucune vision à long terme des intérêts de l'industrie automobile européenne’. 
 
Tuesday, 6 October 2015 – Strasbourg. Emission measurements in the automotive sector. 
Speaker: Roger Helmer (UKIP). 
‘I am concerned that the potential hit to Volkswagen could damage all of us, especially if, as many 
expect, other companies are drawn into the scandal’. 
 
Tuesday, 6 October 2015. Emission measurements in the automotive sector. Speaker: Cornelia 
Ernst (LINKE). 
‘Was wir brauchen, sind sichere Verfahren und Tests zur Umsetzung von Standards, damit europäische 
Autos auch tatsächlich Abgasarm und energieeffizient sind’. 
 
Tuesday, 24 November 2015 – Strasbourg. Tax rulings and other measures similar in nature or 
effect. Speaker: Mara Bizzotto (LN). 
‘Signora Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, si ravvisa molto chiaramente l'azione dei poteri forti e occulti, 
finanziari ma anche politici, che impediscono addirittura alla Commissione di lavorare, impongono a 
chi di dovere, signor Moscovici, parlo di lei di dare alla commissione TAXE i documenti su cui 
indagare’. 
 
Wednesday, 8 June 2016 – Strasbourg. Mid-term review of the Investment Plan. Speaker: Nigel 
Farage (UKIP).  
‘They rejected a disastrous bailout deal created by technocrats in a vacuum detached from the misery of 
the ordinary Greek people. And the other feature I have noticed here is the growth of what I can only 
describe as authoritarianism. You know, we actually saw the Prime Minister of Greece removed 
effectively by a coup d’état and we saw Mr Berlusconi removed by a coup d’état and in both cases 
represented by appointees who were former directors of Goldman Sachs’. 
 
Tuesday, 15 December 2015 – Strasbourg. Bringing transparency, coordination and 
convergence to corporate tax policies. Speaker: Bernard Monot (FN).  
‘Mais je doute de la sincérité des intentions lorsque l'on sait que M. Juncker est le principal artisan du 
scandale des LuxLeaks’. 
 
Wednesday, 30 November 2016 – Brussels. MFF revision. Speaker: Marco Zanni (FSM). 
‘Inutile parlare di flessibilità del quadro finanziario pluriennale e chiedere più risorse, quando alla prima 
occasione il falco di turno, come ha fatto ieri il presidente dell'Eurogruppo, invita esclusivamente al 
rispetto rigoroso delle regole’.  
 
Tuesday, 24 November 2015 – Strasbourg. Tax rulings and other measures similar in nature or 
effect. Speaker: Fabio de Masi (LINKE).  
‚Der Ausschuß wir hätten uns einen echten Untersuchungsausschuß gewünscht ist auf eine Omertà, 
eine Mauer des Schweigens, gestoßen. Und auch nicht die Finanzminister der großen Mitgliedstaaten Ð 
wie meines Heimatlands Deutschland Ð die dazu schwiegen, weil heimische Konzerne profitierten. Die 
Finanzminister haben doch gepennt und weggesehen’. 
 
Monday, 21 November 2016 – Strasbourg. European Central Bank annual report for 2015. 




‘Sie machen Politik. Sie wollen Arbeitsmarktpolitik machen, und Sie wollen Italien oder Griechenland 
am Austritt aus dem Euro hindern. Sie machen Politik. Aber Sie haben dazu kein Mandat’.  
 
Wednesday, 28 October 2015 – Strasbourg. European Semester for economic policy 
coordination: implementation of 2015 priorities - Steps towards completing the Economic and 
Monetary Union. Speaker: David Coburn (UKIP). 
‘Mr President, most people in this place talk about one of three things: themselves, their own 
amendments or how wonderful the EU is, or indeed all three at once’.  
 
Wednesday, 8 July 2015 – Strasbourg. Conclusions of the European Council (25-26 June 2015) 
and of the Euro Summit (7 July 2015) and the current situation in Greece. Speaker: Pablo 
Iglesias (PODEMOS).  
‘Ojalá sepan escuchar ustedes, señor Weber, ojalá sepan escuchar ustedes, señor Juncker, lo que han 
dicho los griegos en el referéndum del pasado domingo.(...) Pásense al bando que defiende los derechos 
sociales y abandonen, de una vez, esa maldita gran coalición que nos está llevando al desastre’. 
 
Wednesday, 16 September 2015 – Brussels. Conclusions of the Justice and Home Affairs 
Council on migration. Speaker: Fabio Massimo Castaldo (FSM). 
‘Ho visto ancora più ipocrisia nel versare lacrime per un giorno davanti a una fotografia senza fare nulla 
sul campo’.  
 
Tuesday, 2 February 2016 – Strasbourg. Refugee emergency, external borders control and 
future of Schengen - Respect for the international principle of non-refoulement - Financing 
refugee facility for Turkey - Increased racist hatred and violence against refugees and migrants 
across Europe. Lorenzo Fontana (LN).  
‘Dall'altra parte, però, la cosa che mi sorprende che non ci sia magari un interesse. Che qualcuno magari 
non abbia l'interesse a fare in modo che tutte queste persone entrino? Perché mi sembra quasi che 
qualcuno voglia creare il caos. Creare il caos, non so per quale motivo, ma evidentemente ci sono 
interessi importanti che qualcuno non vuole debellare’.  
 
Tuesday, 19 May 2015 – Strasbourg. Situation in Hungary. Speaker: Laura Ferrara (FSM).  
‘Inaccettabile ignorare questa deriva antidemocratica nel cuore dell'Europa e lavarsi la coscienza, come 
fanno gli struzzi che mettono la testa sotto la sabbia’.  
 
Tuesday, 2 February 2016 – Strasbourg. Refugee emergency, external borders control and 
future of Schengen - Respect for the international principle of non-refoulement - Financing 
refugee facility for Turkey - Increased racist hatred and violence against refugees and migrants 
across Europe. Speaker: Cornelia Ernst (LINKE). 
‘Und wir müssen auch eines wohl sagen: Der Aufstieg der Rechten in Europa und die Gewalt an 
Flüchtlingen, die sich wie ein Virus verbreitet, das hat auch seine Ursachen. Nämlich, daß hier in 
diesem Hause nicht gesagt wird: Gewalt an Flüchtlingen ist ein Verbrechen’. 
 
Thursday, 17 September 2015 – Brussels. Council Decision establishing provisional measures 
in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy, Greece and Hungary. Speaker: 
Miguel Urbán Crespo (PODEMOS).  
‘Esperamos que la posición‹n de la UE al respecto sea clara y aísle y margine las solicitudes de la 
extrema derecha en materia de migración, que pretenden, siguiendo su agenda, la bunkerización de 
Europa y el consiguiente cierre de fronteras’.  
 
Wednesday, 29 April 2015 – Strasbourg. Report of the extraordinary European Council meeting 
(23 April 2015) - The latest tragedies in the Mediterranean and EU migration and asylum 




‘Sie sind die Schuldigen. Genau wie alle anderen, die mitmachen, die schweigen, die wegschauen, die 
Toten nicht sehen können, die den Familien der Opfer nicht in die Augen schauen wollen’. 
 
Tuesday, 16 December 2014 – Strasbourg. Shortage of funding for the World Food Programme 
aid scheme to Syrian refugees. Speaker: Markus Pretzell (AFD). 
‘Aber auch jene Gruppen tragen Verantwortung, welche durch ihre Reden den Eindruck erwecken, 
Europa sei in der Lage, abertausende Wirtschaftsflüchtlinge angemessen zu versorgen’.  
 
Thursday, 17 September 2015 – Brussels. Council Decision establishing provisional measures 
in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy, Greece and Hungary. Speaker: 
Beatrix von Storch (AFD). 
‘Fast alle Migranten wollen nach Deutschland; sie wurden von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel eingeladen’. 
 
Wednesday, 25 November 2015 – Strasbourg. EU Strategic framework on health and safety at 
work 2014-2020. Speaker: Gerard Batten (UKIP). 
‘UKIP is not against good and sensible health and safety rules, but the only people who should create 
laws to protect workers are our democratically elected and accountable government, not unelected 
bureaucrats in Brussels’.  
 
Wednesday, 16 September 2015 – Brussels. Decision adopted on 15 July 2015 on the energy 
summer package. Speaker: Dario Tamburrano (FSM). 
‘Oggi si è imposta invece una forma di democrazia degenerata in questo Parlamento. La dittatura 
bullista della maggioranza che trasforma l'unica istituzione europea elettiva in un non rivoltante libero 
mercato delle vacche tra due soli gruppi politici, per cui ogni atto parlamentare, qualsiasi New Deal 
fantastico che voi preparerete, parte viziato alla base da una perdita progressiva di un minimo comune 
denominatore etico’.  
 
Wednesday, 29 April 2015 – Strasbourg. Report of the extraordinary European Council meeting 
(23 April 2015) - The latest tragedies in the Mediterranean and EU migration and asylum 
policies. Speaker: Monika Hohlmeyer (CDU-CSU). 
‘Jetzt populistisch eine kurzfristige Lösung zu fordern, ist schlichtweg nicht die Wahrheit’. 
 
Wednesday, 16 December 2015 – Strasbourg. Situation in Hungary: follow-up to the European 
Parliament Resolution of 10 June 2015. Speaker: Christine Revault D’Allonnes Bonnefoy (PS). 
‘Le spectre de la peine de mort réapparaît dangereusement. Le racisme, l'antisémitisme et la xénophobie 
ne font que progresser. Cette situation préoccupante constitue un véritable test pour évaluer la capacité 
de l'Union à réagir fermement quand un de ses États membres agit en contradiction flagrante avec ses 
valeurs’. 
 
Wednesday, 20 May 2015 – Strasbourg. European Agenda on Migration. Speaker: Michela 
Giuffrida (PD). 
‘E stamattina molti hanno speso il loro tempo, il nostro tempo, in populismo e demagogia a fini 
elettorali. Per guadagnare consenso o, è il caso dei più, per non perderlo’. 
 
Tuesday, 10 May 2016 – Strasbourg. Statistics concerning balance of payments, international 
trade in services and foreign direct investment. Speaker: Sylvie Goddyn (FN). 
‘Cette gouvernance de la Commission dans le domaine économique est imposée aux États membres’. 
 
Wednesday, 25 February 2015 – Brussels. European Central Bank annual report for 2013. 
Speaker: Mario Borghezio (LN). 
 ‘Signor Presidente, onorevoli colleghi, se avessimo avuto dubbi sul fatto che siamo soggetti a una 





Tuesday, 10 March 2015 – Strasbourg. European Central Bank annual report for 2013. Speaker: 
Beatrix von Storch (AFD). 
‘Die Kontrolle der EZB sollte bei den Vertragsstaaten der Eurozone liegen. Diese weigern sich jedoch, 
die EZB zu kontrollieren und die EZB durch rechtliches Vorgehen zu zwingen, dass sie ihr Handeln in 
den Rahmen des Mandats zurückführt’. 
 
Thursday, 29 October 2015 – Strasbourg. European Semester for economic policy coordination: 
implementation of 2015 priorities. Speaker: Mara Bizzotto (LN).  
‘Considerata la governance delle istituzioni europee in cui si riscontrano gravi lacune in fatto di 
democrazia, trasparenza e principio di sussidiarietà’. 
 
Wednesday, 11 March 2015 – Strasbourg. Single market governance within the European 
Semester 2015. Speaker: Marco Zullo (FSM). 
‘Il semestre di coordinamento delle politiche economiche negli ultimi anni caratterizzato dalla fredda 
severità con cui la Commissione europea impone agli Stati membri l'applicazione di regole soffocanti’.  
 
Thursday, 25 February 2016 – Brussels. European Semester for economic policy coordination: 
Annual Growth Survey 2016. Speaker: Marco Valli (FSM).  
‘Ho votato contro l'ennesima relazione che dovrebbe individuare le priorità strategiche per la crescita e 
l'occupazione in Europa analizzando ciò che non ha funzionato sinora, ma che finisce ancora una volta 
per insistere ciecamente sulle solite ricette fallimentari propugnate da oltre cinque anni dalla 
Commissione europea senza ottenere altro risultato se non quello di produrre livelli record di 
disoccupazione, povertà e diseguaglianze’. 
 
Tuesday, 15 December 2015 – Strasbourg. Euro area recommendation - Completing Europe's 
Economic and Monetary Union. Speaker: Fabio de Masi (LINKE).  
‘Wir brauchen öffentliche Investitionen, weil die FED die Zinsen vielleicht schon morgen anhebt, weil 
das billige Geld der EZB auf den Finanzmärkten, nicht aber für Investitionen bei Unternehmen und 
privaten Haushalten landet’. 
 
Tuesday, 22 November 2016 – Strasbourg. European Central Bank annual report for 2015. 
Speaker: Xabier Benito Zilagua (PODEMOS).  
‘Consideramos que el BCE incurrió durante 2015 en una clara extralimitación de sus funciones al 
utilizar los medios a su disposición para ejercer una presión política sobre el gobierno griego’. 
 
Wednesday, 9 September 2015 – Strasbourg. Provisional measures in the area of international 
protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece. Speaker: Marine Le Pen (FN). 
‘Le rapport de Mme Keller fait exactement le contraire, en préconisant encore plus de pouvoirs pour la 
Commission européenne, notamment par le biais d'un régime d'asile européen commun’. 
 
Tuesday, 5 July 2016 – Strasbourg. Refugees: social inclusion and integration into the labour 
market. Speaker: Jill Seymour (UKIP). 
‘The only people who should take decisions on these things are elected national governments in 
compliance with the 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees. None of this should be decided on or 
dictated by unaccountable EU institutions’.  
 
Wednesday, 10 June 2015 – Strasbourg. Situation in Hungary. Speaker: Laura Ferrara (FSM). 
‘La massima istituzione democratica che rappresenta i cittadini dell'Unione non può permettersi di 





Wednesday, 11 May 2016. Turkey's progress in fulfilling the requirements of the Visa 
liberalisation roadmap Speaker: Martina Michels (LINKE). 
‘Es sollte jedoch zugleich den Rat und die Kommission auffordern, endlich eine gemeinsame humane 
EU-Flüchtlingspolitik anzupacken’. 
 
Wednesday, 6 July 2016 – Strasbourg. European Border and Coast Guard. Speaker: Miguel 
Urbán Crespo (PODEMOS).  
‘Señora Presidenta, la creación‹n de la Guardia Europea de Fronteras y Costas refuerza la idea de la 
construcción‹n de la Europa-fortaleza, es un paso más, justamente, en el cierre de fronteras’. 
 
Thursday, 17 December 2015 – Strasbourg. Setting up a Committee of Inquiry on emission 
measurements in the automotive sector, its powers, numerical strength and term of office. 
Speaker: Jonathan Arnott (UKIP). 
‘It is important to hold the Commission to account, and for us to have answers to the tough questions 
about the emissions scandal – not least to find out what, if anything, the Commission knew about it’. 
 
Wednesday, 28 October 2015 – Strasbourg. Use of genetically modified food and feed. Speaker: 
Lola Sanchez Caldentey (PODEMOS). 
‘Pero desde un proceso legislativo más democrático en el que el Parlamento Europeo tenga una mayor 
participación que la que hasta el momento se le ha otorgado en dicho informe’. 
 
Tuesday, 15 December 2015 – Strasbourg. Outcome of the COP 21. Speaker: Julie Girling 
(CONERVATIVES). 
‘The extra climate effect of the Strasbourg circus – no, we are not going to change that. That is not 
going to change; we will carry on as we were. So it is fine words’.  
 
Wednesday, 15 April 2015 – Brussels. Amendment of the MFF 2014-2020. Speaker: Dominique 
Bilde (FN).  
‘Ce système absurde justifie pour certains un nouveau saut fédéral qui n’est rien d’autre qu’un saut dans 
le vide et qui serait une atteinte intolérable à la souveraineté des États’. 
 
Tuesday, 16 December 2014 – Strasbourg. Economic governance review of the 6-pack and 2-
pack regulations. Speaker: Bernd Lucke (AFD). 
‘Wenn wir uns wieder an das Nichtbeistandsprinzip halten, dann hat jeder Staat seine Souveränität, 
seine finanzpolitischen und wirtschaftspolitischen Entscheidungen so zu treffen, wie er das selbst 
verantworten kann vor dem Hintergrund der Tatsache, daß er selbst und nur er seine Schulden wird 
bezahlen müssen’.  
 
Tuesday, 4 October 2016 – Strasbourg. Macroeconomic situation in Greece, structural reforms 
and their impact, as well as prospects for future negotiations within the Programme. Speaker: 
Tim Aker (UKIP). 
‘Winston Churchill called socialism the equal sharing of miseries. At what point are you willing to 
concede that the misery the Eurozone has created across southern Europe is the point at which it 
should be dissolved and that the best boost for Greece and southern Europe is to revert back to 
national currencies? Surely that is the way forward if you want to stop countries leaving the European 
Union. Britain will not be the first. It will not be the last either, come the revolution’. 
 
Wednesday, 8 July 2015 – Strasbourg. Conclusions of the European Council (25-26 June 2015) 





‘They believed there would be acceptance of this project; that the North and South of Europe would 
converge; that we would all start to love each other; that we would all begin to feel a European identity; 
that we would all begin to show allegiance to the flag and the anthem’. 
 
Tuesday, 5 July 2016 – Strasbourg. Synergies between structural funds and Horizon 2020. 
Speaker: Rosa D’Amato (FSM). 
‘Questo significa che stata imboccata una pericolosissima direzione verso un'Europa sempre più a due 
velocità, verso una frattura sempre più profonda tra Stati più e meno sviluppati’. 
 
Thursday, 30 April 2015 – Strasbourg. European Investment Bank annual report 2013. Speaker: 
Bernd Lucke (AFD). 
‘Das ist der Kardinalfehler der europäischen Wirtschaftspolitik heute’. 
 
Tuesday, 15 December 2015 – Strasbourg. Euro area recommendation - Completing Europe's 
Economic and Monetary Union. Speaker: Florian Philippot (FN).  
‘Au contraire, les économies sont de plus en plus divergentes, les pays européens en dehors de l'euro 
s'en sortent beaucoup mieux. Les pauvres s'appauvrissent, les plus riches s'enrichissent, les tensions 
montent et les peuples se dressent les uns contre les autres’.  
 
Wednesday, 8 July 2015 – Strasbourg. Conclusions of the European Council (25-26 June 2015) 
and of the Euro Summit (7 July 2015) and the current situation in Greece. Speaker: Nigel 
Farage (UKIP). 
‘I feel that the continent is now divided from north to south: there is a new Berlin Wall and it is called 
the euro’. 
 
Thursday, 25 February 2016 – Brussels. European Semester for economic policy coordination: 
Annual Growth Survey 2016. Speaker: Marco Valli (FSM).  
‘Noi abbiamo insistito sulla necessità di cambiare rotta, introducendo subito meccanismi democratici 
che consentano di uscire dall'euro e preparando un piano per la dissoluzione controllata e coordinata 
dell'Eurozona’. 
 
Thursday, 17 December 2015 – Strasbourg. Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary 
Union. Speaker: Marco Valli (FSM).  
‘E sulla necessità di ripensare radicalmente l'attuale quadro di governance, mettendo al centro la 
sovranità nazionale sulle scelte democratiche di politica monetaria e fiscale’.  
 
Thursday, 17 December 2015 – Strasbourg. Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary 
Union. Speaker: Estefanía Torrez Martínez (PODEMOS).  
‘Por nuestra parte pensamos que la unión monetaria tal como existe hoy en día es una fuente de 
desequilibrios y está condenada al fracaso si continúa supeditada a los intereses de los grandes bancos 
centroeuropeos’. 
 
Tuesday, 15 December 2015 – Strasbourg. Euro area recommendation - Completing Europe's 
Economic and Monetary Union. Speaker: Fabio de Masi (LINKE). 
‘Ein solcher Euro ist nicht demokratischer, ein solcher Euro wird nur den Le Pens nutzen!’ 
 
Thursday, 29 October 2015 – Strasbourg. European Semester for economic policy coordination: 
implementation of 2015 priorities. Speaker: Tania Gonzáles Penas (PODEMOS). 
‘Con el Semestre Europeo se pretende someter los presupuestos de los Gobiernos a una fiscalización 
por parte de la Comisión Europea que asegure el cumplimiento de ciertos objetivos macroeconómicos 





Wednesday, 11 May 2016 – Strasbourg. Tackling inequalities in order to boost inclusive and 
sustainable economic growth in the EU. Speaker: Thomas Händel (LINKE). 
‘Wir brauchen ein Europa mit sozialer Gerechtigkeit, mit guter Arbeit, von der man eigenständig und 
armutsfrei leben kann, guter Bildung für alle, mehr öffentlicher Daseinsvorsorge und ökonomisch wie 
ökologisch nachhaltiger Wirtschaft’.  
 
Tuesday, 27 October 2015 – Strasbourg. Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 15 
October 2015, in particular the financing of international funds, and of the Leaders' meeting on 
the Western Balkans route of 25 October 2015, and preparation of the Valletta summit of 11 and 
12 November 2015. Speaker: Nigel Farage (UKIP). 
‘What has been made clear here, with Greece and indeed with Portugal, is that a country only has 
democratic rights if it is in favour of the project. (...) Perhaps none of this should surprise us, as Mr 
Juncker has told us before that there can be no democratic choice against the European Treaties’. 
 
Wednesday, 11 May 2016 – Strasbourg. Decision adopted on the Common European Asylum 
System reform. Speaker: Markus Pretzell (AFD). 
‘Freikaufen kann man sich aus diesem europäischen Solidaritätssystem!’ 
 
Wednesday, 14 October 2015 – Brussels. Mobilisation of the Flexibility Instrument for 
immediate budgetary measures under the European Agenda on Migration. Speaker: Margot 
Parker (UKIP).  
‘Each country should manage its own policy and work together on a bilateral basis to deal with the 
current crisis’. 
 
Wednesday, 10 June 2015 – Strasbourg. Situation in Hungary. Speaker: Bill Etheridge (UKIP).  
‘I say to the British people: if you want your voice to be heard, if you want direct democracy on a 
whole range of subjects where referenda could really make a difference, if you want freedom, then 
when this referendum does come on our membership of the EU, take note of the example of how they 
have treated Hungary and let us get out: vote to leave!’.  
 
Tuesday, 24 November 2015 – Strasbourg. Repealing certain acts from the Schengen acquis. 
Speaker: Gianluca Buonanno (LN).  
‘Sulle politiche legate a Schengen non possiamo limitarci a semplici aggiornamenti ma occorre 
procedere a una completa riforma’. 
 
Wednesday, 11 May 2016 – Strasbourg. Restoring a fully functioning Schengen system. 
Speaker: Beatrix von Storch (AFD). 
‘Wer verantwortlich, aber nicht willens oder in der Lage ist, die Schengen grenzen zu schützen, muß 
den Schengen-Raum verlassen’.  
 
Wednesday, 11 May 2016 – Strasbourg. Restoring a fully functioning Schengen system. 
Speaker: Gilles Lebreton (FN).  
‘Il est temps de voir la réalité en face. Schengen est un échec total, une passoire dont il est impossible 
de boucher les trous. Les peuples européens n'en veulent plus. L'Union européenne devra les écouter 
ou elle disparaîtra’. 
 
Wednesday, 25 November 2015 - Strasbourg. Mobilisation of the Flexibility Instrument for 
immediate budgetary measures to address the refugee crisis. Speaker: Marie-Christine 
Boutonnet (FN) 
‘Au lieu de prendre les mesures qui s’imposent face à cette pression migratoire, C’est-à-dire le 
rétablissement des contre les aux frontières de l’Europe, et la fin de Schengen, avec le retour de ces 




Tuesday, 27 October 2015. Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 15 October 2015, 
in particular the financing of international funds, and of the Leaders' meeting on the Western 
Balkans route of 25 October 2015, and preparation of the Valletta summit of 11 and 12 
November 2015. Speaker: Pablo Iglesias (PODEMOS). 
‘Dije entonces que aspirábamos a una Europa diferente, a una Europa que fuera un poco menos dura 
con los débiles y un poco menos complaciente con los poderosos. Creo que, por desgracia, esa 
afirmación de hace quince meses sigue siendo y sigue estando vigente hoy. 
Recordé, en aquel discurso de hace quince meses, a los combatientes españoles que lucharon contra el 
fascismo y contra el horror como la mejor contribución de mi patria al progreso de Europa, como la 
mejor contribución de mi patria a una Europa social, una Europa democrática y una Europa respetuosa 
de los derechos humanos’. 
 
Wednesday, 20 May 2015 – Strasbourg. European Agenda on Migration. Speaker: Ignazio 
Corrao (FSM).  
‘E qui siamo di fronte all'ennesimo caso in cui gli Stati si mostrano egoisti di fronte a quella che  
un'emergenza globale, di fronte a quello che un grande momento in cui l'Europa si dovrebbe mostrare 
solidale’. 
 
Wednesday, 16 September 2015 – Brussels. Decision adopted on 15 July 2015 on the energy 
summer package. Speaker: Gianluca Buonanno (LN).  
‘Questi sono due dati di fatto che fanno capire come l'Europa in realtà sia succube del potere 
americano e sia accondiscendente su tante politiche che alla fine si dimostrano demenziali, grazie’.  
 
Thursday, 17 December 2015 – Strasbourg. Setting up a Committee of Inquiry on emission 
measurements in the automotive sector, its powers, numerical strength and term of office. 
Speaker: Jonathan Arnott (UKIP).  
‘Any success is seen as a green light for further harmonisation, whereas any failure requires 
harmonisation as the solution’. 
 
Wednesday, 28 October 2015 – Strasbourg. Use of genetically modified food and feed. Speaker: 
Lola Sánchez Caldentey (PODEMOS). 
‘Nuestro Grupo defiende la soberanía de los pueblos y, cómo no, también como resultante, 
defendemos nuestra soberanía alimentaria’.  
 
Tuesday, 16 December 2014 – Strasbourg. Economic governance review of the 6-pack and 2-
pack regulations. Speaker: Ashley Fox (CONERVATIVES). 
‘If it is going to work, then you either have to let those states that cannot keep up with the 
Deutschmark, such as Cyprus and Greece, go in an organised manner, or rich countries are going to 
have to pay them very large sums of money, as happens in the United States’.  
 
Thursday, 10 September 2015 – Strasbourg. Migration and refugees in Europe. Speaker: Daniel 
Hannan (CONERVATIVES). 
‘Like the euro, was a fair-weather system. Neither has survived its first crisis. They worked perfectly 
well when the sun was shining. They have crumbled beneath the storms’  
 
Tuesday, 5 July 2016 – Strasbourg. Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 28 and 29 
June 2016. Speaker: Syed Kamall (CONERVATIVES). 
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This appendix shows the tests done to assess the assumption of the OLS regressions presented in 
chapter 7 of this work.  
The first Table D.1 reports the values of the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for both model 5 
and 6 of each regression tables. Values of the VIF should be lower than 10 to account for the absence 
of multicollinearity. As showed in the table the highest value of VIF is 5.18, thus confirming the 
absence of correlation between the dependent variables and the used predictors.  
The following figures account for the graphical tests of normality in the distribution of residual, 
hetheroskedasticity of the sample data and linearity relationship between the dependent variables and 
the used predictors. 
The first and the second above-mentioned assumptions are graphically tested in Figures D.1, 
D.3, D.5, D.7, D.9, D.11, D.13, and D.15. To test the first assumption each of the just-mentioned 
figures reports two different plots: 
1. The histogram of the residuals that should follow a normal – bell-shaped – distribution; 
2. The QQ-plot further assessing the normality in the used data. 
To test for the absence of hetheroskedasticity, each figure reports – lower left-hand side of each 
figure – the plot of the residual against the fitted values. The distribution might be considered as 
homoscedastic if the residuals do not funnel out; if they do not create any recognizable pattern.  
To graphically test for the linearity of the relationship between the dependent variable and the 
used predictors, Figures D.2, D.4, D.6, D.8, D.10, D.12, and D.14 present the partial residual plots with 
the addition of the fitted line (ideal in red and effective in green). If the relationship between the 
dependent variables and the predictors is not linear, the fitted line is not a line.  
According to these observations, the assumptions of the regressions presented in this work are 














Table D. 1: Values of the Variance inflection Factors (VIF) for models 5 and 6 reported in each regression table 
















community Table 7.6 
of Chapter 7 





































---- 2.893569 ---- 2.893569 ---- 2.893569 ---- 2.893569 
Seniority 2.909383 2.825537 2.909383 2.825537 2.909383 2.825537 2.909383 2.825537 
GDP T2 T1 1.273441 1.252959 1.273441 1.252959 1.273441 1.252959 1.273441 1.252959 
Poverty risk 













1.423330 1.270166 1.423330 1.270166 1.423330 1.270166 1.423330 1.270166 
Perception of 
immigration 1.810314 1.719511 1.810314 1.719511 1.810314 1.719511 1.810314 1.719511 
Issue ID 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 
Year 1.786464 1.874854 1.786464 1.874854 1.786464 1.874854 1.786464 1.874854 
Source: own calculation. The data refers to the regression Tables 7.3, 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6 presented in chapter 7 of 




















Source: own calculation. The first graph on the left-hand side of the figure represents the histogram of the 
residuals; the second graph on the upper right-hand side of the figure represents the QQ-plot of the residuals; 
and the last graph plotted on the lower left-hand side of the figure represents the Residuals plotted against the 




















Source: own calculation. The data refer to the regression model 5 presented in Table 7.3 of chapter 7. (See: 




Figure D.3: Regression tests for model 6 presented in Table 7.3 of chapter 7 (DV: EU-opposition to the EU-




Source: own calculation. The first graph on the left-hand side of the figure represents the histogram of the 
residuals; the second graph on the upper right-hand side of the figure represents the QQ-plot of the residuals; 
and the last graph plotted on the lower left-hand side of the figure represents the Residuals plotted against the 



















Source: own calculation. The data refer to the regression model 6 presented in Table 7.3 of chapter 7. (See: 





Figure D.5: Regression tests for Model 5 of Table 7.4 (DV: opposition to the EU-elite target).  
 
 
Source: own calculation. The first graph on the left-hand side of the figure represents the histogram of the 
residuals; the second graph on the upper right-hand side of the figure represents the QQ-plot of the residuals; 
and the last graph plotted on the lower left-hand side of the figure represents the Residuals plotted against the 






















Source: own calculation. The data refer to regression Model 5 presented in Table 7.4 of chapter 7. (See Chapter 









Source: own calculation. The first graph on the left-hand side of the figure represents the histogram of the 
residuals; the second graph on the upper right-hand side of the figure represents the QQ-plot of the residuals; 
and the last graph plotted on the lower left-hand side of the figure represents the Residuals plotted against the 


















Source: own calculation. The data refer to regression Model 6 presented in Table 7.4 of chapter 7. (See Chapter 









Source: own calculation. The first graph on the left-hand side of the figure represents the histogram of the 
residuals; the second graph on the upper right-hand side of the figure represents the QQ-plot of the residuals; 
and the last graph plotted on the lower left-hand side of the figure represents the Residuals plotted against the 


















Source: own calculation. The data refer to the regression Model 5 presented in Table 7.5 of chapter 7. (See: 








Source: own calculation. The first graph on the left-hand side of the figure represents the histogram of the 
residuals; the second graph on the upper right-hand side of the figure represents the QQ-plot of the residuals; 
and the last graph plotted on the lower left-hand side of the figure represents the Residuals plotted against the 




















Source: own calculation. The data refer to the regression Model 6 presented in Table 7.5 of chapter 7. (See: 








Source: own calculation. The first graph on the left-hand side of the figure represents the histogram of the 
residuals; the second graph on the upper right-hand side of the figure represents the QQ-plot of the residuals; 
and the last graph plotted on the lower left-hand side of the figure represents the Residuals plotted against the 





















Source: own calculation. The data refer to regression Model 5 presented in Table 7.6 of chapter 7. (See: Chapter 








Source: own calculation. The first graph on the left-hand side of the figure represents the histogram of the 
residuals; the second graph on the upper right-hand side of the figure represents the QQ-plot of the residuals; 
and the last graph plotted on the lower left-hand side of the figure represents the Residuals plotted against the 

















Source: own calculation. The data refers to regression Model 6 presented in Table 7.6 of chapter 7. (See: Chapter 
7, section 7.3.4, page 188). 
